Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

See Chapter 12, Halachah 18, which explains that even if the woman intended to transgress, if her father or husband nullified the vow beforehand, she is not liable.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:37) mentions the Rambam’s view, it also mentions that of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that this last phrase is not effective in nullifying a vow.

For his wording does not imply that the vow is nullified.

I.e., although these expressions are effective for a sage when absolving a vow, they are not effective for a husband or a father.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 13:8), the Rambam explains the statements he makes here. The term “nullify” implies nullifying an entity to the extent that it is as if it never existed. “Releasing,” by contrast, implies that a connection existed, but it was released and will not have any effect in the future.
The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries for they appear to run contrary to the understandings of other authorities and the Ram barn’s own rulings. To explain: Halachah 15 of this chapter and Chapter 12, Halachah 19, appear to indicate that until a father or a husband nullifies a vow, the vow is binding. Even when he nullifies it, the nullification affects only the future. See Hi/chat Nazirut 9:11. When a sage absolves a vow, by contrast, it is as if the vow was never taken. See Hilchot /shut 7:8•9, Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the terminology employed by the Rambam here can be explained as follows: A sage does not “uproot” a vow; he causes it to be considered as if a vow was not taken originally. A father or a husband, by contrast, uproot a vow,
causing an entity that did exist to be nullified.

I.e., the Rambam is making a distinction between hafarah, “nullification,” and bittul, “voiding,” as he proceeds to explain. See also his Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.,, where he elaborates on the distinction between these two activities.

E. g., if she took a vow not to drink wine, he causes her to drink wine.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that there is no concept of voiding a woman’s vow by causing her to break it. Such concepts apply only with regard to servants. The Radbaz explains the Rambam’s wording, stating that with regard to servants, it is necessary to actually compel them to break their vows. Such conduct is not appropriate with regard to one’s wife or daughter. Nevertheless, if a husband or a father gently cause a woman to break their vow, that vow is nullified. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:39) mentions both views though it appears to favor the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., since the vow has been nullified, she is under no obligation to keep it. On the other hand, she is not obligated to perform the act forbidden by the vow.

Without him saying anything.

I.e., she took a vow not to wear jewelry or not to partake of a particular food.

Even though this vow has no connection to the Sabbath and it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath, we allow him to nullify it. The rationale is that, otherwise, he will not be able to nullify it on Saturday night, because the time for nullification will have already passed. As stated in Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:6, generally, on the Sabbath, a sage may absolve only those vows that concern the Sabbath (Kessef Mishneh).

Because it is the Sabbath, it is preferable to change the wording one uses. Even if one uses this wording during the week, the vow is nullified, as indicated by Halachah 6.

This concept is also derived from the prooftext cited below. Until a vow comes into existence and can be upheld, it cannot be nullified (Turei Zahav 234:28).

See Chapter 4, Halachah 11, Chapter 8, Halachah 6. The rationale is that a sage nullifies the vow from the outset, causing it to be considered as if it were never taken. Therefore the entire vow is considered as a single entity. A husband, by contrast, nullifies a vow as it exists. Hence, each element of the vow can be considered independently.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:36). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that a husband must also nullify the entire vow. Once a portion of a vow is upheld, the vow cannot be nullified.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 3, for an explanation regarding the convention of extending a vow.

For by attaching himself to her vow, he shows that he considers ii a viable entity.

As Nedarim 3a states, the laws that apply to the nullification of other vows also apply to the nullification of nazirite vows.

For the reason mentioned in the previous halachah.

For his vow is not at all dependent on hers.

She must, however, state her consent, for he cannot compel her to take a vow against her will.

He is forbidden to nullify his wife’s vow, because by doing so, his own vow would be nullified as stated in the conclusion of the halachah. Since he is forbidden to cause his own vow to be nullified, he is forbidden to nullify her vow (see Nazir 22b).

For his commitment is not dependent on hers at all. Even if she refuses to accept a nazirite vow, he is obligated to keep his vow. Hence, his right to nullify her vow is intact.

This refers to the first clause. It is as if he made his vow and her vow a single statement. Thus nullifying her vow would cause his vow also to be nullified. This is forbidden, because he is bound to uphold his vow. Nevertheless, after the fact, if he does nullify her vow, his vow is also nullified (Radbaz). See the Nekudot HaKessef [to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:54)]. There it is ‘explained that the Rambam’s version of Nazir 22b follows the Jerusalem Talmud and differs from the standard text of the Babylonian Talmud.

