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The rationale for this ruling is the principle of migo. If the husband’s statements were untrue and his intent were merely to free his wife from the obligation of yibbum, he would not have to lie. Instead, he could give her a get (Bava Batra 134b).
See also the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:6) and commentaries, which mention other opinions regarding whether this ruling applies when the prevailing presumption is that the man is childless, when the prevailing presumption is that he has brothers, or when witnesses testify that he has brothers.

I.e., when the prevailing presumption is that he does not have a brother, and hence his wife would not be obligated to perform yibbum.

Even though the statements are being made at the time of the person’s death, when it is unlikely that he would lie, we still suspect that he is speaking falsely to spare his wife the difficulty of yibbum or chalitzah.

One might assume that, as in Halachah 1, the husband’s statements would have been accepted based on the principle of migo. For in this instance as well, the husband could free his wife from yibbum by giving her a get. Nevertheless, our Sages explain that the principle of migo does not have the power to counteract a prevailing presumption.
Still, even if the prevailing presumption is that a person has brothers, his word is accepted if he says that he has sons. The rationale is that, in this instance, his statements are not contradicting the prevailing presumption, but rather introducing a new factor (Beit Shmuel157:9).

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not this rumor has to be substantiated in a court. The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s opinion as being that even a rumor that is not substantiated should be taken into consideration. Needless tosay, in the contemporary era, when communications have advanced and travel is easier, this question is far less significant than in previous ages.

See Hilchot Nachalot 4:1.

If the woman is married, there is no question regarding the Rambam’s ruling, for we presume that by and large, she engaged in relations with her husband. If she is single, the matter is more complex.
In this context, the commentaries draw attention to the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Terumot 8:14, which states that when a priest had relations with a woman and she became pregnant, she is allowed to partake of terumah for the sake of her child. This indicates that we assume that she was impregnated by that priest.
As indicated by the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Terumot and in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah15:17-18, the matter depends on the woman’s reputation. If she is known to be promiscuous, we consider the possibility that she was impregnated by another man. If, however, everyone presumes that she engaged in relations only with this man, he is considered to be the father of the child (Maggid Mishneh).
Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:9) quotes the Rambam’s wording without making this distinction. See the Beit Shmuel 156:15.

Lest the child have been fathered by another man and the deceased in fact be childless.

Lest the child have been fathered by the deceased, in which case relations with his brother would be prohibited.

Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam regarding this matter and maintains that The testimony of one witness is not acceptable with regard to the death of a yavam. Although theRama (Even HaEzer 158:3) quotes his opinion, many Ashkenazic authorities recommend leniency. (See Beit Shmuel 158:2.)

The Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher differ with the Rambam with regard to this point, for unlike the death of a person, the birth of a child is not a matter that will surely become un-deniable public knowledge. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:8) quotes the Rambam’opinion, while the Rama follows the other view.

In Hilchot Gerushin, Chapters 12 and 13.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12:16, which states that the statements of a woman’s mother in law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, [her husband’s] other wife, her yevamah (i.e., the wife of her husband’s brother) and her husband’s daughter are not accepted with regard to her husband’s death, because the prevailing presumption is that they hate each other.

I.e., the women are married to two brothers. Thus each one is considered the yevamah of the other.

I.e., the testimony of each woman is accepted with regard to the death of her own husband. With regard to the death of her yavam, by contrast, the only testimony is that of her yevamah, and that testimony is not accepted.

And with regard to the death of her yavam, there is no testimony that is acceptable to the court.
Even if the woman actually remarries, at which point, it would be likely to assume that her husband is dead, her yevamah is still prohibited. Our Sages feared that a woman would risk ruin in both this world and the next, in order to cause her foe to be forbidden to her husband.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12:15.

And neither has witnesses to support her testimony.

For she is dependent on the testimony of her yevamah, as above.

For her authorization to remarry does not depend on whether or not her yavam is alive.

Or chalitzah.

I.e., there were only three brothers. Since the death of the first two brothers was never verified adequately to allow these women to marry freely, the original prohibition applying to them remains in force.

For her marriage and divorce releases each of the women from their obligation to their missing yavam.

The punishment— lashes— is lesser, and the woman’s children are not considered illegitimate.

Having relations with another man while married, by contrast, is a prohibition punish-able by execution by the court, her children are considered illegitimate, and it brings severe retribution in the world to come. Because the prohibition against marrying while under obligation to a yavam is less severe, our Sages feared that the woman might lie about the yavam’s death and transgress this prohibition.

It is forbidden for a husband to marry his wife’s sister while his wife is alive. Our Sages feared that the second sister or the husband may desire to give false testimony, so that they can marry.

I.e., generally, the testimony of two witnesses is required with regard to matters involving marriage and divorce. As mentioned in the concluding passage of Hilchot Gerushin (cited in the notes on Halachah 6), in order to allow a woman to remarry, leniency is granted and merely on the testimony of one witness. In this instance, however, there is no difficulty in theman’s or the woman’s remarrying; the only difficulty is that they cannot marry each other. Insuch an instance, our Sages were not willing to extend leniency.
[There is a slight difficulty when comparing the Rambam’s statements here to his statements at the conclusion of Hilchot Gittin. As explained by the Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam’s wording indicates that, according to Scriptural Law, with regard to a point of fact that can be verified, it is not necessary for twowitnesses to testify, and the statements of one witness are sufficient. The leniency granted your Sages was to accept the testimony of women, relatives and others whose testimony would not ordinarily be accepted. Here, however, the Rambam is stating (as he does in Hilchot Edut 5:2) that the acceptance of the testimony of a single witness is a leniency of Rabbinic origin. (See the Responsa of the Rivash, Responsum 181.)]

