Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. III, Chapter 49), the Rambam explains a rationale for this mitzvah. If it were possible to bring about a divorce through speech alone, a woman might commit adultery and then try to free herself of liability by claiming that she had been divorced previously. Requiring a written bill of divorce prevents such a possibility from arising.

The word get is Aramaic for legal document, and indeed when accompanied by a modifier is used to refer to other types of legal documents. Nevertheless, the most common use of the word is within the context of divorce, and when the term get appears without a modifier, it generally refers to a bill of divorce. (See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:5.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 222) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 579) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The intent is not that it is a mitzvah to divorce one’s wife, but rather that if a man does desire to divorce his wife, it is a mitzvah for him to follow the rules prescribed by the Torah. To cite a parallel example: There is not a mitzvah to eat meat. If, however, one does desire to eat meat, it is a mitzvah to have the animal slaughtered according to the rules prescribed by the Torah.

The details of all these principles are described in the halachot and chapters that follow.

This is the law as prescribed by Scriptural and Talmudic Law. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Gershom, one of the sages who laid the foundations for Ashkenazi custom and tradition, ordained that, except in several unique instances, a man may not divorce his wife without her consent. This practice is followed universally within the Ashkenazi community (Rama, Even HaEzer 119:6) and has been accepted by many Sephardim as well.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

This wording is used in the deed freeing a slave from servitude and is not appropriate with regard to a woman’s divorce.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 8.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 18.

See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 124:3), which states that the scribe should cut the paper or parchment used for the get to the right size before writing it. If he cuts it to size after he writes it, it is not acceptable according to Rabbinic Law.

Even if the man gives the woman the entire plant and the land on which it grows, the divorce is void (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 124:4).

I.e., the standard text of the get, leaving blank places for the name of the man, his wife, the date and the line that states: ‘‘Behold, you are free to [marry] any man.’’ See Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

The date of the get is only a Rabbinic requirement. Nevertheless, if it is written while the get is still attached, the get is not acceptable according to Rabbinic Law.

I.e., at the outset, one should not write any portion of the get while it is attached to its source of nurture. After the fact, as long as the fundamental elements of the get were written after it was detached, it is acceptable.

The Chelkat Mechokek 124:12 and the Beit Shmuel 124:12 both emphasize that the term ‘‘unacceptable’’ — pasul in Hebrew — implies that while the get is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, it is unacceptable according to Rabbinic decree. Accordingly, they explain that this law applies when there is an interruption between the flowerpot and the earth. If there is no interruption, the get is void according to Scriptural Law, because when a flowerpot has a hole at its base, it is considered as though it were attached to the ground.
Similarly, according to the Chelkat Mechokek 124:13, even when a get is written on the leaves of a plant growing in a flowerpot that does not have a hole at its base, the get is unacceptable according to Rabbinic decree.

From this and the following halachah, it appears that the Rambam maintains that it is sufficient that the husband state his intent to the witnesses; the woman need not know that she is being divorced. Tosafot (Gittin 78a, quoted by the Rama in Even HaEzer 136:5) states that although the woman need not be informed by her husband at the time the get is given, she must be informed by the witnesses afterwards, or in some way have this matter made known to her. The commentaries question whether or not the Rambam differs with this view.

With regard to the latter instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 138:3) states that even if he tells the witnesses: ‘‘See the get that I am giving her,’’ the divorce is void.
From this clause, it appears that, in addition to the husband’s intent, the Rambam requires that the woman take an active part in receiving the get, even if she is not totally aware of what it is.

According to Rav David Arameah, this clause applies to all the instances mentioned in the halachah.

We accept this rationale and do not say that he nullified the get with his statements.

As mentioned previously, the word pasul generally means ‘‘unacceptable according to Rabbinic decree.’’ (See Chapter 2, Halachah 7; Chapter 10, Halachah 2.) In this instance, however, there are authorities who maintain that the Rambam’s intent is that the get is utterly void. The Tur (Even HaEzer 136) and Rabbenu Nissim indeed rule in that manner.
The Beit Shmuel 136:1, however, explains that the get itself indicates the purpose for which it is given. Hence, in contrast to kiddushin (Hilchot Ishut 3:8), even if it is given in silence, it is acceptable according to Scriptural Law and disqualified only by the Rabbis.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1, where the Rambam states this explicitly.

Based on Gittin 78a, Rabbenu Asher offers a slightly different conception of the activity necessary for a husband to perform so that helping his wife take the get is considered ‘‘giving.’’ The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 138:1) quotes both views, but appears to favor that of Rabbenu Asher.

Based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 8:2), it appears that this statement must be made in the process of transferring the get, and not afterwards.

For he has performed an action making it easier for her to take the get.

The transition of a woman from a state where she is forbidden to one in which she is permitted is one of the ‘‘matters’’ referred to in the above verse.

