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Chullin I 02b.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 182) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 452) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This prohibition is also one of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants (Hilchot Melachim 8:10).

Since the species is forbidden, no additional prohibitions apply.

The Merkevat HaMishneh notes that this represents a difference between this prohibition and the prohibition against ritual impurity stemming from a limb where the limb must possess a bone. He explains that there a bone is necessary, for the source of the impurity is that of a corpse, and a corpse possesses bones.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and does not accept this distinction. He maintains that partaking of part of an organ is also · included in the prohibition against partaking of a treifah.

Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

We do not consider an organ or limb as a distinct creature and hold him liable, as he is liable for partaking of an ant, even if it is smaller than an olive. Chullin l 02a explains that we require an olive-sized portion for the verse that states the prohibition speaks of “partak [ing] of the soul.” The term partaking is appropriate only when one eats an olive-sized portion.

Since one did not alter its natural form, one is liable for the bones and sinews as well.

Even though he did not detach the meat from the sinews and the bones, since he cut the limb and distorted its natural form, we consider only the meat and not the other elements of the limb.

This explains why the person is liable for the prohibition against partaking of a treifah, for seemingly, we should follow the principle “a prohibition does not fall on a substance which is already forbidden.” This principle does not apply in this instance, for here, both prohibitions take effect at the same time. Hence, one does not take precedence over the other and the transgressor is liable for both. (See Hile hot Issurei Bi’ ah l 7:8-1 O; Chapter 14, Halachah 18, for explanation regarding these principles.)

He is liable for both prohibitions, because the prohibition against partaking of a limb from a living animal is of a wider scope (issur mosif, i.e., it is forbidden to gentiles as well as Jews) than the prohibition against partaking of forbidden fat (Lechem Mishneh).
Kin ‘at Eliyahu asks why a limb taken from a forbidden species is not forbidden. Here also, the prohibition against taking a limb from a living animal is of a wider scope than that against partaking of a forbidden species.

The two mentioned in the previous clause and the prohibition against partaking of a treifah.
He is liable for all three prohibitions, because the prohibition against partaking of forbidden fat is of a wider scope than the prohibition against partaking of a treifah and the prohibition against partaking of limb of a living animal is of a wider scope than the other two (ibid.).

From a comparison to the following halachah, it appears that this prohibition is of Scriptural origin.

Chullin 74a makes this distinction between an animal that dies naturally and one which is ritually slaughtered.

For it is considered as part of the animal.

Without detaching it.

In Hilchot Shechitah 8:11-12, the Rambam mentions instances where a broken bone causes an animal to be designated as treifah. Here the Rambam is speaking of instances where the broken bone does not cause the animal to be treifah and the question involves merely the broken limb. May the meat from that limb be eaten or not?

I.e., when one would calculate the entire amount of the flesh, it would be large enough to cover the majority of the bone. Nevertheless, it is not located in large sections, but is instead, made up of many small pieces.

None of these perforations, however, caused a decrease in the mass of the flesh.

Chullin 76b mentions all these circumstances without reaching a final ruling regarding them. Hence we rule stringently.

I.e., organs that do not cause an animal to be considered as a treifah.

This distinction is made on the basis of Chullin 68a, 69a. The rationale is that the animal’s organs are an integral part of it. On the basis of Deuteronomy 14:5, “You shall eat it,” our Sages explain that when it is whole, one may eat everything within it, but not when it is lacking. The fetus, however, is not considered an integral part of the animal. Hence, as long as its limbs have not emerged outside the womb, they are permitted with the slaughter of the mother.

From this halachah and Halachah 11, we see that there are two prohibitions involved: partaking of a limb considered treifah and partaking of a limb from a living animal. At times, one applies, and in other situations, the other applies.

The Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh interpret this as referring to a situation where the fetus was not born before the mother was ritually slaughtered (see also Halachah 12). Instead, the mother was slaughtered while the fetus was still in its womb. Afterwards, the fetus was taken out and it survived. If, however, the fetus is born before the mother. is slaughtered, the leg which emerged is not forbidden. When the calf is slaughtered, all of its legs are permitted. There are authorities who · differ whether this is the Rambam’s intent. Most, however, agree that this ruling should be followed in practice [Rama (Yoreh De’ah 14:2)].

I.e., it is not its natural place.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

As evident from a comparison to Halachah 9, the prohibition against partaking of a treifah applies only when the limb was cut off following the ritual slaughter of the mother.

For the ruling is dependent on the mother’s condition, not that of the fetus. Even if the fetus dies, it is permitted to partake of it after the slaughter of the mother (see Tosafos, Chullin 72a).

I.e., he is not liable for lashes for transgressing the prohibition against partaking of a limb of a living animal. As reflected by Halachah 9, he violates the prohibition against partaking of a treifah.

And not for either the prohibition against partaking of a treifah or a nevelah. The death of the mother causes the limb to be considered as if it fell off during the animal’s lifetime. See Hilchot Sha ‘ar Avot HaTumah 2:9 which explains the parallels that apply with regard to the laws of ritual impurity.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this also refers to a situation where the fetus was born after the mother was slaughtered.

Chullin 69a asks whether this milk can be compared to milk from a kosher animal or not. The distinction is that a kosher animal will become permitted if it is slaughtered in the ritual manner and this limb will never become permitted.

With regard to a live fetus, see the following halachah. With regard to a dead fetus, the Rambam is emphasizing that it is not considered as a separate entity (in which case it would be forbidden as a nevelah), but instead as one of the limbs of the mother.

Chapter 4, Halachah 5, states that a placenta that is expelled together with the newborn is forbidden to be eaten. In this instance, however, since the placenta has not been expelled, it is still considered part of the mother’s body and permitted.

Like the limb of a fetus that emerged before ritual slaughter (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra’avad states that the placenta is comparable to an animal’s waste products and therefore is not forbidden at all. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling.

Which was not permitted because of the slaughter of the mother.

I.e., the period of gestation was full term.

And can be killed in any manner.

Because of the impression that might be created (Chullin 75b).

Without slaughtering it according to Torah law.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 13:3) states that at present, we do not permit any fetus found in the womb of a treifah even if it was ritually slaughtered.

Since the slaughter of the mother does not cause the mother to be permitted, it is not effective with regard to the fetus.

Since the period of gestation has not been completed, it is not considered as an independent entity. Even if it is taken from the womb and lives for a brief time, ritual slaughter does not cause it to be permitted.

Although blood is a liquid, the Rambam mentions an olive-sized portion, i.e., a measure of mass, rather than a fourth of a lug, a liquid measure. It is possible to explain that since the Torah uses the word “eat” while stating the prohibition, the intent is the same measure that applies with regard to other prohibitions involving “eating,” an olive-sized portion.

The soul is cut off in this world (i.e., the person dies prematurely) and in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1). Whenever a person is liable for karet, he is punished by lashes if he was warned before committing the transgression. If lashed, he is absolved from karet.

This term is used to differentiate this offering from a guilt offering whose value is adjusted according to the person's means.

In contrast to the prohibition against partaking of cheilev, forbidden fat, which applies only with regard to kosher species of domesticated animals.

I.e., the verse uses the term behemah which more specifically refers to domesticated animals and mentions both domesticated animals and wild beasts.

One may, however, be liable for another prohibition as the Rambam continues to explain.

The Ra’avad and the Maggid Mishneh note that Keritot 21a states that it is permitted to partake of fish blood that has been collected only when fish scales are placed in it. Otherwise, it is forbidden because of the impression that may be created. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 66:9) quotes this view.

As apparent from Chapter 3, Halachot 1 and 6, although this prohibition is of Scriptural origin, it is not punishable by lashes. See also Chapter 3, Halachah 22.

Chapter 2, Halachot 9-10.

