Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This law is derived from Exodus 21:22, which states: “If men strive together, and a pregnant woman is struck and she miscarries....” It would appear that the man who caused the injury did not seek to harm the woman, and yet the Torah holds him liable.

The above verse continues “as the woman’s husband will claim against him,” indicating that the fundamental claim is made by the husband.

For these affect her body.

If sold as a servant in the market place. A pregnant woman would obviously bring a higher price, since the purchaser is also paying for the fetus, which will become his property.

I.e., her value after a normal birth. This is more than her value after the miscarriage, but the damage to her body because of the miscarriage is paid to her as a separate assessment.

And not to the woman, for it is considered to be his property.

Since her husband did not acquire money or the rights to it during his lifetime, he cannot therefore transfer it to his heirs. Moreover, there is an indication in the above verse that a woman has a claim to the fetus, for it states “and she loses her fetuses,” instead of saying “she loses the fetuses,” adding the word “and” (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that even in such an instance, the husband’s heirs are entitled to receive the assessment for the fetus[es]. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 423:1) cites the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah follow the Ra’avad’s approach.

For any property owned by a convert who does not leave any heirs is free to be acquired by anyone (Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah, Chapter 2). Hence, it is as if the person who caused the injury acquired it.

Even the opinions that differ with regard to a woman whose husband has heirs, agree in this instance.

At the time she is converted or is freed, she is considered to be a new entity and she has no marriage ties to anyone. Similarly, the fetus is considered a new halachic entity. Thus, there is no “woman’s husband” - to refer to the wording of the verse - and the right to the assessment reverts to her. This applies even if a woman and her husband convert, and he is the natural father of the fetus.
Rabbenu Asher differs and states that if the father of the fetus is alive, the assessment is due him. If the father is not alive, the person who caused the injury is not liable at all. The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 423:3), while that of Rabbenu Asher is cited by the Tur and the Ramah. [Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 5:4), the Rambam offers an interpretation similar to that of Rabbenu Asher, and his ruling in the Mishneh Torah represents a change of position.]

I.e., one might think that since the person is not liable for capital punishment because he struck the woman unintentionally, he would then be liable for a financial payment. The Rambam counters this hypothesis in the remainder of the halachah.

The Torah never holds a person liable both for capital punishment and for financial compensation (Hilchot Geneivah 3:1). This halachah explains that even when capital punishment is not administered, since the deed is punishable by capital punishment, there is no financial penalty.

Because he did not intend to kill her - although he did intend to strike her - he is considered to have killed her unintentionally.

The Rambam’s ruling here has aroused the attention of the commentaries. The basis for his decision is a difference of opinion between our Sages (Sanhedrin 19b) whether a person who intends to kill one person, but instead kills another, is liable. The Rambam rules according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold such a person liable for capital punishment. Since he is not liable for capital punishment, he is liable to make financial compensation (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that the Rambam himself follows the opinion of Chizkiyah in the previous halachah, in Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:13 and in other sources. The law stated in this halachah appears to be the subject of a difference of opinion between Rav Ada bar Ahavah (Bava Kama 42a) and Chizkiyah (Sanhedrin 79b), and Chizkiyah states that one is not liable for financial payment. Seemingly, the Ra’avad argues, the Rambam should follow his opinion in this instance as well.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Radbaz (Volume VI, Responsum 2250) rationalize the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that one can accept Chizkiyah’s ruling quoted in the previous halachah and still follow Rav Ada bar Ahavah’s ruling with regard to the financial penalty stated in this halachah. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 423:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of the Ra’avad.

As stated in Hilchot Mamrim 5:5, a person who strikes his parents is liable for execution only when he draws blood.

For he has not violated a sin punishable by execution.

In which case he would not be liable for execution.

Halachah 5.

I.e., although injuring a colleague is basically a destructive act, when a person wounds a colleague in anger, he is considered to be performing a constructive act, because he is calming his feelings and causing his anger to subside [Hilchot Shabbat 8:8; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 8:8)].

