Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sanhedrin 87a derives this concept through accepted techniques of Biblical exegesis. There are two different opinions concerning the extent of the difference of opinion between the elder and the court in that Talmudic passage. In this and the following halachah, the Rambam follows one opinion (that of Rabbi Meir) and Halachah 3, his rulings relate to the other one (that of Rabbi Yehudah). See the notes to that halachah.

This underscores that the reason he is executed is that he is undermining the authority of the court, not because he is causing others to commit a serious transgression.

Our translation differs slightly from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah and is based on authoritative manuscripts.

But they maintain that the tradition is different than that maintained by the rebellious elder.

The Rambam’s position is not accepted by all authorities. The Ramban, in his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 1, states that a sage is never considered a rebellious elder because of a difference of opinion with regard to a question of Rabbinic Law. For there is no point of Rabbinic Law whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. Kerait and sin offerings are relevant only when speaking about Scriptural prohibitions.
The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that since the prohibition against chametz itself is punishable by kerait or a sin offering, the Rabbinic safeguards against this prohibition also are included in this category. The Kessef Mishneh explains that these Rabbinic safeguards could lead to a situation whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. If a man consecrates a woman with chametz in the fifth hour of the day on the fourteenth of Nissan, according to our Sages, the woman would be consecrated, while according to the rebellious elder, she will not be. Relations with this woman is a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

As stated in Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:8-9, the Torah prohibits partaking of chametz from midday of the fourteenth of Nissan onward. As a safeguard for that prohibition our Sages decreed that it is forbidden to partake of chametz from the beginning of the fifth hour of that day and it is forbidden to benefit from it from the beginning of the sixth hour of that day. If the rebellious elder issues directives that conflict with this decree, he is liable.

As an example of such a difference of opinion, Sanhedrin 87b speaks of a person who has relations with a daughter born from a woman whom he raped. Since the prohibition against relations with a daughter is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah (- it is instead, inferred from the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter’s daughter), there is room for a rebellious elder to argue that such relations are not punishable by kerait.
Similarly, in all the cases that follow, Sanhedrin, loc. cit., gives examples of the types of differences of opinion that could arise. We will not explain all these hypothethical situations. A reader who is interested in those details should consult that source.

A condition involving vaginal bleeding at times other than a woman's menstrual period. Such bleeding renders the woman ritually impure.

In these three instances, if the woman is impure, relations with her involve a transgression whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

The latter view represents the halachah.

For the month the majority of Sages consider as the second Adar will be Nisan, according to the rebellious elder. And the month the Sages consider as Nisan will be Iyar for him. Thus he will - or instruct others to - partake of chametz on Pesach. Hence, the difference of opinion ultimately leads to a transgression whose willful violation is punishable by kerait.

Since the object used to consecrate her did not belong to her prospective husband, the consecration is not valid. For the stolen article must be returned and thus she never received anything for consecration.

While, according to the other opinion, the consecration is valid and relations with her involve a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

E. g., they differed about the endowment obligation of a child less than a month old, must the child’s worth be given or not? See Sanhedrin 88a.

E. g., they differed if interdicted property (cherem, see Leviticus, ch. 27, Hilchot Arachin V’Charamin, ch. 6) whose objective was not specified should be given to the Temple treasury or to the priests. According to the opinion that it should be given to the priests, it is his private property and can be used to consecrate a woman, while according to the other view, if it is used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

I.e., their difference of opinion concerned whether the evaluation of the consecrated article’s worth was carried out according to required principles and the redemption is valid, or whether those requirements where not met, and hence the redemption was invalid (Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).

A calf whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder (see Deuteronomy, ch. 21).

The fruits produced by a tree in the first three years after it was planted. It is forbidden to benefit from these fruits. Hence according to the opinion that they are forbidden, if they are used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Produce which falls from the reapers’ hands that must be left for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22).