I.e., the same blood that he is permitted to swallow.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 5:1) where he states that this is the blood of fundamental importance. See also Halachot 5-6.

I.e., blood that flows slowly after the majority of the animal's blood has already been discharged. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the prohibition against the blood of the liver is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin. See the gloss of Rav Moshe HaCohen.

The term “blood within the limbs” appears to refer to blood that is absorbed within the meat and organs of the animal. As indicated later in this chapter and as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 67:1) this blood is forbidden only when it emerges from the meat or moves from place to place within the meat. See the notes to Halachah 12.

There is a distinction between the blood of a fetus and its fat (which is permitted in certain circumstances, see Chapter 7, Halachah 3). The rationale is that the verse forbidding blood prohibits “any blood” (Lechem Mishneh).

As stated in Halachah 3.

According to the Maggid Mishneh, even if one slaughters the fetus after removing it from its mother’s womb, he is not liable for partaking of its blood

As stated in Halachah 12, the Rambam maintains that even when one roasts meat, he must salt it first. As stated in the notes to that·halachah, there are other Rabbis who differ with that point and require salting only when one cooks meat. See also the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 72:1) which quotes certain authorities that forbid eating a cooked heart, even if it was cut open and salted.

Pesachim 74b states that the meat of the heart is smooth and hard and will not absorb the blood. Other substances that are cooked with it, however, are forbidden (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba). The Ra’avad and others differ with the Rambam and consider a heart cooked with its blood as forbidden. This is the view cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 72:2).

The heart of a fowl is not large enough for there to be an olive-sized portion of blood absorbed within its meat before slaughter. And it is only that blood for which one is liable for karet. If an olive-sized portion of blood collects there when the animal is slaughtered, one is liable for lashes.

This indicates that according to the Rambam, even when one cooks blood, one is liable for kereit for partaking of it (Lechem Mishneh). Other authorities differ and maintain that if blood has been cooked or salted, one is not liable according to Scriptural Law (Siftei Cohen 87:15).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 73:1) states: “The liver has an abundance of blood. Therefore at the outset, it is not a sufficient measure to prepare it for cooking by salting.” The liver must be cut open thoroughly so that the blood contained in the blood vessels inside of it will flow out. Afterwards, placing it in vinegar or hot water causes the blood to be sealed in its place and not to flow into other portions of the liver. It is only blood that flows from place to place within the meat itself that is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

Implied is that if one desires to roast it, there is no difficulty (Maggid Mishneh).
Many opinions maintain that we are not knowledgeable with regard to the process of casting a liver in vinegar or boiling water in the present age and should not rely on this practice. This view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 73:2)..

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 10:11) where the Rambam mentions ordinary roasting and not singeing for the liver to be permitted.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 73:1) states that it must be roasted to the extent that it is fit to be eaten. The Siftei Cohen 73:2 explains that this means that it must be roasted at least half the extent to which one would normally roast it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this custom is not as widespread as the custom of singeing the liver. Instead, he writes that it is customary to cut open the membrane surrounding it and then to salt itthoroughly. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 71:3).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 73:2) follows the opinion that the liver itself is permitted if it is cooked after being salted, though everything cooked with it is forbidden. The Rama, however, states that the Rambam’s view should be followed.

For then the blood will not flow from the liver to the other meat. Hence, even at the outset, this is permitted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 73:4) states that this ruling applies with regard to the ovens that existed in the Talmudic era. In the present era, however, it is common to turn the spit upside down. Hence, one should not roast the liver together with other meat.

That has been salted [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 74:1)].

I.e., the animal suffers internal bleeding when its neck is broken. Since it is in the midst of expiring, it does not have the potential to expel this blood from its system. Instead, it becomes absorbed in its meat [Tur (Yoreh De'ah 67)].

By casting it into vinegar or boiling water.

Chapter 4, Halachah 13. In that chapter, the emphasis was that the animal was not dead when slaughtered. Here the Rambam is restating the law to emphasize that we do not fear that the blood became absorbed within the meat and will not be released through salting.

