Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Stoning is considered a more severe form of execution than decapitation (Sanhedrin 50a).

Thus, they are executed in a more lenient manner than an individual who serves a false god, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

From the passage concerning an עיר הנדחת, it is obvious that proselytizing in this manner is forbidden. Within that passage, however, there is no specific prohibition (i.e., a verse saying “Do not do such and such”) banning such an activity. The Rambam’s question (quoted from Sanhedrin 63b) is: Where is there a verse in the Torah that states this prohibition?

The use of the plural form in the verse implies that at least two people must be involved (Sanhedrin 111b).

The Rambam’s statements are quoted from Sanhedrin 15b. Tosafot explain that the source for this decision is Amos 5:2, which mentions “a city of one hundred.”

Though we have translated אֲנָשִׁים as “people,” its literal meaning is “men” — i.e., adult males (Sanhedrin 111b).

The use of the plural form in the verse implies that at least two people must be involved (Sanhedrin 111b).

The expression “the inhabitants of their city” would be appropriate only if the majority of the city was involved.

Sanhedrin 112a states this limitation because the passage obviously describes a proselytizing effort.

As stated above, the proselytizers must come “from your midst.”

In contrast, were the city condemned as an עיר הנדחת, it would be forbidden for anyone to benefit from the property.

I.e., the supreme Sanhedrin, which met in the Temple courtyard.

Based on this teaching, the Radbaz (Vol. 5, Responsum 1415) resolves the apparent contradiction between Halachah 2 and Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:11, which states that when the totality of a tribe is led astray, it is judged by the supreme Sanhedrin. The Radbaz explains: The tribe is judged by the supreme Sanhedrin. The punishment administered, however, is stoning. (See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 1:5.)

I.e., a city belonging to a specific tribe. In contrast, the cities of refuge are the property of the entire Jewish people as a whole.

Jerusalem was also not the ancestral heritage of any single tribe, but rather belonged to the people as a whole. (See also Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:14 for other laws that stem from this principle.)

This restriction was instituted lest a large portion of the land be left empty.

The Ra’avad objects to this statement, maintaining that the cities must be located in separate portions of Eretz Yisrael — e.g., one in Judea and one in the Galilee. The Migdal Oz and others justify the Rambam’s position.

This is required because the proof-text also uses a plural expression.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 2-3.

Slaughtering, bringing a burnt offering, offering a libation, and bowing.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

This does not appear to refer to a trial where testimony is formally given in court, but rather a thorough investigation of the evidence, as the passage states (Deuteronomy 13:15), “You must investigate and probe, making careful inquiry.”

The Seder Mishneh suggests Joshua, Chapter 22, as a source for the Rambam’s statements. There it is related how Pinchas and ten elders were sent to investigate the behavior of the tribes of Reuven, Gad, and half the tribe of Menasheh.

The commentaries question the nature of this warning: Most agree that it does not refer to the warning which must be given to an individual to accept responsibility for his acts before committing a transgression. The Lechem Mishneh and others explain that this refers to a general warning given to the city as a whole. Once this warning is given, the laws of an עיר הנדחת can be applied to this city.

The Ra’avad questions of what concrete value their repentance will be. Though Teshuvah will make atonement possible and give them an opportunity to attain the world to come (note Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14), once a person has committed a transgression that has been observed by witnesses, he must be given the appropriate punishment regardless of whether he repents or not. The Sefer Kovetz and the Avodat HaMelech explain that if the city as a whole repents, all the transgressors — even if they constitute the majority of the city — are executed as required. The city itself and its children are not destroyed.

Rav Meir HaLevi questions the execution of the women and children, since Deuteronomy 24:16 states: “A man shall die for his own sins.” Note Hilchot Teshuvah 6:1, where the Rambam states that this concept does not apply to young children. See also his statements in the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. I, Chapter 54, where the Rambam states that, in contrast to all other sins, retribution is visited on the children of idolaters. Note also the Migdal Oz, who cites how even young children were swallowed up together with Korach, Datan, and Aviram (Numbers, Chapter 16).

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam’s phraseology implies that the person who proselytized on behalf of the false gods is not punished as a madeach unless he is successful in leading astray more than half the city’s population. If he does not accomplish this, even though he leads astray many individuals, he is not judged as a madeach, but executed as one who prophesies in the name of idols.

Sanhedrin 112a states: “What motivated these people to live there? (I.e., why did they live in a sinful environment?) Their fortunes. Therefore, their fortunes should be destroyed.”

