Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Genesis, ch. 32, relates that before his confrontation with Esau, Jacob remained alone in his camp. An unidentified being - interpreted by the Torah commentaries to be Esau’s archangel - wrestled with him the entire night. When he saw that he could not defeat Jacob, he gave him a blow to his upper thigh, dislocating his gid hanasheh. In commemoration of this event, “The children of Israel do not eat the gid hanasheh”. The Rabbis identified the gid hanasheh as the sciatic nerve, the large main nerve running down the back of an animal’s hind leg.

See Halachah 5.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 183) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 3) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 65:7) does not cite the Rambam’s view, but instead quotes two differing opinions: one that the prohibition does not apply to a fetus at all and another, that it applies only when the fetus has completed the period of gestation and is discovered alive.

Although the angel only dislodged the nerve on one of Jacob’s legs, we are forbidden to partake of the nerves from both sides.

See Halachah 7 concerning the removal of this nerve.

Because he violates a Scriptural prohibition.

For violating a Rabbinic prohibition.

Accordingly, even if the gid is less than an olive-sized portion in size, the person is liable. Compare to Chapter 2, Halachah 21, Chapter 15, Halachah 17, and Chapter 16, Halachah 6.

Rav Moshe HaCohen writes that this ruling applies when the person was given a separate warning for each gid. Otherwise, he receives only one set of lashes. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept that interpretation.

This explanatory addition is based on Chullin 92b.

Chullin 92b discusses these issues and leaves both matters unresolved; hence, the Rambam’ s rulings.

Not for partaking of the gid and not for partaking of the meat of a forbidden animal.

Chullin 101a notes that the confrontation between Jacob and the angel took place before the Giving of the Torah, at a time when the Jews could eat non-kosher animals. Hence, there is reason to say that the prohibition could involve a non-kosher animal, for partaking of such animal was not forbidden until the Giving of the Torah.
In response, the Talmud explains that our observance of this prohibition does not stem from the practice observed by Jacob’s descendants, but because this prohibition was reiterated at the time of the Giving of the Torah. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6), the Rambam elaborates on this point, explaining that our observance of Jewish practice, even the mitzvot which we know that the Patriarchs fulfilled like circumcision, stems from God’s command at Sinai and not from our ancestors’ observance.

Chapter 4, Halachah 18. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 65:9) which states that a gid is “like a piece of wood; it has no flavor.”

I.e., the prohibition against partaking of a neveilah, treifah, or burnt offering.

Following the concept of issur kollel, “an encompassing prohibition,” as explained in the conclusion of Halachah 14 (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Chullin 82b states that according to the opinion that a gid hanesheh does not have any flavor, one is not liable. Only the opinion that maintains that the gid hanesheh does have a flavor holds one liable. From the previous halachah, it appears that the Rambam follows the former view. Why then does he hold the person liable for two sets of lashes.

Since the gid hanesheh and the gid forbidden by Rabbinic decree subdivide into several branches, this is a rather difficult task. For this reason, in most sectors of the Jewish community today, it is customary not to eat the hind-quarters of an animal. Accordingly, several cuts of meat, e.g., sirloin steak, are not available from kosher butchers.

I.e., we rely on llis word and do not inspect the meat ourselves.

If the person himself does not have a reputation for observance and knowledge of the laws, he can sell meat if he hires such a person to act as a supervisor. This is the rationale for the practice of hasgachah, kashrut inspection, practiced today.

In the present era, there is no difference between Eretz Yisrael and other lands, for the majority of the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael are not Torah observant.

He must return the money entirely. This applies even if the customers already partook of the non-kosher meat (Hilchot Mechirah 16:14). The rationale is that a person’s soul is revolted by the commission of a transgression and he is not considered to have benefited from the meat at all (Sefer Meirat Einayim 232:4).

See Chapter 7, Halachah 21.

If he performs such an act in a place where his identity is known, it can be said that he did so in order to be reinstated.

I.e., they show that he is willing to forgo his financial benefit in order to keep Torah law. See also Hilchot Shechitah 10:14 and Hilchot Edut 12:9 which deal with the same concept. Hilchot Edut states that in order to be accepted as a witness, he must wear black garments as a sign of repentance.

See the Maggid Mishneh who maintains that the Rambam would rule in this manner even when a Jew is reputed to transgress various prohibitions. He also mentions the opinion of the Rashba who maintains that further precautions must be taken if an article is entrusted to a non-observant Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 118:8) quotes the Rambam’ s ruling and then cites the Rashba’ s view without indicating which opinion should be followed.

I.e., we do not expect that he will steal. Moreover, he will derive no benefit from doing so, for he will have to supply an equivalent piece of meat for the one he exchanges. We do not expect him to cause sin without deriving any benefit. If, however, he has a reputation for stealing, his word is not accepted (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., Canaanite servants, non-Jews purchased as servants who have undergone a partial conversion process (Hilchat Issurei Bi’ah 12:11).

For a gentile is never trusted in any matters involving Jewish observance. When one desires to send food that involves prohibitions with a gentile, it is necessary to take precautions as stated in Chapter 13, Halachot 8-10.