The commentaries explain that there is a fundamental difference between the function of witnesses in cases involving financial matters and their function with regard to marriage and divorce. With regard to financial matters, the function of witnesses is to clarify the truth (eidei berur). With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the witnesses’ function is to notarize the event (eidei kiyyum). For a marriage bond to be established — or broken — even when the husband and wife agree that the event took place, witnesses must observe the proceedings (Tumim 90:14; Tzafenat Paneach; K’lallei HaTorah).

And not signed by the scribe. If the scribe also signs the get, the signature of one witness is enough for the get to be acceptable according to the Rambam. (See the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 2.)

According to Scriptural Law, the get is acceptable, for the husband’s writing is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses. It is unacceptable only because of a Rabbinic decree. Indeed, even if the witness did not sign the get, the exact same laws would apply. The Rambam mentions the signature of the get by a witness only to clarify that, even with such a signature — in contrast to a get signed by a scribe and another witness — the get is still disqualified by the Rabbis (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 130).

In such an instance, if the woman transgresses this Rabbinic prohibition and marries again on the basis of this get, she is allowed to remain married. Other authorities, however, maintain that since the get was given without being observed by witnesses, it is void according to Scriptural Law, and the woman must leave her second husband (Beit Shmuel 130:31).

Although present in the standard texts of the Mishneh Torah, this phrase is lacking in the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the text. The Kessef Mishneh states that it is self-evident from the previous clause, and therefore is most likely a printer’s addition. For this reason, we have set it off in braces.

Gittin 34b, 36a explains that there is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer maintains, as stated here by the Rambam, that the fundamental requirement for witnesses is with regard to the witnesses who observe the transfer of the get. The signing of the get by witnesses is merely a Rabbinic ordinance. Rabbi Meir, by contrast, maintains that the fundamental requirement is for the witnesses to sign the get. Most authorities follow the perspective of Rabbi Eliezer. The Beit Shmuel maintains, however, that a priori, the perspective of Rabbi Meir should also be respected.
At present, the custom is that the witnesses who sign the get also observe its transfer (Rama, Even HaEzer 130:1).

I.e., they were deemed unworthy of serving as witnesses because of family ties to the couple, their violation of Scriptural Law or other reasons, as detailed in Hilchot Edut, Chapters 9-16).

This ruling indicates that although Rabbi Eliezer places an emphasis on the witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, he does not negate the effect of the signature of the get by witnesses.

The Beit Shmuel 133:3 notes that Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher maintain that such a get is utterly void. He questions why the Rambam states that this opinion considers it unacceptable merely according to Rabbinic decree. If Rabbi Eliezer does not accept the signature of witnesses as sufficient, seemingly the get would be of no consequence whatsoever, not merely disqualified by the Sages.

Gittin 4a explains that even Rabbi Eliezer, who puts the emphasis on the witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, would disqualify such a get. Although — as stated in the following halachah, a get that was not signed by any witnesses is acceptable — when it is signed by unsuitable witnesses, it is not.

The Ra’avad states that if such a get were given, it would be unacceptable despite the fact that witnesses observed its transfer. Many authorities, however, follow the Rambam’s view. (See Rama, Even HaEzer 130:1.)
The Beit Shmuel 130:3 questions the Rambam’s decision, noting that in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 27:5, the Rambam states that a contract of loan is invalid if the witnesses sign more than two lines away from the text, and he does not mention the option of making it acceptable by giving it in the presence of witnesses. He explains that laws regarding business contracts differ, because they must serve as proof over an extended period of time.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that this explanation is supported by the distinction between the role of witnesses with regard to marriage and divorce, and their role with regard to business agreements mentioned in the notes on Halachah 13. Since the role of witnesses in business agreements is to clarify the terms of the agreement, such a document is not acceptable, because particulars can be added. With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the witnesses’ function is merely to notarize the event, and this is accomplished by the witnesses who observe the transfer of the get.

Since the witnesses who observe the transfer of the get are essential for the divorce to be effective, they must know that the document transferred is in fact a get (Beit Shmuel 135:1).

The Rama (Even HaEzer 135:1) states that it is customary to read the get aloud both before and after it is given.

After quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 135:2) states that if the husband manifests possession of the get after giving a document of unknown contents to the woman, his word is accepted if she has not remarried already. If, however, she has remarried, his word is not accepted.

A second get is necessary. Even if the woman remarries, she must leave her second husband, as explained in Chapter 10, Halachah 3.

With regard to this, Gittin 19b states: ‘‘Just as his statements are not acceptable to cause her to be forbidden, they are not acceptable to cause her to be permitted.’’

Placing the get in a domain belonging to the woman is equivalent to placing it in her hand.

This instance also describes a situation in which the witnesses have not read the get. If they have read the get, the woman’s status is in doubt, and we suspect that she has been divorced (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 135:5).

