Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Any specific entity.

This term is being used for the Hebrew term cherem. Cherem implies the removal of an entity from one framework of reference and its inclusion in another. Similarly, in this instance, the property is being taken from the realm of private, personal possessions and being sanctified (see the gloss of HaKtav VeHaKabalah to Leviticus 27:29). It must, however, be emphasized that the term cherem has negative connotations, meaning ‘a ban’ and the root has the connotation ‘absolute destruction.’ In that context, in his Living Torah, Rav Aryeh Kaplan interprets the term is meaning ‘declare taboo,’ i.e., banned from ordinary mortal use and hence, designated for the Temple treasury or the priests.

As stated in Halachah 2, a person should not dedicate all of his possessions. Nevertheless, if he chooses to do so, his statements are of consequence.

The differences between the two types of dedication offerings mentioned are described in Halachah 4. To which priests the property is given is described in Halachah 5.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Arachin 28b) and it appears that the conclusion of the Talmud is that if no specification is made, dedication offerings should be given for improvements to the Temple. Indeed, Rashi (Beitzah 36b) and others rule in this manner. The Or Sameach suggests that the Rambam’s source is Ezekiel 44:29 which states: “All the dedication offerings from the Jewish people shall be yours.”

But not his Hebrew servants. See Halachah 21 and notes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 145) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 357) include the laws governing dedication offerings among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the dedication offering must be ‘from what he owns,’ i.e., implying that he is giving a portion of what he owns, but not all that he owns. The rationale for this ruling is explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 13.

I.e., in contrast to a person who pledges an airech who is allowed to retain ownership of his basic necessities, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachot 14-17.

I.e., until they are redeemed - by the owner or by another person - they are the property of the Temple treasury and it is forbidden to benefit from them or use them for mundane purposes.

I.e., the owner loses all rights to them. They become the property of the priests, able to be used for whatever purposes the priest who receives the property desires, as explained in the following halachah.

I.e., before it is given to the priest. Once it is given to the priest, he may sell it if he so desires.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 110-111) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 358•359) include both the prohibitions against selling and redeeming property designated as a dedication offering among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s apparent source is the Sifra, but the version of the standard text of the Sifra speaks of a prohibition against selling the property to the Temple treasurer. There are those who maintain that the Rambam followed a version of the Sifra with a different reading. Significantly, however, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines the prohibition as forbidding the sale to the Temple treasurer.

The implication appears to be that, like terumah, the donor has the right to give the dedication offering to the priest of his choice from the watch. It is not divided among all the priests of the watch. See Arachin 28a.

As stated in the notes to Chapter 4, Halachah 24, there were 24 priestly watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week at a time according to a rotating cycle.

They may not be used by the former owner for his own purposes and the prohibition of me ‘ilah, misappropriating consecrated property, applies.

Our translation follows the commentary of the Kiryat Sefer. The version of the standard published text (which reflects that of authentic manuscripts and early printings) would be literally translated as “When a priest possesses a field that was designated as a dedication offering which he acquired after the Jubilee.” We prefer the version of the Kiryat Sefer, because there is no connection between the Jubilee year and a priest’s acquisition of dedication. offerings.

See Chapter 4, Halachot 19, 24.

I.e., just like an ancestral field belonging to an Israelite is given to the priests, so too, a field owned by a priest that is designated as a dedication offering is given to the priests.

Since he was the original owner, one might think that the laws that apply when one consecrates an ancestral field would apply. This is not the case, because once he designated it as a dedication offering, it became the property of the priest.

Which, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 26, returns to its original owner. In that instance, as in this halachah, the person who consecrated it did not have everlasting ownership of it. Hence, he cannot consecrate the field forever.

For once it is given to him, the priest is considered its owner for all time.

This ruling was a matter of question for the Rambam. There is a difference of opinion concerning this point among the Sages. The standard published text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 8:5) indicates that he favored the view that restricts the application of this concept to priests. Rav Kapach maintains that this is an error and his ruling there is - as stated here - that it applies to both priests and Levites.

I.e., if they make such a dedication, it is of no consequence.