As stated in Halachah 11.

The rationale for this ruling is that the husband’s nullification affects the vow only from the time he made it onward. It does not nullify it from the outset. Hence, any extension of a vow that was made before the vow is nullified is binding [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:51)].

I.e., alone, without the nullification of the father (Chapter 11, Halachah 10).

Chapter 11, Halachot 20, 22.

I.e., whether or not his nullification takes effect depends on their relationship at the time he nullifies the vow (Nedarim 89a).

Because he cannot nullify the vows that were taken before marriage, as explained above.

Here also, what is important is the woman’s status at the time of the vow and not what her status will be when the vow takes effect.

As stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18, when a husband remains silent throughout the day, his wife’s vow is upheld. This is a sign that his tacit acceptance of a vow is sufficient for it to be binding (Rabbenu Nissim).

As stated in Halachah 7, he must make a verbal statement of nullification. If, however, he voids his wife’s vow, her nullification is not binding, as stated in Halachot 4-5.

This term has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Alecha Rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).

Since a person can nullify a vow or an oath if he retracts within this time, he may certainly retract his acceptance of his wife’s oath in thought.

I.e., just as he can appeal to a sage to absolve him of a vow he took, so, too, he may absolve his acceptance of a vow.

I.e., the day he changed his mind, even if it is several days afterwards, is equivalent to the day he heard of his wife’s vow. Since he cannot have his acceptance nullified unless he changes his mind, the days when he does not change his mind are consideredequivalent to days when he does not know of the vow [Tur (Yoreh De’ah 234)].
There are other Rishonim who maintain that he can ask the sage to have his acceptance absolved only on the day he heard of the vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:49) mentions both views without indicating which one should be favored. The Rama maintains that we should be stringent and follow the second view.

Upholding a vow is considered equivalent to taking a vow. Hence, just as a vow can be absolved, the acceptance of one can be absolved. The nullification of a vow, by contrast, cannot be considered as a vow and cannot be absolved. The Radbaz adds that if the person does not know that he can have his acceptance absolved, the day he finds out that information is equivalent to the day he heard of the vow.

The Siftei Cohen 234:16 states that this applies even if he has the acceptance absolved on the day he hears of the vow.

Even if the first one nullified the vow again so that they make a combined statement, their nullification is not accepted.

At the time he stated his acceptance of the vow a second time, his acceptance was of no consequence, because it was unnecessary. Nevertheless, after he nullifies his first acceptance, the second acceptance becomes significant.

As stated in Halachah 20.

The Radbaz states that this ruling applies even if he does not add the words “at the same time.”

The two statements cancel each other out. It is as if he remained silent and the vow is therefore upheld. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's rationale is that since the nullification cannot take effect after the vow is upheld, it cannot take effect if it is made simultaneously with the upholding of the vow.

Since, as the Rambam states later on, he did not verbally express his nullification of the vow, it remains binding even after the day passes.

For a vow must be nullified on the day the man heard about it. In his Nekudot HaKessef, the Siftei Cohen explains that the Rambam’s wording implies that he may nullify it that day. The Turei Zahav 234:39-40, however, infers that he cannot nuJlify it at all once it takes effect for that day.

The instances cited by the Rambam are questions posed by Nedarim 69b, 70a. Since the Talmud continues asking questions, using one instance as a springboard for another, following the pattern of im timtzeh lomar, the Rambam concludes that each of the instances used as a basis for a further question is accepted as halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the last of the series of instances concerning which the Talmud asks in that passage.

Lest her vow in fact be binding.

Because punishment is not given when we are uncertain whether a prohibition exists.

This requires him to allow his hair to grow untrimmed and thus will prevent him from beautifying his appearance. See Nedarim 9b which relates that Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach would almost never partake of the sacrifices of a nazirite. Once, however, he saw a particularly handsome young man who had taken a nazirite vow. He asked him why he had done so and the young man explained that, because of his good looks, he was being tempted by his evil inclination. To rise above the temptation, he took the nazirite vow. Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach praised him for his actions.

Avot 3:13.

