Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 182) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 520) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

The verse cited as a proof-text continues, emphasizing that these cities shall be “in your land, which God your Lord is giving you as an inheritance.” The Sifre Zuta interprets this to be an exclusion, teaching that such cities should not be set aside in the diaspora.
Nevertheless, if a person kills unintentionally in the diaspora, he should flee to one of the cities of refuge in Eretz Yisrael (Kessef Mishneh, interpreting the Sifre).

Although only two and a half tribes lived in TransJordan and nine and a half lived in the land of Canaan, the same number of cities were set aside in both areas. Makkot 9b explains that murderers are commonly found in Gilead (one of the regions in TransJordan).
[Kin’at Eliyahu offers a different explanation, noting that all the 42 cities of the Levites that also served as cities of refuge were located in the land of Canaan, thus tipping the ratio considerably in favor of the land of Canaan.]

For his actions were of no immediate consequence.

Kin’at Eliyahu questions the place of this statement in the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah. The Mishneh Torah is a book of halachah - Torah law - and not a text of ethical teachings. Why then does it mention this point? He explains that this teaching - to fulfill a mitzvah whenever one can - is also a halachah, a point of Torah law.
In that vein, see the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Avot 4:2), which cites this deed performed by Moses as a “shining example” of the teaching “Run to [perform even] an easy mitzvah.” The Rambam concludes there: “If Moses our teacher... the most perfect of all men, endeavored to add the fulfillment of half a mitzvah to his attainments... needless to say, this course of action should be followed by those who have tainted their souls.”

See also Hilchot Melachim 11:2. The Rambam cites the commandment to establish three new cities of refuge as a proof that there will be an Era of the Redemption. For “the Holy One, blessed be He, did not give this command in vain.”
The Rambam’s intent is that since the mitzvah of setting aside the cities of refuge also includes setting aside these three cities, that mitzvah will certainly be fulfilled in all its particulars. For the mitzvot are absolute Godly truth, and they are intended to be fulfilled on the material plane. Thus, these cities will ultimately be set aside for the purpose stated in the Torah (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XXXIV).
Likkutei Sichot (based on the teachings of the Ari zal) also questions why it will be necessary for there to be cities of refuge in the Era of the Redemption. In that era of perfect existence, there will be no unintentional killings, so why will we need cities of refuge?
Likkutei Sichot offers a resolution based on Yoma 80a, which states that when Rabbi Yishmael (who lived after the Temple’s destruction) would inadvertently commit a transgression, he would write a note saying, “When the Temple is rebuilt, I will bring a succulent sin offering.” Similarly, the cities of refuge in the Era of the Redemption will be for those who killed unintentionally in the era of exile.

See Genesis 15:18-19. Our Sages interpret these three names to be referring to the nations of Edom, Moab and Ammon, whose lands extended to the south and west of Eretz Yisrael.

Makkot 9b exp1ains that these roads must be direct routes, without detours.

This is twice the width of an ordinary road.

This date was chosen because it was at the end of the conclusion of the rainy season, for it was in that season that the damage to the roads would take place. Also, that date was convenient because it coincided with the beginning of the collection of funds for the Temple treasury. These funds were used to repair these roads.

I.e., Chevron was the southernmost of the cities of refuge; Shechem, the center; and Kadesh, the northernmost (Joshua 20:7). The distance from Chevron to the southern border of Eretz Yisrael was the same as the distance from Chevron to Shechem. Similarly, it was the same distance from Shechem to Kadesh, and from Kadesh to the northern border of Eretz Yisrael (Makkot 9b).

For in such a situation, the blood redeemer may frequent the place (Rashi, Makkot 10a).

For in such a place it would be difficult for a newcomer to earn his livelihood.

I.e., these cities should be surrounded by other villages and towns. In this way, if several blood redeemers join together to do battle with the city of refuge, the neighboring villages will come to the aid of the city of refuge (ibid.).

These refer to snares for trapping animals. Nevertheless, they should not be set in a city of refuge, for trapping leads to hunting, which can lead to weapons being sold there. And thus, the blood redeemer may come and purchase a weapon and slay the killer.

