Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

See the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

I.e., which is in his possession at that time.

Although ultimately this money will accrue to the estate, since it is not in the father’s possession at the time of his death, the firstborn does not receive a double share.
The Rambam’s statements regarding a loan are taken from Bava Batra 125b. If, however, security was given for the loan, the firstborn receives a double portion (Maggid Mishneh). See also Halachah 5 and see Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 7:4.
The Ra’avad explains that the Rambam’s statements about a ship at sea are derived from Arachin 17b. There, the Mishnah is speaking about an instance when a person was obligated to bring a sacrifice whose value is linked to his financial status. The Mishnah states that even though a person possesses a ship that is at sea, the assessment for the sacrifice is made according to his immediate financial standing, and at that time he has no resources. Similarly, in this instance, the ship is not considered to be money within the estate at present, but money that will accrue to it later.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling and the Ra’avad’s explanation, noting that the Talmud (and the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah) interpret the situation as referring to an instance where the ship was hired out to another person. The Talmud is explaining that the person is still considered poor, because the rental fee for the ship is not due until the conclusion of the rental period. And he is not considered to be wealthy because of the ship himself, because when we calculate a person’s assets we do not include the property he uses to earn his livelihood.
The Maggid Mishneh points out: a) In Hilchot Arachin 3:18, the Rambam rules that a ship is not considered in the category of the tools to earn a livelihood that are excluded when calculating a person’s assets; b) in this instance, the person is deceased and we are no longer concerned with his earning his livelihood, the ship (and any merchandise belonging to him on it) is seemingly part of his estate. The Rashba also rules in this manner. This appears to be the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 278:3). For when mentioning the concept that a firstborn does not receive a double share of a loan, the entire issue of a ship is not discussed.
The Rambam La’Am gives a practical explanation of the Rambam’s ruling. Because of the dangers (both of sinking at sea and being raided by pirates) inherent in a ship’s voyage, it and its contents cannot be considered money possessed by the estate.

For a fixed fee.

For a share of the profits.

After the father’s death.

If its weight increased and it was sold (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 278:5).

The rationale is that although the increase in the value of the cow and the calf itself were not in the possession of the estate at the time of the father's death, they are considered as coming about as a matter of course, like a tree that grows larger. (See Halachah 4.) Hence, it is as if they were originally part of the estate.
The Ra’avad maintains that the Rambam’s opinion regarding the calf represents a minority opinion in Bava Batra 124a, and it should not be accepted as halachah. The Maggid Mishneh interprets that Talmudic passage differently and maintains that the opinion on which the Rambam’s ruling is based is accepted by the majority of the Sages.
The Maggid Mishneh compares this halachah to Halachah 4 and raises a difficulty: Halachah 4 states that the firstborn does not receive a double share of grain and dates, even though the produce had already began to grow when he inherited the estate, because the growth and ripening of the produce is considered a change. Seemingly, the birth of the calf represents an even greater change.
The Maggid Mishneh offers - albeit with reservation - a possible resolution based on our Sages’ principle (Yevamot 78a, et al): “A fetus is like the thigh of its mother.” Thus, it is as if it has not changed. Ketzot HaChoshen 278:3, however, reinforces this conception, citing Avodah Zarah 47a, which states that “the fetus was originally an animal and now it is an animal, only then the gateway to its mother’s womb was closed.”
Ketzot HaChoshen also cites another ruling of the Rambam (Hilchot Geneivah 1:11), which expresses the same principle: “When a stolen article increases in value while it is in the thief’s possession - e.g., a sheep bore a lamb... - [the thief] must return the sheep... and its offspring.” Although a thief need not return an article that undergoes a fundamental change, the birth of the lamb is not considered such a change.
The Ra’avad and the Tur differ with that ruling. Similarly, in this instance, the Tur maintains that the firstborn does not receive a double portion of the offspring. The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 278:4), while the Ramah cites that of the Tur.

This law would not apply if the animal was slaughtered after the person’s death.