I.e., even if the proportions are heavily weighted in favor of the conclusion that the meat is kosher, we accept the possibility that it is non-kosher.

This is a general principle applying in many other contexts as well, e.g., Hilchat Chametz UMatzah 2:10, Hilchat Issurei Bi’ah 18:15.

This also is a frequently employed Talmudic principle.

As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh, there are Rishonim who permit meat found in the possession of a gentile when the majority of the sellers are Jewish, maintaining that this is evident from Chullin 95a. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 63:1), however, quotes the Rambam’s view.

According to the literal meaning of the Rambam’s words, if meat was placed in the freezer, it would be forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 63:2) cites, however, the opinion of Rashbam which permits the meat if it is found in the same place that it was placed. The Rama writes that it is customary to follow this view.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if a person has a reputation for upright conduct, his word is accepted in this concept even if he is not a Torah scholar. Note the contrast to Hilchot Gezeilah V’Aveidah 14:12 which accepts only the word of a Torah scholar if one claims to recognize a lost object, but cannot identify it with distinctive marks.

If, however, he found it as he left it, it is certainly permitted (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh notes that according to Pesachim 22a, it would appear that the authorities who maintain that the gid hanesheh has no flavor also maintain that it is forbidden to benefit from it. Now the Rambam follows the perspective that the gid hanesheh has no flavor (see Halachah 5). Hence his position here is somewhat difficult. The Maggid Mishneh explains, however, that the two positions are not necessarily interrelated and both rulings of the Rambam can be upheld.

I.e., because there is no prohibition against receiving benefit from the gid hanesheh, he does not have to remove it before selling the meat.

Since the Jew sees a co-religionist giving the gentile the meat, he will assume that it was ritually slaughtered and that the meat was kosher. [This applies in a place where public announcements are made when an animal is discovered to be treifah(Chullin 93b). Otherwise, the Jew must tell the gentile that the animal is kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 65:11)].
Nevertheless, since the place of the gid hanesheh is recognizable.: i.e., it is obvious whether the gid is still in the thigh or has already been removed - he will not partake of the meat until the gid is removed.

Since the place of the gid hanesheh is not obvious, the other Jew may think that ordinary kosher meat is being given and may partake of it.

Both of these commands are in the second person: one singular, one plural.

Sometimes the command is stated in an active voice; sometimes, it is passive; sometimes, singular and sometimes plural. The passive form implies that it is forbidden to derive any benefit that could lead to one’s eating, e.g., selling it for money that could be used to purchase food.

Rav Moshe HaCohen questions this ruling, stating that if the intent of the Scriptural prohibition is that it is forbidden to benefit from these substances, why is one not liable for lashes for deriving such benefit? The Maggid Mishneh explains that he is not liable, for one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit from the food in the ordinary manner one derives benefit from food. This includes only eating. Receiving money, by contrast, is not considered as benefiting from food in the ordinary manner. Rav Moshe HaCohen, however, anticipated that attempted resolution and explains that, on the contrary, selling edible food is an ordinary way of deriving benefit.

There is one exception to this: money received in return for a false deity or articles associated with it. That money is itself forbidden (see Chapter 13, Halachah 15; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:19).

I.e., one’s livelihood may not revolve around the sale of these forbidden entities or performing work with them (e.g., serving as a chef in a non-kosher restaurant). The rationale for the prohibition is that we fear that a person who has extensive involvement with forbidden substances may come to partake of them (Rashba).
The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that the above applies only with regard to food from forbidden species. One may choose a profession that involves employing a horse or a donkey as a beast of burden.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 186-187) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 113 and 92) include these prohibitions among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:11,13.

I.e., together the mixture is the size of an olive. It is not necessary that one have an olive-sized portion of milk and an olive-sized portion of meat.

If, however, the meat and milk have not been. cooked together, there is no Scriptural prohibition against partaking of them together (Maggid Mishneh). According to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to partake of them in any manner.

Even if a prohibition was not violated when cooking them together (e.g., they were cooked by a gentile), it is forbidden for a Jew to partake of the mixture. The implication is that the prohibitions against cooking the mixture and partaking of it are separate issues that do not necessarily share a connection (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., nowhere in the Torah does it state that it is forbidden to partake of such a mixture.

Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit., the Rambam explains that the prohibitions against partaking of and benefiting from milk and meat are derived from the fact that the Torah repeats this prohibition three times. Perhaps the reason the Rambam does not mention this means of derivation here is to avoid the following question being raised: Why are lashes not given for benefiting from milk and meat?
To explain: In Chapter 8, Halachah 16, the Rambam writes that one is not liable for lashes for deriving benefit from a forbidden substance. As explained in the notes to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh explains that one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit- from the food in an ordinary manner. This includes only eating and not other forms of deriving benefit. Nevertheless, seemingly this should not apply with regard to benefiting from a mixture of milk and meat. For, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 10, in that instance, one is liable even if one does not derive benefit in the ordinary manner. Hence, it would appear that one should be liable for lashes for· partaking of such a mixture.
Among the explanations given why one is not liable is that the prohibition against deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat is derived from an inference from a more lenient instance to a more stringent one (a kal vichomer; see Chullin 115b). And we follow the principle that punishment is not meted out when a prohibition is derived in such a fashion, only when it is stated explicitly (Sifri, Naso). If, however, there was an explicit prohibition in the Torah teaching us that deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat was forbidden, seemingly, one would be liable for lashes (Lechem Mishneh).

