Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day
Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 5, Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 6, Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 7
Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 5
Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 6
Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 7
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For the prooftext says “No …. “Although setting an entity afire is significant only ifone sets afire an olive-sized portion (as stated in Halachah 3), if one mixes a small amount of a leavening agent or a sweetener together with other substances the size of an olive, one is liable for setting the mixture on fire.
Devash, the term used by the prooftext and the Rambam, means "honey." Here it is interpreted in a broader sense applying to date honey, bee-honey, and sweet sap from other fruits.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 98) and Sefer HaCVuch (mitzvah 117) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
If, however, he sets them afire for the sake of fuel, he does not incur liability, as stated in Halachah 3.
Although one is liable for lashes for each individually, since both transgressions are mentioned in the same verse, one is liable for only one set of lashes. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that he is liable for two sets of lashes.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 4:5) states that honey would greatly enhance the aroma of the incense offering. Nevertheless, it is forbidden by Divine decree.
On the Inner Altar where the incense offering is brought. If he would offer the incense on the Outer Altar, he would not be liable for lashes, because that is not the place where it is burnt (Kessef Mishneh).
I.e., not together with a sacrifice.
As explained in the following halachah.
All of the entities the Rambam mentions are sacrifices or portions of sacrifices that were intended to be eaten.
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:1; 9:1, which outlines the portions of the sacrifices that were eaten.
Ibid. 10:1.
lbid. 12:9.
Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:12.
Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:7.
lbid. 12:3.
Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:11.
Hilchot Mechusrei KapParah 4:2-3.
From the exegesis of Leviticus 2:12, the Sifra and Menachot 57b derive that the altar’s ramp is equivalent to the altar in this context.
The verse speaks about the two loaves offered on Shavuot and from them, inference is drawn to other sacrificial entities.
Although the Rambam considers this prohibition as Scriptural in origin, he does not consider it as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot, Moreover, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that although this prohibition is derived from the exegesis of the verse cited above, since it is not explicitly stated in a verse, lashes are not given for its violation.
Here the prohibition applies only to the altar and not to the ramp.
Which was designated to be eaten and not con3umed.
I.e., non-kosher. Conversely, in this context, “pure” means kosher.
And, generally, lashes are given only when a negative commandment is violated and not when a positive commandment is violated.
As stated in Deuteronomy 14:6; see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:1.
In the verse stated at the conclusion of this halachah.
Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:1-2. There the Rambam explains that “with regard to the camel, the pig, the rabbit, and the hare, [Leviticus 11:4] states: ‘These you may not eat from those which chew the cud and have split hoofs.’ From this, you see that they are forbidden by a negative commandment, even though they possess one sign of kashrut.” And he concludes “Certainly, this applies to other non-kosher domesticated animals and wild beasts that do not have any signs of kashrut.” Thus although other non-kosher animals are not specifically mentioned in the prohibition, since they are included in the converse of the positive commandment, we conclude that the negative commandment applies to them as well.
The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, maintaining that just as one does not receive lashes for offering an animal with a blemish, so too, he does not receive lashes for offering an impure animal. His objection appears to be based on the principle that punishment is not given for transgressions that are derived by logical inference. Accordingly, since the obligation for lashes is explicit, even though it could be derived by logical inference, we should not come to such a conclusion. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain the Rambam’s perspective: these cannot be considered as prohibitions derived from logical inferences, because they are forbidden due to the positive commandmept. Logic only expands the scope of the person’s liability.
All sacrifices are brought from behemot, domesticated animals, or fowl, not from chayot, wild beasts.
The term tzon, translated here as "flocks," can be used in reference to both sheep and goats. This is the intent here.
This is a general principle, applicable in many different contexts. See Chapter 3, Halachah 8, Hilchot Ishut 1:8, et al.
The Radbaz quotes Bava Kama 66b which explains that this refers to an instance where a person steals an animal set aside as a sacrifice and offers it as that sacrifice. It reaches that conclusion, for it is obvious that if the animal was not consecrated beforehand, its offering is not acceptable, for a person cannot consecrate an object that does not belong to him.
