Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Exodus 20:12 commands: “Honor your father and mother.” Leviticus 19:3 commands: “A man shall fear his mother and father.” See Hilchot Mamrim, Chapter 6, for a discussion of these mitzvot.

All the particulars of this halachah apply only regarding רבו מובהק, a teacher from whom one has learned the majority of one’s wisdom (Bava Metzia 33a; see also the commentary to the next halachah). However, every teacher under whom one has studied Torah deserves a certain measure of respect (Halachah 9).

I.e., he sired him and provided him with his fundamental necessities.

A person’s Torah study and the mitzvot it motivates are the means through which he will attain a portion of the world to come. The reason given by the Rambam has its source in Bava Metzia, loc. cit. Keritot 28a states a different reason: “He and his father are both obligated to honor his teacher.” The Rambam quotes this rationale in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 209).

Therefore, he should tend to his teacher’s article first. Only after returning it should he tend to his father’s.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Keritot 6:9, the Rambam equates removing a load with returning a lost article and redeeming a person from captivity in all respects. Accordingly, as explained below, if one’s father is also a Torah scholar, he should be given priority. However, the Kessef Mishneh explains that where there is no danger to life or property, and only honor is involved, priority should be given to one’s teacher, even if one’s father is a Torah scholar of equivalent stature.

Note Hilchot Matanot Aniyim, 8:10-18, for a discussion of the importance of this mitzvah.

Even if he is not equivalent to his teacher (Kessef Mishneh).

This decision is disputed with regard to the return of a lost object, as explained below. Nevertheless, with regard to the redemption of captives, all agree that because of the life-and-death nature of the question, one’s father is given priority if he has achieved some level of scholarship.

The commentaries have noted the apparent contradiction between this statement and Hilchot Aveidah 12:2, which states:
[The following rule applies when] one sees a lost object belonging to his teacher and a lost object belonging to his father: If his father was equal in stature to his teacher, his father’s [lost article] is given precedence. If not, his teacher’s is given precedence. This applies only to a person’s primary teacher, from whom he learned the majority of his wisdom.
The text of Bava Metzia (loc. cit.), the source for this decision, is closer to the text in Hilchot Aveidah. Indeed, on that basis, the Hagahot Maimoniot and others maintain that our text contains a printing error. However, that conclusion is difficult to accept, since in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Keritot, loc. cit., the Rambam gives a father who is a Torah scholar priority over a person’s teacher, without requiring that the father be of greater stature.
The Lechem Mishneh explains that our text refers to a situation when it is possible to retrieve both lost objects, and the only question is whose is given priority. In contrast, Hilchot Aveidah refers to a situation where it is possible to return only one of the lost objects. Alternatively, the Tashbetz (Responsa, Vol. III, 275) and the Radbaz (Responsa, Vol. V, 1493) explain that here we are referring to a father who has also instructed his son (albeit, not to the same degree as his teacher). In contrast, Hilchot Aveidah refers to a father who has not instructed his son at all.

Avot 4:15.

In his commentary to that Mishnah, Rashi notes that Pesachim 22b equates the deference due a Torah scholar to that due God. Surely, that applies to a sage under whom one has studied.

Sanhedrin 110a. The Rambam quotes the entire passage that follows below in Sefer HaMitzvot, poitive commandment 209, in his description of the commandment to honor a Torah scholar.

I.e., “comes out against his decisions... teaching and granting decisions, without his permission” (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

This verse describes Korach’s revolt. Though ostensibly, the revolt was directed against Moses, the Torah considers it as directed against God, Himself.

Numbers 20:1-3 describes how, because of a lack of water, the Jews began quarreling with Moses.

When the Jews complained against him and Aaron because of a lack of food, Moses gave them this reply.

Explaining his statements and actions in an unfavorable light (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.)

In this case as well, the people directed their criticism over a lack of food and water to Moses; however, the Torah considers it as being directed against God.