See Hilchot Jssurei Bi’ah 2:6.

With regard to the meat or milk of a kosher wild beast or fowl, see the following halachah and notes.

I.e., the prohibition involves only a kid that could be eaten and milk of which one could partake.

I.e., the term g’di translated as “kid,” commonly means “kid-goat.” Nevertheless, according to the Bible, it is not necessarily restricted to this meaning unless the verse specifies so explicitly, as in Genesis 27:16; 38:20.

I.e., the intent is not that one is liable only for cooking an offspring in the milk of its mother and not in any other situations.

Needless to say, one is liable for partaking of the non-kosher meat or the non-kosher milk.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis in Chullin 116a whether the prohibition against eating the meat of a wild beast [cooked] in milk is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin. According to some interpretations, that difference of opinion is perpetuated among the Rishonim (see Siftei Cohen 87:4). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Rishonim and Achronim follow the opinion the Rambam states here. This is also the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 87:3).
Significantly, iri (Hilchot Mamrim 2:9), the Rambam states that the meat of a wild beast that is cooked in milk is forbidden according to Scriptural Law. In their glosses to Hilchot Mamrim, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that there, the Rambam is speaking theoretically: Were the halachah to follow the opinion that the meat of a wild beast is forbidden according to Scriptural law, the ruling would be such and such. The Merkevat HaMishneh, however, maintains that a printing error crept into the text in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot and the text should be changed to fit the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Mamrim.

Hence were the Sages to allow one to partake of the meat of a wild beast and fowl cooked in milk, one might think that the prohibition applies only in its most literal context. As a safeguard, they instituted this prohibition.

The Turei Zahav 87:3 and the Siftei Cohen 87:5 mention that there are authorities who forbid eating fish and milk together because it can cause health dangers. They, however, reject that ruling.

This refers to eggs that already have a yolk and whites, but are still connected to the chicken’s body (Maggid Mishneh). See the Turei Zahav 87:6 and the Siftei Cohen 87:9 who quote authorities who explain that even though such eggs are considered as meat in certain contexts, there is no prohibition against partaking of them together with milk.

Nevertheless, there is a prohibition against partaking of all these mixtures

I.e., milk that was in the animal’s udders when it died or was slaughtered. See Halachah 12.

The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 87:6) states that, after the fact, there is no prohibition against a mixture of milk from a male and meat. The Siftei Cohen 87:16 explains that this refers to milk from a male human. Even the Rama would forbid milk from a male animal according to Rabbinic Law.

Implied is that in the latter instance, one is liable for partaking of blood. The Siftei Cohen 87:15 notes that according to many authorities, one is not liable for lashes for partaking of blood that has been cooked.

In this instance, we do not say that “one prohibition does not fall upon another,” because there is no prohibition against cooking a neveilah or forbidden fat.

He is, hP. wever, liable for partaking of a nevelah or of forbidden fat.

For as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 18, such substances are not fit to be eaten and thus are not considered as meat.

The pot must be boiling hot. If meat falls into cold milk, it will not absorb it. See Halachah 17.

Chullin 97a states “An Aramean chef shall taste it.” Tosafot and others explain that only a chefs word is accepted. He will not lie, because if his falsification is discovered, his professional reputation will be tarnished and he will suffer a loss. We suspect that an ordinary gentile, by contrast, will lie. His word is only accepted with regard to ritual matters when he makes statements in the course of conversation, without knowing that a Jew is depending on his word.
This interpretation is not evident from the Rambam’s words. On the contrary, it appears that according to the Rambam, the statements of any gentile are acceptable (see Chapter 15, Halachah 30, and notes). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 92:1 quotes the Rambam’s words. The Siftei Cohen 92:1 mentions the view of Tosafot. The Rama states that in the Ashkenazic community, the custom is not to rely on the word. of a gentile in this context. Instead, we require sixty times the volume of the meat in all instances. Otherwise, both the milk and the meat are forbidden.

For it certainly absorbed milk.

As will be explained (see Chapter 15, Halachah 6, and notes), our Sages received the tradition that a forbidden substances will not impart its flavor to a mixture when the mixture contains sixty times its volume.

There is no way of distinguishing the remainder of the milk from the forbidden milk. Hence the entire mixture is forbidden unless there is more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s words in this and the following halachah, we are speaking of an instance where milk falls on a piece of nieat that is not in the sauce. According to Rashi, the lower portion of the meat is resting within the sauce in the pot and its upper portion - on which the milk falls - projects beyond it. According to Rabbenu Yitzchak, the entire portion is outside the sauce. See Turei Zahav 92:2; Siftei Cohen 92:4. (From the Rambam’s wording at the beginning of the following halachah, it would appear that he follows Rabbenu Yitzchak’s position.)

