Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., according to Scriptural Law the robber is required to pay only the worth of the goods that witnesses can testify that he took. In this instance, as reflected by the following halachah, the witnesses do not know the exact amount the robber took, and so, according to Scriptural Law, the extent of his liability could not be defined. Nevertheless, as a penalty to the robber, the Rabbis gave the person whose property was taken the option of clarifying the doubt regarding the amount plundered, by taking an oath.

The only oaths required by Scriptural Law are those enabling a defendant to support his claim to money that the plaintiff claims he owes. Our Sages (see Sh’vuot 44b) instituted several oaths to serve as the legal mechanism to enable a plaintiff to collect his claim.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 15, such a person is considered to be a robber.

As reflected by Halachah 6, this refers to an instance when the owner was home at the time the person took the utensils. If the witnesses were able to identify the utensils, an oath would not be necessary (Halachah 6; see also Halachah 12). The oath is required because they cannot identify the utensils.

A Torah scroll (Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:8). In certain circumstances, tefillin are substituted for a Torah scroll (ibid.:12).

If the owner claims that the robber took an object more valuable than the owner could be expected to have possessed in his home, his claim is not accepted.
In such an instance, the defendant (the robber) can free himself of the claim by taking a Rabbinic oath (sh’vuat hesset) that he did not take the article in question. This is the Rambam’s opinion, as stated in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:2). It is mentioned by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 90:1). These sources also quote another opinion that states that the robber is threatened with a ban of ostracism, but he is not required to take an oath (because his oath is no longer accepted).

If, however, the articles the owner claims to have been taken are too large to be carried under the robber’s cloak, the owner is not given this prerogative.
The Tur and the Ramah (op. cit.) state another condition: that it is reasonable to assume that the article that the owner claims to have been taken would be kept in the portion of the home into which the defendant entered.

The term Rabbinic oath refers to a sh’vuat hesset, a more lenient oath, in which the person taking it is not required to hold a sacred object.

The basis for his exoneration is the Talmudic principle of migo, that if the defendant wanted to lie, he could have used a more effective argument. Since he would not be held liable for that more effective argument - in this instance, the claim that he entered, but did not take anything - he is not held liable even if he claims not to have entered.
Generally, the principle of migo is not effective when it involves - as in this instance - a direct contradiction of the testimony of two witnesses. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the witnesses are testifying only about the person’s entry to the house, his word is accepted. For the entry is not a substantial matter and could have been forgotten; what is significant is whether or not he took anything, and regarding that fact, there is no contradiction between his statements and the testimony of the witnesses (Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 90).
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 90:2) follows the Rambam’s ruling, the Tur and the Ramah differ. They maintain that since the defendant contradicts the testimony of two witnesses, his word is not accepted.

The Maggid Mishneh and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 90:3) emphasize that this also refers to an instance when the person stated that he was going to take collateral for a debt owed him. Otherwise, in certain instances he could clear himself by claiming that he had purchased the goods he took.

Our translation of the latter phrase is based on the gloss of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 90:5.
As stated in Halachah 13, if the witnesses were able to identify the object that was taken, the person who took it would not be given the opportunity to clear himself by taking an oath. He is given this opportunity because the witness cannot do so (Maggid Mishneh).

Scriptural law states that although evidence from one witness is not sufficient to establish a binding obligation, it is sufficient to require the defendant to take an oath to clear himself. In this instance, although the witness cannot identify the object, the fact that he testifies that the person took something is sufficient to require an oath.

I.e., a robber is not given the prerogative of defending himself against the charges against him by taking an oath. A person who is classified as a robber based on the testimony of two witnesses is disqualified as a witness and is not given the prerogative of taking an oath. This person is given such an opportunity, because until two witnesses testify against him, he has not been classified as a robber.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this law applies even if the watchman is not financially responsible if anything is taken from the home.