As Deuteronomy 18:3 states, whenever a person slaughters an ordinary animal (in contrast to a sacrificial animal), he is required to give a priest the animal's foreleg, jaw, and maw as presents. The father who died was a priest and because of their bonds of friendship, the person slaughtering the animal would always give the presents from the animals he slaughtered to him. Even if the presents were not separated from the animal at the time of the father’s death, he is considered to have acquired them during his lifetime. Hence, they are considered to be part of the estate rather than a later increment, and the firstborn receives a double portion (Bava Batra 123b).

He cannot be compelled to give his brother a portion of the land.

The rationale is that this increase was not part of the estate at the time of the father’s death.

In its initial state, the kernels were not formed, and then they became formed. In Hebrew, the names of the grain in the two stages are different. Hence, the entity is considered to have undergone a change.

In both these instances, the name of the entity remains the same.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 278:13 emphasizes that this applies even when the investment was made with money from the estate.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 278:6) states that if the firstborn protested and told his brothers not to make the investment until the estate was divided, he is given a double portion of the increase in value.

Since the debt was paid with land and from the time the promissory note was composed, the land was on lien to the debt, there is room to consider the land as being part of the estate at the time of the father’s death. In such an instance, the firstborn would deserve a double share. Hence, the Rambam feels it necessary to mention that he does not.
As mentioned in the notes above, even if the father was given land as security for the loan, as long as the debtor has the right to redeem the land, it is not considered to be part of the estate, and the firstborn should not be given a double portion from it (Hike hot Malveh V’Loveh 7:4).

And we assume he made the decision to - and in his mind, actually transferred the money - so that it would be part of his father’s estate at the time of his death, in order to receive his double portion from it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 278:18).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 278:19 states that this is an exception to the general rule: “Whenever a person desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” Here also, there is room to think that the other brothers would not be able to expropriate the extra share from the firstborn. This rule, however, is not applied in this instance.

I.e., because his portion is distinct, if he waives it, the waiver is binding and he is considered to have forfeited his right. If, however, it were not distinct, the waiver could not be binding until the estate was divided and the extra share set aside.
There is a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Talmud that has been perpetuated among the later authorities whether an ordinary son can sell his share (or the firstborn can sell his ordinary share) before the estate is divided. Some maintain that just as a partner can sell his share of a business before the resources of the partnership are divided; so, too, an heir can sell his share of the estate. Others maintain that a portion of an estate does not exist until it is actually allotted. Hence, it cannot be sold.

I.e., he need not express his consent. The fact that he remains silent is considered to be acquiescence [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 278:9)].

For the wine is considered to be a distinct and different entity. Hence, he is required to issue a new protest.
The Ra’avad and the Rashbam interpret Bava Batra 126a, the source for the Rambam’s ruling, differently. The Maggid Mishneh writes that both interpretations are acceptable.

As Deuteronomy, Chapter 25, relates when a man dies childless, his brothers are commanded to marry his wife. See Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah, where this rite is described at length.

Even if the deceased brother’s father is alive, the brother who marries the widow acquires his estate. Ordinarily, the father would have a prior claim, but his rights are superseded because of the marriage (Yevamot 40a).

Yevamot 24b does not follow the literal meaning of the verse and interprets it to mean that the deceased brother’s inheritance is given to the brother who marries his wife. He is the “firstborn” to whom the verse - in its halachic meaning - refers. Accordingly, the same restrictions that apply with regard to the manner in which a firstborn inherits his father’s estate, apply with regard to this brother’s inheritance of his brother’s estate.

I.e., here too, the laws that apply to a firstborn’s inheritance apply to his. See the statements of the Ramah Even HaEzer 163:1), which quotes different opinions as to whether the equivalence is exact or not.

He does acquire the entire increase in the property contained in his brother’s estate - even the increase that occurs before he marries his brother’s widow (Maggid Mishneh).