I.e., we have the meat tasted by a gentile as above.

I.e., the piece itself is permitted and therefore all the contents of the pot.

Since the meat becomes forbidden, because it is meat that has been mixed with milk, tasting the mixture for milk is not sufficient. Instead, we consider the meat as a forbidden article and measure 60 times its volume. It is not possible to distinguish between the flavor of the forbidden meat and that of the permitted meat.

Once it becomes forbidden, it is considered as a prohibited entity and cannot become permitted again. Our Sages [Chullin 108b; Rama (Yoreh De’ah 92:34)] use the expression: “The piece becomes like carrion,” i.e., as Wit is _inherently forbidden.

As if it were mixed with 60 times its volume of non-kosher meat. If the entire mixture is not 60 times the volume of the forbidden piece, the entire mixture becomes forbidden.

Since he mixed at the end, after the meat became forbidden, the entire mixture may become forbidden.

Thus the piece of meat on which the milk fell remained a discrete entity, separate from the entire mixture. Hence it becomes forbidden.

The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 82) states that it is sufficient for him to stir the mixture at the beginning. This will cause the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture. There is no need for him to continue stirring the pot. Rav Y aakov ibn Chaviv maintains that the Rambam would also accept this position. The Rambam mentions stirring the put until the end only for stylistic reasons. This interpretation is also apparent in the Rambam’ s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 8:3).
In his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef, Rav Y osef Caro differs and maintains that the Rambam’s words here should be understood literally. Unless he mixed the pot from the beginning until the end, we fear that it was not mixed well. Hence in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 92:2, he quotes the Rambam exactly. The Rama, however, cites the Tur’s position.

For covering the pot also causes the flavor of the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture.

And we have a gentile taste the mixture as above.

The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 92:2) emphasize that if the person does not stir the pot immediately after the milk fell in, the piece on which the milk fell becomes forbidden. Since its identity is unknown, all the pieces are forbidden unless the entire mixture is 60 times larger than its largest piece.
Rav Yaakov ibn Chaviv and Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef) interpret the Rambam’ s intent as analogous to that of the Tur. They maintain that the Rambam also would agree that if person waited after the milk fell on the piece, that piece - and perhaps all the pieces - become(s) forbidden.
The Maggid Mishneh offers a different interpretation, explaining that in this instance, we do not say that the piece of meat on which the milk fell becomes forbidden because we do not know which piece it is. Hence rather than have the taste of the milk affect that piece, we stir the entire mixture so that the milk will become blended into it and become nullified as explained in the following note.
The Turei Zahav 92:6 and the Siftei Cohen 92:8 follow the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh, explaining that in this instance, the principle (Beitzah 4b) : “We do not nullify the existence of a forbidden substance at the outset,” does not apply. For since the identity of the forbidden substance was never established, there is no specific prohibited substance involved. Hence at the outset, the entire pot is considered as subject to being forbidden. To prevent that from happening, we stir it so that the prohibition will not take effect.

I.e., intentionally mixing the milk throughout the entire pot and thus nullifying its presence. As the Tur (loc. cit) writes, if the milk fell into the sauce, even if the person did not stir the mixture, this would be the ruling. Nevertheless, the Rambam advises the person to stir the mixture so that it will be mixed thoroughly and no trace will remain.

More precisely, the permitted substance must be sixty times the volume of the forbidden substance.

This applies even on a later day. According to Scriptural Law, after 24 hours, there is no prohibition. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, at the outset, one should be stringent and not cook milk in a pot in which meat was cooked previously even if it had been cooked several days beforehand.

I.e., it should be tasted by a gentile. According to the Ashkenazic custom not to rely on a gentile, we require that the contents be 60 times the volume of the pot. The Siftei Cohen 93: I states that it would be very rare for such a situation to exist. Generally, the ratio between a pot and its contents is less than 60. Hence, in most instances, the food would be prohibited.

I.e., we are afraid that a certain amount of milk remained in the udder or that the udder absorbed a certain amount of milk. Since we do not know how much milk it absorbed, we assume that it is entirely forbidden.

Halachah 6.

The ruling regarding roasting is more lenient than the ruling regarding cooking, because when meat is roasted, any fluids it contains are discharged and flow outward without being absorbed (see Halachah 14). When it is cooked, by contrast, it stews in its juices and it and any other meat will absorb the milk it discharges.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 90:2) writes that the accepted custom is not to cook it with other meat at all and to cook it alone only after it has been cut vertically and horizontally and pressed into a wall. The Rama adds that it is Ashkenazic custom not to cook it at all.

I.e., our Sages enforced their decree universally, without differentiating between one animal and another.

In Chapter 15, Halachah 18, the Ram. barn explains that since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages were more lenient. Thus the Rambam interprets this ruling as being of general significance. The Rashba offers a different rationale for this ruling, explaining that since the meat of the udder is acceptable, we include it in the reckoning of 60. Thus in contrast to other instances where 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance is required, here, we require only 59.