Drawing blood on Yom Kippur, in contrast to the Sabbath, is not punishable by execution, but by lashes.

See Hilchot Geneivah 3:1 for a precise statement of this general principle.

There is also another exception, eidim zomemim, perjurious witnesses. See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1.

The Rambam is emphasizing that there is no difference between Yom Kippur and an ordinary case of injuring a colleague, for every time a person injures a colleague intentionally, he violates a transgression punishable by lashing. See Chapter 5, Halachah 3, which gives an example of an instance when lashes are actually administered for injuring a colleague.

For the Canaanite servant is considered to be his personal property and does not have any financial capacity. Everything that the servant owns or earns - and similarly, any damages that must be paid because of him - belong to the servant’s master.
See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 424:4, which states that the master is also not punished by lashing for transgressing the prohibition against striking a colleague. He does, however, cite other views that indicate that he should be lashed.

For a Hebrew servant is not considered his master’s property and possesses an independent financial capacity.

For a master is entitled to the proceeds from his Hebrew servant’s labor.

E. g., it was estimated that it would take ten days of medical treatment to heal the servant. The person who injured him is required to pay for the ten days of treatment, even though the owner used extremely powerful medication that enabled the servant to be healed more speedily.

Thirty silver shekalim, as stated in Exodus 21:32 and explained in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:1.

This fine is paid only to the owner of a servant, and as the Rambam continues to explain, the owner no longer has any rights over this servant.

Bava Kama 42b leaves unresolved the question of whether or not the bill of release establishes the servant’s financial authority. Since the question is left unresolved, neither the servant nor the owner can issue a definite claim against the person who caused the injury.
The Ra’avad and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 424) state that the owner and the servant can give each other power of attorney and together lodge a suit against the person who caused the injury.

As Exodus 21:26 states, if an owner knocks out his servant’s tooth or blinds him, he is required to free him. Since the owner is required to free the servant for the first injury, one might think that the servant could collect financial recompense for the second injury. Nevertheless, this is not so, for he has not established his financial authority yet.

I.e., whether injured by his master or another person, if the servant seizes his due, the money is not expropriated from him according to the Rambam (but not according to the Ashkenazic authorities). For since the question is left unresolved, once the money is in the possession of the servant, the person who caused the injury cannot prove that the sum is not due the servant.

E. g., a servant was owned by two partners - one of them freed him, and one did not.

The Ra’avad protests and states that rather than have the servant work in the manner described by the Rambam, the owner is compelled to free the servant, and the servant must pay for the remainder of his worth from his future earnings. The Maggid Mishneh states that this law applies only to a maid-servant, but not to a male servant. For the owner of a maid-servant is not compelled to free her. The Radbaz (Volume VI, Responsum 2249), however, justifies the Rambam’s view.

The rationale is evident from the Rambam’s later statements. The injury will impede the servant’s ability to work, and the loss will thus be the owner’s and not the servant’s.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 424) explains that the Rambam’s ruling applies to the ultimate benefits the servant will receive for his inability to work due to the injury. With regard to the minimal payments that he would receive for not working during the days following the injury (see Chapter 2, Halachah 11), these should be given to the servant’s owner, since the owner is entitled to that benefit. The commentaries also emphasize that the assessment for the servant’s medical treatment should be used immediately to pay his bills.

For the money belongs to the servant, since he is not considered his owner’s property.

See Halachah 19 and notes. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 424:6) cite opinions that maintain that the principles mentioned there with regard to sons apply also with regard to daughters, and other opinions that favor the daughters even more than sons.

Alternatively, for selling her as a servant.

For this reason, he receives the unemployment benefits.

For this reason, he receives the payment for her injuries.

The pain and the embarrassment are losses that she suffers personally, and the medical expenses must be paid for her care.

I.e., an injury that does not detract from the girl’s appearance or ability to perform work.

For the other two assessments are his, as explained above.

For he is obligated to pay her medical expenses, and he is entitled to her wages.

