Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Although the killing came about as a result of an accident, Judaism maintains that there are no total accidents. Instead, what occurred is a sign from above that the killer has a certain dimension of evil hidden within his soul that must be cleansed. The Sifre (commenting on Deuteronomy 22:8) states that liability is brought upon a liable person.
Going into exile enables such a person to begin a new phase of life and redefine his identity and personality.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 225) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 410) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.
There are commentaries who maintain that (see Halachah 7) the scope of this mitzvah also includes allowing an intentional killer refuge in such a city until his trial.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 295) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 413) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that this law applies only when the killer accidentally kills the victim by causing his throat to be slit. If he kills him in another manner, he should be exiled, even if the victim survives for a brief time afterwards. The other commentaries justify the Rambam’s ruling.

And it is only when the victim’s death is his fault entirely that he must be exiled.

The Rambam uses the expression “two signs,” for the signs for determining whether ritual slaughter is acceptable are whether the windpipe and the esophagus have been slit correctly. Once these two organs have been slit, the person will surely die.

The commentaries note that from Gittin 70b, the source for this halachah, it appears that both conditions are necessary: the person must be wounded in a closed room (otherwise it is possible that the wind sped his death), and he must not go into any spasms (otherwise it is possible that he hastened his own death). Some commentaries suggest that there was a scribal error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the Rambam wrote “and” instead of “or” in this phrase - i.e., he also required both conditions. The majority, however, do not accept that explanation.
The Pri Chadash explains the Rambam’s ruling as follows: When both of the factors are combined - the possibility of hastening one’s own death through a spasm and being exposed to wind - we are still not certain that the killer did not cause the victim’s death. Nevertheless, the combination of factors creates a compounded doubt (ספק ספיקא, and we do not impose exile upon him. Therefore, if one of these factors is absent, there is only one dimension of doubt. Therefore, we follow the rule that in an instance of doubt concerning a Scriptural law, the more stringent position should be followed. Hence the killer must go into exile.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 11, although a Canaanite servant is not obligated to perform all the 613 mitzvot, he has still become a part of “the heritage of God,” and one is therefore liable for killing him, as one is liable for killing a Jew.

Since a resident alien has been given the privilege of living in Eretz Yisrael, he is regarded with honor, and one must bear the responsibility for killing him unintentionally. [One is not, however, liable for execution for killing him intentionally, for such a severe punishment is given only for killing a Jew.]
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that a Jew should not be exiled for unintentionally killing a resident alien, noting that the Talmud (Makkot 8b) appears to exclude such an instance. Moreover, the source for the obligation to flee to a city of refuge mentions killing “your colleague,” and that term does not apply to a person who has not accepted the Torah and its mitzvot.
The Kessef Mishneh accepts the Ra’avad’s objections. Indeed, he suggests that there was a scribal error in the Mishneh Torah, and the Rambam indeed did not mention a Jew being exiled for killing a resident alien.
From the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 2:3), and similarly from the authentic manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, it is clear that the Rambam’s intent is that a Jew is exiled for killing a resident alien. The commentaries explain that the Rambam’s version of Makkot, loc. cit., differed slightly from that of the other Rabbis. The Radbaz (Volume V, Responsum 1484) explains the rationale for the Rambam’s ruling: killing a resident alien is also a serious matter and requires atonement. That is the purpose of his exile.

For he must accept responsibility for his conduct, and do what is necessary to gain atonement.

And he must therefore pay “a life for a life,” in the most literal sense.

The Rambam’s ruling raises a question: A resident alien is given that status because he accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. Among those laws is the prohibition against killing. How then is it possible for a gentile to kill without knowing that it is prohibited? It is possible to explain that the intent is that he commits an act that is deemed murder by the Torah, but is not commonly considered to be murder - e.g., abortion or mercy killing (Kin’at Eliyahu).

Although a Jew is not executed under such circumstances, this is an extra measure of consideration, which is not shown to a gentile.

I.e., one who has not accepted the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants, as a resident alien does.

He is not sentenced to death, but he must continually protect himself from the blood redeemer.

If, however, a son accidentally injures his father, he is not exiled. Although a son may be executed for intentionally injuring a father, exile is not imposed for unintentional injury. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 15.)