Rashi, Chullin 97b, explains that we assume that the milk imparted its flavor to the udder. Hence it becomes forbidden as the Ram. barn proceeds to state.

Thus according to the Rambam, only 59 times its volume is required. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 90:l). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that the second mixture is judged more stringently than the first. They follow the rationale of the Rashba cited above. Thus they maintain at first, the udder is included in the reckoning, because its meat is permitted. With regard to the second mixture, by contrast, it is the meat, not the milk of the udder which is forbidden. Hence 60 times its volume is required.

This is a safeguard so that it will not discharge milk which will flow over other pieces of meat.

For even if its milk does flow over other pieces of meat, they are not forbidden. The rationale is that since it has been cut open, we do not suspect that perhaps some milk remained. Since the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, we are not overly stringent. The Rama states if the udder was not cut open beforehand, the meat that is lower on the spit is forbidden.

I.e., a calf that had drank its mother’s milk and was cooked with that milk in its stomach.

The Kessef Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, this applies even to milk that is still liquid. Since it has already undergone preliminary digestive processes, it is no longer considered as milk. See Chapter 4, Halachah 19.

Hence the logic mentioned in the following note does not apply.

Chapter 3, Halachah 13. As the Rambam states in that halachah, since the amount of skin used is minimal, we might think that no prohibition is involved, for the forbidden substance would be nullified. Nevertheless, the Rabbis ruled stringently, explaining that since the catalyst which causes the milk to curdle is forbidden, everything is forbidden.

For in this instance, the two substances will be absorbed by each other just as if they had been cooked together.

For we follow the principle (Pesachim 76a): “The lower one dominates,” and the food is considered as hot.

We assume that the meat’s surface absorbed a small amount of milk while it was cooling down (ibid.). Hence the surface is forbidden and must be removed. The milk does not, however, permeate beyond the surface. Therefore the remainder is permitted. With regard to the milk, it appears that there is no prohibition. The Radbaz explains that since it is not possible to remove the surface of the milk, there is no prohibition whatsoever. Other Rishonim require that the milk be sixty times the volume of the surface of the meat. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 91 :4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. As explained by the Siftei Cohen 91 :8, this decision is accepted by the Rama despite the fact that this might appear incompatible with some of the other rulings of the Rama. The Turei Zahav 91 :7, however, argues in favor of the view of the other Rishonim.

Since they are both cold, there is no suspicion that one will be absorbed by the other. Washing the meat is necessary only to remove any traces of milk that might be left.

The Bayit Chadash rules that this applies only when one of them is moist. If they are both solid, they need not even be washed.

In previous eras, before the advent of refrigeration, meat was salted thoroughly to preserve it. Afterwards, when one desired to partake of it, he would soak it in water to remove the salt (Rashi, Chullin 112a). The Radbaz states that we are speaking about salting meat in a manner similar to the way it is salted to remove its blood. If less salt than that is used, these laws do not apply. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 91:5) which discusses these laws.

I.e., we assume that it will cause substances to be discharged and absorbed as cooking does. This is merely a Rabbinic stringency.

A mixture of milk, breadcrumbs, salt, and spices, commonly served as a dip in Babylon.

All that is necessary is to wash the meat and/or cheese thoroughly.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if this is speaking about a roasted fowl that is hot, or even one that is not hot. According to the latter opinion, it will still absorb some milk because it has become soft and permeable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 91:7) quotes the first view while the Tur and the Rama mention the second.

I.e., instead of being a solid surface, the surface of the meat cracks open in several places.

Because the cracks in its surface or the spices will cause it to absorb the milk to a greater extent than it would otherwise. This clause appears also to be referring to meat that has been roasted.

Needless to say, this applies to meat (see Lechem Mishneh).

They may, however, be placed together on a serving table (Chullin 104b).

Since both substances are permitted and they are served together, one might accidentally partake of them together.
Implied is that if substances are forbidden and one would not ordinarily partake of them, there is no difficulty in having them served on the table at which one is eating. See Siftei Cohen 88:2.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 88:2) which explains that if a distinction is made, e.g., the milk is placed on one type of placemat and the meat on another, there is no prohibition.

Thus there is little likelihood that they will share their food together.

Even to be eaten alone [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 97:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch, however, grants license if only a small amount of bread was prepared in this manner and thus it can be eaten at one time.

Even if the fat is kosher.

We fear that the fat from the oven became absorbed in the bread, causing it to become fleishig.

Firing the oven to the point that it becomes red-hot will burn away all traces of the fat.

Even if they did not touch each other. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 116) and the Turei Zahav 95:3) which mention that there is a prohibition against eating fish roasted with meat because it could cause a health problem.