The watchman’s oath is effective because he is considered to be the home owner’s agent, and we follow the principle: “A person’s agent is regarded as the person himself” (Sh’vuot 46b). The oath of the watchman’s wife is accepted because, as evident from Bava Metzia 36a, she is considered to be a partner in her husband’s responsibility.

For they have not been given the responsibility of watching the home.

Even if he knows that certain articles are missing, as long as he did not see the person take them, he does not have definite knowledge that the person took his goods.

Since two witnesses saw him take property belonging to someone else, we consider him to be a robber, whose oath is not acceptable.

It is hoped that the robber will fear the spiritual ramifications of this ban and will admit to having taken his colleague’s property.

Even if the owner claims that a greater amount was taken, the robber is required to pay only what he admits. For, as mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the homeowner does not have definite knowledge that this person took his goods.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the owner seizes possession of the robber’s property to obtain reimbursement, he must return it. The commentaries also note the contrast to Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:18 and 8:7.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the oath is required because it serves as the only basis for the plaintiff’s claim. He cannot collect money from the robber without this measure of substantiation.

Note Hilchot Mechirah 20:2, where the Rambam rules with regard to a person who purchases an article from one of five people and cannot identify the seller. Although each claims to have sold him the article, he is required only to place [an amount of money equivalent to] the purchase price between them and allow them to divide it as they see fit. Only if he is pious and desires to act beyond the measure of the law is he required to pay each one.
In the case discussed in Hilchot Mechirah, a transgression was not committed. In this instance, since the robber transgressed, he is given a penalty.
(Although the Rambam’s ruling is accepted by almost all authorities, the Siftei Cohen 365:2 defends the opinion of the Ba’al HaMa’or, who maintains that it is sufficient to leave the amount the robber admits to having taken among all the claimants, and have them divide it as they desire.)

According to Scriptural Law, a plaintiff is not entitled to collect a claim unless the defendant admits his obligation, or two witnesses attest to the claim. Despite the fact that the robber does not admit to any of the specific claims, nor are there witnesses, our Sages required him to pay all the claims as a penalty for robbery.

And the fathers died or are not present to lodge a claim.

This moral and spiritual obligation exists only in the case of a loan, and not when a similar situation occurs with regard to an entrusted article (Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 5:4).

In contrast to the previous halachah, where each of the plaintiffs lodged a claim and supported it with an oath.

100 zuz.

According to Scriptural Law, when a defendant denies entirely a claim lodged against him, the case is dismissed without requiring an oath to be taken. The rationale is that if he did in fact owe him money, he would not deny the claim entirely. Nevertheless, when the moral standards of the Jewish people declined and people began lying for their own gain, our Sages required that the defendant take a Rabbinic oath to support his claim (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:3).

Based on the principles of Biblical exegesis, Bava Kama 107a states that the oath referred to by Exodus 22:7-8 refers to an instance in which a person admits a portion of the claim made against him, but denies the remainder. See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:1.
Our Sages (loc. cit.) explain the rationale for the Torah’s requirement. We suspect that perhaps the person was liable for the entire amount and was merely trying to postpone payment because he did not have the funds available. The oath would require him to set the record straight.

I.e., a robber is not given the prerogative of taking an oath. Nevertheless, since it has not been definitively established that this person is a robber, we do not withhold that prerogative from him.
Seemingly, the person should be denied this prerogative, because he himself admitted to having committed robbery. Nevertheless, we follow the principle: “A person’s own testimony cannot be used to classify him as wicked” (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 2:3), and we therefore give him the opportunity to take the oath (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 364:8).

An act equivalent to robbery (Chapter 3, Halachah 16).

I.e., it is the defendant’s own admission that he took property that creates the difficulty. Therefore, we follow the principle of migo and accept the defense he gives. For if he had desired to lie, he could have denied the entire matter, since there are no witnesses.

Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:2.

Carrying the utensils unconcealed indicates that the person does not fear detection and would lead to the conclusion that the utensils were not taken by robbery. Nevertheless, this conclusion is not accepted.

And it is thus possible that the person who entered had purchased them from the owner previously and received his permission to take them. See Hilchot Geneivah 5:10-11.