E. g., the son already knows a profession through which he can earn his livelihood, and this is merely an avocation.

Our translation follows the interpretation of the Ma’aseh Rokeach. It must, however, be noted that on this basis, the Ma’aseh Rokeach raises questions regarding the Rambam’s statements. For it appears that it is a mitzvah to instruct one’s son in secular subjects aside from what he needs to earn a livelihood. This concept, the Ma’aseh Rokeach finds hard to accept.
Rav Kapach explains that “wisdom” also refers to Torah knowledge. “Torah” refers to the knowledge of Torah law, while “wisdom” refers to the Torah’s philosophical principles. One might draw support for this interpretation from the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:13. Significantly, the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah states “Torah or ethical conduct,” leading to the inference that the intent is the type of wisdom that leads to character refinement.

It is a mitzvah to instruct one’s son in all three of these areas. While giving instruction, it is permissible to employ corporal punishment. Since the father is allowed to strike his son at these times, he is not punished if he accidentally administers a blow that causes his death.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:2, which states: “A teacher may employ corporal punishment to cast fear upon [the students]. He may not, however, beat them cruelly.”

The words “an emissary of the court” appear in the Mishnah (Makkot 2:1). Generally, that term is defined in the manner defined by the Rambam. In this instance, however, Rashi and the Ra’avad differ and interpret the term to refer to the person who administers lashes on behalf of the court.

Deuteronomy 19:11 speaks of a killer “who hates his colleague, lies in wait for him, and kills him,... flee[ing] to one of these cities.” For the blood redeemer should not kill him until he is given the benefit of a trial.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 3.

Why Torah sages? Because they will find the proper words to convince the blood redeemer to restrain himself. Moreover, out of respect for them, he will not act violently.

We have translated the term in the singular although in the Hebrew, it is written in the plural. Perhaps the intent is that there may be many who desire to act as redeemers of the blood.
Alternatively, the Meiri explains that this statement is made to the inhabitants of the city of refuge. And Rav Kapach states that it is made by the court to the two sages who accompany the killer.

2000 cubits from a square drawn around the perimeter of its buildings.

As evident from the following halachah, this is speaking about an instance when the blood redeemer slays the killer before he enters the city of refuge originally, or while he is being returned to the city of refuge. In these instances, the blood redeemer is forbidden to slay the killer. If he does so, however, he is not liable.
Several authorities (see Ketzot HaChoshen 2:1) maintain that the same law applies to a person who kills intentionally, but has not been tried.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 8.

This is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (Makkot 11b). Although Rabbi Yosse HaG’lili differs and maintains that it is a mitzvah for the blood redeemer to slay the killer, the Rambam follows Rabbi Akiva’s position, because, when there is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Akiva and a colleague, Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is followed.

Implied is that although another person is not allowed to slay the killer, he is not held liable if he does so.
The standard text of Makkot 11b states that Rabbi Yosse HaG’lili maintains that any other person has permission to slay the killer, while Rabbi Akiva states that another person is held liable for slaying the killer. The Rambam’s position is found in the Jerusalem Talmud. According to some (Kessef Mishneh, the Tosafot Yom Tov, and others), this version should be substituted in the Babylonian Talmud as well.

Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 2:7), the Rambam rules that the slayer should be executed.

Letting him free would defeat the entire purpose of a city of refuge.

Even if the killer was a priest and involved in the sacrificial worship, he should be taken from the altar to die (Mechilta on the above verse).

The concepts in this halachah are all derived from the discussion of the execution of Yoav, King David’s leading general, in Makkot 12a. As I Kings, Chapter 2, relates, before he died, King David had told King Solomon to have Yoav executed. Upon assuming the monarchy, King Solomon gave orders that his father’s command be carried out. Yoav, hearing of this order, fled to the tent where the ark was kept and took hold of the horns of the altar. Solomon, however, gave orders that Yoav be slain despite the fact that he was holding on to the altar’s horns.
Our Sages comment that Yoav erred in three matters. It is the top of the altar that serves as a refuge, and he took hold of its horns. The Temple had not been built at that time, and it is only the altar of the Temple that can serve as a refuge. And it is only a priest who is involved in the Temple service who can use the altar as a refuge, and Yoav was a commoner.

I.e., once the priest completes the service, he is not forced to continue his work in the Temple forever to protect his life. Instead, he is given escort to a city of refuge.