As mentioned in the commentary to the previous halachah, Halachah 9 states:
When does the above apply? To one’s outstanding teacher (מובהק רבו), from whom one has gained the majority of one’s wisdom. However, a person who has not gained the majority of his wisdom under a teacher’s instruction is considered to be both a student and colleague. One is not obligated to honor him in all the above matters,

And renders halachic decisions. The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 242:7 (see also Kessef Mishneh) explains that the prohibition applies only to rendering halachic decisions on matters directly related to practice. There is no difficulty involved in teaching on a merely theoretical level. However, it is not clear whether the Rambam would accept this view. The Rishon Letzion explains that this prohibition applies even to establishing a house of study under one’s own direction, even though one does not render any halachic decisions.

A person granted permission by his teacher is allowed to render halachic decisions outside his teacher’s presence. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 242:14) equates a teacher’s granting permission to a student to render halachic decisions to the concept of semichah within its present context (in contrast to its definition in Talmudic times).

It is a mark of disrespect to one’s teacher to set oneself up to be an equivalent authority. Eruvin 62b relates that as long as Rav Huna was alive, Rav Chisda, his disciple, would not render any decisions, even those concerning as obvious a matter as dipping “an egg in a mixture of sour milk and bread.” After the teacher’s death, there is no restriction, provided one is fit to render Torah judgments. See Halachot 3 and 4.

This can be derived from Eruvin 63a, which states that Rav Hamnuna would not render judgments in Rav Huna’s lifetime, even though they lived in different cities.

Even though a person has been granted permission by his teacher to render halachic judgments in general. The only exceptions are the instances mentioned in the following halachah. The Vilna Gaon explains that this includes even teaching a halachic concept incidentally, outside the context of a house of study.

The Rambam defines this term in the next halachah. Ketubot 60b relates that, without considering the question of respect due one’s teacher, there is an additional problem. Spiritual influences will cause a student who renders a halachic judgment in his teacher’s presence to err. The Maharik (Responsum 169) states that if a student has reached a stature approximate to that of his teacher, he is permitted to render halachic judgments even in his teacher’s presence. He points to many Talmudic passages which record halachic decisions given by Resh Lakish in the presence of Rabbi Yochanan (his teacher).Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 242:12) explains that it is possible to say that the Rambam would accept this decision. However, there is no intimation of such a concept in the Rambam’s words.

Eruvin 63a explains that Nadav and Avihu, Aharon’s sons, died (Leviticus, Chapter 10) because of this sin. (See also Berachot 31b.) Rendering a judgment outside one’s teacher’s presence without his permission and rendering a judgment in his presence with his permission, although forbidden, are not deserving of such a punishment. It must be emphasized that today, when most of our Torah knowledge is gained from the study of texts and not from personal instruction, many authorities maintain that this entire concept does not apply. (See Hagahot Maimoniot, Lechem Mishneh, Halachah 5.) However, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities. (See Maharik, Responsum 169.)

A mil is 2000 cubits, approximately a kilometer in modern measure.

Even though he was not granted permission by his teacher, as explained below.

This applies both in his actual physical presence and within a radius of twelve mil.

Eruvin 63a relates that while Ravina was in the presence of Rav Ashi, his teacher, he saw a man tie a donkey to a date palm on the Sabbath. At first, he shouted at him [so that he would know it is forbidden]. When he did not respond, he placed him under a ban of ostracism. When Rav Ashi saw this, he questioned Ravina, because the latter’s actions appeared to be disrespectful. Ravina explained that since a transgression was involved (making use of a tree on the Sabbath), he was obligated to take these steps.

Eruvin, ibid., derives this from Proverbs 21:30: “There is no wisdom, no understanding, and no counsel against God.” The teacher’s honor stems from the honor of the Torah and the honor of God. Hence, in all cases, priority is given to the Torah.

This refers to the first clause, which mentions the license to respond to a question outside one’s teacher’s presence.

Since this is a casual occurrence and his teacher is not present, the student’s response is not considered to be disrespectful.

For this clearly implies that the student considers his authority as equivalent (or at least, similar) to that of his teacher. Doing so without permission is considered to be an affront to his teacher’s honor.

I.e., geographic distance is not a factor.