Produce forgotten by the reapers which must be left for the poor (see Deuteronomy 24:19).

The corners of the field which must be left for the poor (see Leviticus, loc. cit.).

The Rambam is referring to blemishes caused by tzara’at, a spiritual affliction resembling leprosy. See Leviticus, chs. 12-13. These blemishes render a person ritually impure.

As related in Leviticus, ch. 14, tzara’at can also affect a building. In such an instance, anyone who enters the building becomes ritually impure.

Similarly, as stated in Leviticus, ch. 13, tzara’at can also affect a garment which in turn can convey ritual impurity upon a person.

For the same question, can that person enter the Temple and partake of consecrated foods, applies.

When a husband suspects his wife of committing adultery, he may warn her not to enter into privacy with a given man. If she violates this warning, she is given special water to drink. See Numbers, ch. 5.

The brother of her husband who must marry her if her husband died childless. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements, noting that although a sotah is forbidden to her yevam, that prohibition is not punishable by kerait, merely by lashes. (See Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 6:19 which bears out that statement.) The Kessef Mishneh does not offer a resolution to the matter. Note the Merkevat HaMishneh who does, suggesting a situation that depends on an understanding of the intricacies of the laws regarding yibbum.

For as mentioned, our worry is not that he is releasing a stringent prohibition, but that his directives will spur controversy among the Jewish people and prevent there being a unified halachic consensus (Radbaz).

As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 1, there are two different opinions in Sanhedrin 87a with regard to when a rebellious elder becomes liable. In Halachot 1 and 2, the Rambam followed one opinion (that of Rabbi Meir). Here his rulings relate to the other one (that of Rabbi Yehudah).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that the different opinions are conflicting and cannot be reconciled with each other. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s position.

Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Ushia explains Rabbi Yehudah’s perspective as follows: “He is not liable unless [the difference of opinion] concerns a matter that comes fundamentally from Scripture, but whose interpretation is Rabbinic. It must be able to add to our Sages’ [interpretation of how to observe the mitzvah], and that addition must degrade [and disqualify the mitzvah].”
If at the outset, the person made five compartments, he is not making an addition that degrades; he is not fulfilling the mitzvah in the proper way from the outset. In this instance, however, the four compartments make the tefillin acceptable. By adding the fifth compartment in the manner described by the Rambam, he disqualifies one of the first four, thus making the tefillin unacceptable.

For unlike tefillin, with regard to these mitzvot, they are either acceptable or unacceptable from the outset, there is no concept of it being acceptable and then being disqualified. For to add a new strand tzitzit or a new species to the four for the lulav, one would have to undo the existing bond. And the new bond would not be acceptable from the outset (Ra’avad).
The Radbaz emphasizes that although the elder is not judged as rebellious for issuing such rulings with regard to tzitzit and a lulav, if one adds a strand or another species, one does violate the prohibition against adding to the Torah’s commandments.

I.e., he came in contact with an article or a person that came in contact with a source of ritual impurity. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 3:15, if a person enters the Temple after coming into such contact, he is not liable for kerait.

He should, however, be punished in other ways, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 318) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 260) count the prohibition against cursing one’s parents as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Radbaz emphasizes that a person who curses his parents is given a more severe punishment than one who strikes them, because by cursing them he also mentions God’s name in vain.

Sanhedrin 66a derives the obligation for this penalty from an analogy established between this verse and Leviticus 20:27 which mentions stoning explicitly.

For even after a person’s death, cursing him brings negative consequences to his soul.

One might think that since it is likely for a person to curse his parents in the privacy of his home, the Torah would not require witnesses for it is unlikely that they be present. Hence the Rambam adds this clarification (Kessef Mishneh).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2.

A person whose genital area is covered by a piece of flesh which prevents us from seeing his gender.

A person who has both male and female genital organs and whose gender is thus an unresolved matter.

I.e., twelve for a girl, thirteen for a boy and for a tumtum and androgynus.