I.e., based on the premise stated in the first clause of the previous halachah.

For the prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would be obligated toperform yibbum if her husband dies.

The prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would not be obligated toperform yibbum if her husband dies. It is only because of her own statements that we might suspect that she is required to do so. Therefore, her statements are sufficient to offset this suspicion.

We suspect that perhaps she is lying in order to marry her brother-in-law.

I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died first, she would be permitted to marry without any restrictions. Because we give her statements some credence, we require her toperform chalitzah.

I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died after her husband, she would berequired to perform yibbum. We do not accept her word to the extent that we allow her to marry without restrictions. Nevertheless, we give her statements some credence and forbid the performance of yibbum, lest in fact there be no obligation to do so.

A woman who is born from a relationship that is forbidden to a priest, but not to an Israelite.

In which case, the chalitzah does not make any difference, for the woman was forbidden to the priesthood regardless

In which case, there is no apprehension of witnesses coming.

For according to her testimony, she is forbidden to do so.

Note the discussion of this ruling by the Beit Shmuel 156:17, and the opinion mentioned there that this ruling applies only when there were witnesses who testified that the woman’s husband and son both died. Otherwise, the woman’s word would be accepted based on the principle of migo— i.e., if she desired to lie, she could have said that her sonwas still alive.

This law applies even if the second wife was not pregnant when she left. Our Sages considered the possibility of the woman becoming pregnant as a reasonable probability.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

We do not consider the possibility that the woman was impregnated by her husband before he departed on the journey and did not realize this until he had already departed.

For even if we presume that the mother-in-law will become pregnant, it is more probable that she will miscarry or give birth to a girl (in which cases, the mitzvah of yibbum would not apply) than that she bear a son (Beit Shmuel 157:11).

For according to the testimony she was given, her husband was survived by a son, and the mitzvot of yibbum and chalitzah do not apply.

In which case her husband would have died without children, and she would be obligated to perform yibbum or chalitzah.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 18.

For it is only when a child is born from forbidden relations that are punishable by karet that this status is incurred (Yevamot 49a).

For her relations with her brother-in-law were prohibited by a transgression punishable by karet. The fact that she violated this prohibition unwittingly does not change the status of her children.

Sanhedrin 31b derives this from Deuteronomy 25:8: ‘‘And the elders of his city shall callhim...’’— i.e., ‘‘his city’’ and not her city.

Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. This version appears appropriate, for the decision to perform yibbum or chalitzah is that of the remaining brother alone.

This follows the Rambam’s perspective (Chapter 1, Halachah 2) that, in general, it is preferable to perform yibbum rather than chalitzah. Even so, the judges should take counsel and see whether the couple appear appropriate for each other.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:26.

Darchei Moshe (Even HaEzer 169) states that establishing a place for the chalitzah beforehand serves to publicize the matter.

For, as explained in the halachot to follow, both the yavam and the yevamah must recite certain phrases within the chalitzah ceremony.

Lo avah yabmi means ‘‘My yavam did not desire’’ [Deuteronomy 25:7]. Improper emphasis could, however, cause the statement to be interpreted as: ‘‘No, my yavam desired.’’

For chalitzah is considered as a ‘‘judgment,’’ and judgments may not be made at night(Yevamot 104a). (See also Halachah 16.)

I.e., there is no need for these individuals to be formally ordained as judges. Nevertheless, as the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 12:1), and as the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:1) states, at the outset, it is proper for three ordained judges to preside over the ceremony.

For they must read the phrases for the yavam and the yevamah, as will be stated later in the text. See Halachah 15, which states that this requirement is a factor only a priori.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 169:2) rules that a judge whose father is a native-born Jew and his mother is a convert may serve in this capacity.

Deuteronomy 25:10 states: ‘‘And his name will be called in Israel....’’ This phrase implies that only those of Jewish ancestry can serve in this capacity.

This serves two purposes. It is of benefit to the woman, for men will become aware that she is eligible to remarry. It also will make known the fact that she is forbidden to a priest(Rashi, Yevamot 101b).

Who do not know how to read. For their presence is only for the sake of making the matter known.

The entire shoe (according to the Rama, Even HaEzer 169:15, even its straps must bemade of leather).

See Yevamot 102a and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:16), which discuss whether a sandal or a shoe should be used. Diagram

There are certain opinions that allow a shoe that is sewn with linen, but both the Shul-chan Aruch and the Rama (ibid. 169:15) follow the Rambam’s view.

At the outset, the shoe should belong to the yavam. (See the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:14).

The yavam should not be wearing socks, and no mud should be stuck to his feet (Shul-chan Aruch, ibid.:26).

The Sifri derives this concept from Deuteronomy 25:8, which states: ‘‘And he shall standard say.’’ After the fact, however, if the chalitzah was performed while the yavam and the yevamah were seated, it is acceptable (Rama, ibid. 169:12).