Since he will also suffer shame from having a wife who is disfigured.

Others maintain that the translation should be: “If the embarrassment was performed in a private place and was not public knowledge.” For any permanent damage to a woman’s features must be compensated as damages.

Although the majority of the embarrassment is felt by the woman, even a woman’s private embarrassment affects her husband. Therefore, he is entitled to a share of the assessment.

As he is entitled to benefit from any property that the woman owns. If the woman becomes divorced or widowed, the land becomes her own entirely; her husband’s heirs have no claim to its profits.

If another person injured a woman, her husband would be granted a share (either one third or two thirds) of these assessments. There are certain opinions (e.g., Bayit Chadash, Even HaEzer 83) that maintain that the husband is therefore required to pay only the share that his wife would receive. The Rambam differs and maintains that the punishment given the husband is more comprehensive, and he is required to pay the entire assessment for these damages.

Just as another person would be required to make such payments, so, too, is her husband. He is not required to pay for her unemployment, for he is entitled to receive the benefits of her labor.

Although a husband is normally entitled to receive the benefit from property his wife owns, an exception is made in this instance. Since he injured her, he is punished and the benefit from this property is not granted to him.

Although a husband has the right to engage in relations with his wife, he has no right to injure her and must accept the consequences of his behavior.

She is obligated to pay him for the damages, but she does not have any independent financial capacity with which to pay him. Her husband has the right to manage all of her property and derive the benefits from it.

In addition to the minimum amounts (200 zuz for a virgin, 100 for a non-virgin) prescribed by our Sages, it was customary in the Talmudic period (and this custom is preserved unto the present day) for a man to commit himself to his wife for a larger amount. (See Hilchot Ishut 10:7.) If the husband divorces his wife or dies, he or his estate is obligated to pay his wife this sum.

But not to others. We fear that if she sold this right to someone else and then became reconciled with her husband, she would waive the right to this money to free her husband from the obligation. If this were the case, the person who purchased the rights to her ketubah would not be entitled to collect anything (Bava Kama 89a).

The purchaser would not be required to pay the entire amount due the woman by virtue of her ketubah, because there is no certainty that the woman’s husband will die or divorce her. Instead, an amount is calculated that takes into consideration the risks involved.

This is a Rabbinic decree, attaching financial consequences to divorce so that a man will view it as a serious matter and think earnestly before taking such a step (Hilchot Ishut 10:10).

Payable to him or his estate upon divorce or death, from the money due his wife by virtue of her ketubah.

The Maggid Mishneh states that these laws apply to daughters as well as sons. According to his interpretation, the intent in Halachah 14 is daughters who are not dependent on the father for their livelihood.

In this regard there is no difference between his sons and others. He must pay the five assessments mentioned previously.

I.e., although rightfully the money should be given to them - since they are immature and might squander it, our Sages required that the money be placed in a durable investment that will produce some revenue.
The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 424:7). The Tur and the Ramah mention that a Torah scroll should be purchased instead. It, like land, is durable. The child can study from it, and this takes the place of the revenue that could be received from land.

Since he provides for their livelihood, any income they earn belongs to him. Therefore, he is not required to compensate them.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 424:7) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Ramah differ. They explain that since he provides for his son’s livelihood, the father is entitled to the wages his son earns. Therefore, it is reasonable to free him from the unemployment assessment. The other four assessments, by contrast, are not related to the son’s wages, and the father should therefore be required to pay them.

I.e., if others cause the injury, there is no difference with regard to the payment of damages whether or not the children are dependent on their father for their livelihood.

This is the version of the standard texts of the Mishneh Torah. The version possessed by the Tur [and quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)], however, stated “The father is entitled to the profits....”

His liability is not always complete, for there is no obligation to compensate a mental incompetent for embarrassment, or a minor for loss of employment. Nevertheless, whatever damages there are must be paid for.