I.e., their landed property is theirs forever. It cannot be given as a dedication offering, because a dedication offering is given to a priest as his private property. Hence there would be no advantage in his making such an offering (Rashi, Arachin 28a).
Thus there is obviously a difference between land or movable property that belongs to a priest and property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering, as stated in Halachah 6. The rationale is that property that a priest owns as an ancestral heritage is essentially his. On the other hand, property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering is not essentially his. Hence, it can be given to other priests as a dedication offering.

The rationale is that consecrating an animal for the sake of improvements to the Temple is like talcing a vow to pay its value to the Temple treasury. Hence, such a vow can be taken even if the animal is already consecrated.

For the second consecration and the redemption do not affect its original status.

Tosafot (Temurah 32a) explains the difference between the two instances as follows: The owner of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice still shares a connection to it. For if it is blemished, he must redeem it and replace it. In contrast, once an animal is consecrated to the Temple treasury, it leaves the owner’s domain entirely.

And once an animal has been consecrated to the Temple treasury, it is not the owner’s unless he redeems it.

For the sake of improvements to the Temple. Whether he states this explicitly or not, it is consecrated for that purpose as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 7, unless he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for another purpose.

Because the consecration did not take effect yet. The Or Sameach notes that the Rambam’s apparent source, the Tosefta (Temurah 3:1), states that it is permitted to partake of the animal that was slaughtered and questions why the Rambam does not rule accordingly. He explains that the Rambam considers the person who consecrated the animal equivalent to an apostate for by slaughtering the animal, he prevents his vow from being fulfilled. As stated in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, there are certain conditions necessary for slaughter performed by such a person to be successful.

Since the original consecration has not yet taken effect, he may still consecrate it for another purpose.

I.e., if the animal does not die within 30 dies, retroactively, the consecration will take effect from the time of his statements.

Since the consecration of the animal will ultimately take effect, it may not be used for mundane purposes unless it is evaluated by the court. That evaluation may not be performed when the animal is dead (Lechem Mishneh).

Since retroactively, the animal will become consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration as a sacrifice is not of consequence, as stated in Halachah 8.

I.e., this evaluation is necessary to establish the extent of his obligation, but nothing more. We do not require him to wait until he actually redeems the animal. The Radbaz explains that there are commentaries that if the animal was not redeemed the Temple treasurers are required to be present at the offering of the animal, because the owner of a sacrifice must be present when it is offered. The Rambam does not, however, require the treasurers' presence.

For the Sages decreed that the animal be considered as if its body has become consecrated.

I.e., because the requirement to wait until its redemption is Rabbinic in origin.

Rashi (Temurah 32a, b) states that in such an instance, the person is not required to pay anything for the dedication offering, because the animal was never evaluated.

Burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.

All other sacrifices.

I.e., he pledged to bring an offering of a particular type. Afterwards, he designated an animal to be offered to fulfill his pledge. If the animal is lost or stolen, he is required to supply another animal.

Since he is obligated to replace his sacrifices, he is required to redeem the consecrated animal.

E. g., he said: “I will bring this animal as a burnt offering.” In this instance, if the animal dies or is stolen,. he is not required to replace it with another animal.

I.e., one might think that since the animal itself is already designated as a sacrifice and the person is not required to replace it if stolen, it is no longer his, and he does not have the right to consecrate it at all.

I.e., since the person could in fact bring the sacrifice, we evaluate how much that right is worth to a person.

Since the person who consecrated the animal is not obligated to replace it, we do not require him to redeem it and offer it. Instead, anyone who desires to pay the estimated amount has the right to do so.

An unblemished firstborn animal is offered as a sacrifice and a priest is given the right to partake of it, while a blemished one must be given to a priest to use as his private property.

And the animal must be redeemed as stated in the previous halachah.

This is speaking about a firstborn animal with a blemish. It becomes the priest’s private property, as stated in Hilchot Bechorot 1 :3. Hence, there is no question that he has the right to do as he pleases with it.

I.e., we do not require the person who consecrated the animal to redeem it.

See Leviticus 27:32; Hilchot Bechorot, ch. 6, for a description of this offering.

In which instance, we follow the principles stated in Halachah 12. A price to be paid to offer the sacrifice is established. Anyone willing to pay that price may redeem the animal.