As the Rambam states at the conclusion of the halachah, we are speaking about a situation in which a father had several sons. The father died and then one of the sons died without leaving any children, and one of the brothers married his widow. That brother receives two shares in his father’s estate, his own share and the share of the deceased.
If, however, the brother who died childless had died before his father, the brother marrying his widow would not receive an extra share in the father’s estate. For that share was “fit to be acquired” only by the deceased brother. As stated above, the brother marrying the widow does not receive an extra share of property fit to be acquired.

At which time he acquired his brother’s property.

Chapter 12, Halachah 12.
This is derived from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 21:18. In his gloss on Hilchot Shechenim, the Maggid Mishneh (and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 174:11) state that this law applies even if the entire property is not of uniform value, and one share is not the same size as the others. For if this were not so, and the ruling were to apply only with regard to shares of equal value, there would be no need for a verse. Instead, the law would be obvious from Halachah 1 of that chapter in Hilchot Shechenim, which states that when brothers come to divide a field that is all of uniform value, without one place being better and another worse, and one says: “Give me my portion on this side so that it will be close to another field that I own, so that they will be one large field,” his request is heeded. “Holding back in such a situation would be [a reflection of] the traits of Sodom.” Following the same logic, if the portions of the field were all of equal value, there would be no reason not to give a person who marries his brother’s widow both of his shares together. Indeed, not to do so would be emulating the traits of Sodom.

I.e., the double portions he receives are an integral entity and not a combination of two portions.

As Rashi explains in his commentary on Bava Batra 12b - the source for this halachah - since the two portions come from inherently separate rights, there is no obligation to join them together.

As explained in Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 2:1, although according to Scriptural Law, the brother of the deceased acquires the deceased's childless wife through marital relations alone, before engaging in relations, it is preferable that he designate her as his wife by giving her money. The act of designating her as his wife is referred to as ma'amar.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 16, the term nichsei m'log refers to property a woman brings to her household that the husband is allowed to use until it is worthless. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, the property is returned to the woman as is.

As explained (ibid.), the term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property a woman brings to her household for which the husband accepts financial responsibility. It is evaluated at the outset, and a financial equivalent is established. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, that sum must be paid to the woman.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 12, a husband obligates himself to pay his wife a minimum of 100 or 200 zuz in the event of his death or the couple’s divorce. Moreover, it was customary for an additional sum to be appended, depending on the couple’s financial standing.

Since the husband’s brothers were obligated to marry her, there is room to say that the woman’s financial connection to her deceased husband has not been severed, and hence, his heirs have a right to her estate. On the other hand, since they did not marry her before she died, and her husband already died, her heirs also have room to claim her estate. Our Sages did not resolve whose claim is stronger, but instead ruled to divide the estate between the two sets of heirs.
The rationale for the division suggested can be explained as follows: The nichsei m’log are considered to be in the woman’s possession. Therefore, her family’s heirs acquire them. The money due her by virtue of her ketubah is not due the woman in her husband’s lifetime. Hence, it is considered to be in the possession of the husband’s heirs and is therefore retained by them. And the status of the nichsei tzon barzel is a matter of question; hence they are divided.
The Shulchu. it Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:7) quotes this view. The Ramah quotes other opinions, which maintain that the husband’s heirs are able to maintain possession of the nichsei tzon barzel entirely.

Hilchot Ishut 12:4.

When he has no sons, and his brothers will inherit his estate, he may identify another person as his brother and give him a share of the estate.

When he has neither sons nor brothers, and his uncles will inherit his estate.

See Bava Batra 134a and commentaries, where it is explained that the rationale is based on the principle of miggo. Since he could give this person his property as a present, his word is accepted when he identifies him as an heir.
The commentaries debate whether the person’s word is accepted with regard to property that he acquires in the midst of his death throes (i.e., a person whose estate he inherits dies shortly before he does). The rationale is that when a person is in his death throes, he is not capable of giving his property away. Hence, the miggo mentioned above no longer applies. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 279:1), however, maintains that the dying man’s word is accepted even in this situation.