In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam explains that “taking and maintaining vows to abstain from certain [undesirable] elements [of conduct] ingrains in a person the tendency to bridle the desires he seeks to curb. This tendency will continue and it will be easy for him to acquire the quality of restraint - i.e., the tendency to protect oneself from impurity.” See also Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, the conclusion of ch. 48, which discusses the Divine service associated with taking and maintaining vows.
Nevertheless, the Rambam is not praising restraint as a mode of conduct that is always desirable. On the contrary, in Hile hot De’ ot 3:1, he explains that a nazirite is called “a sinner” because he abstains from wine and states: Our Sages directed man to abstain only from those things which the Torah denies him and not to forbid himself permitted things by vows and oaths. Thus our Sages (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:1) asked rhetorically: “Are not the things which the Torah has prohibited sufficient for you? [Why] must you add further prohibitions?” In the instances mentioned here, however, the person taking the vow is not doing so because he thinks that abstinence is desirable. Instead, he wishes to develop self-control and inner discipline and feels that taking a vow is an effective means to encourage him to do so.

Lest he not keep the vow, and in this way transgress.

Nedarim 22a.

During the time the Sanctuary stood at Shilo and from the time the Temple was built in Jerusalem afterwards, it was forbidden to offer sacrifices on private altars. Similarly, taking a vow is considered undesirable and comparable to building such an altar. Rabbenu Nissim explains the comparison based on the passage from Hilchot De’ot cited above, i.e., just as a person who builds a private altar offers a sacrifice to God in an undesirable manner, so, too, a person who takes a vow adds a restriction that the Torah does not require him to observe.

As explained in ch. 4.

Thus it is governed by the laws mentioned in the previous set of halachot. As mentioned in the beginning of Hilchot Nedarim, there are two types of vows: vows involving prohibitions and vows taking on an obligation to bring sacrifices. A nazirite vow also involves bringing sacrifices, as will be explained. Nevertheless, it is considered primarily a vow involving prohibitions (Radbaz).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 92) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 374) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 209) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 373) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 207-208) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 375-376) include two prohibitions involving this matter among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Chapter 5 which describes this prohibition.

This includes prohibitions against drinking wine and eating fresh grapes, raisins, grape seeds, and grape peels. Se/er HaMitzvot (negative commandments 202-206) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 368-372) include five prohibitions against partaking of these grape products among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Radbaz explains that the Rambam does not mention these prohibitions in the order that they are mentioned in the Torah, nor in the order that they are mentioned in the Mishnah. The rationale is that the mitzvah of letting one’s hair grow is mentioned first because it involves both a positive and a negative commandment.

For with his deed, he has violated two of the Torah’s prohibitions.

Which applies with regard to the violation of all vows, as stated above in Hilchot Nedarim 1:5.

If he violates his nazirite vow in several ways, e.g., he eats grapes and becomes impure, he receives lashes according to the number of violations involved (Radbaz).

I.e., the commandment to observe the vows one takes. See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :4.

Which is done at the fulfillment of one’s nazirite vow. Se/er HaMitzvot (positive commandment 93) and Se/er HaChinuch (mitzvah 377) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Chapter 8 which describes this procedure.

Deuteronomy 23:22. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim 1:1, this prohibition applies to any person who delays keeping the vows and pledges he makes. He does not, however, list this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot in these halachot, but instead, in Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot (in the introduction to those halachot and in Chapter 14, Halachah 13). See also Hilchot Arachin 6:33 which uses this law as support for the principle that a pledge to perform a mitzvah is considered as a vow.

For as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, lashes are not given for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve a deed. Note, however, Chapter 5, Halachah 21.

This concept, which the Rambam illustrates in the following halachot, expresses the principle (see Nedarim 5b) that yadot nedarim, literally “handles of vows,” are considered equivalent to vows themselves.

According to the Rambam, when he makes such statements while holding his hair, it is not necessary that a nazirite pass in front of him for his statement to be binding.

The Hebrew uses two expressions to communicate this and the previous concept. Our translations for these terms are taken from Rav Kappach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary to the :tvfishnah (Nazir 1:1).

The offering a nazirite would bring if he became impure (see Numbers 6:10).

I.e., with regard to a nazirite vow. Since it is possible that his statement meant that he intended to offer the doves as a sacrifice, it is not considered as implying a nazirite vow. From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (/oc. cit.), it appears that the person is liable to bring these doves as a voluntary offering. It is questionable if here the Rambam is negating that implication.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah the Rambam writes that gentiles who lived among the Jewish people would mispronounce the word nazir in this manner. As such, there would be some Jews who would make similar mistakes.