I.e., the seven names of God that may not be erased. See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2.

E. g., the Merciful One, the All-Knowing, or the like. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2.

I.e., a person who observes the Torah and its mitzvot.
The Rambam mentions the prohibition against and the punishment for cursing a fellow Jew in Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:1. In 26:3, he mentions that one is also liable for cursing when using a descriptive term for God.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s ruling here represents somewhat of a contradiction to his ruling in Hilchot A vodat Kochavim 2:7.

Or grandmother.

I.e., he is lashed, not executed. As the Kessef Mishneh states, a person does not owe his grandfather the same measure of honor he owes his parents.

I.e., an explicit negative command. For there is no verse which states: “Do not curse your parents.”

In the verse from Leviticus cited in Halachah 1.

For as Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:1 states, the prohibition against cursing a deaf-mute also includes all other Jews.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 319) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 48) count the prohibition against cursing one’s parents as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

With regard to this and the other particulars mentioned in this halachah, see the notes to Halachah 1.

Drawing blood.

In which instance, he is liable only for a financial penalty. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:1, Hilchot Sanhedrin 19:4.

For once a person has died, there is no concept of him being wounded.

Even though there is no outward sign of bleeding.

With the intent of healing his father.

Sanhedrin 84b uses techniques of Biblical exegesis to emphasize why actions performed for medical purposes do not make a person liable.

Sanhedrin, loc. cit., states that we are only forbidden to perform actions that a person would not desire to have done for him.

Implied is that his parents must authorize his activity. Kin’at Eliyahu questions what would the law be if they are unconscious and he must act without permission. He maintains that if the operation is absolutely necessary, he should perform it. For a threat to life takes precedence over all the mitzvot. If it is not absolutely necessary, he should wait until his parents regain consciousness.

I.e., an explicit negative command. For there is no verse which states: “Do not strike your parents.”

In the verse from Leviticus cited in Halachah 5.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:12; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:1.

In Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 15:12, the Rambam defines this term as referring to a person who knows the identity of his mother, but not of his father. Shituki means “one who is silenced.” Rashi (Yevamot 37a) states that such a child is given this name, because he will call for his father and his mother will silence him.

Although the mother’s testimony is significant in certain instances (see Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 15:11), it does not have sufficient weight to have the son sentenced to death. See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:20-21 where the Rambam rules that the popular conception of the matter of a person’s relationship to his parents is halachicly significant.

For such a child is considered as having no family ties to his natural father. He is a like a servant or a gentile. If he converts, he is considered as a newborn child and has no family ties to his natural mother either. See Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 1:4.

I.e., at the time of conception, his mother was not Jewish.

She converted before his birth.

This applies whether his natural father was Jewish or was a gentile who converted. The son is considered as having no family connection to him.

Although she was Jewish when she gave birth to the child.

A shituki is not liable for cursing or striking his father, but that is because he does not know who his father is. If his father's identity was established, he would be liable. Hence he is liable for cursing or striking his mother. This child, by contrast, is considered as if he does not have a father at all. Therefore he is not liable for striking or cursing his mother (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., his natural father who has not converted.

I.e., it would appear that becoming Jewish has minimized the convert's responsibilities for he no longer must honor his gentile father.

I.e., he should show him the same measure of respect as he did as a gentile.

I.e., a gentile has a certain measure of responsibility to his parents, for he is considered their son according to law. Hence even if he converts - at which time he is considered like a new baby - he still must continue to show them a similar degree of honor. A servant, by contrast, is considered as his master's property and thus has no connection to his natural parents. It is as if they did not conceive him. Even if his father is Jewish, the servant is not considered as his son. Compare to Hilchot Ishut 15:6.

He may not do this on his own initiative, nor may he act as an agent of the court to perform these acts, as stated in Halachah 13 (Sanhedrin 85b).