Had the owner been present, the defendant’s claim would be accepted in such a situation, for the owner is known to sell his household goods.

The fundamental proposition is that everything that is in a person’s home is considered to be his property, and no one is allowed to take anything from him without demonstrating proof of ownership.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 90:42 states that even if the witnesses cannot identify which utensils the intruder took, if the intruder identifies the utensils (although he claims that they were sold to him), they must be returned to the original owner.

If the homeowner denies totally the intruder’s claim that he sold him the utensils, the homeowner is merely required to take a Rabbinic oath (sh’vuat hesset) to clear himself of the charge.

The Ra’avad questions how it is possible for the homeowner to issue a definite claim against the intruder if he was not present at the time of the intrusion. The Ra’avad suggests that since the owner recognizes his utensils in the possession of the intruder, his claim can be considered a definite one.
Without rejecting the Ra’avad’s suggestion, the Maggid Mishneh offers a different resolution: that an oath that comes because of the testimony of one witness does not require a definite claim on the part of the plaintiff. There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter among the halachic authorities. Rabbenu Efrayim and the Rambam’s teacher, R. Yosef Migash, maintain that there is no obligation to take an oath in such a situation, while the Ramban and others maintain that one is obligated. See the notes on Halachah 17.

The homeowner is not even required to support his claim with an oath to compel the intruder return the utensils. Afterwards, the intruder can issue a claim against the owner, and the owner must take a Rabbinic oath to vindicate himself.
This ruling applies only when the utensils are presently known to be in the possession of the intruder. Otherwise, the intruder’s claim is accepted on the basis of the principle of migo. Had he desired to lie, he could have told a better lie and said that he had already returned the utensils in question (see Sefer Me’irat Einayim 90:40).

I.e., the witness states that the intruder entered the home and took utensils. On the basis of this statement, the intruder should be classified as a “robber” and is required to reimburse the owner.
Now the only way the intruder can nullify the statement of the witness is by taking an oath to deny it. This he does not do. Indeed, he substantiates the statement of the witness, admitting that he entered the home and took utensils. The remainder of the intruder’s claim, that the utensils belonged to him, we do not accept, because it runs contrary to the assumption (chazakah) that everything in a person’s home belongs to him.

Since he cannot avail himself of the means the Torah provides for him to vindicate himself from the charges levied against him, he must pay the amount required.

This leads to a question: One might think that we should accept the intruder’s claim because of the principle of migo - i.e., had he desired to lie, he could have denied the statements of the witness entirely. This argument is not accepted, however, because the principle of migo is never employed against a chazakah. For, as stated above, the assumption that everything in a person’s home belongs to him is strong enough to counter the migo that could be offered in support of the intruder (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 364:2).

This also follows the same principle stated above. We assume that everything in a person’s possession is his own. Hence, the statement of the witness must be refuted. Since the attacker does not refute that statement, he is liable for the consequences.

The intent is a sh’vuat hesset, the oath required of anyone who denies entirely a claim made by a plaintiff.

In this instance, the plaintiff also agrees that there were twenty coins.

Although the extent of the person’s obligation is being determined by his own testimony and not by that of the witnesses, he is liable for the reasons explained by the Rambam.

This is the oath of a person who is modeh b’miktzat, he admits a portion of the claim issued against him. (See Note 30.)

Bava Metzia 5a explains that when a person is obligated to pay a portion of a claim because of the testimony of witnesses, it is equivalent to his making the admission himself (modeh b’miktzat), and he is obligated to take an oath regarding the remaining portion.
These authorities wish to expand this principle further and maintain that since the defendant becomes obligated to pay because of the testimony of one witness, he should then be obligated to take an oath conceming the other portion.

A sh’vuat hesset.

As is required when a person totally denies a claim issued against him.