I.e., since he used the tenn “nazirite” and the object which he mentioned is forbidden to nazirites, the nazirite restrictions all take effect. Note the contrast to the following halachah.

Because the tenn nazirite does not apply with regard to those objects.

I.e., in the Talmudic era, the wine was very strong. Hence it was customary to mix water into wine before serving it.

I.e., the situation is comparable to those described in Halachah 9.

Who became so drunk that he lost all consciousness of his actions. See Genesis, ch. 19.

I.e., he is considered like a mentally and emotionally incapable person (a shoteh). See Hilchot!shut 4:18, H!Jchot Mechirah 29:18.

I.e., he seeks to avoid keeping one or more of the obligations of the nazirite vow although he will keep the others.

This is a general principle applying in many aspects of Torah law, for example, Hilchot!shut 16:9.

In the previous halachah.

The Ra’avad states that if a person would approach a sage and ask him to absolve his nazirite vow on these grounds, the sage would certainly consent. We are speaking about an instance when the person seeks to have the vow nullified without consulting a sage because it was taken in error. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would also accept this ruling. The Kessef Mishneh, however, does not accept this explanation.

He need not observe any of the nazirite prohibitions, even the ones he had intended to observe.

The Ra’ avad considers this as a vow which a person is prevented from keeping by forces beyond his control, citing Nazir l lb which appears to support this interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz state that while the actual wording of the Talmud fits the Ra’avad’s interpretation, the Rambam’s explanation can be justified. [Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 2:4), the Rambam uses the wording suggested by the Ra’avad.]

Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 3:6; Hilchot Nedarim 4:1.

The Or Sameach notes that the Rambam changes slightly the wording of his source, Nazir 21b, based on his ruling in Hilchot Shechitah 8:16. There the Rambam writes that if an animal is born without a liver it may live, but if it were born with a liver and then the liver was removed, it is treifah.

For it is considered as if he took the vow upon his entire person. Compare to Hi/chat Arachin 2:1; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:2; Hilchot Mechirah 27:8.

A person whose genital area is covered by a piece of flesh and it is impossible to detect his gender.

A person with both male and female sexual organs (Hilchot Ishut 2:24-25).

Although the term ben can be translated as “offspring,” its specific meaning is “son.” Hence the Rambam rules in this manner.

The fact that his wife miscarried in the interim does not negate the vow.

E. g., he said: “I will be a nazirite ifl ate today,” and he was under the impression that he had not eaten, but in fact he had eaten (Nedarim 25b). See Hilchot Nedarim 8:3 and Chapter 1, Halachah 15.

I.e., people compelled him to take the nazirite vows. See Hilchot Nedarim 4:1.

He said: “I will be a nazirite if you do not eat at my home.” See Hilchot Nedarim 4:3.

He said: “I will be a nazirite if I did not see an army as numerous as the Jewish people when they left Egypt.” See Hilchot Nedarim 4:1; Hilchot Sh’vuot 3:5.

See Hilchot Nedarim 4:5.

We do not automatically say: Had he known that the animal would have been stolen he would not have taken the vow. If, however, he asks a sage to absolve the vow on this account, it is absolved. See Hilchot Nedarim 8:5; Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:12.

I.e., his vow was taken on a false assumption, for he believed that he possessed these animals. See Hilchot Nedarim 8:3.

I.e., as illustrated in the following halachah, he states that a nazirite vow taken by a colleague should also apply to him.

Hilchot Nedarim 3:3.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 5.

I.e., “just as he is forbidden to drink wine, so am I.”

I.e., “just as he is forbidden to cut his hair, so am I.”

This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Alecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:17).

I.e., each one speaking immediately thereafter his colleague.

In contrast to the person who took the vow who does not become a nazirite until the child is born (Chapter 1, Halachah 17). This is the conclusion the Rambam derives from the discussion of the issue in Nazir 13a. The Ra’avad offers a different interpretation of the passage. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s understanding.

I.e., were he not to make such a statement, it would appear that he does not have genuine love for him. Because of the above, we say that his vow was not made sincerely and he never intended to become a nazirite.

In contrast to the situation described in the previous halachah, in this instance, the person mentioned in the nazirite vow was not present when the vow was taken.