Instead of being granted a portion of Eretz Yisrael as an ancestral heritage like the other tribes, the Levites were given 42 cities that were dispersed throughout the country.

The cities of refuge spoken about in the first clause of the verse.

For the land in these cities was specifically set aside for the unintentional killers.

I.e., both the cities of refuge and the cities of the Levites.

The term used by the Rambam has a specific meaning: the 2000 cubits from the city’s border, which serves as its Sabbath limits.

The Rambam’s ruling differs from that of most other commentators, who require the killer to climb unto the tree branches for them to serve as a haven for him.

This principle is found in several contexts. Since the tree itself is considered part of the city, its leaves are considered to be an extension of the city. See Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 2:15.

This leniency of regarding the tree to be an extension of its leaves is unique, applying only with regard to a city of refuge. It is one more indication of the merciful nature of the Torah and its sages.

See Halachah 11.

Deuteronomy 21:2 mentions “Your elders” - i.e., two judges - and “your judges” - i.e., another two. Since a court is never composed of an even number of judges, another one is added, thus reaching a total of five (Sotah 44b).

To determine which city the corpse is closest to.

Sotah, ibid., derives this concept from the fact that the above verse speaks of “Your elders and your judges” - i.e., judges who are distinguished among the entire people, not merely one city.

For the Torah explicitly requires such an activity.

See Halachah 6, which mentions that distance is not the only determinant considered by the court.

As mentioned in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:3, whenever a corpse is found abandoned on the road, it is to be buried where it is discovered. (See also Kessef Mishneh and Halachah 9.)

I.e., two years old or less (Chapter 10, Halachah 2).

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sotah 9:5), which cites a parallel verse (Jeremiah 5:15): “For it is a powerful nation.” He states that Sotah 46b interprets the phrase as meaning “ancient.”
Rashi in his commentary on the Torah offers a different interpretation, explaining that this refers to a dried wadi with very firm ground that was never tilled. See also the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 181) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 530) consider the decapitation of the calf to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.
In his Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 40, the Rambam explains that the rationale for the mitzvah of the decapitation of the calf is to call attention to the murder, so that people will search for the murderer and see to it that he is punished.

I.e., the person with the cleaver stands behind the calf and decapitates it.

And not the judges from Jerusalem, who performed the measurement.

I.e., using the exact words of the Torah.

This being called bloodshed by the Torah.

Although in a literal sense the seeing refers to the killing, our Sages took the verse out of its literal context.

The Sifre and Sotah 46b offer this interpretation for this phrase, because literally its intent is difficult to understand. For one would not think that-the elders of the city were the ones who shed the victim’s blood.
Kin’at Eliyahu does not dispute the purpose of this homiletic explanation, to emphasize the importance of showing hospitality to guests and wayfarers. He asks, however, what would happen in an instance when in fact a wayfarer was forced to leave a city without provisions and without accompaniment? Would they in fact be unable to bring this calf as an atonement offering?

Whose function is to bring atonement for the people.

They repeat the entire verse until “in the midst of Your people, Israel” (Kessef Mishneh).

The Rambam adds this explanation to emphasize that this phrase is not recited by the priests (see Sotah 46a).

The Rambam describes this process of estimation in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 5:4).

Once a town had 120 male inhabitants and it had a sufficient number of sages, it was allotted a court of 23 judges (Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:3-5).

I.e., in land given to one of the tribes as an ancestral heritage.

Even if it is clearly apparent that it is the closest city.

Our text of Sotah 9:3, the source for this halachah, reads “a city whose inhabitants are mostly gentile,” while the Rambam does not make such a stipulation. From the text of his Commentary on the Mishnah, we might assume that his version of the Mishnah also followed this reading.
The Ma’aseh Rokeach explains that the Rambam’s intent is a city that is predominantly gentile. Kin’at Eliyahu suggests that perhaps the intent is a very large city, which though predominantly Jewish, has a sufficient number of gentiles as to cause a danger.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sotah 9:2), the Rambam states that by travelling in such places, the person took too great a risk and caused his own death, as it were. Therefore, the court need not seek atonement for it.

Kin’at Eliyahu questions to what extent numbers overrule proximity. Is a very populous city that is very far away given precedence over a slightly smaller city that is much closer? Since the laws of the decapitated calf are not practiced in the present era, these questions have not been defined by many authorities.