The Tur states in the name of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi that if the yavam does not press his foot to the ground, the chalitzah is not acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:32) quotes this as a minority opinion.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:30) differs and follows the opinion of the Tur, who states that the chalitzah should be performed while the woman is standing and bends to untie and remove the yavam’s shoe.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that the yevamah should untie and remove the shoe with her right hand alone. The Rama states, however, that, after the fact, the chalitzah is accept-able if she uses her left hand.

The Tur and others question the rationale for this act. Significantly, the commentaries cite the Rambam’s source as the Zohar, Volume III, page 180a, which states that the removal of the shoe signifies the cutting of the woman’s connection with her deceased husband.

Although the literal meaning of Deuteronomy 25:9 is ‘‘she spits in his face,’’ Yevamot 106b explains that in a halachic context, the phrase should be interpreted as above.

For Deuteronomy, ibid., states that she must spit ‘‘before the eyes of the elders.’’

The Mishnah (Yevamot 12:6) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:42) mention‘‘those standing there.’’

We find a threefold repetition of a phrase employed by the Sages as a means of publicizing the matter. See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:11.
The Halachot Gedolot interprets the threefold repetition as a reprimand. It is as if Godtold him: ‘‘Wicked man! With your body, you could have performed a mitzvah, and you refused....’’ The judges will proclaim: ‘The one whose shoe was removed’ like a mourner.‘The one whose shoe was removed’ like one placed under a ban of ostracism. ‘The one whose shoe was removed’ like a person who rebels against [God’s] commandments.’’

Our translation of lishmah is based on the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:44).

I.e., one who is blind in both eyes (Hagahot Maimoniot, Rama, loc. cit.:48).

As reflected by Halachah 15, this is just an a priori ruling. After the fact, the chalitzah is acceptable.
The Ra’avad states that this law applies only when there is another brother who can perform chalitzah. If there is not another brother, the blind man should perform this ritual on the woman’s behalf. Although the Maggid Mishneh contests the Ra’avad’s decision, the Beit Shmuel 169:48 upholds it.

See Halachah 14.

Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the phrase (Deuteronomy 25:9), kachah ye’aseh, ‘‘this iswhat should be done,’’ implies that all the deeds and the order required by the Torah is imperative for the chalitzah to be brought about. The final opinion of Rabbi Akiva does not, however, accept this view (Yevamot 104b).

This reflects a Talmudic principle frequently applied and stated explicitly with regard to the meal offering brought in the Temple. These offerings consist of flour and oil. The flour and the oil should be mixed together. Nevertheless, as long as the quantity of flour is not toolarge to be mixed with the oil, the offering is acceptable, even when in actual fact the twowere not mixed together (Rashi, Yevamot 104b).

The difference between a chalitzah that is pasul, ‘‘not acceptable,’’ and a chalitzah that is not significant at all is discussed in Halachah 26.

As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Rambam’s view is dependent on the Tosefta, while on the surface, the Mishnah (Yevamot 104b) appears to accept the position that achalitzah performed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence. The Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam’s ruling, but notes that the Ramban and the Rashba follow the latter view. [Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yeva-mot 12:4), the Rambam also appears to favor the latter view, and his decision in the Mishneh Torah represents a reversal of his thinking.] The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer169:44) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.

As mentioned in Halachah 26, the chalitzah does not permit the yevamah to remarry, but prevents her from performing yibbum.
There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the effectiveness of spitting is a Scriptural Law or a Rabbinic institution. The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears that the Rambam is deriving the concept from the exegesis of a verse, but this is not accepted by all authorities.

Yibbum is permitted, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

Yevamot 105a distinguishes between spitting and the recitation of the verses as follows:Spitting should be carried out after the removal of the yavam’s shoe. Therefore, if it is performed before the removal of the shoe, it is considered a distinct act. The recitation of the verses, by contrast, should be performed before the removal of the shoe. An observer will thus realize that the fundamental aspect of the ceremony is still to be performed.

Instead of the two standing when she spits and they recite the verses, and the yavam’s standing, as mentioned in Halachot 6 and 7.

And not on his foot itself, as mentioned in Halachah 6.

Instead of judges who know how to read, as stated in Halachah 5.

Although at the outset, a blind person should not perform this act, as stated in Hala-chah 8.

See Halachah 5.

Since chalitzah is considered a judgment, three acceptable judges must preside over the ceremony.

Deuteronomy 25:9 states: ‘‘She shall remove his shoe from his foot.’’ If the shoe is tied above the knee, it is not considered to have been removed from his foot.

The entire act of removing the shoe must be performed by the woman. The Rama (Even HaEzer 169:33) quotes Rabbenu Asher, who rules that if the man could walk wearing the shoe while it is untied, the chalitzah is acceptable even if the man untied the shoe and the woman removed it.

As stated in Halachah 8, the ceremony must be performed with this intent in mind.

Since the girl is not past the age of majority, her deed is not totally effective. Nevertheless, since she can be be married at this age, her deed has a minimal effect, and she can no longer perform yibbum.

The Rambam’s intent is that the chalitzah is unacceptable, but it at least has the effect of preventing the woman from performing yibbum in the future, as opposed to a chalitzah that is of no consequence, as explained in Halachah 26.