The Ra’avad asks: “If the plaintiff’s claim is not considered a valid claim, why is the defendant required to pay? He cannot be considered to be obligated to take an oath unless a claim is issued against him.” The Maggid Mishneh explains that an oath required by the testimony of a witness does not have to be supported by a definite claim. See the notes on Halachah 13.

See Hilchot Geneivah 5:1, where the Rambam writes:
This is a severe sin, for it reinforces a transgressor and motivates him to steal in the future. For if he did not find a person who would purchase a stolen article from him, he would not steal. With reference to this, [Proverbs 29:24] states: “A person who shares profits with a thief hates his [own] soul.”

When the nature of an article changes and its owner despairs of its return, it is acquired by the robber.

Gittin 45a states: “The mouse is not the thief; the hole is”; for were it not for the hole that allows it to enter, the mouse could not take whatever it takes. Similarly, in the analogy, if not for the persons buying the stolen goods, the thief would not steal.

This is a general prohibition that involves leading a person astray. See Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14.

For the owner’s despair is not sufficient to transfer ownership of the article.

In this regard, we follow the principle (Bava Kama 117b): “Land can never be obtained by robbery.” Thus, the land is always considered to belong to its original owner; there is no concept of its being transferred to another person, even if the original owner despaired of its return.

Chapter 3, Halachah 9.

I.e., the trees are laid across the water as they are. This is not considered a fundamental change, unless the trees are planed and made into boards. See Chapter 2, Halachot O and 12.

Bava Kama 113b states that if the bridge is made by order of the local king or government, one is permitted to pass over it, because “the law of the land is your land.” Since the local authority has ordered that the wood be used for this purpose, that order is binding (Halachah 17; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 369:2).
Similarly, if the robber gave the bridge to the community for use and the owner despaired of the return of the trees, one is permitted to pass over it (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 369:2).

If, however, movable property obtained by robbery undergoes a fundamental change, or the owners despair of its return and it is transferred to another person, one may use it.

Violating the prohibition mentioned in Halachah 2.

Although the robber himself is still liable to return the article, since the owners despaired of its return, no one else is under such an obligation.

Or they may take a portion of the payment from one and the remainder from the other.

Although the sons are not liable on their own accord (as stated in the previous halachah), they are liable because of the debt incumbent on their father’s estate.

And thus they did not benefit at all from the robbery.
Needless to say, if the article obtained by robbery is itself intact, the heirs must return it.

There is no difference whether they are above or below majority (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 361:7).

In his gloss on Hilchot Ishut 16:7, the Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period. In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property thus rose in importance, and a creditor would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.
As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:12, this ruling has been accepted by all the [Jewish] courts of law. Thus, although the ordinance is post-Talmudic in origin, it should be adhered to because of its universal acceptance. See, however, Hilchot Ishut 16:8.

See Hilchot Geneivah 5:2.

According to Scriptural law, the purchaser of an article obtained by robbery would have to return the article to its original owner, and then sue the thief for the money that he paid him. Our Sages, however, ordained that the purchaser be reimbursed by the owner of the article for his purchase. Had they not made such an ordinance, trade in the marketplace would be severely restricted, for people would fear that they are buying stolen goods.

There is no difference whether the owner despaired before the article was sold or afterwards (Hilchot Geneivah 5:3). As long as both the owner despaired and the article was transferred to somebody other than the robber, that person acquires it. As mentioned in the notes to that halachah, the Tur and the Ramah differ with the Rambam’s ruling.

For we assume that everything that he owns was obtained through robbery.

The Maggid Mishneh notes the contrast to Hilchot Geneivah 6:1, where the Rambam states: “If the majority of a particular substance is stolen, one is forbidden to purchase it.” The Maggid Mishneh (and the Kessef Mishneh in Hilchot Geneivah) explain that there is not necessarily a contradiction. When we are speaking about a particular type of substance, when the majority of the substance is stolen we must be wary. When we are talking about a person, the fact that the majority of his property is stolen is not an indication about a particular piece of property.

See Halachah 11.