The Rambam’s wording here is significant, because from his wording in Hilchot Gerushin 2:15, the Kessef Mishneh deduced that when a person can write intelligibly, there is no need to test his powers of comprehension. Writing alone is proof that he is in command of his faculties. Here the Rambam’s wording clarifies that that is not the case. For a person can write without comprehending a matter.

See the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 15.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 2, Halachah 14, Bava Batra121b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 21:17: “he shall recognize,” which is interpreted to mean that he shall cause others to recognize. The identification of a person’s sons is dependent on him (the father). This right applies, however, only with regard to a person’s sons, and not with regard to his other heirs.

This expression refers to a conclusion based on the Rambam's deductive reasoning, which does not have an explicit source in prior Rabbinic literature.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 15:15 and Bava Batra 127b. In principle, the father’s word should be accepted with regard to his son, even when he has already fathered children, based on the exegesis of the verse mentioned above. Nevertheless, since it would appear ridiculous for the person’s grandson to be considered of acceptable lineage, but his son not, once the son has become a father, his own father’s word is not accepted.

The Rambam’s rationale is that since it is only for the sake of appearance (see the previous note) that the son’s lineage is accepted, that argument applies only with regard to the lineage itself, but not with regard to the inheritance. Alternatively, the Rambam’s conclusion appears to be an extension of the principle of miggo. Since the father could give his property to a person other than his son, his word is accepted when he claims that his son is not his heir (Maggid Mishneh).
The Maggid Mishneh also states that if a person’s son fathered children and then died during the lifetime of his father, his father may not disqualify his deceased son’s children as his heirs. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 279:2) accepts the Rambam’s deduction as law. The Ramah adds the thesis of the Maggid Mishneh.

I.e., the statement that he originally gave is considered binding. For once significant testimony is given, it cannot be retracted.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 279:7 quotes the Tur, whose statements imply that if the “son” performs the functions of a servant, the deceased’s word is not accepted.

Thus, the person’s new statement is not considered to be a retraction of his previous statement (which would not be acceptable), but a clarification of its intent. We accept this interpretation because of the principle of miggo. Had the person desired merely to endow this person with his estate, he could have freed him and given him the estate as a present.

As mentioned by the Kessef Mishneh, the Rambam’s version of Bava Batra 127b (which conforms to the standard printed text of the tractate) differs slightly from the version quoted by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 279:3).

In this situation, the miggo mentioned above no longer applies, for it is considered as if it is public knowledge that the person is a servant. The principle of miggo is not effective when there is public knowledge to the contrary.

Where a charge was imposed on a person for bringing in servants.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 279:9 states that this applies only in a situation where we are unaware of the person’s lineage. If, however, it is assumed that the person is a free man, the fact that the individual who passed through customs called him a servant is not significant.

Hence, his first statement is not considered to be significant.

For if he had not been his servant, there would not have been any reason to identify him as such, especially when doing so would lead to a financial charge.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 279:4) states that this applies only when the identity of the person’s mother is not a matter of public knowledge. If, however, the woman reputed to be his mother is Jewish, the fact that the individual who passed through customs called him a servant is not sufficient to have him placed in that category. He may be considered a mamzer because of that person’s testimony, but not a servant.

We have chosen the names Joe and Sarah instead of the term "so-and-so" used by the Rambam.

I.e., a person might think that the servant the person referred to with the term Papa or Mama is in fact his parent. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 279:14.

This term is used to refer to the head of the Torah academy, who serves as the leader of the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael. Berachot 16b relates that Rabban Gamliel's children would refer to the servants of his household in this manner.

When a Jew engages in relations with a maidservant, any offspring conceived are servants and are not considered to have any connection to their natural father. Even if they [or the mother after conception occurs] were freed, they are not considered to be the person's sons.

I.e., we assume that before engaging in relations with the maidservant, the father freed her, so that her offspring is considered to be his son. As evident from the continuation of the text, the scope of this assumption is limited.

This son is not considered to have any connection to his natural father, unless his mother was freed before he was conceived. Nevertheless, if she was freed between his conception and birth, he is considered to have been born a Jew and need not be freed independently. There is no difficulty in his marrying a Jewess.