I.e., when are the three conditions mentioned in the previous halachah applicable?

See Chapter 2, Halachah 4.

For the verse “From My altar take him to die,” is directed to the court. Thus, one might infer that the verse applies only when all of the particulars required for execution by the court are met.
On the basis of this halachah, the Kessef Mishneh questions why King Solomon had the right to order Yoav’s death. He answers that Yoav was judged to be a rebel against the king, and the laws governing such a person are more severe.
The Hagahot Maimoniot 2:6 and others cite the Jerusalem Talmud, which states that Yoav fled to the altar to gain time, so that he could be killed by the judgment of the Sanhedrin and not on the orders of the king. In this way, his heirs would gain the right to inherit his property.

Examples of such uncommon phenomena are described in Halachot 7, 8 and 14.

This indicates that the “blood redeemer” is not given unlimited license to slay the killer. Only in certain occasions is such license granted.

See Halachah 6.

Although he did not have the intent to kill, a man is always responsible for his actions. Showing negligence that causes another person’s death is tantamount to actually killing him.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, noting that the testimony of one witness is never given such weight in Torah law. The Kessef Mishneh and others accept the Ra’avad’s basic premise and explain that the Rambam is speaking about an instance where there are in fact two witnesses, but their testimony is not sufficient to convict the murderer, because they did not see each other at the time they observed the murder. See Chapter 4, Halachah 8.

I.e., individuals who committed murder, but who cannot be executed because of the requirements of Torah law.

See Halachah 9 and notes.

Even though it is more difficult to see at night, since there is a possibility that someone will be walking in the public domain, the person performing the dangerous activity must ensure that no one will be hurt.

I.e., although there was no intention to kill per se, the difference between such carelessness in performing dangerous activities and willful murder is slight.

In the eras before comfort facilities became ordinary features in homes and in the public domain, garbage dumps often served as public toilets. If a particular garbage dump was known to be used for this purpose, a person tearing down his wall would have to take pains to make sure that no one was using the garbage dump at that time.

For not checking the location before acting is gross negligence.

For he had no reason to suppose that this instance would be any different, and that someone would be found in the garbage dump at the time he tore down his wall.

Because darkness afforded the people privacy.

Because of the lack of privacy.

Since the garbage dump is used as a toilet at times, although it is generally not used for that purpose during the day, there is a possibility that this will happen. Therefore, the death is not considered to be close to having been caused by forces beyond the person’s control. On the other hand, since by and large, people do not use it as a toilet during the day, the person cannot be considered to be grossly negligent. Therefore, he is exiled (Makkot 8a).

For the reasons to be described in the following halachah.

Makkot 8a states: “A person who throws a stone into the public domain should be exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: ‘If after the stone left [the thrower’s] hand, [the victim] stuck his head out, [the thrower] is not liable.’”
The Talmud then clarifies the first opinion, explaining that generally a person who throws a stone into the public domain is considered close to killing willfully, and that the obligation to exile the killer applies only when one is tearing down a wall in the situation described in the previous halachah.
The commentaries interpret the Rambam’s acceptance of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov’s approach in this and the previous halachah as implying the following. When a person throws a stone into the public domain, he is considered to be close to killing willfully, because there is a high probability that the stone he threw will cause death. This applies, however, only when the victim was present when the stone was thrown. If the victim was not in the place where he was killed when the stone left the thrower’s hand, we cannot hold the thrower liable, despite the fact that it is probable that throwing a stone into the public domain will cause death.

Therefore, he must live in constant dread of vengeance from the blood redeemer.

Commenting on the above verse, the Sifre states: “[An enemy] should not be executed - perhaps he acted unintentionally. Nor should he be exiled, for perhaps he acted intentionally.”

This is considered gross negligence, because the person should have considered the possibility that his knife could kill.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this ruling is dependent on the Rambam’s interpretation of Makkot 7b, which differs from that of other commentaries.

Since his action was not entirely intentional, he cannot be executed. It cannot, however, be considered to be unintentional, and hence, he is not granted the protection of a city of refuge.

Ignorance of such a basic law is not condoned, and the person is considered as if he killed willfully.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

Although killing a gentile or an animal is not as severe as killing a Jew, that is not significant in the present context. What is significant is that the person’s actions cannot be considered to be entirely unintentional.