Since he threw only one document and others were discovered, we cannot say with assurance that the article discovered was the one thrown.

The present custom is that both of the witnesses and the Rabbi arranging the divorce read the get (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154; Seder HaGet 66).

In the Kessef Mishneh and the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 130), Rav Yosef Caro explains that the Rambam maintains that if the witnesses do not understand the wording of the get, the divorce is not effective. There is no option of translating it for them, for a witness must have first-hand experience of the matter concerning which he testifies. Hearing its translation from another person would be considered second-hand experience. The Beit Shmuel 130:27, however, quotes other opinions that do not accept this understanding.

If, however, a permanent mark would be left, it is forbidden, for writing that covers an existing text is inadmissible.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 130:16) states that this is not acceptable, and instead stencils for the witnesses’ signature should be made.

We fear that the woman’s husband will leave for a foreign country without giving her a divorce, or that he will die and she will be forced to perform either yibbum or chalitzah (Gittin 19a).

Halachah 15 above. I.e., if the matter were a point of Scriptural Law, there would not be room for such leniency.

Generally, we follow the principle ein gozrin gezeirah ligezeirah — i.e., a second Rabbinic safeguard is never attached to the first one. In these instances, however, an exception is made. Although the requirement for witnesses to sign a get is itself Rabbinic in origin, several safeguards were attached to facilitate the divorce laws.

I.e., originally the witnesses would sign, ‘‘I sign as a witness,’’ without mentioning their names. This made the verification of their signatures a very difficult process. Therefore, our Sages required that they mention their names.

Chapter 9, Halachah 29 explains, based on Gittin 10b, that this decree was instituted lest a husband tell a group of people that they should all act as witnesses, in which case each of them would be obligated to sign the get. Such a get would look acceptable if signed by only two witnesses, but in fact would not be acceptable. To prevent such a circumstance from arising, our Sages required that all the witnesses sign in the presence of each other.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 23:6.

This would enable her to avoid receiving the death penalty. The Jerusalem Talmud (Gittin 4:3) records that such an incident did in fact take place.

I.e., the get was written in Kislev and dated in Marcheshvan. This would allow for the difficulty mentioned in the previous halachah and notes.
According to Rabbenu Asher, despite the fact that the requirement is Rabbinic in origin, a get that is predated is void entirely (bateil), not merely unacceptable (pasul). The Rama (Even HaEzer 127:2) quotes a third opinion, which states that even though the get is pasul, the second husband is required to divorce her, but she is forbidden to remarry her first husband.
The Rambam does not consider predated a get that was not given to the woman on the day it was written, as reflected in Chapter 2, Halachah 2. Other authorities differ, and their opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:5), which states that a get that was not given on the day it was written is acceptable only when given by an agent.

E. g., the get was written in Kislev and dated in Tevet.
In this instance, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that a postdated get is acceptable. There are two reasons given by Rav Yosef Caro in the Kessef Mishneh to justify the Rambam’s decision:
a) This could also be used as a cover-up, as explained in the previous halachah. For if we see that the date of the get is incorrect, we would disregard the date and consider the get as if it had no date at all.
b) The woman would not receive the rights to her property when due her. As long as she is married, her husband is entitled to the benefits from her property, but not after divorce. Postdating the get would entitle him to benefits beyond what is due him.
Tosafot agree with the Ra’avad that a postdated get is acceptable, but unlike the Ra’avad, maintain that the get is not effective until the date mentioned within. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:9) mentions both the views of Tosafot and of the Rambam, but appears to favor that of Tosafot.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:2) mentions an opinion that states that in extenuating situations — e.g., when the woman has already remarried, or her husband has gone overseas — such a get is acceptable. The Beit Shmuel states that under such circumstances a get is acceptable, even if it is signed several days after it was written.

Other legal documents, by contrast, are acceptable if the principals were involved in the discussion of the matter that extended from the afternoon until after nightfall. For from the time the contract was written, it was a matter of public knowledge (Beit Shmuel 127:3).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 128:1) differs and states that what is of fundamental importance is the place where the get was signed, and not the place where it was written. It is, however, customary for it to be written and signed in the same place. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 11.
Our translation of the paragraph to follow is based on the interpretation of the Lechem Mishneh. The Maggid Mishneh follows a slightly different perspective.

The Rambam appears to follow Rabbenu Chanan’el’s interpretation of Gittin 17b, that our Sages did not suspect that a person would attempt a deception of such a scale to deceive the court. Therefore, the get is acceptable. Rashi and others explain that when saying ‘‘our Sages did not suspect that a person would not attempt such large scale deception,’’ the Talmud explains why this instance is not mentioned in the mishnah discussed beforehand. It should not be interpreted to mean that the get is acceptable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:8) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Beit Shmuel 127:14, however, states that most authorities accept Rashi’s view.