The Rambam’s rulings here are dependent on the principles and the logic that he stated in Hilchot Gerushin 10:17-19:
When a man divorces his wife and then engages in relations with her... we assume that since she was [originally] his wife, he remarried her and engaged in relations with the intent of consecrating her, and not as a licentious act.... For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not enter into sexual relations with his wife with a licentious intent, when he has the opportunity of having these relations considered a mitzvah....
Several of the Geonim have ruled that any woman with whom a man engaged in sexual relations in the presence of witnesses requires a divorce. [The rationale for their ruling is that] a person will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.
The Rambam continues to mention and dispute the more lenient opinions mentioned in this halachah, stating:
I consider these opinions far from the path of [the Torah’s] judgments, and it is not fit to rely on them. Our Sages made such statements only with regard to [a man’s] wife whom he divorced, or to a person who consecrated a woman conditionally.... In these instances, the woman is the man’s wife, and with regard to a man’s wife we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent.... With regard to other women, however, [we do not follow this assumption]. Instead, whenever [a man engages in relations with] a wanton woman, we assume that he had a licentious intent unless he explicitly states that he intends to consecrate her. Needless to say, this applies with regard to a maidservant.
To apply the above concepts to the case at hand: If the person involved is a Torah scholar, we assume that he desired to minimize the prohibition involved in engaging in relations with her, and hence, freed the mother. (He still would be committing a transgression, for a man is forbidden to engage in relations with any woman unless he is married to her. That prohibition is, however, less severe than that involved in relations with a maid-servant.) Accordingly, the offspring may be considered to be the person’s son. And then we follow the principles mentioned above (Halachah 1) and give “the son” the right to share in the inheritance.
This leniency applies only with regard to monetary law. With regard to the Torah’s prohibitions, we rule more stringently. Hence, since if the mother had not been freed, her offspring would have been a servant and forbidden to marry a Jewess, we require that offspring to supply proof that his mother was freed before his birth.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 279:6) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah states that with regard to the inheritance, the burden of proof is on the “son.” Since he desires to collect a share of the estate, he must demonstrate his right to it. See the first law of the following halachah which appears to support this contention.

I.e., we do not consider that the father desired to avoid committing a transgression. This decision reflects the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Avadim 9:1: “When a Jew has relations with a Canaanite maid-servant - even if she is his own maidservant - the offspring is considered to be a Canaanite slave with regard to all matters.”

Or the other heirs to his father's estate.

I.e., he is their property and they may do with him as they desire.

When a man dies childless, his widow must marry one of his brothers to perpetuate his name. See Deuteronomy, Chapter 25. Since we consider this offspring a servant, he has no connection with his natural father, and it is as if his natural father had never fathered children. See Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 1:4.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah states that the woman should undergo the rite of chalitzah - where she releases her deceased husband’s brothers from the obligation to marry her - rather than yibbum. Since there is a doubt involved, this is a more desired option.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that the father has the right to determine the identity of his son. If the father states that the mother was freed before the son was conceived, the son is considered to be his son.
The Maggid Mishneh disputes the Ra’avad’s contention, stating that the right the Torah gives a father to recognize his son involves only the question of whether he fathered him, and not whether the son’s lineage is acceptable or not.

I.e., they deny the "son" a right to the inheritance unless he supplies proof that his mother was freed before his conception. They do not, however, consider the "son" to be the property of the other sons unless those sons can prove that the woman was not freed. This is the perspective followed by the Ramah, as mentioned above.

I.e., we do not say that certain Jews are bound by one set of laws and others by another.

I.e., they do not have to bring witnesses who testify regarding their lineage. Instead, we rely on the popular conception of the matter.

I.e., while he did not accept the contention, he did not contest it either.

For he did not acknowledge Levi as an heir. As far as Shimon is concerned, Levi is required to prove his claim to the inheritance before it is given to him.

I.e., the portion deducted from Reuven’s share.