Since they are not fully mentally competent, they are not held responsible for their actions. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:6, which states that they should be reprimanded and given physical punishment, to train them not to repeat such conduct.

See Halachot 13 and 15.

For while the woman is married and the servant is owned by his master, neither has an independent financial capacity. Any property they own is controlled by the husband or the master.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 424:9) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that if the woman owns property, she is required to sell the right to that property in the event that she is divorced or widowed, to pay for the damages she caused.

Because the servant has the mental capacity to know what to do - and put that knowledge into practice - to save his own life. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 418:18) states that if the servant is a minor who lacks such mental competence, the person who placed the coal down is liable.

For an animal is considered to be lacking the mental competence to know what is necessary to save its life. The Ramah (ibid.) and the Tur maintain that the person is liable only when the animal is bound. If the animal is not bound, we assume that it has the instinctual awareness to flee from fire.

Even if the owner of the garment saw the person place the coal on it and did nothing to save his property, the person who caused the damages is liable.

For a person’s body is not considered to be his own possession, but God’s. And one may not damage God’s property.

I.e., delivers a blow that does not draw blood or cause any internal injury.

Some commentaries have explained that this modifier was added to differentiate between an instance when Torah law requires that lashes be administered to a person. Even if a person does not abide by Torah law, we are forbidden to strike him, except when instructed to do so by a court.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 300) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 595) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. In the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam lists this prohibition in Hilchot Sanhedrin.
See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 420:1), who writes that a person who strikes a colleague is subject to a ban of ostracism. While he is under this ban, he should not be counted as part of a minyan.

The Sifre comments on this verse: If a negative commandment applies when a blow is added after it was a mitzvah to give blows, surely it applies when there is no such mitzvah. This concept is quoted by the Rambam (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:12).

This concept is derived from Moses’ statement (Exodus 2:13): “He said to the wicked man: “Why do you strike your colleague?” Our Rabbis explain that although the man had not struck his colleague yet, the Torah still calls him wicked.

As mentioned above (Chapter 4, Halachah 9), a person should receive lashes whenever he strikes a colleague. Nevertheless, because of the general principle that a person never receives both financial and corporal punishment, he is obligated to make financial restitution rather than be lashed. In this instance, however, since there is no financial penalty, he should be lashed.

The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 420) questions why the Rambam mentions a servant belonging to a colleague. Seemingly, the same law would apply to a servant belonging to a person himself. Kin’at Eliyahu explains that a person may strike a servant he owns as a reprimand. Therefore, it is preferable to illustrate the concept by mentioning a servant belonging to another person.

Halachah 1 spoke of the prohibition as involving striking a Jew. This halachah mentions that, in this context, a servant is included in that category. It is also forbidden to strike a gentile unnecessarily, but punishment is not administered for such an act.

Moses smote the Egyptian because he had been beating a Jewish laborer without a valid reason.

Although this oath is required by the Rabbis, it is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll (or in certain cases, tefillin).

As the Rambam continues to explain, the intent is not that the witnesses observed the injury being inflicted. If that were the case, there would be no need for an oath.

According to Scriptural Law, since there are no witnesses to the actual injury, the defendant would not be held liable if he denied the claim. Nevertheless, our Sages gave the injured person the above privilege in the hope of discouraging violence.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s choice of wording, for he does not consider this a “penalty,” but rather a proper judgment, for it is unlikely that a person would injure himself. The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position: Since Scriptural Law would not require such a payment, the privilege awarded the injured is a “penalty” for the accused.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 90:16) state that if a third party is present, but it is clear to the witnesses that the third party did not inflict the injury, no oath is necessary.

If there was a contusion in such a place, an oath is required. For it is possible that the injured person knocked his back against a protruding object to cause the contusion.

In this instance, the circumstantial evidence is significant enough to incriminate the accused.