For the vapors from the meat will become absorbed in the bread or in the fish. In Chapter 15, Halachah 32, the Rambam rules that vapors do not cause an object to become forbidden. There is not necessarily a contradiction between these two rulings, for here we are speaking about a small oven [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 97:3)]. Even though, after the fact, kosher meat roasted together with non-kosher meat in a small oven is permitted, here one is not deeming the bread or fish forbidden, one is merely prohibiting that it be eaten with milk (Siftei Cohen 97:4).

Or cooked [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 95:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch adds -that this ruling applies only when the dish was thoroughly washed and no trace of meat remains.

Even though the kutach contains milk. The rationale is that although the flavor of the meat was imparted to the dish and from the dish, it was imparted to the fish. Nevertheless, since it went through these two intermediate stages, it is not considered significant and does not cause the fish to be considered fleishig.

The Rambam’s wording implies that the meat was hot (Radbaz). This ruling applies also to hot cooked meat (Kessef Mishneh). There are opinions that. maintain that this ruling also applies when the meat was cold (Radbaz).

Rashi, Chullin 111 b, states that the rationale is that it is likely that there will be a small amount of fat left on the knife. Thus when the knife is used to cut the sharp food, its sharpness will cause the flavor of the fat will be imparted to it. According to this view, if the knife was cleaned or used to cut another substance first, it does not cause the radish to be forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 96:5); note also the dissenting view of the Rama]. (This opinion speaks of fat being left on the knife, for if there was no fat there, seemingly, this instance would resemble the concept of nat bar nat mentioned in the previous halachah.)
There are, however, other opinions (Tosafot, Sefer HaTerumot) which maintain that this ruling would apply even if the knife was clean. The rationale is that the pungency of the food and the pressure of the knife cause it to absorb more than an ordinary instance of nat bar nat.
From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the entire radish is forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 96:1), however, rules that it is sufficient to remove a piece a fingerbreadth in thickness. The Rama, however, mentions the Rambam’s view.

I.e., substances that are not pungent and soft and contain moisture. If one cuts a vegetable that is not soft and moist, it is sufficient to wash it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 96:5)].

The Ra’avad and the Radbaz note that the Rambam apparently had a slightly different version of Chullin 112a, the source for this halachah, than that found in the standard printed texts of the Talmud. According to the standard version, the rationale is that we fear that some drops of kutach will fall into the salt. The Radbaz adds that according to the Rambam, the prohibition applies only with regard to earthenware jugs. If they are made from metal, the material will be too dense to allow for the flavor to be drawn out.

According to the other rationale, the kutach will remain a distinct entity if it falls into the salt, but it will become mixed with the vinegar and nullified if it falls into it (Radbaz; Turei Zahav 95:16).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 89:2) states that if one sees that his hands are clean, it is not necessary to wash them.

The Rama quotes a view that requires one to wait six hours after eating hard cheese. It is, however, questionable if this would be required for most hard cheese commercially produced today.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states th~t one should also wash his mouth.

The requirement of this stringency for the meat of a domesticated animal is understandable, for the prohibition is of Scriptural origin. Nevertheless, according to the standard text of Halachah 4, the prohibition against a mixture of milk and the meat of a wild beast is also Rabbinic in origin. What then is the difference between the meat of a wild beast and that of a fowl? The Kessef Mishneh, however, explains that the meat of a domesticated animal resembles the meat of a wild beast. Hence it was necessary for the Rabbis to forbid it. Alternatively, Rabbenu Tam explains that the meat of a wild beast will stick to a person’s mouth and hands more than the meat of a fowl.

Since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages did not enforce any further stringency.

This is the view stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 89:1) and in the Rama’s conclusion, although the Rama does mention that there are some more lenient views.

The Tur (Yoreh De ‘ah 89) gives a different rationale: that because meat is fatty, its taste persists for a long time.

The Rambam proceeds to define each of these terms in the subsequent halachot. The prohibitions the Rambam mentions in this chapter apply universally. There are other prohibitions involving the consumption of agricultural products that apply with regard to non-priests, e.g., terumah, as explained in Sefer Zeraim and others involving the sacrifices as explained in Sefer HaAvodah (Radbaz).

The term chadash literally means “new.” It refers to new grain, i.e., grain that is harvested before the sixteenth of Nisan, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

I.e., other species commonly identified as grain, e.g., com, rice, and millet, are not included in this ban.

These five species are commonly identified as wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt.

A measure of barley that is offered on the sixteenth of Nisan, as explained in Leviticus 23:9-15.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 189-191) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 303-305) include these prohibitions among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Radbaz states that the Rambam mentions chadash before the other prohibitions, because it occurs most frequently, recurring every year.

In the Diaspora, where crops of grain are sometimes planted after Pesach, this prohibition could present a problem. For all grain planted after Pesach, will not be permitted until the following year. In resolution, the Rama writes that unless we know otherwise, all grain is permitted after Pesach, based on the concept of sefek sefekah -multiple doubt. It is possible that it is from the previous year’s crop. Even if it is from this year’s crop, perhaps it took root before Pesach and is thus permitted.
The Bayit Chadash in his gloss to the Tur (Yoreh De ‘ah 293) elaborates on the concept that the prohibition against chadash applies only to grain belonging to a Jew. Grain belonging to a non-Jew is not bound by this prohibition. The Turei Zahav 293 :2 differs and maintains that it applies also to grain grown by a gentile. Most of the authorities respect the Bayit Chadash for his attempt to absolve most of the Jewish people from the prohibition (since by and large, the grain available in the Diaspora is grown by non-Jews) but accept the logic of the Turei Zahav. In practice, however, it is customary to rely on the leniency of the Rama.