Makkot 8a.

Since the victim has a right to walk in such places, another person must take precautions so that harm does not befall him.

A person is not obligated for as severe a penalty as exile when the accident takes place in his own domain. Since the victim entered without permission, the owner is not required to bear such a heavy responsibility.

Significantly, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:17, even if the person enters without permission, the carpenter is liable for the damages that the intruder suffered.

Makkot 7a explains that since the object [or in the second clause, the person] was ascending, it is considered out of the ordinary for him to fall.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 2:1). The Rambam is speaking about a roof with a downward slant. Rashi and Rav Ovadiah of Bartinura offer different interpretations.

By swinging it backward first, he will be able to swing it forward with greater momentum.

For this a “descent for the purpose of ascent,” as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

The Rambam’s ruling reflects the statement of this law in the Jerusalem Talmud (Makkot 2:4). According to Rabbenu Chanan’el, this is also the proper version of the Babylonian Talmud (Makkot 7b). As the Kessef Mishneh relates, the version of this passage in the standard printed text of the Talmud (which is reflected in Rashi’s commentary) is slightly different and cannot easily be reconciled with the Rambam’s understanding.

According to Rashi’s interpretation, such a person should be exiled. Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 2:1), the Rambam offers a similar interpretation.

As the person ascends, he pushes the rung of the ladder down slightly. Nevertheless, the purpose of that descent is to enable him to ascend.

For he is ascending and not descending. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 6:4, which delivers the following ruling with regard to whether or not a person is liable for damages in a similar situation:
If [the rung] was not tightly fit or was not strong [enough to bear the person’s weight], he is liable. If it was tightly fit and strong [enough to bear the person’s weight], but it slipped from its place or rotted, the person is not liable. For this is an act of God.”

Numbers 35:22 mentions that a person who kills בלא צדיה “without premeditation,” should be exiled. צד is Hebrew for “side.” Thus, Makkot 7b interprets the phrase to be freeing the person from exile when the object goes to a side other than that intended.

I.e., without his knowledge, someone had placed a stone in his clothes, and he did not detect it before he stood up.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:15, which states that in such a situation, a person is liable for the damages he caused. He is, however, only liable for the damages themselves, and not the other four assessments.

Numbers 35:23 states that a person is exiled when he kills a person “without seeing him.” Makkot 9b interprets this to exclude a person who can never see and yet kills unintentionally.
The rationale for this law can be explained as follows: A blind man has far less control of his surroundings than a person who can see. Therefore, he is not held responsible for a death that he caused unintentionally.

For in most cases of shogeg, unintentional transgression, a person must be aware that he has a responsibility - in this instance, the knowledge that he is holding a dangerous stone - and then lose consciousness of this responsibility.

Although Deuteronomy 19:5 mentions “an iron slipping from the wood,” this refers to a situation where the axe-head slips off the axe when the chopper swings the axe. Thus, the person is killed as a direct result of the killer’s force.

His cutting into the tree is a product of his force. The tree knocking off the axe-head is the effect of his force.
The Rambam’s source is the Mishnah, Makkot 2:1. Significantly, Rashi (Makkot 7b) interprets this mishnah differently, explaining that it refers to an instance where a piece of wood from the tree being chopped flies off and kills a person. Rabbenu Chanan’el mentions both interpretations.

As the Rambam quotes from Makkot 10a, the fundamental reason the teacher is exiled is for his student’s sake. Nevertheless, the commentaries have also emphasized that the fact that a teacher’s student causes the loss of a life also implies that there is a spiritual fault within the teacher that needs to be expiated, and for this reason he is exiled.

For just as a student cannot exist without a teacher, so too, it is equally trying for a teacher to be without students.

As reflected in Hilchot Avadim 9:7, an owner is never obligated to provide for his servant’s livelihood. He can withhold food from him at any time, should he desire. Even so, he does not forfeit his claim to the fruits of the servant’s labor.

To which the husband is entitled.

Which the husband is required to provide.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 12:4, by marrying a woman, a husband makes a commitment to support her if she cannot support herself, whether or not her earnings bring back a commensurate amount.
If, however, the woman is capable of earning her own livelihood, her husband has the option of compelling her to do so, even in a city of refuge, where she will be required to make new business contacts.