I.e., his admission is not considered significant, because even if he had not made the admission, he would have been obligated to pay on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses and the plaintiff’s oath.
Generally, when a person admits his culpability for a k’nas and then witnesses testify, he is not liable. Hence, since it is the defendant’s admission and not the testimony of the witnesses that requires the defendant to pay, one might think that he also is not liable. A distinction can, be made, however, because in this instance the plaintiff lodged the claim on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses. See Prishah (the conclusion of Choshen Mishpat 90).

The Rambam’s rationale is that a person will never voluntarily accept damages or pain, even if he is given fair recompense for them. Therefore, he always receives less than their value. Moreover, pain does not represent any financial loss to the injured. As such, these two assessments are considered to be k’nasot (“fines” or “penalties”) (Or Sameach). As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, when a person’s culpability for a k’nas is dependent on his own admission, he is not liable.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that since fair assessments are made with regard to these damages, they are considered to be mammon, a financial obligation, and not k’nasot. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Ra’avad’s objections in this instance.

This is the law applicable to anyone who denies a claim issued by a plaintiff.

Any lasting marks that cause embarrassment are considered part of the nezek, the payment for damages. Here we are speaking of embarrassment that comes as a result of the act of causing the injury. For together with the physical pain of the injury, there come feelings of shame that others become conscious that such an injury was inflicted by a given individual.
Nevertheless, when comparing the Rambam’s words here with his statements in Chapter 2, Halachah 2, there is a slight difficulty. For in that halachah, there is some indication that the person should be recompensed for the shame of the wound itself.

I.e., when the defendant admits in court that he injured the plaintiff, the plaintiff will suffer embarrassment from having the judges hear of the injury.

Although the Rambam rules in Chapter 3, Halachah 5 that a person is not liable for damaging a person with words, a distinction can be made between the two instances. In the previous instance, all that is involved is verbal statements, and there is therefore no liability. Here, although it is the verbal statement that causes the deed to become public knowledge, the defendant is being held liable for a deed that he committed.

For personal suffering can never be atoned for by mere financial payment.
See Rashi (Bava Kama 92a) and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 422), who single out the pain and the embarrassment as the elements that cannot be atoned for by financial payment, and require a request for forgiveness. There is a certain logic to that conception, for the damages, medical expenses and unemployment compensations are basically financial matters, not very different from damage to property. It is the pain and the embarrassment that affect the person’s feelings.

A region in Eretz Yisrael, renowned for its choice rams. See Isaiah 60:7.

Atonement for sins between man and his fellow man involve not only offering financial payment, but appeasing the person who was wronged. See Hilchot Teshuvah 2:9.

Bava Kama, loc. cit., derives this concept from the narrative (Genesis, Chapter 20) in which God tells Avimelech to placate Abraham and ask Abraham to pray on Avimelech’s behalf. God was emphasizing that Avimelech’s atonement could not be achieved until Abraham was willing to forgive him.

For Jews are by nature merciful, humble and doers of kindness (Yevamot 79a).

From the Rambam’s words, one may infer that if one feels that the person’s first request is not genuine, one may withhold forgiveness until a second request is made. See also Hilchot Teshuvah 2:9, which implies that a person’s teacher has the right to withhold forgiveness from him until he asks for forgiveness repeatedly, to teach him the importance of such conduct.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 2:10, which elaborates on the importance of granting forgiveness, and on how the failure to do so is a sign that one does not share in the heritage of the Jewish people.

We assume that he made his statement facetiously, without really expecting his colleague to injure him.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 421:12) quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, that if the injured person explicitly tells the person causing the injury that he will not hold him liable, he is not liable. According to this perspective, when is the person who causes the injury liable? When he asked the injured person, “Will you hold me liable if I injure you?”, and the injured person said: “No.” In such a situation, we can assume that the remark was made facetiously, and he did not imagine that his colleague would actually injure him. When, however, he explicitly gave his colleague permission to injure him, the colleague is not liable.

In this instance as well, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 380:1) share a more lenient perspective and maintain that even if the owner of the property does not explicitly tell him to damage it, as long as he indicates he is willing to free the person who causes the damage of liability, that person is not liable.

