Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

A small copper coin of little value.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 245) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 229) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 194) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 130) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

And thus, it could not be returned.

As explained in Halachah 5, the obligation is to return the stolen article itself. If, however, that is impossible, the obligation is satisfied by returning its worth.

See the commentaries on Hilchot Geneivah 1:2, which discuss the source for this prohibition. (See also Halachah 6.)

As reflected in Hilchot Geneivah 7:8 and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 12:7), this prohibition is of Scriptural origin. Note, however, the Kessef Mishneh, who cites sources that indicate that the prohibition against withholding money from a gentile is Rabbinic in origin. (See also the Ma’aseh Rokeach, who states that the Rambam’s mention of “a colleague” in Halachah 1 is intended as an exclusion of a gentile, implying that the prohibition against robbing a gentile is of Rabbinic origin. See also Siftei Cohen 359:2 which interprets the Kessef Mishneh as considering robbing a gentile as Rabbinic in origin.)
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav explains that robbing a gentile is prohibited by Scriptural command, but withholding money due him violates merely a Rabbinic prohibition. This might also be the Kessef Mishneh’s intent. The Noda BiY’hudah (Yoreh De’ah, Volume I, Responsum 81), offers a different perspective, stating that it is forbidden to rob a gentile, because of a Scriptural command to respect his property. There is, however, no direct prohibition against such. Thus the prohibition has the strength of a positive commandment and not that of a negative commandment.

Note the Noda BiY’hudah (ibid.) who states that even though the prohibition against robbing a gentile is Scriptural in origin, the obligation to return the article that was obtained by robbery is of Rabbinic origin.

In this source and in Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 247), the Rambam distinguishes between gezel (robbery) and oshek (withholding a colleague’s due). The Maggid Mishneh, however, suggests that the Talmudic sources (Bava Metzia 61a and 111a) do not make such a definitive distinction.

Even if one never intended to take possession of the servants or the livestock, using them against his colleague’s will is considered robbery.

Delaying payment of a worker’s wages also involves the violation of a specific prohibition against that act. See Hilchot Sechirut 11:2.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 247) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 228) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. This prohibition is not punishable by lashes, because it can be corrected by the return of the withheld funds [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 3:1).]

I.e., he does not have the prerogative of returning the value of the article that he obtained by robbery, but must return the article itself.

I.e., the article itself.

See Chapter 2, where the nature of the required change is discussed. (See also Hilchot Geneivah 1:12.)

Note, however, the concluding halachah of this chapter.

In contrast to a thief, who must pay twice the stolen amount if convicted on the testimony of witnesses.

For if the robber were required to tear down the entire building, it is likely that he would never repent, but instead maintain possession of the article that he obtained by robbery.

Although a sukkah is a temporary dwelling, the importance of the mitzvah causes it to be considered as if it were permanent (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:4).

The prevailing assumption is that the person who was robbed is not concerned with an article of such little worth and is willing to forgo its return.

Although the robber already fulfilled the mitzvah of returning the article that was obtained by robbery, and the article he retains is worth less than a p’rutah, he is obligated to return it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:8).

For the article in his possession is not worth a p’rutah.

For what he returned was not worth a p’rutah, and the court is not obligated to compel him to return the remaining article that he obtained by robbery.
This reflects the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh and Rav Moshe HaLevi. The Kessef Mishneh quotes the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 360) as understanding the Rambam to be stating “There is a robbery, and the article that has been robbed has not been returned.” (This does not, however, fit the version of the standard text of the Tur.)
The Kessef Mishneh also offers his own interpretation of the Rambam’s words: “The article that was obtained by robbery was not returned (for both items were not returned), nor is there an obligation to return the remaining article (because it is worth less than a p’rutah).”

For although it is possible for the article to be taken from the owner by forces beyond his control in a settled area as well; it is far more likely that this will take place in a desert.

Even if the robber forces the owner to accept the article in the desert, and the article is taken afterwards from the owner in the desert by forces beyond his control, the robber is held responsible.

The robber is not, however, obligated to return the article to its owner in the place where he originally took it from him. It is sufficient for him to give it back to him in any safe setting [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 366:4)].

I.e., he is embarrassed and unwilling to admit the robbery to the owner.

For the owner will count the change he received and realize how much money he has been given. If the owner subsequently loses the money or it is stolen from him, the robber who returned the money is not held responsible.

I.e., if it is stolen from the wallet, the robber remains responsible.

Since according to the owner’s knowledge, the wallet was empty, he would not be likely to check it and thus he would not discover the money that was returned.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 265) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 38) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. Significantly, in the listing of the mitzvot at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam also mentions coveting a colleague’s wife, but in these halachot he mentions another man’s wife only with regard to the prohibition against desire.

Although the popular conception is that the transgression is violated only when the object is taken without payment (Bava Metzia 5b), this is not the case.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements and maintains that for the person to be liable, the original owner of the article must refuse to sell it, and the violator must take the article against his will. Even if he leaves payment for the article, he is still considered to have violated the said prohibition.
To what can this be compared? To a person who was compelled to make a sale against his will. In such an instance, the halachah (Bava Batra 48a; Hilchot Mechirah 10:1) rules that the sale is binding.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position, stating that although after the fact such a sale is binding, at the outset it is forbidden to compel a person to part with his property. [See the commentaries, who cite a difference of opinion between Abbaye and Ravvah (Temurah 4b) whether a transaction that violates Torah law is binding or not. They note that in several rulings the Rambam appears to maintain that the transaction is binding, and in others he states that it is not binding. Kin’at Eliyahu states that according to the explanation given at the conclusion of the following note, the reference to Temurah is out of context.]
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 359:10) follows the Rambam’s perspective.

The Ra’avad disputes the rationale given by the Rambam. For indeed, as the Rambam himself continues to explain, the coveting spoken of in this verse involves a deed, taking the desired article. The Ra’avad explains that violation of the commandment is not punished by lashes because the article taken should be returned to its owner.
The Maggid Mishneh rationalizes the Rambam’s position, explaining that according to the Rambam the sale is binding, and there is no obligation to return the article. Indeed, the sale itself is not a prohibited act. What is prohibited is the pressure that the purchaser applied to the original owner to sell him the article, and that involved speech, not deed.

Note the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 359), whose version of the Mishneh Torah stated: “that he cannot acquire from him” - i.e., even the desire for articles that can never be purchased is included in the prohibition.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 266) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 416) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

For this reason, it is considered to be distinct from the prohibition against coveting mentioned in the previous halachah.

In this context, Rav Kapach cites the discussion of whether there are mitzvot in the Torah that were instituted merely as “a fence” for other mitzvot, or whether each of the mitzvot has a self-contained purpose.

As stated in I Kings, Chapter 21, Ach’av, King of Samaria, coveted a vineyard owned by Navot. When Navot refused to sell it to him, Ach’av had Navot executed and the property confiscated.

If the article taken by robbery exists, however, it must be returned, for one may not benefit from property obtained in such a manner, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 2. (See also the first halachah of the following chapter.)

If, however, the robber does not seek to repent, and the owner sues for the value of the goods stolen from him, the court expropriates it from the robber (Maggid Mishneh).

Nevertheless, the original owner has a legal right to the money, and if he desires that it be returned the court must facilitate this, even if the robber repented of his own volition (ibid.).