These individuals are all considered mentally and/or emotionally challenged, and their deeds are not considered of consequence with regard to Scriptural Law. As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that chalitzah performed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence whatsoever.

E. g., a yevamah who is pregnant.

The commentaries explain that the Rambam’s opinion is that such a man should not perform chalitzah at all. Other commentaries maintain that if the stump of the yavam’s legcan be placed in a shoe and that shoe tied beneath his knee, the chalitzah is acceptable. Although the Rambam accepts, after the fact, chalitzah performed when the straps of the shoe are tied below the yavam’s knee, that is only because it is theoretically possible to have tied them on his foot. When it is impossible to tie the shoe on to his foot, as in theinstance at hand, the chalitzah should not be performed (Maggid Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:35) mentions both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam’s view. The Beit Yosef states that according to the Rambam, such a chalitzah is of no consequence at all. The Beit Shmuel 169:33 states that since there are authorities whomaintain that such a chalitzah is acceptable, the later authorities agree that a woman may not perform yibbum after such a chalitzah.

After the fact, if a yavam does not press his heel to the ground in an ordinary instance, the chalitzah is, nevertheless, acceptable. The distinction between an ordinary chalitzah and thecase at hand is that ordinarily, it is possible for the yavam to press his heel to the ground, and therefore the fact that he does not actually do so is not significant. In this instance, the yavamis incapable of doing so. Hence, the chalitzah is unacceptable.
Although the Ra’avad and others differ with the Rambam on this issue, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:34) accepts the Rambam’s view.

A cloth shoe does not protect the foot at all; therefore, it is not considered a shoe(Yevamot 103a). This ruling is also applied in other contexts— e.g., on Yom Kippur, when we are forbidden to wear shoes, it is permitted to wear a cloth shoe (Hilchot Sh’vi-tat Asor 3:7).
The Rashba and others maintain that there is no difference between a cloth slipper anda shoe made from the other substances mentioned. This is the view quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:22).

These substances offer some protection, and so the chalitzah is of some consequence. Nevertheless, when the Torah uses the word na’al, the intent is always a leather shoe.

This applies after the fact. A priori, none of these situations is acceptable.

The same rules apply with regard to a shoe made from any of the other substances mentioned in the previous halachah and covered with leather (Maggid Mishneh).

In the present age, when the Rabbinic court owns a special chalitzah shoe, it is customary to give it to the yavam as a present before the ceremony.

See Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at, Chapter 12, which describes the process in which a garment or shoe affected by tzara’at is judged by a priest. There are two stages to this process: one in which the article is ‘‘quarantined’’ for a period of a week to determine whether it has actually been affected, and a second stage during which the priest declares that the article is affected and must be burned.

Rashi (Yevamot 103b) interprets this as a leather covering placed on the feet of an idol to prevent damage when it is transported from place to place. Thus, the sandal is placed in thecategory of ‘‘an accessory to a false deity.’’

For it is abhorrent to use an article associated with impurity or false deities for the pur-pose of a mitzvah (Yevamot 103b).

The rationale is that the performance of mitzvot is not considered to be a personal benefit.

The difference between this and the previous instance can be explained as follows: It is possible to nullify the connection between ‘‘an accessory to a false deity’’ and the worship of the false deity. (See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:8-9.) As such, there is a possibility that such a sandal will not have to be destroyed. An object offered to a false deity, including the hide from which a sandal was made, can never be separated from its association with the false deity (ibid.). As such, it is condemned to be destroyed, forbidden for eternity and considered as if it did not exist.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 4, which describes the laws governing such a city. All the property in the city is condemned to be burned, and thus it cannot be used for chali-tzah, for the reasons described above.

Yevamot 102a questions whether the Torah’s intent is that the yevamah must bare the yavam’s foot, in which instance these examples would be acceptable, or she must remove hisshoe in the ordinary manner, in which instance they would not be acceptable. Since the question remains unresolved, the Rambam rules stringently.

Our translation is based on the Aruch. It is possible that it is not precise according to the Rambam’s view. The intent, however, is definitely a sharp pungent herb.

The intent is that she must spit again in order for the chalitzah to be performed as required. Even if she does not spit at all, the chalitzah is acceptable after the fact, as stated in Halachah 12 (Maggid Mishneh).

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that a yevamah who spits blood need not spit again, even if she does not suck her wound. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:40).

The fact that spittle is mixed with blood or another substance does not disqualify it.

The intent is that the spittle must pass in front of or below the yavam’s face. If the yeva-mah was taller than the yavam and the wind moved her spittle away before it passed before his face, the spitting is not acceptable.

Although a priori the judges must see the spittle, as stated in Halachah 7, after the fact their failure to do so does not render the spitting unacceptable.
In Yevamot 106b, a phrase ‘‘before the eyes of the elders’’ (Deuteronomy 25:9) is cited as a support for this requirement. Nevertheless, the Rabbis explain that the requirement is Rabbinic and not Scriptural in origin, and the verse is merely an asmachta. See the Beit Shmuel 169:39.

Note the Maggid Mishneh, which mentions that there is a dispute among the Rabbis about this issue. The rationale for the position that the chalitzah is acceptable is that in this instance, the yavam did intend to free the yevamah from her obligation to him. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 169:52.)