In this context, Gittin 17b explains that even in this instance, the date of the get — though imprecise — is somewhat useful: it excludes the time before or after the time period mentioned. Even when the date of the month is mentioned, the time is not pinpointed exactly, because the woman could have committed adultery in the morning and received the get in the afternoon. Therefore, even these less precise dates are also acceptable.

I.e., dating our legal documents according to the rulers’ years indicates the rulers’ importance (Rashi, Gittin 80a).

This is the present custom. The practice of dating documents according to the years of the gentile rulers was discontinued because those rulers ceased to attach importance to the matter.

Alexander’s kingdom began 3450 years after creation. Since it encompassed the entire Western world, it provided a uniform dating pattern for people throughout the world. It is, however, no longer customary to date legal documents in this manner.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 8.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 23:6.

In most matters of Jewish Law, a person is able to charge an agent to act on his behalf. From the Rambam’s wording, Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 228) and the Kovetz deduce that the Rambam requires that not only the person who gives the get, but also the scribe, must be appointed as agents. This decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:1). Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch continues, stating that in addition, the scribe must write the get with paper and ink belonging to the husband. There are, however, other opinions, which maintain that the scribe need not be appointed as an agent. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 16 and notes.)

There is a difficulty in this instance, for the scribe must also act as one of the witnesses who sign the get. Tosafot and many other authorities rule that a get signed by a scribe is unacceptable. In the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 130), Rav Yosef Caro explains that the Rambam agrees that a priori, the scribe should not act as one of the witnesses who sign the get. When there is no alternative, however, it is acceptable. (See Lechem Mishneh.)

In this instance, the act the agent effects does not concern him. Therefore, there is no difficulty in his serving as a witness to it. (See also Hilchot Ishut 3:16.)

There are two points of clarification that must be made with regard to this ruling: First, if the husband enters into privacy with his wife after having the get written, the get is nullified, for we assume that the couple engaged in intimate relations, as reflected in Chapter 3, Halachah 5.
Second, there is the problem that the get is predated — i.e., although it was dated on the day it was written, it is the giving of the get and not the writing of the get that brings about the divorce. Thus, the date on which the get was given and the date of the divorce are not the same.
With regard to that issue, we are forced to say that the Rambam does not consider it to be problematic. Indeed, when discussing the issue of predated gittin (Chapter 1, Halachah 25), the Rambam makes no mention of this matter at all. Other authorities differ, and it is their view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:5), which states that if a get is not given on the day on which it was written, it is acceptable only when given by an agent. (See Beit Shmuel 127:7.)

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 24:3-4. The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that there are several points to be derived from an analysis of the Rambam’s choice of wording in the present halachah and in that source:
a) Even if the man is accompanied by a woman he claims to be his wife, the witnesses may not sign a get for her until this fact is established.
b) It is not significant whether or not the scribe knows the identity of the man and his wife. When the scribe does not sign the get (see the notes to the previous halachah), it is the witnesses alone who must be aware of the identity of the husband and wife.
c) As long as a person’s name has been established in a city for thirty days — even if it is only according to his own statements — this is sufficient.
d) The witnesses must also know the names of the father of the husband and of the wife.
e) The person’s father’s name can also be established on the basis of his own statements.

From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bava Batra 10:3), it appears that the intent is to prevent the woman receiving the get from engineering such an act of deception.

A time of danger means an instance when the husband is in danger of dying and asks to have a get written for his wife, so that she will not have to undergo the rites of either yibbum or chalitzah (Gittin 66a).

Although according to Scriptural Law it is the husband who should pay for the writing of the get (for it is his responsibility), Bava Batra 168a explains that our Sages transferred this obligation to the woman, lest the husband lack the financial resources and cause the woman to wait unnecessarily for her get.

The Rambam mentions a court of law to indicate that in this instance, their authority is no greater than that of an ordinary person.

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh.

In other instances, an agent can transfer his agency to another person, but here the scribe and the witness were charged with only a verbal command, and a verbal command cannot be transferred to another agent (Gittin 66b).

For the difficulty is with the composition of the get itself.

In contrast to the previous halachah, in which the get is deemed void, here the Rambam rules that it is unacceptable. This more lenient ruling is given because in this instance, the husband’s colleagues carried out his instructions.

For the husband did not convey the instructions to the scribe himself.

Rav David HaCohen interprets this to mean that this case is judged more severely than other gittin that are unacceptable, and the status of the woman’s divorce is in doubt. This is also the ruling of the Rama. Rav Moshe Alshacar, however, differs and maintains that there is no difference between this instance and others in which the get is deemed unacceptable.