At which point the honor due him takes on a different dimension.

Since the teacher has given permission for the student to answer questions, doing so is not considered to be an affront to the teacher’s honor. Although a student was not granted permission by his teacher to render halachic decisions during the latter’s lifetime, he may assume that authority after his death.

Avodah Zarah 19b requires a student to be forty years of age before he is considered to be worthy of rendering halachic judgments. In summation of that entire passage, Rabbenu Nissim writes that a Torah scholar is not entitled to render a halachic judgment until he reaches 40 unless there is no sage of equivalent status in his city. He questions why the Rambam makes no mention of this requirement.
Among the resolutions offered for the Rambam’s decision are:
a) The Rambam interprets the passage from Avodah Zarah to mean that only until he is forty years old can a worthy student hold himself back from rendering judgment because of his humility. He does not mention this law here, since the unworthy students have become so numerous, and at present, no worthy student should hesitate from rendering judgment at all (Kessef Mishneh).
b) The Talmud’s decision refers only to a student who received his instruction from an individual teacher. At present, since students gain their knowledge from texts which are always available, there is no such restriction (Lechem Mishneh).
c) The Rambam places the entire emphasis on a student’s capability and does not pay attention to the age factor (Merchevat Hamishneh). Though the latter paragraph is included in this halachah in the published texts of the Mishneh Torah, many manuscripts include it in the following halachah.

The Rambam’s statements are based on Avot 4:9, which uses these adjectives to describe a person who “renders halachic judgments casually.” In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that this applies to one who “does not worry about rendering a judgment and proceeds to do so without fear or proper consideration.”

Almost parenthetically, in the midst of his critique of the underdeveloped who render halachic judgments too casually, the Rambam explains that, nevertheless, a person who is qualified should not hesitate from rendering halachic judgments. On the contrary, if he does hesitate, he is also guilty of improper conduct.
[A teacher once told a student to serve as the Rabbi of a particular community. The student protested, claiming that he was afraid of the responsibility of rendering halachic judgments for such a large community. The teacher responded: “Whom should I send? Someone who is not afraid?”]

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:8, the Rambam makes similar statements, except that there he qualifies his condemnation of “a sage who is worthy of rendering halachic judgments and refrains from doing so” as applying only when “the generation needs him.” In contrast, if [the sage] refrains because he knows that there is another individual fit to render halachic judgments, “he is praiseworthy.” Similarly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin 3:10, the Rambam praises sages who flee from seeking appointment as judges.

The Rambam is referring to those who are intellectually unaware or spiritually handicapped.

The word עצומים (prodigious) is related to the word עוצם, meaning to close one’s eyes (Kessef Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh notes that although the Mishneh Torah was composed as a timeless book of halachah, the Rambam’s harsh criticism here may have resulted from the prevalence of unqualified students who sought rabbinical positions in his time.

I.e., the people of Israel (see Isaiah 5:7).

Sanhedrin 100a describes such a person as an epicurus (nonbeliever). Rashi states that he should state a descriptive phrase before mentioning his teacher’s name, following the example of Joshua (Numbers 11:28), who said: “Moses, my master, imprison them.” Compare to Hilchot Mamrim 6:3, which describes the reverence due to a father: “He should not call him by name neither in his lifetime, nor after his death. Rather, he should say, ‘My father, my teacher.’”

Even if he is in a different country entirely.[The version of the text which follows is based on the Oxford manuscript of the Mishneh Torah. The commonly printed text appears to contradict the passage from Hilchot Mamrim. See also Kessef Mishneh and Taz, Yoreh De’ah 242:4, who have noted difficulties with the printed text.]

I.e., his teacher’s name.

As Hilchot Mamrim (loc. cit.) states: “If his father’s or teacher’s name resembles the name of others, he should change their name.” We find an example of this in the Talmud. Abbaye’s name was actually Nachmani. However, since his teacher, Rabbah’s father had that name, he coined a new name for his disciple (HaAruch).