I.e., the prohibition is not dependent on the offering of the omer, but instead applies even when no sacrifices are offered.

I.e., places that will not be able to hear a report when the omer was actually offered before noon because they are far removed from Jerusalem.

I.e., by midday, one can be certain that the omer had been sacrificed.

See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 5, which explains that in places where messengers from Jerusalem would not inform the Jewish community when the new month had been sanctified, the festivals are observed for two days, for perhaps the day considered as the fifteenth of Nisan was really the fourteenth.

Since the observance of the second day was instituted because there was a doubt concerning the day on which the festival should be observed, our Sages ordained that the prohibition concerning chadash should be observed by Rabbinical decree until the conclusion of the seventeenth so as not to minimize. the importance of the festival. Even though there is no longer any doubt concerning the day on which the festival should be observed, we heed this prohibition to maintain our Sages’ original decree (Radbaz).

Provided he is given a separate warning for each one (Radbaz).

All three are mentioned in one verse. Thus one might think that we are speaking of a prohibition of a general nature and we follow the principle (expounded in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3) that lashes are not given for a prohibition of a general nature. Nevertheless, Keritot 5a explains why this instance is an exception.

I.e., even in places that follow a different agricultural cycle than Eretz Yisrael.

And had not sprouted (Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 293:4)..

And thus they would not be permitted until the following year.

Thus had one left it in the ground, it would have been permitted.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 293:5) rules that such grain is forbidden because of the doubt.

The Hebrew term literally means “mixed species in a vineyard.”

The Rambam’s statements have attracted the attention of the commentaries, for they represent a contradiction to his statements in Hilchot Kelayim 8:1: “One is not liable for sowing kilai hakerem unless he sows wheat, barley, and grape seeds together.” The Radbaz explains that the laws governing sowing mixed species are different than those regarding partaking of them.

For as above, the prohibition against sowing mixed species and partaking of them are distinct.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 193) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 549) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Torah does not specifically mention that it is forbidden to partake of the mixed species. Nevertheless, it states that it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. There is no greater derivation of benefit than eating (Radbaz). From the Rambam’s wording, one would surmise that one is not liable for lashes from merely benefiting from kilai hakerem.

I.e., when one eats some of the grapes and some of the vegetables, if the combined volume is the size of an olive, he is liable.

Liability for lashes.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:10), the Rambam writes that this concept is derived from Deuteronomy 22:9: “Do not sow kilayim in your vineyard.” For the only vineyard that can truly be considered as “yours,” i.e., belonging to a Jew, is one in Eretz Yisrael.
The Mishneh LiMelech writes that in the present era, when the observance of the agricultural laws in Eretz Yisrael is only a matter of Rabbinic- Law (as reflected by Hilchot Terumah 1 :26), the prohibition against kilai hakerem is also of Rabbinic origin.

One of the Halachot in Sefer Zeraim.

The term literally means “covered.” Thus the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aserot 4:4) speaks of “something which covers (oral) its fruit.” For that reason, a foreskin is described as an orlah, because it covers the male organ. Here also this fruit is “covered” by a forbidden quality.

I.e., replants an existing seedling or plants a seed and grows the tree from the outset (Radbaz).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 192) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 246) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., an element of the Oral Tradition that has no explicit source in the Written Law.

One of the Halachot in Sefer Zeraim.

I.e., which type of planting or replanting incurs the prohibition against orlah and which does not.

A Scriptural prohibition is involved. Hence we follow the principle: Whenever a Scriptural prohibition is involved, we rule stringently.

As explained in Hilchot Terumah 1:3, King David conquered parts of Syria before he completed the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. Hence, these lands were not considered as part of Eretz Yisrael proper. Nevertheless, certain laws concerning the produce of Eretz Yisrael were applied there by Rabbinic decree.

Thus violating the prohibition against kilai hakerem.

I.e., permission is granted even in an instance where it is highly likely that the produce is prohibited.

I.e., one may purchase the produce even if one is certain it comes from the vineyard in question. Indeed, one may even pick the produce from that vineyard by oneself (Radbaz; Hilchot Ma’ aser Sheni 10:11).

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Batra 24a. Others interpret that passage as stating that we are even permitted to partake of the wine. This is the view quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 294:11).
Tosafot questions: Why isn’t the wine forbidden as yayin nesech, wine touched by a gentile? They reply that we assume that the thieves were Jewish. Thus if there is reason to think that the thieves are gentile, the wine is forbidden (Siftei Cohen 294:22).

I.e., the gentile takes care of the orchard in the orlah years, and the Jew in the subsequent years. He is not considered as benefiting from the produce that is orlah, because it never belonged to him.