We assume that his intent was “You may cause the damage, but must pay me its worth” (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 380:3).

In such an instance, he already accepted the responsibility for returning the article to its owner intact, and he is liable if the article is destroyed through his negligence.

Only such an explicit stipulation can free a watchman from the responsibility he accepted.

Even though the owner did not explicitly stipulate that he would not be held liable. The rationale is that the person who caused the damages never accepted any responsibility with regard to the article, and he did no more than follow its owner’s instructions.

For rather than listening to the instructions of the instigator, he should have followed the rules of the Torah, which prohibit causing wanton destruction. See Kiddushin 42b.

The Rambam is referring to the prohibition (Leviticus 19:14): “Do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind,” which our Sages interpret as a warning against giving people improper advice.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 378:1 interprets the statement of this law by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 378:1) as indicating that not only is a person liable for the damage he causes, but that it is forbidden to cause damage.

See Halachah 4, and Chapter 1, Halachah 12, which indicate that a person is not liable for damages that are caused by his body, over which he has totally no control.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, “A man is considered to be mu’ad (forewarned) at all times” and must bear full responsibility for his actions.

In contrast to Chapter 1, Halachah 12, the Rambam does not distinguish between an ordinary and abnormal wind in this halachah. This leads to the conclusion that there is no difference, and he is liable in both instances. This understanding is reflected in the statement of this law in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:5.

As stated in the following halachah, there is no difference between an animal and any other possession belonging to a colleague.

For an intruder must assume that the owner of a domain keeps his possessions in various places and the intruder must take the necessary precautions not to break them.

He is liable, however, if he intentionally caused the damage. The owner of a domain has the right to remove an intruder and his possessions from his domain. He does not have the right to damage those possessions (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:7).

For a person need not assume that a person entering his domain is bringing possessions. If, however, the owner of a domain gives a person permission to enter his domain or knows of his entry, he is liable if he damages his person or possessions accidentally. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 378:6).

Alternatively, if this took place in the public domain.

If, however, only the person whose possessions were damaged was given permission to be in the domain belonging to the third party, it is as if the damage were caused in the domain of the person whose possessions were damaged. Conversely, if only the person who caused the damage was given permission to be in the domain belonging to the third party, it is as if the damage were caused in the domain of the person who caused the damage.

For he does not necessarily know about the possessions the other person is carrying, and is therefore not required to take care that they remain intact. If, however, one person knows about the other’s presence, he is liable if he causes damages to his person or property, even if he does so unintentionally (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 378:7).
The Ra’avad differs and states that if one of the people intentionally committed an act that damaged the property of the other, he is liable, even if he does not know about the other person’s presence in the domain.

The Ra’avad questions why this is considered as an act of God, and yet a person’s being blown off a roof by an abnormal wind (Chapter 2, Ha1achah 12) is not considered an act of God.

See parallel laws in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 3:13 and 13:6.

I.e., he is not obligated to take extra care to ensure that the jugs are not broken. Bava Kama 28a states: “He may break them as he leaves and break them as he enters.”

The Ra’avad and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 379) differ with the Rambam regarding this point and maintain that if the owner of the courtyard gave the owner of the jugs permission to bring them in, the owner of the courtyard is liable for breaking them. The Rambam’s perspective is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 379:4). The Ramah makes no comment.

For, as mentioned above, he has the right to remove them from his property; he does not have the right to break them.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:3 infers that if such a scenario took place in a domain belonging to the owner of the attacking ox, the owner of the ox that was attacked would be liable. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 383), however, rules differently and does not require the attack to take place in the domain of the owner of the ox that was attacked, in order for its owner not to be held liable.

For he did not intentionally harm the attacking ox.