I.e., if the animal selected to be sacrificed as a tithe offering dies or is stolen, he is not required to offer another animal in its place.

The Rambam is referring to the half-shekel every male is required to give to purchase his share of the communal offerings. See Hilchot Shekalim, chs. 1-3.

This is parallel to the law mentioned in Halachah 11, that a person may consecrate animals designated as sacrifices.

The first fruits that were brought to the Temple and then given to the priests. See Exodus, ch. 23; Deuteronomy, ch. 26, Hilchot Bikkurim, chs. 1-4.

For the bikkurim are not his, but rather the property of the priest.

The bikkurim become the priest’s private property (ibid. 4:14). Hence he may do with them whatever he desires.

I.e., for the portion given to the priest becomes his private property.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 18, when a person consecrates a limb or an organ on which an animal’s life depends, the entire animal becomes consecrated. Here, too, the servant cannot live with only half his body.

Nevertheless the prohibition against me ‘ilah, misappropriating sacred property, do not apply. See Hilchot Me’ilah 5:10.

I.e., they are sold to others and the proceeds of the sale are used for the sake of improvements to the Temple.

For freeing them might create the impression that they were treating consecrated property with disdain and not seeking its full worth.

In which instance, they will receive the market value of the servant.

What the owner is attempting to do is to consecrate the servant’s earnings. That, however, is not possible, for a person is unable to consecrate an entity that has not come into existence already (see Halachah 26). Therefore, he consecrates the servant’s hands, for they do exist, and thus any earnings they produce become consecrated (Radbaz). Note the parallel in Halachah 28.

A servant’s master is not liable to provide for his sustenance (Hilchot Avadim 9:7). Hence that money must be taken from the servant’s earnings. Nevertheless, since his earnings are consecrated, the process the Rambam continues to explain should be followed.

Tosafot, Gittin 12b, explains that even a sum less than a p ‘rutah can be consecrated. (See Hilchot Me’ilah 7:8.) Nevertheless, the owner had the intent that this amount not be consecrated so that the servant would be able to sustain himself.

The price that would be paid if he was sold as a servant in the marketplace.

A servant is considered as property and consecrating him makes him the property of the Temple treasury. Hence it is entitled to all of his earnings. This does not apply with regard to a free man.

Bava Kama 69b derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:14: “When a person will consecrate his house.” Just as his house is his own, so too, everything he consecrates must be his own.

All of the four types of people mentioned above are considered as independent personalities. Although a father and owner possess certain rights with regard to the earnings of these individuals, he does not own their physical persons. This applies even to his children who are beneath the age of majority (Arachin 28a). Similarly, a field that one acquires is never totally his, for he must return it to its original owners in the Jubilee.

For there is no way that they could regain possession of it immediately. Nor may the watchman consecrate it, because it does not belong to him.

I.e., although it is in the physical possession of the watchman, it is still considered as belonging to - and able to be secured by - the owner. See Halachah 25 and notes.

And instead, claimed to be the legitimate owner.

Proving his ownership through the testimony of witnesses or through a valid deed of title.

This is a principle applicable in many aspects of Jewish business law. Land can never be stolen and is always considered as being in the possession of the person who has title to it. See Bava Metzia 7a.

Even if the owner despairs of the recovery of the article, it is not desirable for the thief to consecrate it. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 5:7.

Since a standard price for each article was established and the articles were left for sale, we assume that as soon as the person took the article, he committed himself to the purchase and hence, the sale is completed.

For it is as if it was already sold.

Since the price has to be established, until it is established, the sale is not complete. And until the sale is complete, the article is considered as belonging to the seller. Hence, the prospective purchaser is considered as the watchman of an entrusted article and the law stated in the final clause of Halachah 22 applies. Indeed, Bava Batra 88a mentions this instance and from it, the law stated in Halachah 22 is derived.

Kiryat Sefer explains the rationale for this ruling: Since the object has not come into existence as of yet, it is not in his domain. And, as stated in Halachah 22, a person cannot consecrate an article that is not in his domain.

Needless to say, this applies when the person never owned the field he seeks to consecrate. By mentioning this instance, the Rambam (and his source, Ketubot 58b) emphasize that even though the person originally and ultimately owned the field, since he did not own it at the time he consecrated it, the consecration is not effective.

The Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 258:15 emphasizes that his statement is not even considered a vow, because the wording used does not have the implication of a vow. See Halachah 31 which speaks of this issue. Note, however, the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Mechirah 22:15.

I.e., the consecration is not effective, because the fruits of the woman’s labor did not exist at the time her husband sought to consecrate them.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 12:3, all of the proceeds of the work a woman performs belong to her husband.

For although the fruit did not exist at the time of the original consecration, the tree did. And once the tree is consecrated all the fruit it produces is consecrated. Similarly, the woman’s hands exist at the time the consecration was made, and as a result,. all the pro9ucts of her work are consecrated. Rabbenu Nissim does not accept the Rambam’s ruling. He explains that although our Sages ordained that the profits from a woman’s labor should be given to her husband, those profits are given in exchange for his support of her. If she desires, she has the right to withdraw from the arrangement, decline his support, and keep her earnings. Since she has this right, her hands are not on lien to her husband, and he cannot consecrate them. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 81:1) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama quotes that of Rabbenu Nissim.

I.e., at the time he makes this statement it is in his possession.

Even though he does not make a second statement, it becomes consecrated if and when he repurchases it.

Thus the fact that he sells it to another person in the interim does not detract from the consecration.

For a loan.

Even though the field was not in his possession at the time he made his statement, since he had the right to redeem it, it is considered as if it were.

And during that time, he did not have the right to redeem it.

Although the house is the tenant’s for the duration of the rental period, since ultimately it belongs to the owner, his consecration talces precedence over the rental agreement. For as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 14, consecration takes precedence over other obligations.
Although as implied by the previous halachah, the owner could not consecrate a field given as security while it was in the possession of the lender, he has a greater right to the land in this instance. In the previous case, the field will not return to him unless he pays the loan, while in this instance, the home will return to him at the end of the rental period without payment. Hence he is considered to have greater rights over it and is given the right to consecrate it (Radbaz).

He may, however, avoid the prohibition by paying his rent to the Temple treasury (Arachin 21a).

This phrase indicates a law that the Rambam derived through the process of deduction without an explicit prior Rabbinic source.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Hilchot Nedarim 1 :4-5, Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot 14:13.

I.e., were the person to have the intent to consecrate the article with this statement, the consecration would not be effective, because the article does not yet exist. He is not, however, consecrating the article, merely pledging to do so in the future.

After his vision of the ladder extending to heaven. He was speaking of “what You will give me,” i.e., possessions that he would acquire in the future.

When Jacob tells his wives of the message the angel gave him instructions to return to Eretz Yisrael.

I.e., the pledge he made is considered as a vow.

The Radbaz explains that the second proof is necessary, because one might say that Jacob’s reference to his vow refers to his statement: “And the Lord will be my God.”

See Hilchot Nazir 1 :4 which states that he must observe the nazirite restrictions immediately, because he does not know how long he will live and he is required to fulfill his pledge before he dies.
The Ra’avad accepts the support from Jacob’s statement, but not that from the nazirite’s pledge, bringing two objections:
a) at present, it is within his potential to carry out the nazirite vow. Hence, the comparison to an entity that has not yet come into existence is not appropriate. ·
b) Since the person does not know when he will die, it is as if he has committed himself to observe the vow immediately. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam’s position.

Just like a vow made in error is not binding (Hilchot Nedarim 8:3).

I.e., we assume that his mention of a black ox was deliberate and intended to be a stipulation, not merely a statement of his supposition of what would happen.

In which case, we might say that he would accept the change, because he will be saving money.

In which case, we might say that he· would accept the change, because he will be bringing a more attractive offering.

This ruling has amazed the commentaries, because if the first entity does not become consecrated, how can the second? Seemingly, its consecration is dependent on that of the first.
The Radbaz seeks to explain that the second consecration is dependent not on the status of the initial article, but the intent of the donor who sought to consecrate it. He admits, however, that the interpretation is forced. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this clause is referring to a different concept entirely. If he had an article that was consecrated and extended its holiness to another article unintentionally, that article is consecrated.