E. g., exchange larger coins for smaller ones, or vice versa.

Although the person receives the worth of the money in change, the customs-collector has a certain benefit from the transaction.
If the customs-collector requires a person to pay a certain amount, and the person does not have exact change, he is allowed to pay him the larger amount and receive the change from the customs-collector, for by doing so he is merely taking his due, and preventing the customs-collector from further gain (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 369:4).

For he is being given this in return for his own donkey. Thus, like the purchaser of an object obtained by robbery, this person is allowed to keep it as his own.

For the probability of a tax-collector returning an article he confiscated is not high.

Although the large majority of the objects in a customs collector’s possession are considered to have been acquired through robbery, it is possible that there are some that are legitimately his.

Bava Kama 114b states that this refers to a person who says: “I cannot take money that belongs to someone else.” In this instance, since it is possible that the owner did not despair of his article’s return until the other person was given it, there is somewhat of a moral [but not a direct legal] obligation for that person to return it.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 369:5) states that if the person knows that the original owner did not despair of the return of his article, the recipient is obligated to return it to him.

But not to the customs-collector.

The Rambam’s words [which are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:6)] imply that even if a gentile customs-collector was appointed by the ruling authorities, he is considered to be a robber, for we assume that he will take more than his due (Maggid Mishneh).

Even if the customs-collector is Jewish and collects merely the amount dictated by the king, he is considered to be a robber if he is not appointed by the king (or by the leaders of the Jewish community), for he has no authority to take money from another person.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 369:6) states that even if a tax - or a higher percentage of duty - is imposed upon the Jewish people alone and not on the other subjects of a kingdom, if it is imposed on all Jews uniformly, they are obligated to pay it.

This is the motivating principle for this and all the following laws in this chapter. The laws of any kingdom or government, if uniformly applied without favoritism, are binding on the land’s Jewish subjects according to Torah law.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 369:12 explains this principle as follows: The entire land is the property of the king. And a person can do whatever he wants with regard to his own property.
The Chatam Sofer offers a slightly different rationale: By making a decision to live in a particular country, a person agrees to accept its laws. He has no right to live in a country without doing so. (See Halachah 18.)
One might ask: It is known that some religious Jews are not scrupulous in their adherence to American law. How can they countenance such violations?
The truth is that they should not. No Torah authority would consent to such actions. These people’s deeds are holdovers from Eastern Europe, where the Jews were forced to live under unfair and discriminatory laws. Since those laws were not uniformly applied to all the citizens of the land, our Rabbis considered them unjust and gave people license to circumvent them. (And even then, not in all cases.) In countries where laws are uniformly applied, there is no room for such license.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 369:11) found it necessary to conclude his treatment of this subject by emphasizing that although the law of the land is binding, the Jewish people are obligated to conduct their business dealings and judge all their disputes according to Torah law. Our obligations to the law of the land encompass only our financial and personal responsibilities to the land’s welfare.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Beit Yosef and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:6), Rav Yosef Karo discusses whether this applies if the king hires out the right to impose a customs duty to other people. He rules that if a gentile purchases this right, it is permitted to deceive him and withhold the customs duty.

See also Hilchot Melachim 4:1, with regard to the authority granted a Jewish king to impose taxes and customs duties.

I.e., rather than have his tax-collectors spend their time searching for all the owners of the field, the king decrees that the property tax should be paid by the person collecting the harvest. The later authorities question whether a sharecropper or a worker can be held responsible.

Ulam HaMishpat cites as an example King David’s seizure of an estate granted to Mefiboshet, the son of King Saul, because Mefiboshet failed to support him at the time of Avshalom’s uprising (II Samuel, Chapter 16). Although Shabbat 56a, b criticizes David for this action, the criticism is not for the confiscation of the estate, but for judging Mefiboshet on the basis of the slanderous statements of his servant.
There is, however, a slight difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. In Hilchot Melachim 3:8, the Rambam states that a king may impose any form of corporal punishment for disobedience; he may even take a person’s life. He may not, however, confiscate the person’s property.