Hilchot Mamrim (loc. cit.) continues:
It appears to me that one must take care in this regard only when the name is unique.... However, if the name is one which many people are called by — e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, or Moses —... one may call others by this name outside his [father’s] presence.
Thus, if the teacher’s name is common, it is permitted to refer by name to another person with the same name. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s words raise questions concerning the commonly followed practice of naming a child after one’s parent or teacher, even when that name is unique.

Berachot 27b states: “A person who greets his teacher causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.” Rashi explains that this refers to greeting him casually without a show of reverence.

Note Sofrim 18:5, which mentions such a practice.

Bava Kama 73b states that it is improper for a student to greet a teacher at all, as implied by Job 29:8: “The lads saw me and hid.”

Note the interchange between Rabbi Yosse and Elijah, the prophet, quoted in Berachot 3a.
It must be noted that the phrase שלום עליך רבי, “peace be upon you my master,” has been given halachic significance in totally different contexts. For example, a person who takes an oath is allowed to retract his statements if he changes his mind תוך כדי דיבור (in the midst of speaking). What is considered “in the midst of speaking”? The time it takes to say עליך רבי שלום (Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:17). Similar laws apply with regard to witnesses who want to retract testimony made in court.

Rav David Arameah notes that this law is found in the Shimusha Rabbah. His version of that text leads him to the interpretation “before,” rather than “in the presence of” — i.e., first, the teacher should remove his tefillin, and then the student. However, the Shibbolei HaLeket and others render the Shimusha Rabbah as translated here. The Kessef Mishneh cites Sanhedrin 101b, which forbids removing one’s tefillin in the presence of a king. Since Horiot 13a relates that a Torah scholar is more deserving of a honor than a king, there are those who quote this as a source for our halachah.

Note Hilchot Chametz U’Matzah 7:8, which mentions this prohibition even on the Seder night, when it is a mitzvah to recline.

Because, as mentioned in Horiot, loc. cit., a Torah scholar deserves greater honor.

Standing with one’s back to one’s teacher is a mark of great disrespect.

Rashi, Berachot 27a, explains that doing so would be an expression of pride, implying a degree of equivalence to his teacher.

Yoma 37a states: “A person who walks at his teacher’s right is a boor.” Compare with Chapter 6, Halachah 5.

I.e., standing slightly to his side and slightly behind him.

For it is not respectful to be together with him while naked. However, if the teacher needs his assistance it is permitted, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:16.

This and the following points are taken from the statements in Kiddushin 31b regarding the respect due a father. Similar statements are found in Hilchot Mamrim 6:3.

This translation is based on the Rambam’s definition of the latter expression in one of his responsa. Others define it as “favor his teacher’s opinion,” explaining that doing so is a mark of disrespect, because it implies that the teacher needs the student’s support.

However, if one is in a different place or after the teacher’s death, one is allowed to voice a different opinion. Note Hilchot Shechitah 11:10, where the Rambam states that his father held a more stringent view, while he, himself, followed a more lenient perspective. (See also Eruvin 32a.)

The Midrash Rabbah, Ruth 4:2, makes similar statements, based on Boaz’s instructions to the elders of Bethlehem.

Derech Eretz Rabbah, ch. 5, states: “A person should not depart from a teacher or a colleague unless he takes leave of him or receives permission from him.”

For turning one’s back to one’s teacher is not a sign of respect.

. Yoma 53a relates that the priests and Levites would follow this procedure when departing from the Temple service. It continues to recommend that the same procedure be adopted by students when departing from their teachers.

Contrast to Chapter 6, Halachah 5, which states that a person is not obligated to stand before a sage who is not his teacher until the latter comes within four cubits of him.

The halachah cited above states that as soon as the other sage passes him, the person may sit. The requirement to show an extra degree of respect to one’s own teacher can be derived from the example of Rabbi Elozar, who showed such deference to his teacher, Rabbi Yochanan (Yoma 53a).