When it comes to questions of monetary law, the owner’s despair of the object’s return is not enough to cause it to be acquired by the thief (Hilchot Geneivah 5:2-3; Hilchot Gezeilah VAveidah 2:1). Nevertheless, it is possible to say that according to Scriptural Law, the owner’s despair is enough to effect the transfer of the property; further requirements are Rabbinic in origin and the Sages did not apply their decrees with regard to a sacrifice (Kessef Mishneh). Alternatively, with regard to questions of monetary law, a change of possession together with the owner’s despair is sufficient to effect the transfer of the property (Hilchot Geneivah, loc. cit.). Similarly, in this instance, consecration of the animal is comparable to a change of possession (Lechem Mishneh, gloss to Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:14).
The Rambam’s words imply that certainly the concept would apply if a burnt-offering was involved, but even when a sin-offering is involved, the principle is applied, implying that a sin-offering is a more severe issue than a burnt offering. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the word “even” should be omitted, implying that the two types of sacrifices are of equal standing. (A similar concept applies with regard to the conclusion of the halachah: The Ma’aseh Rokeach suggests amending the text to read: “How much more so does this apply with regard to a burnt-offering?!” I.e., according to the Rambam, the sin offering is considered more severe, while the Ma’aseh Rokeach maintains that the burnt offering deserves more weight.) The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam uses “even” in reference to the first clause - even though the priests partake of such a saccifice, it is unacceptable.
The Radbaz asks: How can our Sages rule that the sacrifice is unacceptable and require that the person bring another offering? Since, according to Scriptural Law, he has fulfilled his obligation, bringing the second sacrifice is in fact transgressing, for he is slaughtering an ordinary animal in the Temple Courtyard (see Hilchot Shechitah 2:1). The Radbaz answers that from this we see the power of the Sages: that if there is a significant reason - as in this instance their decrees can nullify the validity of the first sacrifice. Hence, when the person brings the second sacrifice, he is bringing a sacrifice required of him, not an ordinary animal.
But not a sin-offering, for a sin-offering must be brought explicitly for the sake of the person receiving atonement (Radbaz).
I.e., he did not specify the reason for which it should be offered.
Le., it is as if he had the animal sacrificed himself.
Produce from which the agricultural obligations of terumah and the tithes were not separated.
This refers to produce from the five species of grain which is forbidden before the offering of the omer on the sixteenth of Nisan or the passage of that day.
A mixture of terumah and ordinary produce which may be eaten only by a priest. This is unacceptable, because the offerings must come from produce which is permitted to every Jew, not only a priest (Pesachim 48a).
The substances mentioned in the first clause, though forbidden at present, will ultimately be permitted, while those in this clause will never be permitted. Moreover, it is forbidden not only to partake of them, but also to benefit from them.
Produce that grows during the first three years of a tree’s growth or replanting.
When a species of grain or vegetable is sown together with a vineyard, both plants become forbidden (ibid.:6-8).
This is a principle applicable in many other contexts as well. For example, Hilchot Lulav 8:1 speaks of being unable to fulfill that mitzvah with a stolen Lulav.
I.e., once it is consecrated, it may never be used for ordinary purposes again, but must be destroyed like consecrated property that was disqualified.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 10:6), the Rambam uses the previous verse in that Biblical passage as a prooftext.
Implied is that these breads should be the first offerings brought from the new flour. Although it is permitted to be used by an ordinary person beforehand, it should not be used for sacrifices before then.
Since it is permitted to be used by a private person, after the fact, it is acceptable (op. cit.).
I.e., was placed with one’s merchandise and was not intended to be used for one’s individual purposes. Such wine is forbidden to be used on festivals, but not on the Sabbath. See Hilchot Shvitat Yom Tov 1:17.
Although the Rabbis forbade the use of such wine for private use, it is fundamentally permitted. Hence using it for a libation is not considering as bringing a forbidden substance as an offering. The Radbaz states that the Sages never extended their prohibition to encompass sacrifices.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 62) and Sefer HaCVuch (mitzvah 119) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
This commandment is mentioned many times in this text; among the references: Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 2:1; 6:4, 21-22; 7:1-2; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 4:10; 6:3; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:16.
Although Menachot 21a explains that this concept can be derived from a verse, apparently, the Rambam does not accept the exegesis mentioned there.
See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot6:12.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 99) and Sefer HaCVuch (mitzvah 118) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The question is raised: Why is he liable for lashes? Lashes are not given for a transgression that does not involve a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2). In this instance, seemingly, the omission of salt does not involve a deed. In reply, it is explained that the offering of the sacrifice without salt is a deed and thus warrants lashes.