For as mentioned in Halachah 8, the chalitzah must be performed with the intent of releasing the woman from her obligation.
The chalitzah is, however, effective, in that it prevents the man (or his brothers) from ever performing yibbum with this woman. Therefore, the man is compelled by the court toperform an acceptable chalitzah, for from this point on he has nothing to lose, and he can enable the woman to remarry through his act (Rashba, as quoted by Maggid Mishneh;Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 169:51).

This applies even if the condition is stated in a manner that meets the requirements of conditional statements (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:50).

If such a condition is made, the woman is, however, rightfully obligated to pay the amount she agreed to pay, unless she has a reason for which she considers the yavam as unfit to marry her that the court would accept [Shulchan Aruch (ibid.)].

Based on Hilchot Gerushin 6:19, it would appear that the intent is that he tells twowitnesses that he does not want to perform the chalitzah, the chalitzah should be nullified, because he is being compelled to perform it.

Yevamot 106a establishes an equivalence between divorce and chalitzah with regard to these laws. On this basis, the Rivash (Responsum 482, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh in the gloss on Halachah 16) raises a difficulty, noting that when a husband issues a protest regarding a get, the get is nullified entirely. With regard to chalitzah, however, theRambam rules that it is merely unacceptable.
The Rivash offers a resolution, explaining that when a protest is issued with regard to a get, the get itself becomes nullified, and therefore the divorce is of no consequence at all. With regard to chalitzah, however, the yavam did perform all the required acts. His protest is accepted to the extent that it is considered that he performed these acts without intending torelease the woman from her obligation. This, however, merely causes a chalitzah to be unacceptable, as stated in Halachah 16. It does not nullify it entirely.

See Hilchot Gerushin 6:20.

The equivalence established by Yevamot 106a applies in this context as well. The Ram-bam discusses the laws governing a get given under compulsion in Hilchot Gerushin 2:20.

This refers to a situation analogous to those described in Chapter 2, Halachah 14, or Chapter 6, Halachah 4, in which the person should be compelled to perform chalitzah.
The Rama (Even HaEzer 169:13) states that even according to the Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence, a yavam may be compelled toperform chalitzah only for these reasons.

For, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin loc. cit., the person’s actions are consider to be per-formed voluntarily, because:
He wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvotand eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents, he is considered to have [acted] willfully.

I.e., as opposed to acting as agents for a Jewish court.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 13.

As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the Rambam’intent is that these acts of chalitzah are acceptable according to Scriptural Law or not.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the woman should, however, be forced to separate from her second husband until she performs an acceptable chalitzah. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 169:55) follows this ruling.

As stated in Halachah 16.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam’s ruling alludes to the following law: If neither the yevamah nor the yavam has the intent to perform chalitzah, the fact that sheremoves his shoe is of no consequence, and she is permitted to perform yibbum. Note the discussion of this subject in Sefer HaKovetz.

This distinguishes it from a bill of divorce (a get), which is actually necessary to bring about the divorce. For that reason (as implied by Hilchot Gerushin 11:9), it need not be written for the sake of the man and the woman, nor is it bound by the other details that apply to a get.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:56), which states that the paper on which the document is written must be ruled with a stylus (i.e., sirtut is required), because it contains Biblical verses.

The Rambam is emphasizing that we do not suspect that perhaps the court erred and presided over a chalitzah without knowing the identity of the parties involved.

For as stated in Halachah 5, at the outset five judges are necessary. Nevertheless, it is the presence of three that is considered significant.

Using the Hebrew words of the verse.

We have included these lines based on the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, although it is highly likely that they are a printer’s addition. They are not found in most early manuscripts and printings. Moreover, it is likely that they are a later printer’s addition because the Rambam does not mention witnesses signing this document, but rather only the judges who presided over the chalitzah.

See Halachah 29.

The Rambam concludes Hilchot Gerushin by stating:
Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages released the prohibition [against a married woman], which is considered a very severe matter, on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maid servant, statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation, a written statement, or [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation, as we have explained.
[These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah required the testimony of twowitnesses, and all the other details of the laws of witnesses only with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony— e.g., that one person killed another, or that one person lent money to another. When, by contrast, the matter can be verified definitively without the testimony ofa witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true— e.g., when one testifies that a person died, the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.
As interpreted by the Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam’s statement implies that since the matter will ultimately become public know-ledge, no formal testimony is required, and the statements of an individual who witnessed the matter himself are sufficient to be accepted.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 2; Hilchot Ishut 22:14.

It appears in this context that the Rambam is referring to the literal meaning of the verse and not the halachic meaning, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 6.

This refers to an instance where the woman was a virgin when she married her first husband. Since she did not collect her due from her first husband, she is still entitled to marriage contract of two hundred zuz. Otherwise, she would be granted only one hundred zuz, as is granted to other widows.

Although there is some rationale for the placement of the text of the ketubah here, because the Rambam refers to it in the previous halachah, the commentaries question whyhe did not include it in Hilchot Ishut, where the laws of ketubot are discussed in detail.
The version of the ketubah cited by the Rambam is employed with minor variations by theSephardic community today. In the Ashkenazic community, the variations are greater, but the basis of the document remains the same.