Note the contrast to someone who derives benefit from a false deity or anything dedicated to it. The latter is liable for a double measure of lashes, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 2.

The witnesses were disqualified because two other witnesses testified that, at the time when the alleged transgression took place, they were together with the witnesses in another place. (See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 18.)

I.e., why does it not return to the possession of its original owners?

Hence, to reassume ownership over their property, they would have to acquire it with a formal kinyan. In this respect, there is no difference between the owners and any other individuals. Compare to Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:13. This applies even to the property of the righteous living in this city.

In many other contexts as well, a person who lives in a city for thirty days is considered as a resident. (See Hilchot Matnot Ani’im 9:12.)

The members of the caravan must be executed for their transgression. The question is: Are they considered to be members of the city and governed by the special laws applying to them, or are they considered to be individuals who worshiped idols?

Note the contrast to Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 4:3, which states that a Jew is obligated to destroy chametz that belongs to a gentile and was entrusted to him for safekeeping, if he accepted responsibility for it. The leniency with regard to an עיר הנדחת is derived by Sanhedrin 112b through the exegesis of the verse quoted above.

The Rambam’s decision differs from Rashi’s interpretation of Sanhedrin, loc. cit., where he requires that all property belonging to the condemned city that is found in neighboring cities be gathered together and burned with the עיר הנדחת.

The animal is killed because its life is dependent on the portion which belongs to the inhabitant of the Ir Hanidachas, it is therefore considered as if it belongs to him entirely.

Exodus 21:28 states: “If an ox gores a man or a woman and [the victim] dies, the ox must be put to death, and its flesh may not be eaten.” The oral tradition teaches that we are forbidden from benefiting from the ox at all. Accordingly, even were the ox to be slaughtered in the ritual manner before the sentence was carried out, one is forbidden to partake of the meat. (See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, Chapter 10.) The same laws apply to the animals of anעיר הנדחת.

See Hilchot Eivel 14:21, which states that it is forbidden to benefit from a corpse, but that the prohibition does not involve its hair. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:4.)

This applies also to a wig belonging to a righteous person.

This is the rationale for the law stated in the previous halachah.

They are not burned together with the city.

Nor are they considered ownerless, and thus free to be acquired by anyone.

I.e., they are locked in closed place and allowed to die. They are not killed like the ordinary animals of the condemned city.

Our translation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. Rav Kapach notes that the text of the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah would be rendered as "and afterwards, the city is burned."
This is a very important distinction. The Ra'avad and other commentaries note a difficulty with the standard text, questioning why the consecrated property must be burned after it was redeemed. Since it was not condemned together with the city, as the Rambam explains, why should it be burned?
The Kessef Mishneh attempts to resolve the difficulty, explaining that the consecrated property is considered as essentially belonging to the owners, but is "owed" to the Temple treasury. When that obligation is removed by its redemption, it becomes its owners' in its entirety, and thus must be burned together with their other property.

The laws pertaining to both these sacrifices are discussed in Hilchot Bechorot.

Since they are blemished, they are no longer to be sacrificed, nor must they be redeemed. Hence, they are considered to be privately owned animals which must be slain, as stated in Halachah 6.

This applies both to terumah gedolah (the portion of the crops given by the common people to the priests) and terumat ma’aser (the tenth portion of the tithe, which the Levites are required to give the priests).

Therefore, it must be allowed to rot. It is, nevertheless, not burned with the city as a whole, because it is consecrated unto God.

See Deuteronomy 14:22-27 and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, which describe how a second tithe is separated from the crops with the intent that it be eaten in Jerusalem. If it is impossible to bring the produce itself to Jerusalem, it should be redeemed, and the money that is used to redeem it should be taken to Jerusalem to be used to purchase food. Both the produce and the money used to redeem it have a certain dimension of holiness. Hence, it may not be burned. It is, nevertheless, the private property of the inhabitants of the Ir Hanidachas. Hence, it is entombed.
In contrast to terumah, it is not left to rot. Our Sages prescribed these different laws because the priests to whom the mitzvah of terumah is given are more scrupulous in its observance than are the common people in the observance of the mitzvot of the second tithe.

It is forbidden to destroy sacred writings, as stated in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:8. They are, nevertheless, the private property of the inhabitants of the Ir Hanidachas. Hence, they must be entombed.

The Rambam’s statements were obviously intended to assuage the natural feelings of compassion that would arise when confronting the need to administer such harsh punishment. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5: “A display of cruelty to those who sway the people after emptiness is an act of mercy for the world.”)