An ox that is mu’ad is known to be prone to goring other oxen, while an ox that is tam is not. The owner of an ox that is mu’ad is liable to pay full damages for death caused by goring, while the owner of an ox that is tam is liable only for half the damages.
The Rambam’s point is that the owner of the lower ox may pull his animal out even though it involves a risk to the attacking ox - not only when the attacking ox is tam, in which instance the owner of the lower ox would lose half the value of his ox - but also when the attacking ox is mu’ad, and the owner of the lower ox would recover the full value of his ox. For although he could ultimately recover the full value, doing so would require him to engage in a legal suit, and that is undesirable.

The Meiri interprets this as meaning that he could have pulled away the lower ox, and the upper ox might have fallen without being critically injured. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:6 interprets it as meaning that he could have pulled away the attacking ox.

Since he had an opportunity to remove the danger to his ox without fatally injuring the attacking ox, and instead, pushed it violently, he is liable.

For he had no other alternative to save his ox.

I.e., they came from two opposite directions. The fact that they are both carrying loads is also significant, for this causes them to walk with their heads down and not to take full notice of the movement of other people.

As stated in Halachah 3, if two people both have the right to be in the same domain, and one damages the other’s possessions unintentionally, the person who caused the damage is not liable.
Note the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 379), who rules that if the owner of the jug is standing still and the owner of the beam runs into him and breaks his jug, the owner of the beam is liable.
To draw a comparison to contemporary experience: Two cars are progressing in opposite directions on a one-lane country road. If they both continue to proceed and they collide, neither is responsible for the damage to the other.

I.e., the two were walking in the same direction, one behind the other.

I.e., the owner of the jug was walking faster than the owner of the beam, and hit the beam with his jug as he advanced.

Even if the owner of the beam was walking very slowly, he is not responsible. For the owner of the jug should have looked in front of himself and taken the necessary precautions so that his jug would not be broken.

The owner of the beam is liable, because the owner of the jug had no reason to suspect that the owner of the beam would stop suddenly. Therefore, the collision is considered the fault of the owner of the beam.
In this instance, the comparison to contemporary experience presents somewhat of a contradiction. If two cars are proceeding in the same lane, one suddenly stops short and the other collides with it, the second car is usually held liable for the collision (in contrast to the Rambam’s ruling, which holds the owner of the beam liable). There is, however, reason to hold the first car liable when it suddenly stops short for no valid reason.

After hearing the warning, the owner of the jug should have stopped and not collided with the beam.

I.e., the owner of the beam proceeded too fast and collided with the jug.

For his was an act of obvious negligence, for which he must bear responsibility.

Because he had no reason to expect that the owner of a jug would come to a sudden stop.

For he was given a warning and should have stopped.

For, as stated above, a person who stops to adjust his load is considered as if he were walking. Therefore, the owner of the beam is liable.
Note the Yam Shel Shlomo, who rules that the owner of the beam is not liable. Theoretically, the owner of the jug may be considered as though he were walking, but in actuality he has stopped, and there is no way that the owner of the jug would know to stop on time.

If the lamp sets fire to the flax, the same principles are applied to determine whether or not the owner of the lamp is liable.

The halachah is speaking about an instance where the two are walking toward each other from opposite directions.

And it is this departure from the norm that caused the accident to take place.

But before the appearance of three stars - i.e., the time of the inception of the Sabbath.
Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 3:6), the Rambam does not mention bein hash’mashot, the period between sunset and the appearance of three stars. Indeed, other commentaries explain that the intent is toward nightfall, from the time the need for Sabbath preparations became pressing. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam also mentions that the same laws apply on the days before festivals.

For they are both departing from the norm.

Our Sages refer to all of these as the person’s “arrows.”

In his Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 384), Rav Yosef Karo questions the purpose of the inclusion of this phrase, wondering what law it teaches us. He does, however, include it in his statement of the law in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 384:1).

It must be emphasized that if the person causes the damage unintentionally, he is not liable for the embarrassment assessment, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

And when utensils are damaged because one falls into a cistern, the owner of the cistern is not liable (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:1).

Ibid.:2.

For the spark is a direct result of his activity. And it is not abnormal or even infrequent for beating metal to cause a spark to fly in this manner.