See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:16 where this concept is discussed. Salt is not placed on the entire meal offering, only on that fistful which is offered on the altar.
Although a private individual may donate wood for the altar (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 6:9), he may not demand that this wood be used for his own sacrifice.
See the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus.
See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 5:17 where the chamber is mentioned
See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Chapter 2, Halachah 8; Chapter 3, Halachah 11; Chapter 7, Halachah 11.
As will be explained, every sacrifice must be accompanied by a meal offering that is mixed with oil and a wine libation.
The offerings.
See Halachah 9.
See Halachah 11.
See Halachah 14.
See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 5:8 which explains that there was a special chamber set aside in the Women’s Courtyard where the priests would check the wood to make sure it was not worm-infested.
Because then, it is impossible to scrape away the worm-infested portion in a desirable manner.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 3.
As in Chapter 1, Halachah 2.
See Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:3, 18:5, and notes for a definition of this punishment and the situations where it is applied. See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:7).
As explained in Hilchot Arachin 5:9, blemished animals are the subject of the above verse. They can be “caused to stand before a priest.” All of the above are inanimate objects that cannot be “caused to stand before a priest.”
The fine flour, wine, and oil. Wood, fowl, and sacred utensils may never be redeemed.
Hilchot Shegagot 10:12. The verses and the latter source refer to an adjustable guilt offering. If a person was poor and therefore set aside a meal offering as required of one of his financial status and then became wealthy, he may sell the meal offering and use it to buy an animal as is required of him in his new financial position.
The flour, wine, and oil that accompany a sacrifice.
The Radbaz states that this refers to offerings that became impure while on the top of the altar. If they became impure beforehand, they should not be brought there to be burnt.
See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 10:6.
This is speaking about a situation in which the water that was taken for a libation before the Sabbath of the Sukkot and became impure on that Sabbath. We are forced to say this, for if we were speaking of an ordinary weekday, there would be no difficulty in going down to the Gichon Stream and getting new water. On the Sabbath, this is forbidden and the only alternative is restoring the ritual purity of the water (Rashi, Meiri, Pesachim 34b).
Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 2:21 which explains that when a receptacle containing water has an ordinary sized opening and is submerged in a mikveh, the water can regain its status of ritual purity.
Even though the water regained its purity, it is no longer acceptable as an offering. This is a Rabbinic stringency (Pesachim, loc. cit.; see Halachah 8). Instead, water for the libation should be taken from the basin (see Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 10:10).
57 cc according to Shiurei Torah, 100 cc according to Chazon Ish.
The rationale is that as stated in Hilchot Tuma’at Ochalin 4:1, impure food will not cause other foods or liquids to contract ritual impurity unless the impure food is the size of an egg sized portion.
I.e., were the liquids to be of the body of the fruit, they would be considered impure like the fruit itself. It is, however, considered as if they are distinct entities (ibid. 1:2) and they do not have the possibility of becoming impure until they emerge from the fruit. Hence, if there is less than an egg-sized portion, the liquids will not become impure.
Even though it is acceptable with regard to terumah.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 4:5) the Rambam writes that the only unfashioned wood which ever contracts ritual impurity is wood used for the altar.
Wine sweetened due to exposure to the sun; alternatively, wine to which a sweetener was added (see Hilchot Shabbat 29:14).
Wine stored in a utensil with a foul odor [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:6)].
This improves the flavor of the wine. See Rav Kappach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.).
Grape juice that has not fermented.
All of these types of wine have an inferior flavor.
As explained in Hilchot Rotzei’ach UShemirat Nefesh 11:6-8; 10, when wine was left uncovered, it is forbidden because it is possible that a snake might have deposited venom in it. Hence, it is forbidden for the altar.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 5.
Even slightly worm-ridden.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 5:14), the Rambam defines solet, translated as “fine flour,” as the flour of substance that remains in the process of refinement and kemach, translated as “flour dust,” as the dust that is cast off.
Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:2).
All of these types of flour are of inferior quality (ibid.).
And the grain growing from them is an entirely new entity. Were they not to have been sown, flour made from them would not be acceptable.
In vinegar or in brine.
As explained above, fruit grown under these conditions is of inferior quality.