When a get is void, the woman’s first marriage is not annulled, and she must leave her second husband if she has remarried. Any children she bears the second husband are considered to be mamzerim. When the get is deemed unacceptable by our Rabbis, by contrast, the woman should not remarry, but if she does remarry she is allowed to remain married to her second husband (Chapter 10, Halachot 1 and 2).

We do not suspect that the husband had a void or unacceptable get composed and gave it to his wife to cause her difficulties (Kessef Mishneh).

We do not say that the agency with which they were entrusted involved only the composition of one get, and that they must receive a new charge from the husband before writing another one.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 122:1) states that if the get is not unacceptable, but does not conform with the standard demanded by the local Rav, the scribe does not have the right to write a second get, for the agency with which he was charged by the husband has already been discharged. Therefore, it is customary for a husband to tell the scribe and the witnesses to write as many gittin as necessary, until one finds favor in the eyes of the Rav arranging the divorce.

If the husband had in fact given them only such a limited agency, were they to have another get written, they would no longer be acting in the agency of the husband, but rather on their own initiative.
Rav Moshe HaCohen differs with the Rambam on this point, maintaining that since they did not write an acceptable get, their agency was not completed. For the husband did not charge them with writing a worthless piece of paper; he wanted them to write a get. Note the Beit Shmuel 122:7, who interprets the disqualifying factor mentioned by the Rambam as referring to a disqualification that occurred after the get was given to the agent. He maintains that if a get that was void or unacceptable was given to the agent, even the Rambam would allow the writing of another get. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 122:2) quotes the ruling of the Rambam, while the Rama follows the opinion of Rav Moshe HaCohen.

We are not certain that their agency was limited in scope. Perhaps the husband’s intent was that they bring about the divorce.

This and the following term are acceptable, because they are Aramaic equivalents of the word ‘‘divorce.’’

These expressions do not convey adequately enough the intent that the husband desires to divorce his wife for them to be considered effective in bringing about the appointment of the agents for this purpose.

Note the Beit Shmuel 141:21, who quotes authorities who maintain that even in such instances the status of the divorce should be considered doubtful.

For the husband has not charged them with bringing about the divorce.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 6:5), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a person taken from jail in chains to be judged by a gentile magistrate.

We assume that, in all these instances, his intent was to divorce his wife, lest he die and she be required to undergo the rite of either yibbum or chalitzah. Alternatively, he knew that he was entering a dangerous situation, and feared that he might die, without there being any witnesses of his death. In order to prevent his wife from being forced to remain unmarried for the rest of her life, he charges witnesses with the composition of a get. He surely wanted to tell the witnesses to give the get and it was only because of his concern with his personal situation that he forgot to do so (op. cit.). (See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:24, which relates similar concepts with regard to a person’s division of his estate.)

In this instance as well, we assume that the person intended to say that the get should be given, but failed to mention the point because of his preoccupation with his own concerns.

For his intent is not clear and it is possible that he wanted to deliberate before having the get given.

The Rambam’s ruling is debated by the commentaries, for it is questionable why the get would be considered valid, in light of the doubt that exists. Indeed, there are commentaries that suggest that the text before us is a printing error and that the Rambam considers the status of the divorce to be in doubt. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:18) rules that if the husband falls immediately afterwards, the get is acceptable. If not, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:19) states that the man must state his name, the name of his wife, the name of the city in which he lives and the name of the city in which she lives.

E. g., his face had been cut to the point where his identity was no longer recognizable.

The slitting of these organs are the two signs that determine whether or not ritual slaughter is acceptable.

The Beit Shmuel 121:11 interprets this to mean that the man shakes his head in response to questions (see Halachah 16) and thus indicates that he desires to divorce his wife.

The get is not considered to have been given after the man died, and his wife is not required to undergo the rites of yibbum or chalitzah. See Chapter 6, Halachah 28.

For a person’s actions to have halachic significance, he must be mentally competent at the time he performs them.

Whom Genesis, Chapter 19, describes as having become so drunk that he was not aware of having intercourse with his daughters.

The Rambam appears to be saying that if we are certain that the person is drunk, but see that he is conscious enough to have some control over his behavior, a get that he orders to be given is of doubtful status.
The commentaries question this understanding, noting that in Hilchot Ishut 4:18, the Rambam rules that kiddushin given by a drunk are viable, unless he reaches Lot’s state. Similarly, with regard to the entire Torah, a drunk is considered responsible for his conduct. If he commits a transgression punishable by death while drunk, he is executed. Despite these questions, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 121:1) quotes the Rambam’s wording. On this basis, the Beit Shmuel states that both a husband and a wife should not drink alcoholic beverages on the day of their divorce.