For it was taken from his share of the estate.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:2) clarify that this applies only when the property inherited or property that was acquired in its stead remained in Levi’s possession. If, however, those assets were no longer definable, Reuven does not receive a greater share of Levi’s estate.

I.e., according to Reuven, they both are Levi’s heirs. Hence, his estate should be divided between them.

I.e., without Levi’s investing anything to cause this increase in value.

Our translation is not literal; the Rambam’s words mean “an increase that [will soon be carried away] on a person’s shoulders” (Maggid Mishneh). Alternatively, “crops that have grown to shoulder height” (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 280:5) Thus, it is almost ready to be reaped. Although such crops still need the land, they are - in several halachic contexts (Bava Kama 95b, Bava Metzia 15b, Bava Batra 42b, et al) - considered to be movable property, and hence, a separate entity from the land itself.

For the crops are considered to be part of the land itself, and the land belongs to Reuven.

For in contrast to the previous instances, where the matter was left open, here he explicitly stated that he shares no connection to Levi.

I.e., we follow the principle: When a person desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.

A person whose genitalia are covered by flesh so that his (or her) gender cannot be discerned.

A person who has both male and female sexual organs.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the tumtum is given his sustenance as a daughter would be.

The rationale is that there is a doubt whether or not the tumtum or the androgynous are considered males and hence given the right to share in the inheritance of the estate. Since their status is doubtful, the son whose status as an heir is definite inherits the entire estate.

The status of the tumtum or the androgynous as males - and hence as sole heirs to the estate - is doubtful, as explained above. Hence, the daughters also have the status of a doubtful heir. Since the status of both is doubtful, they share equally.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:9) follow the same general principle, but arrive at different sets of figures. In a situation where a person leaves a tumtum and a daughter, and the estate is ample, they explain that the tumtum definitely receives half the estate, for even if the tumtum were a female, that share would be given. The doubt concerns the remaining half of the estate, and that half is divided equally. Thus the tumtum receives three fourths, and the daughters, a fourth. If the estate is not ample, and is hence used to sustain the daughters, the entire sustenance is granted to the daughters. For they can tell the tumtum: “Perhaps you are a male.”
With regard to an androgynous, the Tur and the Ramah rule that when an estate is ample, they agree that it should be divided equally between an androgynous and the daughters. And when it is not ample, the androgynous does not receive anything at all.

I.e., until the daughters reach the age of majority, they receive their food, clothing, medical expenses and other needs from their father’s estate (Hilchot Ishut, the latter portion of Chapter 19).

I.e., provide them with a dowry so that a man will desire to marry them. As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 20, a girl is given the dowry that we would have expected her father to give her from his estate. If we have no way of approximating what he would have given, we give her ten percent of the estate.

Hilchot Ishut 12:2, 19:10.

Thus, they are considered to be a debt incumbent on the estate.

When the estate is large enough to provide for the support of the sons and daughters until the daughters reach the age of majority (ibid. 19:17).

This is somewhat of an overstatement. The amount necessary to support the daughters is taken from the estate and set aside. The remainder is given to the sons. Nevertheless, if there is only enough money in the estate to provide for the daughters’ sustenance, the entire estate should be designated for this purpose.

Or the androgynous. The Rambam is borrowing the wording of his source (Bava Batra 10:2).

Since the status of the tumtum is in doubt, the sons are not required to give him a share of the estate. Nevertheless, he is given his sustenance from the estate as the daughters are.
As mentioned above, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:9) approach these issues differently. They maintain that if there are limited funds in the estate, the daughters receive their sustenance before the tumtum does. Only when enough for the daughters’ sustenance has been set aside can the tumtum receive a share in the estate.

In this instance as well, since the tumtum’s status is doubtful, the daughters have this prerogative.

See Hilchot Gerushin 11:18, which requires a woman to wait this amount of time after divorce or her husband's death so that such a determination can be made.

Because of his death or due to divorce.

The Rambam is operating under the perspective that babies born in both the seventh and ninth months of pregnancy are viable. In contrast, a baby born in the eighth month of pregnancy is not considered a viable birth. It is questionable if these laws apply today, when it is possible to determine the term of a woman’s pregnancy far more easily.