Since the person was not present, we feel that it is less likely that his statements were made merely to make an impression (see Nazir 13a).

The rationale is that at the time of the completion of the vow, the person is required to offer sacrifices. Were his vow not to have taken effect, he would be slaughtering non-sacrificial animals in the Temple courtyard which is forbidden (Rabbenu Nissim).

Because as stated at the conclusion of the previous halachah, if there is a doubt where a nazirite vow is binding, we rule leniently.

A dry measure used in the Talmudic period equivalent to 30 se’ah (Hilchot Arachin 4:4).

For he desired the nazirite vow to take effect only if the said amount of grain was in the grain heap.

A ko’i is a hybrid born from breeding a deer and a goat. There is an unresolved question among our Sages if it is considered as a domesticated animal (behemah) or a wild beast [(chayah) the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Bikkurim 2:8]. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:13, he states that the term refers to any hybrid that comes from mating a domesticated animal with a wild beast.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 5:6), the Rambam states that if one person made all these statements, he is obligated to fulfill an equivalent number of nazirite vows.

See the following halachah where the Rambam elaborates on these points.

See Hilchot Shechitah 14:4.

See Hilchot Ma ‘acha/ot Assurot 1:13.

See Hilchot Kilayim 9:5.

See Hilchot Shechitah 12:8-9; Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5; 10:7; Hilchot Sha ‘ar Avot HaTumah 1 :6, et al.

I.e., either semen or the secretion of a zav. See also Hilchot Mita ‘amei Mishkav UMoshav 1:7; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah 3:7.

See Hilchot Avadim 4: I.

See also Hilchot Tzitzit 3:9; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 6:8; Hilchot lssurei Bi ‘ah 22:11, et al.

Note the Radbaz who offers an explanation why all three illustrations of the principle are necessary.

I.e., twelve for a male and eleven for a female. He or she must also be aware of the One for whose sake they are taking vows (Hilchot Nedarim 11:1-4).

The Ra’avad questions this ruling, noting that there are authorities who maintain that the obligation for a minor to keep his vow is Rabbinic in origin. According to their view, it would be forbidden for the minor to bring a sacrifice, for that would be bringing non-sacramental animals as offerings. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that those authorities follow a minority position.

The commentaries discuss this issue, noting that, seemingly, the prophetess Chanah administered a nazirite vow to her son Samuel. They explain that although the inspiration for the vow came from Chanah, it was actually administered by Elkanah, Samuel’s father.

I.e., his silence is considered as acceptance. If, however, he refuses to become a nazirite, he is not- bound by his father’s statements, as stated in the following halachah.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 3, 11.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

The Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz refer to the difference of opinion between Rashi and Tosafot (Nazir 28b) whether the objection must be made immediately or whether they can be made throughout the span of the nazirite vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 4:6), the Rambam espouses the view shared by Tosafot that once the son began observing the nazirite vow, he cannot object to it.

The Mine hat Chinuch (mitzvah 368) writes that if ·the child agrees to observe the nazirite vow, it is binding even if the relatives object.

See the Or Sameach who debates whether drinking wine is also considered a deed which registers the son’s objections.

For his father's authority over him is not absolute.

Becomes thirteen years old and manifests signs of physical maturity, as stated in Hilchot /shut 2:2; see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.

The verse which introduces the laws of a nazirite vow. By addressing the passage to Jews, the Torah indicates that it does not apply to gentiles.

Numbers 6:2 specifically mentions a woman taking a nazirite vow. With regard to · ervants, Nazir 62b explains how this concept can be explained by Biblical exegesis.

See Hi/chat Nedarim, chs. 11-13.

We are speaking about a Canaanite servant who is his master’s property. Accordingly, vows he takes are dependent on his master’s consent as indicated by the following halachah.

I.e., with regard to a servant, a verbal nullification of the nazirite vow is not sufficient. The master must physically compel him not to observe it.

See Hilchot Arachin I :2.

I.e., as the Rambam continues to explain, the vow is void without the master having to take any action at all.