While the husband (the principal) is incapacitated, his agent (the scribe) cannot act on his behalf. Therefore, the get should not be written until he regains his health. Nevertheless, once he regains his health, the agency that he originally conveyed is unaffected, and the get should be written and delivered.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro questions why the Rambam uses the term ‘‘unacceptable’’ (pasul). Seemingly, based on Gittin 70b, this ruling should apply only when we have a means of healing the afflicted person. Otherwise, the get should be void. Indeed, in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 121:2), Rav Yosef Caro rules accordingly. Note, however, the Beit Shmuel 121:2, who justifies the Rambam’s ruling
[The difference between these two opinions revolves around the fundamental conception of an agent’s authority. Is he acting independently of the principal (in which case the principal’s state is not of concern to us) or is he considered to be an extension of the principal (in which case, if the principal is unable to perform an act, neither is his agent). See Lekach Tov, Section 1.]
Based on the above, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 121:4) writes that we should check that a person who is giving a get when terminally ill is sound of mind.

According to the Kessef Mishneh, the intent is three questions in which at least one of the answers differs from the other two. There are other authorities who require two sets of three questions. Also, based on Gittin 70b, the Rama (Even HaEzer 121:5) suggests that the person should be asked questions about fruit — e.g., would he desire a summer fruit in winter? His ability to discern with regard to these matters will serve as an indicator of whether or not he is of sound mind.

A deaf-mute is not considered to be of sound mind and is not held responsible for his conduct.

For the marriage bond he established is binding according to Scriptural Law, and he is not capable of initiating divorce proceedings that have that power.

See Hilchot Edut 9:9, where the Rambam defines the term shoteh as including not only maniacs whose behavior is totally beyond control, but also those who are confused and lack the stability to function normally.

Hilchot Ishut 4:9.

Just as the Torah gives him authority to consecrate her, he is responsible for taking part in the divorce, for Deuteronomy 24:2 establishes an association between the forging of the marriage bond and its dissolution (Ketubot 47a). This applies, however, only before the marriage bond is consummated. After nisu’in, the consummation of the marriage, the father no longer has any authority over his daughter even though she is below the age of majority. (See Hilchot Ishut 3:12.)
We may conclude that, before nisu’in, the Rambam does not consider the girl as having the authority to receive her own get. This opinion is accepted by most authorities and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:4). The Shulchan Aruch, however, also mentions the opinion of Tosafot, who maintain that the girl possesses this authority.

I.e., a girl between the age of twelve and twelve and a half, who has manifested signs of physical maturity. She is already considered to be past majority with regard to certain dimensions of Torah law. Nevertheless, her father is still granted authority over her in certain contexts. (See Hilchot Ishut 2:1, 3:11.)

A married girl below the age of majority, by contrast, may not appoint an agent to receive her get even if her father dies or her marriage has been consummated (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 141:3.)

If the girl’s father consecrates her, the kiddushin are effective according to Scriptural Law, and a divorce is required. If, by contrast, the girl’s father died, and her mother, her brother or she herself established a marriage bond, it is not binding according to Scriptural Law and a get is not required. Instead, this marriage can be dissolved through the rite of mi’un, as described in Hilchot Ishut 4:7.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 141:6) states that this refers to a girl of six or seven, depending on her intellectual capacities.

If, however, a minor’s father is alive, he can accept a get on her behalf regardless of her age or degree of understanding. Rashi (Gittin 64b) differs and maintains that if she is unable to make distinctions, she cannot be divorced even via her father. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:6) quotes both opinions, it appears to favor that of the Rambam.

E. g., a man whose wife says she is repulsed by him (Hilchot Ishut 14:8), a man who was married to a woman for ten years without her bearing a child (Hilchot Ishut 15:7), a man who becomes afflicted by [constant] bad breath or an odor from his nose, one who becomes a collector of dog feces, a miner of copper or a tanner or one who becomes a leper (Hilchot Ishut 25:11-12) or a priest who marries a divorcee (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:7).

The application of this law is not confined to Eretz Yisrael or to the era when the Sanhedrin (the High Court of Law) was in power.

Rav Mesharshia states that the Rabbis deemed the get unacceptable, lest women become accustomed to hiring gentiles for this purpose (Bava Batra 48a). In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro notes that Gittin 88b appears to reject Rav Mesharshia’s view and states that a get that was forced on a man by gentiles is void entirely. (This indeed is the ruling of Rashi, Rabbenu Nissim and Rabbenu Asher.) In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 134:5), Rav Yosef Caro’s wording is not specific when dealing with this issue. The Beit Shmuel 134:10 states that such a get is void.

See Hilchot Mechirah 10:1, which states that such a sale is acceptable, after the fact. Nevertheless, if the seller notifies the witnesses that he was compelled to sell against his will, the sale is nullified.

The Rambam’s statements have implications far beyond their immediate halachic context. The Rambam is saying that the fundamental desire of every Jew is to affirm his Jewishness and observe the Torah and its mitzvot. Even when a person’s conscious mind does not necessarily consent to this inner motivation, it is at work, molding his character without his knowledge. And at times, either because of undesirable circumstances — being compelled against his will as above — or because of desirable ones — an expression of Divine favor — this inner drive will surface.