Among the reasons given for this initial washing are:
a) it removes the blood on the external surface of the meat;
b) it softens the meat and enables the blood inside to flow out more easily;
c) it enables the salt to adhere well to the surface of the meat.

A mil is a Talmudic measure equivalent to approximately a kilometer. According to many Rabbinic opinions, it takes 18 minutes to walk a mil. [This view is cited in the present context by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 69:6).] 1:l!e Rambam, however, follows a more stringent view [see his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 3:2)] and requires 24 minutes.
The Rama states that these measures are acceptable only after the fact or when there is an urgent need to prepare meat quickly. Otherwise, meat should be allowed to soak in water for at least half an hour.

This washing removes the salt and blood from the meat. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 69:7) states that the meat should be washed twice and the Rama requires a third washing.

This follows the Rambam’s view that we are knowledgeable in the process of casting meat into hot water to seal· it in its place. (As mentioned above, there are many who maintain that we lack that knowledge.) Moreover, in this instance, once the meat has been salted, there is no need for this measure, because all its blood has been released. For this reason, the Ra’avad and the· Maggid Mishneh object to the Rambam’s ruling. It is, however, mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 69:19).

So that the blood will drain out and not be reabsorbed by the meat. If one salted meat in a utensil that did not have holes, all the meat lying in the brine is forbidden. Moreover, the outer surface of the meat above the brine becomes forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 69:18)]. The Rama maintains that the entire piece of meat becomes forbidden.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 69:3) states that one should be careful not to use salt with overly large crystals for they will not adhere to the meat. The Rama adds that if one has only thin salt, it is permitted to salt meat using it.

For the water will stop the meat from releasing blood. Afterwards, the salt may cause the blood on the surface to be reabsorbed into the meat (Siftei Cohen 69:27).

When meat is cooked, the blood will enter the pot in which it is being cooked and cause the meat and any other substances to become forbidden. When it is being roasted, the blood will flow down from the spit without being absorbed.

The Rambam’s statements have attracted the attention of the commentaries, for they appear to contradict his approach in Halachah 9 and in the latter clause of this halachah. To explain: From Halachah 9, it would appear that it is forbidden to eat raw meat that is not salted only when there is internal bleeding while the animal is being slaughtered. For although the meat contains blood, that blood is forbidden only when it moves from one part of the meat to another while cooking. If one eats the meat raw, such a transfer will not take place.
Similarly, the latter clause of this halachah permits meat when it is cast into vinegar because the blood becomes sealed in its place. Implied is that the blood itself is permitted.
This clause, by contrast, states that one must salt the meat to remove the blood even when one eats the meat without cooking it. Implied is that the blood is forbidden even though it has not moved from place to place within the meat. The Kessef Mishneh resolves the contradiction, explaining that since the blood is fit to move from place to place, it is forbidden. Hence, the latter clause which speaks about blood that is sealed in its place does not represent a contradiction. Similarly, this interpretation also allows Halachah 9 to be understood in a manner that does not produce a contradiction.
It must be emphasized that the Ra’avad and many other authorities object to the Rambam’s ruling and maintain that as long as the blood has not actually moved from place to place, it is not forbidden. Therefore it is permitted to partake of raw meat without salting it. It must, however, be washed thoroughly to remove all blood on its surface. This view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 67:2).

As mentioned previously, in the Ashkenazic community (and also among many Sefardim), the custom of sealing blood by casting meat into vinegar is no longer practiced. See Rama (Yoreh De’ah 67:6).

For its power has been weakened (Rashi, Chullin 33a).

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that it is based on an improper interpretation of Chullin 93b. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 67:4-5) appears to think that the interpretations are not mutually exclusive, for it accepts both of them.

An indication that it has absorbed additional blood.

For they also contain large quantities of blood. See Chullin 93a.

Literally, the place where the animal was slaughtered.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 68:l) states that, as an initial and preferred measure, it is customary to be stringent and not to roast the head while it is whole at all, even if the opening to the neck is positioned downward.