See a parallel ruling in Hilchot Gezelah 15:18.

In this way, the calf will belong entirely to the city that is obligated to bring it to secure atonement.

I.e., most probably, both cities are not exactly equidistant from the corpse, and in fact only one of the cities should bring the calf. The tools of measurement available to man, however, may not be sensitive enough to make minute distinctions. Hence, this conditional arrangement is adopted.

I.e., if one city is closer to the corpse’s feet and the other is closer to its head.

This is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (Sotah 45b). He derives this concept from Genesis 7:22, which describes man as having “the soul and the spirit of life in his nostrils.”
There are two other opinions mentioned in this passage (that of Rabbi Eliezer: “from his navel,” and that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov: “from the place where one is [usually] slain, from his neck” (see Halachah 11). The Rambam chooses Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, although frequently the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.

Sotah, op. cit., also mentions this ruling in the name of Rabbi Akiva, but states that it is dependent on a different rationale. Rabbi Akiva maintains that when the head is severed from the body, the head will generally fall in the place where the person was killed, while the body may - as a result of convulsions - shift its position slightly.

If some corpses are found closer to the other cities, those other cities must also bring a calf as atonement. This ruling is followed even though one might surmise that all the people were traveling together and left from the same city.

There is no need to atone for each death individually.

For the ones beneath it are considered to be “covered.” As mentioned in the following halachah, when a corpse is covered there is no obligation to bring a calf for atonement.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that this is not indicated from his understanding of Sotah 45a. Although the Kessef Mishneh tries to rationalize the Rambam’s ruling, he admits that it is difficult to do so.

This term is unnecessary for the simple meaning of the verse; its addition implies that the corpse must be lying openly upon the earth and not buried or hidden under other objects.

These words are also unnecessary for the simple meaning of the verse. The Torah adds them to allude to the concepts stated.

Even if, as indicated by the following halachot, that knowledge is not sufficient to have the murderer executed.

Although the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to convict a murderer, when there is such a witness - even if there are no acceptable witnesses, as in the instances that follow - it cannot be said that: “And it is not known who killed him.”

Neither women nor Canaanite servants are acceptable as witnesses.

See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 10, which mentions this disqualification.
From the Rambam’s words, it appears that this ruling applies even with regard to those disqualified as witnesses by Scriptural Law. Thus, there is a distinction between this ruling and his ruling in Hilchot Sotah 1:15, which accepts only the testimony of those disqualified according to Rabbinic law.

When there was an overflow of the violence of Roman society into the Jews’ lifestyle.

I.e., he testified that the first witness was together with him in a place distant from the site of the murder.

Since the testimony of each witness nullifies that of the other, we return to the initial circumstance, and the calf is decapitated.

In which instance, the testimony of the first witness had not yet been accepted.

This is a principle frequently followed in Jewish Law. Whenever the testimony of one witness is sufficient to establish the status of a matter, once that witness’ testimony is accepted, his testimony is given the weight of that of two witnesses. See parallels in Hilchot Gerushin 12:18 and Hilchot Sotah 1:16.

For the testimonies nullify each other, and we return to the original situation, in which the decapitation is required.

Who is not an acceptable witness, and thus her testimony carries less weight.

According to the Rambam, the testimony of a woman can never be accepted as that of witnesses or even as that of two women.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on this point and states that, in this context, there is no difference between the testimony of a woman and that of a man. If the testimony of a woman is accepted, she is considered as two women, and her testimony cannot be negated by one woman.

See the clarification in the following halachah.

For the testimony of one acceptable witness that has been confirmed by the court can be nullified only by the testimony of two acceptable witnesses. See a parallel in Hilchot Sotah 1:18. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam with regard to this ruling as well.

As the Rambam continues to illustrate, one acceptable witness is considered to be of equal weight to any number of unacceptable witnesses. This applies even after the statements of the unacceptable witnesses have been confirmed by the court.
The Ra’avad differs with regard to this point as well, and maintains that the only time the testimony of one acceptable witness is given more weight than that of an unacceptable witness is when he testifies in court and his testimony is confirmed before the other witnesses come. Most of the other commentaries follow the Rambam’s understanding.