For the coins of the Talmudic era were one part silver and seven parts base metal (Hilchot Ishut 10:8).

Based on Hilchot Ishut (ibid.), this phrase appears to be a printer’s addition, for theRambam considers the commitment to this sum to be a Rabbinic ordinance. It is lacking inmany authoritative printings and manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. According toAshkenazic custom, the phrase should be included in the ketubah.

This conveys a man’s pledge to give his wife sha’arah (her sustenance), kesutah (her clothing) and onatah (her conjugal rights). These constitute a man’s fundamental obligations in marriage, as stated in Exodus 21:10. (See also Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 262; Hilchot Ishut 12:2.)

I.e., to provide his wife with her provisions and clothing.

I.e., a kinyan sudar, the exchange of a handkerchief that serves to formalize the acquisition of property, or the establishment of a binding contractual agreement.

An agreement made facetiously, without the desire to keep it.

The essential requirement of the marriage contract of a widow is only one hundred zuzim. In order to explain this reduction, the marriage contract mentions her status.

This is necessary for the reasons mentioned previously and also to identify the woman as being forbidden to the priesthood. Even if this husband leaves her a widow, she may not marry a priest, because of her previous divorce.

Such a woman is forbidden to the priesthood, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:17.

If a woman had engaged in intimate relations previously outside the context of marriage, she should also be given a ketubah of this amount according to many authorities. Others maintain that she should be given the amount usually given to a virgin bride, so that she will not be publicly embarrassed. Others differentiate between a womanwho had relations only with her prospective husband (in which case, the second ruling is followed) and one who had relations with others (in which case the first ruling is followed).

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here [which is also reflected in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 2:4)], and his ruling in Hilchot Sefer Torah 7:16, where he states that one may write three words, but not four, without ruling the writing surface. The Maggid Mishneh notes that both of these opinions have their source in Megillah 7b. He and other commentaries discuss this issue in Hilchot Sefer Torah.
The contradiction was brought to the attention of the Rambam’s grandson, Rabbi Yehoshua, who states that the ruling in Hilchot Sefer Torah should be followed, since there the subject is given full focus, while in Hilchot Yibbum the matter is mentioned tangentially. Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 284:2) differs and follows the more stringent view.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

This refers to a get given before the brother made a statement of intent to marry the yevamah (ma’amar). See Halachot 4 and 5.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 3:5), the Rambam writes that at the outset, the get should precede the chalitzah.

I.e., the get nullifies the kiddushin brought about by the ma’amar.

Whenever the Rambam uses the expression ‘‘It appears to me,’’ he is referring to a ruling that is not specifically mentioned in the Talmud. In this instance, Rashi (Yevamot 32a, 52a)agrees with the Rambam, but the Ra’avad and Tosafot differ and maintain that if the yavam who gave her the ma’amar and the get desires, he may still perform yibbum with her. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 170:15) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

In Halachah 1. The Rambam is adding that even if the yavam had already given the yevamah a ma’amar, this ruling still applies.
If the yavam gives a get without specifying the reason, we assume that his intent is to sever his connection with the yevamah and not merely to nullify his ma’amar (Rashi,Yevamot 32a; Rama, Even HaEzer 170:15).

Once a yavam has performed chalitzah, neither he nor his brothers may perform yibbum afterwards. Similarly, once a get has been given, the yavam is obligated to perform chali-tzah and may not perform yibbum. Since yibbum is not relevant, the ma’amar is not accept-able.

For only one of the wives of the deceased brother may be married by a yavam, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

Since a ma’amar does not complete the bond between the yavam and the yevamah, the connection between them can be disqualified because of undesirable actions, such as those mentioned by the Rambam.

Although the ma’amar that follows the relations is nullified, the marriage bond established by the relations remains in effect (Rav David Arameah).

This ma’amar is disqualified by the actions that follow it.

This ma’amar is disqualified by the actions that preceded it.

Although the ma’amar is unacceptable and yibbum is not allowed, a get is necessary(from both brothers, when two ma’amarim are involved), nevertheless, to nullify the kiddu-shin. Afterwards, one of the brothers should perform chalitzah to enable the woman to marry another man.

According to Rabbinic Law, the yavam should give the yevamah a ma’amar before entering into relations with her. Nevertheless, after the fact, if he failed to give her such ama’amar, their relations still establish a marriage bond between them that the Sagesallowed to continue.

In all these instances, the yavam must divorce the yevamah with a get, because of their relations in which they engaged, and also perform chalitzah because of his original obligation to her. Similarly, he and/or his brothers must give a get to any of his deceased brother’s other wives if she was given a ma’amar in such an instance (Maggid Mishneh, based on Yevamot 50b).

See Halachah 12. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 9, from which it is apparent that when-ever a yavam cannot perform yibbum with his yevamah, the chalitzah he performs with her is deemed ‘‘inferior.’’

I.e., the deceased was married to many wives.

I.e., as mentioned above, unacceptable relations and/or an unacceptable ma’amar have an effect and nullify the possibility of performing yibbum with any of the deceased’s other wives.