If, however, a hole is made in the skull and its membranes so that the blood can drain off, the brain is permitted [Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 68:1)].

The brain must, however, be removed from the skull, before the skull is cooked (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Ramban).

That has not been salted and left to let the blood drain off.

For if one waits until there is no trace of the blood, the fat that one wishes to collect will also have drained off.

One should use only a small amount of salt. If one uses a large amount, the blood will become mixed with the fat (Maggid Mishneh).

Because it is mixed with blood. Since the fat does not mix with the other liquids but instead floats above them, it remains a distinct entity and is permitted.
The Maggid Mishneh writes that there are opinions that we are not familiar with the details of this process. Hence one should not rely on this leniency. This approach is followed by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 76:6) which state that one should not place a utensil under the meat until the meat is roasted to the extent that it can be eaten.

I.e., once the meat is roasted to the extent that it is fit to be eaten, we assume that all the forbidden blood has drained off.

Generally, when pieces of meat are being salted together and the utensil has holes so that the blood can run off, the meat is permitted even if the blood from other meat flows over it. The rationale is that since it is expelling its own blood and/or other juices, it will not absorb blood. Fish, however, will expel its blood and juices far faster than meat or fowl and will complete that process before the meat completes expelling its blood. Hence, we fear that it will absorb the blood from the meat or fowl (Maggid Mishneh).
All that is forbidden is the external surface of the fish (kedai kelipah). Once that is cut off, the remainder of the fish is permitted [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 70:1)]. The Rama rules that all the fish are forbidden. This stringency applies when the fishes’ scales have been removed. If they have not been removed, the fish are permitted.

I.e., into the stuffings. Afterwards, the blood will become reabsorbed into the fowl itself and cause it to become forbidden.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s ruling as being dependent on his ruling in Halachah 10 that, after being salted, meat must be placed in hot water. In this instance, the fowl’s stuffing prevents the boiling water from having the desired effect on the fowl.
Alternatively, the Rambam’s ruling can be understood according to the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ ah 77:1) who rules that initially one must salt both sides of the fowl. If the fowl was already stuffed, salting just the exterior is not sufficient, because it will not effect the blood on the inside. See also the Rama who rules that at the outset, fowl must be salted properly and any meat placed within it must be salted properly. Only in such a situation should one cook a fowl with stuffing.

For the fire will cause all the blood to drain out.

Even in such a position, the power of the fire will cause the blood to drain downward.

Hence salting is not required.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets this halach_ah as referring to fowl that were salted, but were not placed in water after the salting. According to the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 78:1), it applies to fowl that were not salted. The Shulchan Aruch continues, stating that according to the present custom, one should not coat meat that is being roasted unless it has been salted and washed first.

I.e., it will not stick thoroughly to the sides of the fowl. Thus there will be space for the blood to drain through.

In which instance, the flour is very thin and hence, clings tightly to the fowl.

Even if they are not white like silver.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on the following points. There is a difference of opinion among our Sages (Chullin 8b) whether the portion of the animal’s neck where it is slaughtered is considered as “hot” at the time of slaughter, in which instance, when the animal is slaughtered some of its blood would be absorbed into the knife. Or it is not hot, in which instance, there is no such absorption.
From the Rambam’s ruling (here and in Chapter 17, Halachah 7), it appears that he maintains that the animal’s neck is not “hot.” Nevertheless, he requires certain safeguards in consideration of the other views.
This issue is a matter of concern only when the meat being cut itself is hot. For otherwise, the blood absorbed in the knife will not be transferred to it.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there is another opinion which maintains that even though the animal’s neck is cold, the pressure of cutting causes the knife to absorb some blood. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 10:2) and commentaries.

Since these foods are sharp, they produce an effect similar to actual heat and have the potential to affect forbidden foods absorbed in a knife. Therefore safeguards should be taken.