Both individual and communal offerings [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:1)].
Grown in the present year.
The offering of barley brought on the second day of Pesach.
These concepts are evident from Leviticus 23:10 and, 16-17. See also Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:5-6; 8:2.
This chapter focuses on one fundamental concept: that ideally the entities used for the sacrifices should be of the highest quality.
As evident from Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 16:4, here, the Rambam is focusing on the optimum manner of fulfilling the mitzvah, not on the letter of the law.
Because of their fat (Rav Yosef Corcus).
All of the names mentioned here are regions or cities in Eretz Yisrael. Each respective place was renowned for the quality of the particular item associated with it.
I.e., wood that has not been used for any other purpose first.
Oil and wine are considered basic necessities and hence, the trees and vines from which they derive should not be cut down for use as fuel for the altar. The Radbaz explains that olive trees and grape vines also frequently have knots and produce smoke that is undesirable.
Which do not produce edible fruit [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Tamid)]. This atoned for the Sin of the Tree of Knowledge which was a fig tree [Rashi (Yoma 58a)].
Our translation is based on Rashi’s Commentary to Tamid 29b. Literally, the words would be translated as “oily trees.”
For this was the size of the pyre.
Even though the size of the altar as a whole was increased.
I.e., the practice to be described delineates the optimum manner of preparing flour for the meal offerings. Flour which was prepared in another manner may also be acceptable.
Leaving the field fallow improved the quality of the grain it produces.
Plowing it each time [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:2)].
Although this falls on 5 Shvat which is in the midst of winter. “the sun already has the power to shine upon it” (Rashi, Menachot 85a) and improve its growth.
To remove any other seeds and to select the highest quality wheat (Radbaz).
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 6:5) the Rambam interprets this as striking the wheat powerfully with one’s hand so that the dust will be removed from them.
Crushing them with his feet to crack the shells (ibid.).
This is also the optimum manner to prepare wine. Wine prepared by other means is also acceptable.
The Radbaz explains that the more barrels are stored together, the less each one is exposed to air. Hence, there is less deterioration in the flavor of the wine.
If the jug is filled to the brim, the vapors from the wine will have no chance to rise. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 8:6).
In that source, the Rambam explains that in the wines that he is familiar with, this phenomenon takes place only in the superior wines. He supposes that in Eretz Yisrael, this phenomenon would occur only with the inferior wines.
Until then, the fermentation process will not be complete. The Radbaz writes that although the Rambam’s wording does not imply this, from the beginning of the fortieth day onward, the wine is acceptable.
Once its flavor has begun to spoil, however, it is unacceptable. See Chapter 6, Halachah 10.
Apparently, the Rambam is speaking about a situation when the majority of the crop is not ready to be picked and the ones he selects are those of the highest quality.
I.e., one of the techniques of pressing olives was to put them under pressure from a heavy beam. This would squeeze out more oil from them.
Readjusting the beam will apply greater pressure and squeeze out more oil.
Without separating the good from the bad. This is speaking about the stage when most of the olives are ready for picking. Thus the ones he picks are not necessarily the most choice.
These are olives which grew late and never ripened sufficiently.
Although they were crushed and thus dregs will be produced, they were not, however, pressed with a beam, which would produce more dregs.
Menachot 86b states that the Torah allowed the inferior types of oil to be used, so that the price of superior oil would not rise and thus be prohibitively expensive for the people at large.
For the olives are superior and they are not pressed, so that few dregs will be included.
The second category uses superior olives, but they are pressed, so that they will have dregs. The fourth uses inferior olives, but they are not pressed, so there will be no dregs.
Even though the olives of the third category will have been pressed twice, because they are of a superior quality, they are equal to those of a lower quality that were pressed less. Similarly, those of the seventh category, though pressed only once are of inferior quality to those of the fifth category.
Even though those of the sixth category have been pressed twice, they are of a higher quality than those of the eighth.
For they are both of a lower category and have been pressed twice.
“The light.”
I.e., excluding oil produced by pressing.
Even though the Rambam mentioned this point in the previous halachah, he mentions it again here to emphasize that this concept is also derived from the exegesis of the verse. It is necessary that. the oil flow from crushing only “for the light,” and not for the meal offerings.
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 16:3-4.
See also Hilchot Terumah 5:1 which state that the finest grain should be separated as terumah.
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