And therefore, the calf should be decapitated.

See parallels in Hilchot Gerushin 12:22, Hilchot Sotah 1:19. As the Ra’avad emphasizes, this applies even if the witnesses do not come to the court at the same time.

For Deuteronomy 21:1, the source for this mitzvah, speaks of “the land that God, your Lord, is giving you to inherit.”

The Rambam’s wording raises some questions with regard to the status of TransJordan. For on one hand, it appears to be distinct from Eretz Yisrael, and yet laws that apply only in Eretz Yisrael apply there.

Generally, when the Torah uses the word eglah, calf, with regard to sacrifices, the intent is that it may not be more than one year old. Nevertheless, with regard to the calf that is decapitated, Deuteronomy 21:3 states eglah bakar, “a calf of cattle,” implying that the calf could have already matured (the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah 11).

One day is regarded as an entire year (Rosh HaShanah 10a).

Although sacrificial animals may not be blemished, Sotah 45b explains that such a requirement does not apply with regard to the decapitated calf. Our Sages derive this concept as follows: With regard to the red heifer, Numbers 19:2 states explicitly that “it must have no blemish.” Since such a statement is not made with regard to the decapitated calf, one may conclude that this requirement does not apply.

Afflicted by a physical condition that will cause it to die within a year. As stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 2:10, such an animal may not be used for a sacrificial offering.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah 9:5), the source for this law, also mentions that a calf that is lacking a limb is unacceptable for this purpose. The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam does not mention this point.

See Hilchot Parah 1:7.

Although the calf carried the garment, since it was carrying it for its own benefit, it is not disqualified.

The Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Parah 2:4, states that if the person places his garment on the calf without intending that it carry it, it is not disqualified, even though it did carry it and thus perform work.

1:7.

Hence just as sacrifices are offered only during the day, so too, the decapitation of the calf is performed only during the day.

This is not a sign of respect for the mitzvot, for by performing two mitzvot at the same time, neither is given its proper token of respect.

This is also derived from the fact that it is compared to the sacrificial offerings. Just as it is forbidden to benefit from those offerings, so too, it is forbidden to benefit from a decapitated calf.

Since it became forbidden during its lifetime, its status does not change. We do not say that its designation for decapitation by the court was conditional in nature, and since it was not used for that purpose, its status changes.

As explained in the previous chapter, from Halachah 11 onward.

See the previous chapter, Halachah 14.

I.e., a second pair of witnesses testified that the first pair of witnesses were not at the place where they claimed to be together with the first witness, but in another place, and the first witness was not there.

Some commentaries explain that the court had this possibility in mind when it set aside the calf. The calf thus becomes forbidden from the time that it is designated. (See the following note.) Others explain that since the calf was set aside in error, all the restrictions resulting from that designation are rescinded when the error is discovered.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that from Bechorot 24b, 25a, it would appear that either the calf should not be forbidden until it is decapitated (in contrast to the ruling in Halachah 6), or that the calf should be forbidden in this instance as well.
In reply, the Kessef Mishneh explains that we say that the court had in mind that possibly the identity of the murderer would be discovered, and therefore the designation of the calf was conditional in nature. This is in fact likely, because as mentioned previously, according to the Rambam, one of the reasons for the decapitation of the calf is to publicize the murder and bring it to the forefront of people’s attention.

We do not say that since the murderer was discovered, the decapitation of the calf was unnecessary, and we may therefore derive benefit from it.

I.e., it is sacrificed to atone for the murder when the identity of the murderer is not known.

I.e., we do not say that since the decapitation of the calf brought about atonement for the murder, there is no need to execute the murderer.

I.e., by executing the murderer.

I.e., even if the river dries up, it is forbidden to till the river bed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 309) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 531) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

Although Yom Kippur generates atonement for sins that only God knows were committed, an exception is made with regard to the decapitated calf. Keritot 26a states that from Deuteronomy 21:5 “Atone for Your people Israel whom You have redeemed,” we can conclude that the atonement brought about by the decapitated calf affects even the Jews redeemed from Egypt, despite the fact that many Yom Kippurim have passed since then.