Sukkah 27b relates:
An incident occurred concerning Rabbi Ellai, who journeyed to visit his teacher, Rabbi Eliezer, in Lod during a festival. He told him: “Ellai, you are not one of those who rests on the festivals.”
Rabbi Eliezer would say: “I praise the lazy ones who do not leave their homes during the festivals, because it is written: ‘And you shall rejoice on your festivals.’”
That is unacceptable, because Rabbi Yitzchak taught: What is the source for the obligation that a person has to visit his teacher on the festival? It is written: “Why are you going to him today? It is not a day of rest or a new moon.” From this we can infer that on a day of rest and on the new moon, a person is obligated to visit his teacher. There is no difficulty: the [latter reference] applies when he can go back and forth in one day.
The Rambam interprets Rabbi Yitzchak’s statement simply, because, in a number of other instances (Sukkah 10b, 26a), the Talmud relates how students would visit their teachers on festivals. The Nodah BeYhudah, Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 94, notes that this law is not quoted by the Tur or the Shulchan Aruch. Therefore, he explains that it applies only in the time of the Temple. In contrast, at present, since the Temple is destroyed and the festival pilgrimages are no longer made, it is improper to make a special visit to one’s teacher. Doing so would imply that one is showing him greater deference than is shown the Divine Presence. This view is not accepted by many commentators. Indeed, the Talmudic references to visiting one’s teacher during the festival cited above took place in the period after the destruction of the Temple.
Based on the statement quoted in Halachah 1, “Your fear for your teacher should be equivalent to your fear of Heaven,” Kin’at Eliyahu explains that there is a parallel between a visit to one’s teacher and a pilgrimage to the Temple.

Honoring a student in the presence of his teacher may be interpreted to be an affront to the latter’s position.

Since the teacher himself shows the student deference, he will not be upset by others doing so (Rashi, Bava Batra 119b).

At that time, it was customary to wear tefillin the entire day. Nevertheless, for some reason, this student was not wearing tefillin.

I.e., a “Canaanite servant,” who is not considered to be a full-fledged Jew.

I.e., he is freed from the performance of any menial tasks which might create this impression.

When a student has the opportunity to appreciate not only the intellectual gifts of his teacher, but the totality of his behavior, he becomes aware of how a Torah lifestyle is an all-encompassing commitment, affecting every aspect of his daily activity. This leads to complete fear of heaven.

Berachot 27b makes this statement regarding one who prays behind his teacher or who greets his teacher in a casual manner. (See Halachot 5 and 6.) The Rambam extrapolates that the concept also applies regarding other acts of disrespect to one’s teacher.

Kiddushin 32a makes similar statements regarding a situation when one saw one’s father transgress Torah law. The Rambam inferred that a similar concept applies regarding one’s teacher (Kessef Mishneh). Others point to Berachot 16a-b, which quotes Rabban Gamliel’s students as reproaching him in such a manner after carrying out a number of deeds which appeared to contradict his teachings.

Sanhedrin 99b, 101a states:
Who is an epicurus (nonbeliever)? A person who relates a concept from another source that occurred to him while he was sitting before his teacher, and states: “This is what is said there,” rather than “This is what you taught us, master.”
Similarly, Mo’ed Katan 7b relates that once Rabbi Chiyya mentioned a teaching before his teacher, Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, and prefaced his statements with the expression: “You have taught us the following, master.” [From that passage, it appears that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi had not actually made that statement, and Rabbi Chiyya’s remarks were merely a polite token of respect.]

In general, there is an obligation to mention a concept in the name of its author (Megillah 15a). However, in this instance, there is a particular obligation to do so, lest it be assumed that this teaching was authored by one’s teacher.

With regard to the rending of one’s garments until one’s heart is revealed, see Hilchot Eivel 8:3, 9:2 and Mo’ed Katan 22a.

Mo’ed Katan 26a equates garments torn over a teacher’s passing with those torn over a father’s passing, with regard to the latter law. On this basis, the Rambam concludes that the same principle applies regarding the extent one rends his garments. The Rambam draws this comparison from Elisha’s behavior at the death of Elijah, his teacher. II Kings 2:12 relates: “He cried out, ‘Father, Father, Chariot of Israel,’.... He took hold of his clothes and rent them into two....” (Hilchot Eivel 9:5).
[At present, it is very uncommon to see a student rend his garments at his teacher’s passing. Among the rationalizations for the present custom is the opinion of the Hagahot Maimoniot and the Lechem Mishneh mentioned above, that at present we derive most of our knowledge from books. Accordingly, the concept of a רב מובהק does not apply.]