In contrast to property obtained by robbery from which it is forbidden to benefit, as explained in Halachah 3.

I.e., if they call the case to a Jewish court, the judges will not order the purchaser to return the field.

Since all kings are given such authority, exercising this authority is not considered to be robbery.

The source of legal authority for that country.

The classic example being Achav’s acquisition of the vineyard of Navot (I Kings, Chapter 21).

From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that, as mentioned in the notes above, even if the king’s laws discriminate against a particular nation - e.g., the Jews - as long as they are the uniform law of the country and are not aimed at seizing the property of a particular individual, they are binding.

Generally, in Talmudic times, the law was that a person can be sold as a servant for not paying the head tax, but that his property could not be confiscated (Bava Batra 55a).

The Ramban differs with the Rambam on this point, maintaining that when a king decrees a law that does not conform to the accepted standards of law, it is not binding, and the seizure of property on this basis is considered to be robbery. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:9) follows the Rambam’s ruling, and the Ramah does not object.

From Bava Metzia 73b it appears that this refers to a person who paid the property taxes voluntarily. In return, he is merely entitled to the benefit from the property.
Thus, when the owner returns, he does not have to repurchase the land; all that is necessary is that he pay the taxes that the other person paid. If he pays these taxes, however, the person who paid the taxes does not have to pay the owner for the benefit he received in the interim (Maggid Mishneh).
As stated above, if the king’s tax collectors desire, they may sell a field because of an owner’s failure to pay taxes. In that instance, the owner does not have the option of paying the taxes and receiving the field.

The Rambam restates this concept in Hilchot Avadim 1:8. In his gloss on that text, the Ra’avad differs and maintains that the person who did not pay the tax can be compelled to do work that is worth more than the amount of the tax, and yet the person who paid the tax is not considered to have received interest. The rich man may not, however, compel the poor man to work excessively.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam is stating that he must be treated as a Hebrew servant and not as a Canaanite servant. Therefore, the person who paid the tax cannot compel him to perform denigrating tasks like carrying his clothes to the bathhouse or removing his shoes. See Hilchot Avadim 1:7.
See also Halachah 8 of that source, which states that if a person does not conduct himself as befits a Jew, he may be treated as a slave.

See the contrast to Halachah 3. When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:2) states that one is permitted to benefit from the bridge even if the king’s subjects took the lumber from only one person, instead of distributing the financial burden evenly among many subjects.

Hilchot Melachim 5:3 cites this principle in connection with wartime. From this halachah, it would appear that even when a country is at peace, a king has this authority.

I.e., the acceptance of the king’s laws is dependent on the subjects’ willful recognition of him as their leader. In doing so, they become duty bound to follow his laws.

Our Sages illustrate this instance by citing the example of a certain ben Natzar, a robber-king whose bands controlled several sections of Babylonia at one point of Talmudic history. A more recent example can be given of the various militia who ruled different portions of Russia in the period immediately following the Bolshevik revolution.

The Rambam has not completed his discussion of the principles governing property obtained by robbery. He mentions these laws here - although they are relevant, and to a certain extent repeated, with regard to the obligation to return lost articles - to emphasize that a person who takes an article in such a situation is not considered to be a robber.

I.e., if the finder knows that the owners have despaired.

For this is an obvious indication that they have not despaired of the article’s return. See the notes on the following halachah.

This does not necessarily refer to divers finding articles on the sea bed. The intent is also articles found near the sea, that were washed away when the tide came in and then discovered when the tide went out (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 269:7).

I.e., one heard a statement to that effect from them.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that from Bava Metzia 22b and 27a, it appears that if the owners have no ordinary means of recovering their article, we assume that they have despaired of its recovery. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that, as reflected in Chapter 11, Halachah 10 (see also Chapter 14, Halachah 4), the Rambam also accepts this principle. The present halachot are referring to instances where it is within the owners’ power to recover their article.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 259:7) follows the perspective of the Ra’avad and the Tur, and states that in these instances even if the owner is present and shouts that he does not despair of the article’s return, the finder may keep the article he discovers. The Ramah adds that it is proper, however, to go beyond the letter of the law and to return the article to its owners.
The source for the Rambam’s ruling is a difference of opinion between Ravvah and Abbaye (Bava Metzia 22a). Although in differences of opinion between the two, the halachah ordinarily follows Ravvah, this is one of the few instances where the halachah follows Abbaye.