I.e., he was contracted to tear down the wall, but to preserve the stones, so that they could be used again.

I.e., not as a result of his blows, but because they were supported by the other wall, and now that it has been tom down, there is nothing to support them.

For a person is liable for any damage that comes as a direct result of his force.

Although it was the water or the sun that actually killed the animal, the perpetrator of these acts is not considered to be merely an indirect cause of the animal’s death. Instead, it is considered as if he killed the animal with his hands. Note the parallel in Hilchot Rotzeach 3:9.
The Ramah and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 383:5) cite opinions that maintain that if the person does not actually hold the animal in the sun, but merely closes all exits, he is not considered to have killed the animal himself, nor is he held liable by a mortal court.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:9 states that this law applies even when each of the people performs an activity that could by itself have caused the animal’s death or the destruction of the utensil.

This reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Kama 10a. Rashi interprets the passage differently. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, the Rambam’s version of that Talmudic passage is slightly different from the version in the standard printed texts of the Talmud.

The fact that the animal was able to walk indicates that it was able to bear the weight of the previous burdens. Thus, it is the sixth person who overburdened it and caused it to die. Therefore, he is held liable for its death.

For it is not clear that his actions were of any consequence. On the contrary, it appears likely that the animal would have died even if he had not placed his burden upon it. From the following clause, the Vilna Gaon draws the conclusion that in this instance, the five people who had placed their burden on the animal previously are liable.

Because of the doubt involved, all six are required to pay for the damages.

Rashi (Bava Kama 10b) interprets this as referring to an instance where the sixth person leaned on the previous five and prevented them from standing up. It is his interpretation that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 381:1). The Shulchan Aruch also interprets the law as referring to a “bench” and not to a “chair.”

Our translation follows the standard text of the Mishneh Torah and is supported by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 381:2. Many authoritative manuscripts and early printings have a different version, which would be translated as “and joined us.”

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 381:1) comment that we assume that benches are intended to be sat upon, and unless people depart from the norm in the manner in which they sit, they are not liable.

According to all other authorities, the animal must also have been redeemed by its owners and permitted to be used for mundane purposes. Although the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:1 might be interpreted as having other implications, the later authorities agree to this ruling.

The three are considered equally liable, for each had a part in the damages that ensued. The man who pushed and the owner of the ox share in the liability, for the man and the ox pushed the person, animal or object into the cistern. And the owner of the cistern shares in the liability, for had the cistern not been open, this damage would not have occurred.
If a person or an animal fell into the cistern and was injured, and the ox was mu’ad (known to gore), the damages are equally divided. If the ox was tam, its owner is required to pay only half of his share of the damages. Thus, the owner of the ox pays one sixth, and the person and the owner of the cistern each pay five twelfths.
With regard to the other payments mentioned in the halachah, there are differences, because one or more of the three persons involved are not held liable for such assessments. Those who are liable are liable for the full amount of the assessments. There is no reduction, because the others contributed to the death, damages or injury. The rationale is that the deed of each person is - in and of itself - sufficient to cause liability for the entire amount. Therefore, if there is another person to share in the liability, it is shared. If not, it is assumed totally by the one who is liable.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the man pushed the other person or the animal into the cistern unintentionally. If he pushed the other person or the animal intentionally, the owner of the cistern is not liable. For in the ordinary course of events, his cistern would not have caused damage. To what could this situation be likened? To someone taking an article belonging to a colleague and tossing it on a fire started by a third person. No one would hold the person who started the fire liable in such a situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:34) accepts the Rashba’s insight.

For these assessments are made only when an injury is caused by a human being, but not when it is caused by an animal or a cistern. See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Chapter 4, Halachah 1; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:3, 11:3.

For these payments are required only of the owner of a goring [mu’ad] ox. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:2, 11:1.

With regard to utensils, the owner of the cistern is not liable, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:1. And similarly, he is not held liable with regard to an animal disqualified as a sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 12:17.