As mentioned above, the commentaries interpret this to be a reference to all the tokens of reverence and respect mentioned in the previous halachot.

Of the latter. Rashi, Eruvin 63a, defines the term תלמיד חבר (a student and a colleague) as a sage of equivalent stature who has learned some concepts from the “teacher.”

He should show some signs of respect.

When he comes within four cubits of him (Kessef Mishneh)

Bava Metzia 33a praises the students of Babylon for showing these tokens of respect to each other.

I.e., one’s brother, sister, spouse, son, daughter, and parents. Many commentaries note the apparent contradiction between this halachah, which implies that it is sufficient to rend one’s garments a handbreadth, and Hilchot Eivel 9:11, which states that one is obligated to rend one’s garments over the passing of a sage (even if he is not one’s outstanding teacher) until one reveals his heart.
The Kessef Mishneh writes that the law in Hilchot Eivel applies only to a sage accepted as a city’s halachic authority, while the present halachah refers even to a personage of lesser stature. The Lechem Mishneh writes that the law in Hilchot Eivel is incumbent on the common people, while a person who is himself a Torah scholar is not obligated to make such a large gesture of mourning.

Pirkei Avot 6:3 states:
A person who learns from a colleague a single chapter, a single law, a single verse... or a single letter must show him honor. So we find concerning David, King of Israel: He learned from Achitofel only two things, yet he called him his teacher, his guide, and his mentor

Bava Metzia 33a relates that the Sage Shmuel rent his garments at the passing of a student from whom he learned only one concept.

Whose intellect and emotions are well-trained (Rambam, Commentary to the Mishnah, Avot 5:6)

Avot (ibid.) states:
There are seven traits that characterize an underdeveloped person and seven [that characterize]
a wise man. A wise man does not speak in the presence of anyone who is wiser than he.

This is the Rambam’s own addition.

Kiddushin 32a relates a difference of opinion between the Sages concerning this matter. Rav Chisda maintains that a teacher is not entitled to forgo his honor, because the honor is not due him personally, but to the Torah. Rav Yosef maintains that once he has mastered the subject matter he studies, it is considered as his own. Hence, he is entitled to forgo the honor due him because of it.

Kiddushin 32b relates that Ravva and Rav Pappa relaxed certain formalities and served their students at weddings.

I.e., he may restrict these leniencies to only a small number of students or extend them to all, as he desires.

I.e., he must stand in front of him, refrain from sitting in his place, and the like. The student’s failure to do so would be considered an act of disrespect for the Torah.

Our translation is based on Avodat HaMelech. That text notes the apparent redundancy in the Rambam’s statements and explains that even if the teacher is willing to forgo these minimal tokens of respect, the student is obligated to grant them to him, because it is improper that such respect not be shown to the Torah.

Though we should treat all men with respect and affection, a teacher should make a special effort to display these qualities to his students.

Avot 4:15.

Avot D’Rabbi Natan, Chapter 27, quotes as an example of this behavior Moses’ instructions to Joshua (Exodus 17:9): “Choose men for us,” where Moses equated Joshua with himself.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

First, as described in the next halachah, students deepen a teacher’s comprehension of the subject matter. Also, their success and progress generate great feelings of satisfaction.

For a student’s actions and study increase the merit of his teacher, who led him to these righteous paths.

Ta’anit 7a and Makkot 10a quote two different sages who made the following statement.

Ta’anit, loc. cit., makes these statements within the context of the explanation of Deuteronomy 20:19: “Is man a tree of the fields?”

In order to answer a student’s questions, a teacher must probe to the essence of the subject. For himself, he might have been willing to be content with a more superficial understanding. However, when a student questions him, he must penetrate to a deeper comprehension of the matter to provide him with an answer.