There is a question among the commentaries if the word ‘‘each’’ is included in the textof the Mishneh Torah or not. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this word should be included in the text. According to his interpretation, even if the yavam performs chalitzah with one of the deceased’s wives who did not receive a ma’amar or engage in relations with the yavam, this chalitzah does not remove the obligation from the deceased’s other wives, and each of them must perform chalitzah.
The Lechem Mishneh differs and maintains that the word ‘‘each’’ is a later addition.(And indeed most authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah substantiate this contention.) According to this view, if the yavam performs chalitzah with one of the deceased’s wives who did not receive a ma’amar or engage in relations with the yavam, this chalitzah removes the obligation from the deceased’s other wives, and none ofthem is required to perform chalitzah.
Even according to this view, if the yavam performs chalitzah with the yevamah whoreceived an unacceptable ma’amar or engaged in unacceptable relations, this chalitzah does not remove the obligation from the deceased’s other wives, and each of them must perform chalitzah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 170:19) quotes the Maggid Mishneh’s interpretation of the Rambam’s ruling, but mentions that other authorities differ.

In which instance she is forbidden to him by Rabbinic decree, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12.

I.e., consecrating the woman by engaging in intimate relations with her, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 1:2.

In which case the relations with the second yevamah violate a positive Scriptural commandment.

For even when the relations violate a Rabbinic prohibition or a positive Scriptural commandment, a marriage bond is brought about, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 4:14.

Halachah 2.

As mentioned in Halachah 1, it is only through chalitzah that the connection is completely dissolved.

As explained in the following halachah.

The intent is that the relations are of no consequence with regard to the laws of yibbum. They are, however, adulterous relations and if the yevamah engages in them willingly, she is not permitted to remain married to her husband.

A person is forbidden to marry the women who are closely related to his divorcee. In this instance, although neither of these gittin is necessary, the prohibition is still applied in both cases.

Both brothers are not required to perform chalitzah in order for her to be permitted to marry others. Performing chalitzah with her does not, however, cause the deceased’s other wives to become permitted, as explained in Halachot 11 and 12.

See Halachah 13.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 14, the same relatives who are forbidden to a man who divorces his wife are forbidden to a man who performs chalitzah.

This refers to ‘‘acceptable relations,’’ as stated in Halachah 11. If the relations are ‘‘unacceptable,’’ different laws apply (Maggid Mishneh).

If, however, the yevamah engages in these relations willingly, she must be divorced by her husband for committing adultery.

See Halachah 13.

I.e., the deceased left two or more wives and was survived by two or more brothers. One brother decided to perform yibbum with one of the widows. Unknowingly, another brother decided to perform yibbum with another widow, and it is not known who performed yibbum first.

For the marriage of one of them is sinful, transgressing a positive commandment. Since it cannot be determined whose marriage is sinful, both are required to divorce.

For it is not known that his brother performed yibbum, and even if he did perform yibbum, perhaps he did so after this brother performed yibbum. Since there are multiple doubts involved (sefek s’feikah), the yavam is not forced to divorce until he has determined that his brother has also performed yibbum.

The commentaries have questioned this ruling, based on Chapter 3, Halachah 16, which requires a woman to wait until she discovers what has taken place overseas, lest the chalitzahbe unnecessary, she discover that fact and marry a priest and an onlooker not know all the details of the situation. Such a scenario could also happen in the present situation.
There are commentaries that try to reconcile the Rambam’s ruling. For example, Mishneh LaMelech explains that in the present instance, the doubt could be protracted indefinitely, while in the previous case, everything is dependent on a woman’s giving birth, and the matter can be clarified after nine months. Nevertheless, because of these objections, the ShulchanAruch (Even HaEzer 170:20) does not mention this element of the Rambam’s ruling.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 15 (and Hilchot Ishut 11:3), when a boy over nine years old enters into intimate relations with a woman, his actions are considered of consequence in certain contexts.
The Maggid Mishneh and Rashi (Kiddushin 19a) explain that when a minor above nine years old enters into relations with a woman, he acquires her as his wife according to Scriptural Law. (Nevertheless, if another man enters into relations with her, the other man is not executed for committing adultery.) Our Sages, however, reduced the level of connection established and caused their marriage bond to have only the effectiveness of a ma’amar.
[The rationale why yibbum performed by a minor is effective although a minor does not possess the intellectual maturity to take responsibility for his conduct is that we find that yibbum does not require intent at all; what is significant is the act of intimate relations. (SeeChapter 2, Halachah 3.)]
Tosafot differ and maintain that, in this context, the relations of a nine-year old are of no consequence according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, the Rabbis enforced a stringency and considered these relations to be equivalent to a ma’amar.

This concept is illustrated in the halachah that follows, as is another consequence of the principle that the intimate relations that this youth engages in are considered equivalent toa ma’amar given by an adult.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 16, chalitzah performed by a minor is of no con-sequence, because the passage concerning chalitzah explicitly mentions an ish— i.e., a male past majority. Since chalitzah performed by a minor is of no consequence, a get given by himis of no consequence, because the disqualification caused by a get is an extension by the Rabbis of the Scriptural prohibition caused by chalitzah.
Significantly, the Rambam’s statements here represent a reversal of his ruling in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 10:6), in which he rules that a get given by a minor does disqualify a yevamah from performing yibbum with the minor’s brothers.

Had the younger brother been past the age of majority, he would have disqualified the yevamah from performing yibbum with his older brother, as stated in Halachot 7 and 14.