Even if the father has no other sons, his other heirs are awarded the estate, for their claim· is definite, while this "son's" claim is a matter of doubt.

Without leaving children.

If the woman separated from her first husband because of divorce, he has the right to share in the inheritance of the "son." If their separation was caused by his death, that right is given to his heirs.

As is required to clarify that she was not pregnant when her husband died (Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 1:19).

For if this son was fathered by the woman’s first husband, there is no requirement for yibbum. On the contrary, the widow is forbidden to marry her husband’s brother.

For we do not know whether he truly had the right to marry his brother’s widow and inherit his estate.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 163:3) rules that even if one of the claimants had already taken possession of the deceased brother’s estate, he must give half to the other claimant.

I.e., the brother who married the widow kept his brother’s estate as a separate entity and did not integrate it into his own financial holdings. After the second brother’s death, a question could arise between the sons who are certainly his and the son whose status is doubtful, concerning the right to the first brother’s estate.

The “son” whose status is doubtful can claim: “I am the only one who certainly has a claim to this estate.” For if he is the son of the first brother, the entire estate belongs to him and if he is the son of the second brother, a portion of the estate belongs to him.
This argument is not accepted, because his right to inherit the estate as the son of the brother who married the widow does not stem from his own claim to the estate. The other sons of that brother perpetuate their father’s claim. Hence this “son’s” claim is still considered of doubtful status.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 163) rules that the portion of the estate that this “son” would be given if he were a son of the brother who married the widow is granted him. The remainder of the estate is then divided equally. This opinion appears to be favored by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 163:4).

I.e., those sons who are definitely his.

For if this person was not the son of the brother who married the widow, he is the son of his brother- and he alone, without sharing with the brother who married the widow - was entitled to inherit that estate.

Since his status is doubtful, they are not obligated to share the estate with him. And with regard to his claim regarding the remainder of the first brother’s estate, the source for this ruling, Yevamot 37b states that the case has been closed. Since that estate was already divided, we do not reopen the issue.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as questioning the law in the above instance, when a division of the first brother’s estate was not made: Is the argument mentioned by the Rambam accepted or not? Since the question was left unresolved, there is room to argue that the issue can be raised after the death of the brother who married the widow. See Tosafot, Yevamot, loc. cit.

I.e., Jacob had two sons: Reuven and Shimon. Reuven died and Shimon married his widow, who gave birth to a son, Dan, under the circumstances mentioned in Halachah 4. Afterwards, Jacob died. Shimon and Dan come to claim his estate.

As Jacob’s son, he definitely has a right to at least a portion of his estate.

His father’s share.

For a son does not receive a share when his father is alive.

Because the son whose status is doubtful does not have a definite share in the estate, he is not given a share at all.

Even if the brother who married the widow dies afterwards, the son whose status is doubtful cannot claim the portion of his grandfather’s estate due him. As mentioned in the conclusion of the last halachah, once such a ruling is given, the matter is not reopened.

For the estate becomes the property of the brother who married the widow and is divided into three equal shares, one for each of his three sons.

Each one receives a quarter, half of the half.

Thus, the son whose lineage is a matter of question receives 5/12 of the estate, and each of the brothers receives 7/24.
The rationale is that the portion that each claimant acknowledges as belonging to the other is given to him, and the remainder is divided in half. The rationale is that with regard to the remainder, neither has a definite claim.

Without leaving any heirs.

Since neither has a definite claim, the estate is divided between them.

Without leaving any other children.

Since neither has a definite claim, the estate is divided between them.
The text of the Mishneh Torah possessed by the Maggid Mishneh did not include this latter law. Hence it is placed in parenthesis. There is, however, no debate concerning whether it is correct, for it is an extension of the principles stated previously.

I.e., in an earthquake. To cite another contemporary example: A person and his wife were killed in a car accident. See also Halachah 9.