For the get was not written with the intent of being used to bring about a divorce (Gittin 24b).

For the get was not written for the sake of the man [initiating] the divorce and for the sake of the woman who is being divorced (ibid.).

This ruling depends on the concept of bereirah — i.e., that since ultimately the husband’s intent is clarified, it is considered retroactively as if this had been his intent at the outset.
This concept of bereirah is relevant not only in the present context, but also with regard to many other contexts discussed in the Talmud and later Rabbinic works. Generally, the rule that is followed is that with regard to questions involving Scriptural Law, the concept of bereirah is not accepted, but with regard to Rabbinic Law it is accepted. On this basis, the commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling. In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro explains that although with regard to following stringencies, we say that the concept of bereirah does not apply to questions of Scriptural Law, it does apply with regard to the acceptance of a leniency. Therefore, although the woman must consider herself divorced, she does not have the prerogative of remarrying. On this basis, Rav Yosef Caro quotes the Rambam’s wording in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:4). (See the Beit Shmuel 130:4, who also discusses this issue.)

I.e., tracing over the letters is ineffective, for writing on top of other writing is insignificant (Gittin 20a). A parallel exists with regard to the Sabbath laws. If a person traces over letters on the Sabbath, he is not considered to have violated the forbidden labor of writing (Hilchot Shabbat 11:16)

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 2, the Rambam does not consider a get that was written before it was given to be predated. Other commentaries do, however, and it is their view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 127:5).

This law applies only after the fact. At the outset, such a get should not be used, as reflected in the previous halachah.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 132:1) follows the opinion of the Tur and Tosafot, who differ with the Rambam and state that the get is acceptable only when it was post-dated, and the date on which it was given was mentioned. If the date on which the get was written was mentioned, the get is unacceptable. (It is worse than an ordinary ‘‘old get,’’ because in that instance, the couple merely entered into privacy together; we are not certain that they had relations. In this instance, by contrast, the marriage bond was consummated.)

Although the yevam does not have to consecrate his yevamah, he also does not have to divorce her. Hence, there is a question whether the connection between them is sufficient for the get to be acceptable.

So that they would have a get ready, in order for them to prepare it for a husband in a relatively short time.

These are the parts of the get that are of fundamental importance, and which are referred to as the toref.

On this issue there is a difference of opinion in the Mishnah (loc. cit.) between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer. It appears that the opinion cited by the Rambam above is that of the Sages. Thus, this ruling is worthy of notice, because it represents a change of mind on the Rambam’s part, for he writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah that the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer. (It is also noteworthy that in the Rambam’s manuscripts of his Commentary to the Mishnah, the latter statement was rubbed out and written over, implying that the Rambam deliberated back and forth about the matter when composing that text. See the Kovetz and others, who discuss this issue.)
See also the Beit Shmuel 131:2, who states that the Shulchan Aruch does not mention this law, because most authorities differ with the Rambam and do not grant a scribe such license. (See also Halachah 17 and notes.)

There is a question whether the words within the brackets {} are the Rambam’s or a printer’s addition. There is, however, no difference in law between the two versions.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15, it is not necessary for witnesses to sign the get according to Scriptural Law. Our Sages required such signatures only to afford an advantage for the woman lest the witnesses die.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:17) follows the Rambam’s approach and rules that such a get is unacceptable by Rabbinic decree, but not void.

The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 131:6) quote the Rambam’s decision, while mentioning the minority opinion.

This and the following two halachot are dependent on the Rambam’s understanding of a Talmudic passage that appears in Gittin 27a and Bava Metzia 18a. Many authorities differ with the Rambam in the interpretation of this passage, and it is their view that is favored by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 132:4), although the Rambam’s view is also quoted.
According to these views, if there are two people who, with their wives, share the same name in the same town, there is a difficulty if the get was not discovered immediately.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) also mentions a difficulty when a person was seen passing by the place where the get was lost, even when the place is not frequented by caravans and it is not known that two people of the same name live in that place. His ruling is, however, questioned by the Beit Shmuel 132:10 and others.

The commentaries question why the Rambam requires both factors, that the get was in its original container, and that it could be recognized. Seemingly, one factor alone is sufficient. Indeed, when discussing this issue, the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) requires only one factor: either that it was found in the original container, or that the agent could recognize the get.
Note the Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 62), who supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that there are various levels of recognition. Since the agent recognizes the get only by its length and width, it is necessary that it also be found in its container.

Implied is that if enough time passed for one of the passersby to wait there, the get is unacceptable.

And whose wife’s name is the same as the woman’s name written in the get.