See Halachot 7 and 14.

Since the minor’s relations possess only the strength of a ma’amar, their effectiveness can be nullified by the actions of an older brother.

For the relations in which they engaged after the yavam attained majority complete the marriage bond.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 2:11, a male who does not manifest signs of impotency is considered a minor until he attains the age of 35.

See Hilchot Ishut 4:7-9.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:7 and Hilchot Gerushin 11:1, when a girl’s father died and she is below the age of majority, our Sages ordained that her mother and/or brothers can arrange a marriage for her. This marriage is not binding according to Scriptural Law. Accordingly, when creating this option, our Sages gave the girl the possibility of nullifying themarriage before she reaches majority merely by making a verbal statement.

If, however, she marries, they would respect the limits of modesty and her husband would protect her (Yevamot 112b).

If, however, one is a mentally capable woman past the age of majority, yibbum or chalitzah should be performed with her— for her marriage is binding according to Scriptural Law— and not with those whose marriage is binding only by virtue of a Rabbinic ordinance.

For their marriage bonds all share the same status.

The marriage relationship of each one possesses an advantage over the other. The marriage with the minor, had it not been interrupted, could have blossomed into a marriage bond binding according to Scriptural Law. On the other hand, there is an advantage to the marriage to the deaf-mute, because the minor had the option of ending her marriage at will, while that of the deaf-mute was binding. As evident from Halachot 27 and 28, the marriage to the minor is preferable.

For just as she can dissolve her relationship with her husband while he is alive, she can nullify it afterwards, freeing herself from any obligation to the yavam (Hilchot Gerushin 11:3).
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that a minor is permitted to free herself from an obligation to the yavam through mi’un only when this facilitates the establishment of marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural Law. (See Halachah 30 and Chapter7, Halachah 15.) In this instance, however, she is not given the privilege. Instead, she must wait until she attains majority and then perform chalitzah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 171:1) quotes the Rambam’s view.

Since the deaf-mute is not considered responsible for her actions, she cannot perform chalitzah. She must either perform yibbum or remain unmarried for the remainder of her life.
If the yavam performs yibbum with the minor, he may not perform yibbum with the deaf-mute, for he is permitted to perform yibbum only with one of his deceased brother’s wives.

The deaf-mute is not considered responsible for her actions. Nevertheless, since according to Scriptural and Talmudic Law a get may be given without the woman’consent, the divorce is binding (Hilchot Gerushin 10:23).

And performing yibbum with a woman who is consecrated only according to RabbinicLaw does not free a woman who is consecrated according to Scriptural Law from her obligation.

For, as mentioned in Halachah 14, after a yavam engages in relations with his yevamah, their relationship cannot be disqualified.

If the second wife does not perform mi’un, her consecration is also binding. Nevertheless, it involves the violation of a positive commandment. Moreover, a get is required for nullifying this marriage, and she becomes forbidden to the priesthood. If, however, she dissolves her marriage through mi’un, a get is not required.

For relations with her are forbidden, and yet her consecration is binding.

Although the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that it is forbidden to remain married to the minor, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 171:7) follows the Ram-bam’s ruling.

For the marriage to the minor is preferable to that of the deaf-mute.

Since the yavam entered into relations with the deaf-mute first, he is not able to remain married to the minor. She should therefore dissolve her obligation to him through mi’un. The Sages preferred this option rather than having her wait until she attains majority and receives a get and chalitzah, because of the impression that the latter process might create(Or Sameach). Moreover, far fewer legal details are involved (Kin’at Eliyahu).
Note the Tur (Even HaEzer 171), which interprets the Ra’avad’s comments on this hala-chah as implying that the yavam should remain married to the minor. The Tur does not accept this view.

Once the minor has performed mi’un, it appears that there is no obligation for the deaf-mute to be divorced, for the minor has uprooted her connection to her deceased husband, and as such, the relations with her seemingly should not affect the status of the deaf-mute. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the deaf-mute must be divorced, as a penalty, because the yavam should have waited to engage in relations with her until the minor performed mi’un (Or Sameach).
The Tur (loc. cit) differs and maintains that the yavam may remain married to the deaf-mute. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 171:8) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Rama mentions that of the Tur.

For her marriage was established through ‘‘acceptable relations.’’ Even if the other wifeof the deceased was mentally competent, relations with her would not disqualify the yavam’s marriage to the first yevamah.

Because she becomes consecrated through these relations. Nevertheless, continuing this marriage involves a prohibition.

Since the marriage to the mentally competent woman is binding according to Scriptural Law, it supersedes the marriage to the deaf-mute.

She must be divorced, because the relations with the deaf-mute cause relations with her to be considered as ‘‘unacceptable relations.’’ Therefore, she must receive a get to nullify the consecration brought about by the relations, and chalitzah to nullify her obligation to her yavam.

For these are ‘‘acceptable relations.’’

Since the yavam entered into relations with the woman past majority first, he is not able to remain married to the minor. She should therefore dissolve her obligation to him through mi’un, rather than having her receive a get, because in this manner she is not disqualified from the priesthood.

In this way, the minor dissolves all connection to the yavam, and there is no prohibition against his remaining married to the woman past majority. This option is preferred so that the yavam will have performed an act of yibbum that is binding according to Scriptural Law.