When, however, the robber is Jewish, the case must be heard before a Torah court, and a Torah court will not require a robber to return anything unless there are two witnesses to the crime.

Thus, the owner will appreciate the removal of the cress.

At which point, it will be useful for its seeds (Bava Metzia 107a).

The rationale is that since it is not in the midst of the flax, it will not cause much damage.

Chapter 13, Halachah 14.

For our Sages have deemed the hay and the straw ownerless, as a penalty for causing an obstruction to passersby.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:15.

In contrast to hay and straw, there is no advantage to a piece of feces being trod on. Therefore, our Sages did not penalize the owner of the piece of feces by declaring it ownerless.

I.e., any place where large numbers of people gather.

Since the clothes were exchanged unknowingly, the garment in the person’s possession belongs to someone else, and he has no right to use it.
Moreover, even if that person’s own garment is lost, he must return the garment he took to its rightful owner. It is forbidden for him to condition his return of the garment on his receipt of his own garment (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 136:1).

Here too, it is likely that he is using an article belonging to someone else, and that person has not given permission for its use.

If, however, the original owner of the article comes to claim it and states that he never gave the craftsman permission to sell it, the recipient must return it to him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 136:2).

And is disqualified as a witness (Hilchot Edut 10:4).

The term “set doves into flight” is mentioned by Sanhedrin 24b. There are two interpretations given by the commentaries: that offered by the Rambam, and racing doves. The Rambam alludes to the latter interpretation in Halachah 10.

In a settled area, one can assume - as the Rambam continues to explain - that those doves brought back by the person’s own doves belong to others. If, however, one sets doves into flight in a desert, one may assume that the doves brought back by his own doves are ownerless. Hence, he is not disqualified.

Although a person does not have a claim to the doves in his dovecote according to Scriptural law, for he has not acquired them through a proper kinyan (deed of acquisition), our Sages ordained that they be considered his property in order to foster peaceful relations in the community. (See the parallels at the conclusion of this chapter.) Therefore, taking these doves is considered to be robbery only according to Rabbinic law.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 370:2, which suggests that a person who brings a domesticated animal should be considered a robber according to Scriptural law. For a domesticated animal is usually acquired in a lawful manner by its owner.

A mil is 2000 cubits - approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

Beyond this distance, one may assume that the doves come from outside the settled area and are ownerless.

And they are accustomed to flying greater distances.

The Rambam’s wording indicates that there is no difficulty in snaring the doves from the dovecote, and the only difficulty is in snaring those that come from the settled area. With regard to a dovecote owned by the person himself or one that is ownerless, there is no difficulty, but a problem arises with regard to a dovecote owned by a gentile. As the Rambam states in the first chapter of these halachot, it is forbidden to take the property of a gentile. Why then can one set up a snare near a gentile’s dovecote?
The Hagahot Maimoniot explain that even a Jew does not have a claim of ownership over doves according to Scriptural Law; his ownership is the result of a Rabbinic decree to foster peaceful relations in the community, and our Rabbis did not enact such decrees in favor of gentiles.

Because there is a concentration of doves in this place, even doves from distance places will be attracted to it.

So they will not eat the seeds or the produce grown in the gardens of the village. Although doves fly further than 50 cubits, we assume they will look for their food in their dovecote or in its immediate surroundings (Bava Kama 23a).

We assume that the previous owner of the field had entered into an arrangement with his neighbors allowing him to construct the dovecote. The new purchaser can thus continue in the path of his predecessor.

This is slightly more than ten cubits.