According to the Rambam (based on Nazir 62b), there are four different rulings with regard to vows or oaths a servant takes:
a) All oaths and valuation assessments that a servant takes are nullified automatically. The rationale is that “his body is not his property so that the oath he takes will be effective. With regard to oaths, [Numbers 30:3] states: ‘forbid something upon one’s soul.’ [Implied is that the verse applies to] someone whose soul is his property. It excludes a servant who is someone else’s property” (Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 12:6).
b) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are either aggravating or prevent the servant from working are automatically nullified. The rationale· is that, with regard to an oath, it is written (Leviticus 5:4): “Whether he will do harm or do good.” Implied is that he can take an oath ~ or a vow, because an association is established between vows and oaths - only when he has the choice of either doing good or doing harm to himself. This does not apply to these oaths. Since they harm his master, he has no right to take them.
c) Nazirite vows are not automatically nullified, because the association with vows does not apply with regard to them. Nevertheless, since the servant belongs to his master, the master has the right to nullify his vow.
d) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are neither aggravating nor prevent the servant from working must be fulfilled. The rationale is that in contrast to an oath in which the prohibition is incumbent on the servant (the gavra), for a vow, the prohibition falls upon the object (the cheftza). Since there is no harm to the master involved, such vows can take effect.

Since the master does not suffer any loss, there is no reason that the vow should not take effect.

When a master desires to nullify a vow taken by his servant, he must physically compel him to break it, as mentioned above. If he does not do so, but instead, verbally nullifies it, he is indicating that he no longer considers his servant as having that status, but has freed him. See parallels in Hilchot Avadim 8:17.

For the verbal nullification made by his master is of no consequence.

Fleeing from his master is not equivalent to attaining his freedom (Radbaz).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Nazir 9:1 mentions that this issue is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yossi. Generally, in such instances, the halachah follows Rabbi Y ossi and yet the Rambam follows Rabbi Meir’s view. The Radbaz explains that the fact that Nazir 61a concludes by mentioning Rabbi Meir’s view indicates that the halachah follows his opinion. The Kessef Mishneh suggests (- this, however, is not borne out by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah -) that the Rambam’ s text of the mishnah read opposite to the standard version. Others support the Rambam’s ruling, based on Tosafot who states that the halachah follows Rabbi Meir with regard to his decrees.

I.e., completed the process required of a nazirite at the conclusion of his vow.

We do not say that since the vow was fulfilled without the knowledge of his master, its fulfillment is of no consequence. Although his master could have nullified his vow, since in fact he did not do so, it is considered significant (Radbaz).

I.e., he must begin counting the days of his nazirite vow anew as a free man, without counting the days during which he observed as a servant.
The rationale why these days are not counted is that since he did not complete his vow (by shaving), the status of the vow is left open. For, at any time, his master could compel him to drink wine and nullify his vow. As such, he is never considered to have completed a valid nazirite vow. Although the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, the commentaries justify his approach.

I.e., he does not bring a sacrifice as would a free man who became impure in the midst of his nazirite vow. Instead, he begins his nazirite vow anew when he becomes pure after he attains his freedom.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 12, for a description of how this vow is observed.

This is not a point of Scriptural Law. Instead, the rationale is that since our Sages decreed that the Diaspora - its earth and even its air - conveys ritual impurity, a nazirite. cannot observe his vow there (Nazir 54a; see Hilchot Tuma ‘at Meit 11:1).

Nazir 19b, 20a relates that Queen Heleni took a vow that if her son would return safe from a war, she would be a nazarite for seven years. She observed her vow and came to the Temple to offer her sacrifices. The School of Hillel ruled that she should remain in Eretz Yisrael and observe her vow for another seven years, for the time she observed it in the Diaspora was not counted.

The Ra’avad questions what purpose will be served by ascending to Eretz Yisrael in the present era. We are all impure because of contact with a human corpse (or impurity that results from that) and there are no ashes from the red heifer to purify ourselves. If so, what difference is there between Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora? In neither place, will one be able to complete his nazirite vow in purity. Hence, the Ra’avad concludes, it is forbidden to take a nazirite vow in the present age, whether in the Diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael. The Radbaz states that although we are ritually impure, abiding in the Diaspora increases that impurity. Hence, it is preferable for one who. takes a nazirite vow to ascend to Eretz Yisrael. The Kessef Mishneh goes further and states that since a person can prevent himself from coming into contact with the ritual impurity associated with a corpse, there is no prohibition against taking a nazirite vow in the present age.

See the parallel in Chapter 6, Halachah 7.

For even though we are all ritually impure at present, a nazirite who is impure who comes in contact with a corpse is liable for lashes for each time he comes in contact (Chapter 5, Halachah 17).