For the crops that are orlah are considered to have become the Jew’s property and he is bartering them. Rashi and Rabbenu Asher (Avodah Zarah 22a) differ and permit such an arrangement to be made. They explain that although if such an arrangement is not made at the outset, it is forbidden to make it with regard to the Sabbath, different rules apply here. On the Sabbath, it is forbidden for the gentile to perform work on behalf of the Jew. In this instance, no such prohibition exists (Siftei Cohen 294:28). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 294:13) follows the Rambam’s approach, while the Rama follows that of Rabbenu Asher.

Here also, the authorities who rule leniently, as mentioned in the previous note, would rule leniently (Siftei Cohen 294:29).

This term refers to the produce of the fourth year of a tree's growth. This produce must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten in a state of ritual purity or redeemed and the money taken to Jerusalem to be used for food to be eaten there.

See Hilchot Terumot 1:4; Hilchot Shemitah 4:27.

Hilchot Ma ‘aser Sheni 9:1.

Where the laws of the tithes and the Sabbatical year do not apply at all.

The Rambam’s wording is somewhat misleading. The laws of neta reva‘i are not dependent on the existence of the Temple. Even if the Temple is not standing, this mitzvah applies. Nevertheless, according to Scriptural Law, they apply only when the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael is intact. And according to Scriptural Law, that sanctity was nullified after the conquest of the land by the Assyrians and Babylonians. According to Rabbinic Law, however, these laws do apply in Eretz Yisrael in the present age.

The harvest of a vineyard must be redeemed, but not that of any other type of tree.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 294:7) quotes opinions that state that the laws applying to neta reva‘i also apply in the Diaspora, as well as the Rambam’s view that they do not apply. The Tur and the Rama quote the opinion of the Geonim who maintain that these laws apply with regard to a vineyard, but not with regard to any other types of produce.

The Radbaz emphasizes that even if the fourth year passes, fruit which grew during that year is forbidden in the fifth year until it is redeemed. This is also included as one of the 613 mitzvot. The Rambam, however, lists that mitzvah in Hilchot Ma ‘aser Sheni.

I.e., in the present era. See the following note.

In Hilchot Ma‘aser Sheni, the Rambam explains that in the era of the Temple, the produce would be taken to be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity (or redeemed for its value and that money taken to Jerusalem to be used to purchase food to be eaten there iri a state of ritual purity). Since that is not possible in the present era, different laws apply.

A copper coin of minimal value. In the era of the Temple, it was necessary to redeem the produce for its value and add a fifth (Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 4:1,9). In the present era, since there is no opportunity to use the money as required, a p’rutah is sufficient for one’s entire harvest (Arachin 29a).

I.e., a place where no one will benefit from it.

Seemingly, the wording of the blessing should also be altered as indicated by Hilchot Ma‘aser Sheni 4:3.

This is also a leniency granted in the present age. In the era of the Temple, at the outset, one should not transfer the holiness from one species of produce to another (Hilchot Ma ‘aser Sheni 4:2).

These kernels of grain must also be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity. Since this is impossible, they should be destroyed, lest another person transgress by eating them elsewhere.

Before produce may be eaten, a person must separate bikkurim (the first fruits), terumah gedolah (a small portion - 1/40 to 1/60 of the produce) which is given to the priests, ma’aser (tithes, which is given to the Levites), and ma’aser sheni (the second tithe, which is eaten in a state of purity in Jerusalem) or ma’aser oni (the tithe given to the poor). From the tithe which the Levites receive, they must give a tithe to the priests as terumat ma’aser.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 153) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 284) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

There is a question if this prohibition applies even to a priest who would later be permitted to partake of terumah. To explain: There is a discussion among the Achronim if tevel is considered as an independent prohibition or if it is forbidden because of terumah that has not been separated (see Tzaphnat Paneach; Atvan D ‘Oraita). According to the former view, even a priest is liable, while according to the second view, there is room for leniency.

I.e., he will die before his time.

Terumat Ma‘aser should be separated after the tithes are separated. Nevertheless, after the fact, if one separated it beforehand, the separation is valid.

The Ra’avad explains the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of the prooftext cited in the previous halachah which puts an emphasis on “the sacraments of the children of Israel.” That term refers to terumah. The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the second tithe is also referred to as “a sacrament.” The Lechem Mishneh, however, offers a resolution.

Although that prohibition forbids eating. the second tithe outside of Jerusalem, it also has this intent.

E. g., produce that grows in a flower pot without a hole on the bottom.

See Halachah 8 and 10.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Chapter 8, Halachah 16) states that this is not the ordinary way which one benefits from such produce. The Lechem Mishneh explains that other juices, in contrast to wine and oil, are not considered to have the substance of the fruit.

See Chapter 18 of Hilchot Pesulei HaMekedashim where these prohibitions are discussed.

In all other instances, it is the substance (cheftzah) that is forbidden. On Yorn Kippur, the prohibition does not apply to the substance, but to the person (the gavra). He is forbidden to partake of all foods.