Seemingly this refers to a bowl that does not have holes. Nevertheless, there are authorities who also forbid using a bowl that has holes. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 69:17) states that at the outset, one should not use even a bowl that has holes, but after the fact, the food is permitted.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ ah 69:16) also quotes an opinion that forbids using
the bowl for cold food at the outset if it has not been washed. a

One of the fundamental principles of the laws of kashrut is that an earthenware vessel can never be kashered. Once it absorbs forbidden matter, it will never be dislodged from it (see Chapter 17, Halachah 2). Hence once the bowl has absorbed the blood, there is no way that the earthenware utensil will be permitted again.

And will be released when the hot food is placed in it, causing that food to become forbidden.

Were the utensil to be made of lead alone, it could be kashered by boiling water in it (hagalah), as is the law with regard to metal utensils. In this instance, however, the metal is just a coating and the blood will penetrate to the earthenware base. Hence, it remains forbidden.

The term forbidden fat refers to the Hebrew term cheilev, to distinguish it from shuman which refers to fat that may be eaten. Unless otherwise mentioned, the term “fat” in this text will refer to forbidden fat.

There is, however, no prohibition against benefiting from forbidden fat. See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 185) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 147) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See the following halachah.

I.e., there is no separate prohibition concerning it. If the animal is kosher, its fat is not considered cheilev and is permitted. If the animal is not kosher, its fat is of course forbidden, but it is not bound by a separate prohibition. This reflects a contrast to the prohibition against partaking of blood mentioned in the previous chapter.

There is not, however, a separate prohibition for partaking of its forbidden fat. From Chullin 75a, it appears that this leniency applies only when the fetus is stillborn before its full period of gestation is completed. If, however, the full period of gestation is completed, the prohibition against cheilev does apply (Maggid Mishneh; Siftei Cohen 64:5). See also Halachot 3-4.

I.e., why we do not follow the principle that one prohibition does not fall upon another.

The fat was forbidden previously and a further prohibition is added when the meat becomes forbidden.

Contrast this to the prohibition against gid hanasheh as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 14. The Ra’avad mentions an opinion which states that one is not liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 64:2) cites both views..

From the Rambam’s inclusion of the phrase “takes out,” the Kessef Mishneh concludes that the prohibition applies only when the fat is taken out from the mother’s womb while the animal is still alive. If the fat is left inside the womb and then the animal is slaughtered, he maintains that the fat is permitted. This conclusion is cited by the Turei Zahav 64:4 and the Siftei Cohen 64:6.

The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that this stringency does not apply when the fetus dies in its mother’s womb even if it has completed the nine months of gestation.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 64:5) states that one must remove the fatty portion on the inner side.

Chullin 117a interprets Leviticus 3:16: “All of the cheilev to God” as referring to the portions of the animal offered on the altar. These include the kidneys and the lobe of the liver although they are not “fat” (see Hilchot Maaseh HaKorbanot 1 :18). Instead, the intent of term cheilev in the verse is “choice portions.”

Genesis 45:18; Deuteronomy 32:14.

The tenth of the tithe which the Levites who receive the tithe must separate and give the priests.

Here also the intent of the term cheilev is "choice portions."

An animal has four stomachs. We have chosen synonyms arbitrarily to describe them.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:12) cites the Rambam’s view, but also that of the Tur which requires one to be stringent and remove. all of its traces. The Rama states that, after the fact, even the stringent opinions do not consider the kidney forbidden if it was cooked without the traces of this fat being removed.

For while an animal is alive, its meat hangs loosely (Chullin 93b).

For in its lifetime, it is not covered by meat.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro mentions that some interpret Chullin 93b as stating that a cubit of the intestines are forbidden and he quotes this view as halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:15), The Ramah, however, states that the forbidden measure is not a full cubit, but close to it.

From the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Shechitah 6:10, it is obvious that he favors the first opinion. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the second view should be followed. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:15) states that one should follow the stringencies of both views.

I.e., there is blood absorbed in the tissue or membrane.