I.e., his sons from another wife or his father, brothers, or their heirs;

For her husband inherited her estate when she died (Chapter 1, Halachah 8), and when he died his heirs inherited it.

In which instance, his heirs do not have any claim to his wife's estate (Chapter 1, Halachah 12).

I.e., her sons from another husband or her father, brothers, or their heirs.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 16, the term nichsei m'log refers to property a woman brings to her household, which the husband is allowed to use until it is worthless. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, the property is returned to the woman as is. The nichsei m'log are considered to be in the woman's possession. Therefore, her family's heirs acquire them.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 12, a husband obligates himself to pay his wife a minimum of 100 if she is not a virgin or 200 zuz if she is a virgin, in the event of his death or the couple's divorce.

Moreover, it was customary for an additional sum to be appended to the ketubah depending on the couple’s financial standing.

Since none of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is due to the woman in her husband's lifetime. It is considered to be in the possession of the husband's heirs, and therefore is retained by them.

As explained (ibid., Chapter 16), the term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property a woman brings to her household, for which the husband accepts financial responsibility. It is evaluated at the outset, and a financial equivalent is established. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, that sum must be paid to the woman.

Since the status of the nichsei tzon barzel is a matter of question, they are divided. See also similar concepts in Chapter 3, Halachah 9, and notes.

We are speaking about an instance where the woman is divorced or widowed. Thus, her son is her heir, and then after his death the inheritance should be given to his paternal family. If, however, he died first, then his mother's estate is given to her heirs from her father's household.

If the woman has another son, the term “definitely heirs” can be understood simply. He is certainly entitled to half of his mother’s estate. Hence, since the status of the claimants to the other half is doubtful, he inherits the entire estate.
If she does not have another son, the concept has a slightly different meaning in this instance from that in other cases of inheritance. Generally, it means that we know that the person has a right to the estate (which is not the case here, for if the mother died before the son, her paternal heirs do not have a right to her estate). In this instance, the intent is that while the woman was alive, the property was known to belong to that family. Hence, unless one has clear proof that the estate belongs to someone else, they should be allowed to retain possession. This interpretation, although followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 280:10), is somewhat problematic, for her heirs from her father’s household do not have a definite claim to the estate. Seemingly, the estate should be divided evenly between the two claimants. See the notes on the following halachah.

For the mother does not inherit her son's estate, nor does the son inherit his mother's estate after his death on behalf of his heirs (Chapter 1, Halachah 13).

Who is his closest heir.
Bava Batra 159b mentions the second clause in this halachah. The Rambam extrapolates that these laws would also apply in the situation he describes.

I.e., his paternal brothers who were born from a different mother.

Chapter 1, Halachah 13.

I.e., his brothers, his father, or his uncles.

For neither have a definite claim to the estate.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rashba question the Rambam’s ruling, for it seems to contradict his ruling in the conclusion of the previous halachah. There, the Rambam ruIes that the estate remains in the possession of the mother’s heirs. On that basis, it would appear here that the estate should remain in the possession of the father’s heirs.
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a Responsum from Rabbenu Asher (Section 84, Responsum 3), which endeavors to resolve the difficulty, explaining that in this instance, the rights to the inheritance are passed to the daughter who has died. Since the rights are no longer in the possession of the person who passed away, there is room to rule that the inheritance should be transferred to others. [Many others do not accept that resolution.]
Rabbenu Asher himself admits that his resolution is weak and states that if one found authorities who rule that the father’s heirs should maintain possession, he would agree with them. His son, the Tur, indeed quotes such authorities and rules in that manner. This approach is followed by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:11).

For the son’s heirs have no obligation to pay his debts from their own resources.

Since the son inherited his father’s estate, his own estate then has resources that can be used to pay his debts.

For their rights as heirs to the estate - whether from the son or the father - are definitely established.

The Siftei Cohen 280:3 states that this ruling applies according to the position that a creditor does not have a right to property that is fitting for an estate to acquire. There are, however, opinions that do not accept this thesis.

Today with the advances in modem communication, this question no longer applies, for it is possible to establish who died first.