The Rama (loc. cit.) states that if the name of the husband’s town was mentioned, and we know that there is only one couple with the name mentioned in the get, we are not concerned about the fact that caravans frequent the place. We do not suspect that there are two towns with the same name. The Beit Shmuel 131:16 questions the Rama’s ruling.

A sign is, however, necessary. According to the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), it is sufficient for the agent who lost the get to say that he recognizes it; witnesses, by contrast, must give signs through which it can be identified (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that if there are other individuals who share the same name as the witnesses, the witnesses must also recognize their own signatures.

And whose wives have the same names.

I.e., the agent[s] give both gittin to one woman, and thus she receives the get intended for her. They then take the gittin from her and give them to the second woman. There is no necessity for the woman to know which get was intended for her originally (Gittin 86b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 132:3).

The Maggid Mishneh (quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) explains that if, however, the agent gives the get that remains to one or the other of the women, the status of the divorce[s] is in doubt.

I.e., his most popular name.

I.e., according to the Rambam, there is no obligation to mention the other names with which the husband or wife is known. Other authorities differ and require that all the names by which a man or a woman is known should be mentioned in the get. This latter view is cited by the Rama (Even HaEzer 129:1).

I.e., a derivative of the person’s name by which he or she is often called — e.g., Danny, which is a derivative of either Dan or Daniel. Other interpretations of the term chanichah are offered by different commentaries.

The Ra’avad states that this applies only when the nickname is more extensively used than the person’s actual name. Note the discussion of this issue in the Beit Shmuel 129:1. The Beit Shmuel also discusses whether the intent is that, after the fact, a woman divorced with such a get may remarry, or whether the intent is that at the outset such a get may be given.

By Rabbinic decree. If, however, both names are mentioned in the get, the get is acceptable despite the fact that the less-used name is mentioned first (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 129:2).

At present, it is not customary to mention the woman’s city or the man’s city. Instead, the location in which the get is given is mentioned.

I.e., even according to Scriptural Law.

Our translation is based on the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text was changed by the church’s censors.
The equivalence between the desecration of the Sabbath and the worship of false gods isdiscussed by the Rambam at the conclusion of Hilchot Shabbat, based on Horayot 8a.

Note the Maggid Mishneh, who states that although an apostate is not capable of writing a get, if he is married to a Jewess, he may — and indeed should — divorce her with a get. Just as the kiddushin he gives establish a viable marriage bond (Hilchot Ishut 4:15), a get that he gives can dissolve such a bond.

Even if an observant Jew stands over him, and tells him the intent with which he should write the get, it is void. (See Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)
The Rambam puts the emphasis on the gentile’s lack of proper intent to explain why a get written by an apostate is unacceptable. For the Rambam could have employed the same reason given with regard to a servant — that the laws of marriage and divorce do not apply to him — to exclude a gentile. He chose to give this reason to allude to the law concerning an apostate because an apostate also cannot be relied upon to write with the proper intent (Beit Shmuel 123:5).
The reasons given by the Rambam are significant in another context. As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 1, there is a difference of opinion among the authorities regarding whether or not the scribe writing the get must be appointed as an agent. All the individuals mentioned are not capable of serving as agents. Since that rationale is not given, it would appear that the Rambam does not require such an appointment. Nevertheless, other sources lead to the opposite conclusion.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 123) quote other opinions, which maintain that such gittin are disqualified by Rabbinic Law only. Hence, because of this difference of opinion, the status of the divorce is in doubt (Chelkat Mechokek 123:6)

The Rama (Even HaEzer 123:3) quotes the opinion of the Tur, who maintains that in such an instance the get is deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic Law.

If these individuals are supervised, they will write the get with the proper intent. Hence, there is no reason to negate the feasibility of using the standard portions of the get that they wrote, out of fear that they will write the essential portions without the proper intent.

Halachah 7 above.

It appears that the Rambam’s intent is that the get was written by the husband without his knowing of the transgression and not signed. It was given to his wife in the presence of witnesses. Although the same law would apply if the get were signed in unknowing violation of the holy day, the Rambam does not mention that possibility, because it is highly unlikely that both the man writing the get and the witnesses would not know of the transgression (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the transgression was performed unknowingly, the get is acceptable. (See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Chulin 1:1.)

Our translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. There are other versions that state ‘‘If it was written and signed on a holiday....’’
The difference between the two versions is that the prohibition against forbidden labor is less severe on the holidays than on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur. The holidays are mentioned to emphasize that the get is void even in such an instance.

By the husband and was not signed by witnesses.

Here a holiday is mentioned rather than the Sabbath, because if a get were written as a willful transgression in public on the Sabbath, the writer would be considered to be an apostate, and a get that he wrote would be disqualified by Scriptural Law, as mentioned in Halachah 15. Since the desecration of the holidays is not so severe, the person is not considered to be an apostate. The get he wrote is, however, disqualified by Rabbinic decree.