The commentaries have cited Chapter 6, Halachot 10-12, as the Rambam’s intent, but this point is not explicitly stated there.

For the blood will flow out of it.

For the fire will cause the blood to drain off [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 65:1)]. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there are some authorities who require that the blood vessels be cut open even when one roasts the meat.

Otherwise, the fat will seep through the meat when it is being cooked or roasted.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 64:13) explains that these strands of tissue extend from the lower portion of the backbone. As will be explained in the notes to Halachah 13, there are differences between his interpretation and that of the Rambam.

Our translation follows the commentary of Rashi to Chullin 93a and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:10).

I.e., they are forbidden, but one is not liable for Karet for them.

This follows the Rambam’s interpretation of Chullin 93a. Rashi [and his view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 64:13)] understands that passage as referring to the strands of fat mentioned in Halachah 11.

The Maggid Mishneh and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 75:3) write that in the present age, leniency is granted with regard to these blood vessels. Nevertheless, it is customary to remove them.

I.e., these are blood vessels in which blood will be lodged after the slaughter of the animal. Therefore they must be removed or cut open (see Halachah 10) before the animal is cooked or roasted.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam (and his source, Chullin 93b) do not mention a calf when stating this leniency. Implied is that even at a younger age, the testicles of a calf are considered as developed.

Until the kid or lamb reaches that age, the blood vessels are not developed and there is not a large quantity of blood flowing through them.

Chapter 6, Halachah 13.

This refers to the organs themselves. Hence they need not be salted (Maggid Mishneh, see Chapter 6, Halachah 18). With regard to the fat on these organs, it is possible for there to be blood vessels within them as mentioned above.
The Maggid Mishneh writes that we do assume that the stomach contains blood. This view is not, however, followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 75:1). The Siftei Cohen 75:1 and the Turei Zahav 75:1, however, state that we do assume that the stomach of a fowl contains blood.

This expression indicates a conclusion at which the Rambam arrived through his own powers of deduction without any explicit prior Rabbinic source. It appears that the Rambam did not arrive at a conclusive decision that the prohibition was of Rabbinic origin, but that he did favor this understanding.

The verses mention kol, “any,” fat or blood. That term could be understood as an inclusion beyond the ordinary scope of the term and hence, involving these substances as well.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 16, Hilchot Shivitat Esor 2:3, et al.

For we fear that the meat will absorb some of the fat.

If one cleans the knife or the container first, scrubbing it carefully, it is permitted (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba).

For at the outset, the knife used to slaughter should not be used to cut meat (see Chapter 6, Halachah 20).

Chullin 8b asks: Why isn’t one container sufficient? First he will wash the meat in it and then the fat? That text answers that perhaps he will forget and wash the fat first. In this instance, by contrast, since he has two clearly designated containers, he will not make such a mistake.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions views that maintain that this restriction only applies directly after slaughter when the fat is still warm. Once it has cooled, it hardens. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:18).

Although there are some more stringent views regarding certain particulars, the Rambam’s view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 64:19).

This is a safeguard against the fat and blood being absorbed by the meat.

See the following chapter.

According to the Rambam, after the fact, we do not say that the fat and/or blood was absorbed in the meat (see also Chapter 15, Halachah 32, and notes). The Rashba differs and maintains that one must remove the surface of the meat with them, because that surface also becomes forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 64:20) quotes both views. The Rama also cites a more stringent perspective, but concludes that one may rely on the Rashba’s view.

He is not removed from his position, because these prohibitions are Rabbinic in origin (Maggid Mishneh). This ruling is, however, somewhat difficult to understand according to the second view mentioned in Halachah 16.

For he transgresses the prohibition: “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind,” which is interpreted as a charge forbidding one to cause others to transgress. Nevertheless, lashes are not given for the violation of this prohibition.

And his customers might cook the meat without checking for fat (or being knowledgeable about the details of the prohibition). Hence, he would cause them to transgress.