This ruling emphasizes that exile is not merely a benefit for the killer - so that he will be protected from the blood redeemer - but is also required in order to bring him atonement.

At which point the killer’s deed has been expiated.

Although Jewish law generally does not allow disinterment, one of the exceptions is an instance when the corpse is being taken to be buried in an ancestral plot.

For the cities of refuge are given to the tribe of Levi in place of the ancestral heritage received by other tribes. (See Numbers, Chapter 35, and Chapter 8, Halachah 9.) Nevertheless, as reflected in Chapter 8, Halachah 8, not all the inhabitants of the cities of refuge were Levites. The laws mentioned by the Rambam apply to all the inhabitants aside from the exiles.

For as stated in Halachah 8, he is forbidden to do so, because of the first death that he caused.

Our translation follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, although it appears to be in error. The word ובכן, translated as “similarly,” does not fit the context. It appears that the proper text is ובן לוי literally meaning “son of a Levite,” and used interchangeably with the term לוי. This version is found in the authoritative manuscripts.

For he must leave the city in which he killed.

Chapter 8, Halachah 9.

Although he is not leaving the place of his permanent dwelling, since he is leaving the city in which he killed, it is considered to be exile.

It would appear that the city is not disqualified as a city of refuge, but that it no longer accepts new killers.

I.e., that they are not killers as he is.

The K’nesset HaGedolah and the Ma’aseh Rokeach note that Makkot 10b, the source for this halachah, also mentions that a city cannot bring a calf whose neck is broken (see Chapter 9), nor carry out the judgment of a rebellious son, unless it has elders. They question why the Rambam does not mention these laws.

The Or Sameach notes that generally a threat to life supersedes all the prohibitions - and surely all the positive mitzvot - in the Torah. Why then should the killer remain in the city of refuge, although doing so may cause the loss of many lives?
He explains that since the blood redeemer has the right to slay the killer, the killer is not required to risk his own life to save the lives of others.

Chapter 5, Halachah 11.

The oil described in Exodus, Chapter 30, which was used to anoint the sacred vessels in the Sanctuary, and afterwards, the High Priests and the kings of the Davidic dynasty. This oil was entombed together with the Holy Ark in the time of King Josiah, shortly before the destruction of the First Temple.

I.e., the High Priests from Josiah’s time onward, who were not anointed. The literal translation of the term used by the Rambam is “one who adds garments,” referring to the fact that the High Priest wears four additional garments besides those worn by an ordinary priest. Putting on these garments would constitute his initiation into the High Priesthood.
(See Rav Kapach, who interprets merubah b’gadim not as having many garments as above, but as having long garments, referring to the white clothing the High Priest would wear on Yom Kippur, which had a long train.)

As Makkot 11a states, these terms are not mutually exclusive. Thus one can be a High Priest who performs the service of a High Priest and yet still be included in either one of the first two categories.

E. g., one who became leprous or sick and was unable to continue in his office.

See Deuteronomy, Chapter 20, and Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 7, which relate the command for a priest to be anointed with the anointing oil and address the army before they engage in battle.

The fact that he has been anointed does not change his status in an ultimate sense.

I.e., even though a High Priest was appointed subsequently, since he was not in office at the time the killer was sentenced to exile, the killer does not return after his death (Makkot 11b).

None of the four types of High Priests mentioned in the previous halachah were alive at that time.

Both this and the previous law refer to instances where a new High Priest had not been appointed until the sentence of exile was given. This is the Meiri’s perspective; there are differing views.

For the fundamental aspect of the killer’s atonement is achieved with the death of the High Priest.

According to Scriptural Law a priest is forbidden to marry a divorcee, and according to Rabbinic Law he is forbidden to marry a woman who has undergone the rite of chalitzah, the practice which releases a childless widow from her obligation to marry her deceased husband’s brother.
If a priest violates the prohibition against marrying a divorcee, his son is a challal and is not considered to be a priest. And if a priest marries a woman who has undergone chalitzah, his son is considered a challal according to Rabbinic Law and is likewise disqualified.
Thus, if it was discovered that a High Priest had blemished lineage of this nature, he is not a priest at all, and there is no High Priesthood. It is just as if there were no person serving in that office at all.

See Hilchot Mamrim 5:5.

The commentaries cite Chapter 5, Halachah 2.