Moreover, if the dovecote falls, he may rebuild it in its original place (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 155:24).
The Shulchan Aruch mentions this law in the section concerning the distance by which neighbors must separate elements that may cause damage from property belonging to another person. The Rambam, by contrast, does not mention this law in Hilchot Sh’chenim, where he discusses such issues. This leads to the conclusion that if a person does construct a dovecote near a colleague’s field and the doves cause damage, he does not hold the owner of the dovecote liable. See Kitzot HaShulchan 155:9 who mentions that there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim concerning this issue.

In contrast to the definition of robbery according to Scriptural law, which is taking another person’s property by force.
Based on Sanhedrin 25a, it appears that the Rambam considers the loser’s consent as an asmachta, a commitment that he did not make wholeheartedly and did not expect to fulfill. Therefore, it is not binding (see Hilchot Mechirah 21:3), and taking his money is considered to be robbery.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s view, noting that there is give and take on this issue in the Talmudic passage cited above and it appears that the conclusion is that gambling is not considered robbery, even according to Rabbinic law. The Maggid Mishneh [and the Kessef Mishneh (Hilchot Edut 10:4)] explain that from Shabbat 149b, it appears that gambling is forbidden as robbery by Rabbinic law.
[There remains a slight difficulty however, since the Rambam’s own words in Hilchot Edut appear to indicate that gambling is not considered robbery even according to Rabbinic law. (See also the gloss of the Radbaz on Hilchot Edut.)]
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 370:2) quotes the Rambam’s opinion. The Ramah (based on the Tur) differs and maintains that gambling is not considered robbery. He cites earlier statements (Choshen Mishpat 207:13), where he maintains that when people are playing with money on the table, the winner may keep his gambling profits. When, however, they are playing on trust, the loser is not obligated to pay.

For since the gentile consents to the sport, taking his money is not considered robbery.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:3), where the Rambam states:
It is fitting for a person to occupy himself... with only these two matters: wisdom to bring fulfillment to his soul, or financial activity - e.g., a profession or commerce. And it is fitting to spend less time in the latter and more in the former, as [our Sages] said (Avot 4:10): “Minimize your business activities and occupy yourself with the Torah.”

Gittin 59b states that the Rabbis forbade taking the snared animals in order to foster peaceful and neighborly relations.

In order for the owner of the snare to acquire them, he must take possession of them through a formal kinyan. Gittin, ibid., explains that this applies only when the snares do not have a receptacle. If they do have a receptacle, having the animal lodge in the receptacle is sufficient for it to be acquired according to Scriptural law (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 370:4).

I.e., they are not the private property of the person in whose land they lie. Anyone may draw water from them.

When produce is forgotten by its owner, it must be abandoned and left for the poor (Deuteronomy 24:19).

Since the poor person has not performed a formal kinyan, he has not acquired them according to Scriptural law. Hence, the prohibition against taking them is merely Rabbinic in origin.

By taking them in his hand, the poor man executes a kinyan, and the olives are considered to be his property according to Scriptural law. If another man takes them, the poor man can have them expropriated by a court.

In this instance as well, they have not been acquired via a kinyan.

This is also a decree instituted to foster peaceful and neighborly relations (Bava Kama 114b).

I.e., if the bees rest on a branch, he may not cut down the branch to take them all at once.
The governing principle is that the owner of the bees cannot purposely cause damage to his colleague’s property in order to retrieve his bees.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 274) quotes Rabbenu Asher’s opinion that this is permitted. The Ramah cites both views.

The Rambam is referring to the following situation: A swarm of bees left a person’s property. He pursued them and found them on the property of another person. The latter claims that this swarm of bees did not belong to the person seeking them. If a woman or a child makes statements to support the seeker, he is granted the swarm of bees.
When does this apply? When they took his side on their own initiative in the course of the argument. If, however, he asks them to serve as witnesses, their testimony is not accepted.

Hilchot Edut 9:2.7.

This indicates the power with which the Sages invested their decrees regarding financial matters.

See the following chapter, where this obligation is discussed.