Through their violation of Torah law, it is as if they removed themselves from the Jewish people. Hence their son is not liable for violating his obligation to respect them.

Because their repentance restores their status. Although they are liable to die for their sins, their children are still obligated to respect them.

For a son is liable for cursing his parents after their death (Halachah 1). It’s true that he is not liable for striking them after their death (Halachah 5), but that is only because there is no concept of wounding a dead person. There is, however, a concept of wounding someone going to his death.

As stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 9, whenever a person is sentenced to death, it is as if he was already executed. See also Hilchot Edut 19:2.

Even though he is not acting on his own, but as the agent of the court, he should not be the one charged with this responsibility.

For this resembles cursing (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:5,9.

We have used general terms in our translation. In particular, the wording used by the Rambam has a specific connotation. A mesit is someone who attempts to entice an individual to worship false deities. A madiach is someone who attempts to lead an entire city astray. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, ch. 5.

Having one’s son administer these punishments may be more painful to bear than the punishments themselves.

See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:9.

I.e., he should take an ordinary oath, mentioning God's name and stating that he does not owe his son anything.

Hilchot Rotzeach 1:3.

Who is obligated to kill the slayer.

By mentioning an “eye that mocks,” the prooftext emphasizes that any mocking, even a mere insinuation is considered worthy of punishment.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:5.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 210) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 33) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 211) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 212) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See the Jerusalem Talmud, Pe’ah 1:1, which explains that the honor one is required to show one’s parents exceeds that which one is required to show God, as it were (Radbaz).

Kiddushin 31 a states that a child has a tendency to honor his mother more than his father. Therefore, his father is mentioned first with regard to this mitzvah. And his tendency is to fear his father more, so with regard to that mitzvah, his mother is given first mention.

I.e., taking his position in the place where elders usually stand and take counsel with each other. Alternatively, it refers to standing in his place in the synagogue [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:2)].

I.e., the place where he dines at home.

Our translation is based on a responsun of the Rambam (Responsum 264). Others render the term as supporting his words. For supporting his father’s decision implies that his support enhances his father’s words. That is a mark of disrespect.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) mentions that this applies in his father’s presence. For that is a mark of disrespect. Outside his father’s presence, he may differ with him or justify his father’s opinion. It would appear that the Rambam himself would accept this distinction, because we find that he did express different halachic opinions than his father. See Hilchot Shechitah 11:10.
This presumption is borne out by the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:6 where he states that a person may not contradict or support the words of his teacher “in his presence.”

This is indeed the manner in which the Rambam refers to his father in Hilchot Shechitah, loc. cit. The Radbaz states that if a person refers to his father as Rabbi Abraham or the like, it is acceptable.

For others might think that he is referring to his father, and that will compromise his father’s honor (Radbaz).
Tosafot Rabbenu Asher (Horiot 14a) gives an example of this concept. The Sage Rabbah raised the Sage Abbaye who was his nephew. The name Abbaye was actually coined by Rabbah because Abbaye shared the same name as Rabbah’s own father. Indeed, that factor is indicated by the name itself. For Abbaye is an Aramaic derivative of the Hebrew Avi, meaning “my father.” Ravva, Abbaye’s colleague, by contrast, did not refer to him as Abbaye, but instead called him by his given name: Nachmeini.

It would appear that within his father’s presence, this is forbidden.

Implied is that the son does not have to use his own resources to provide for his parents.

I.e., the court may use physical force to compel him to provide for them.

I.e., he is compelled to sustain them from the money that he would donate to charity [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 240:5)]. The Ramah adds that if the person has ample resources, he should be cursed if he sustains his father from money for charity.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:8 which states that all the services a servant performs for his master must be performed by a student for his teacher.

See ibid.:7 which states that a person must stand in his teacher’s presence from the time he sees him until he passes from his vision.

Even though that would have been appropriate as a mark of deference because he is his teacher. The Radbaz questions this ruling, stating that seemingly, out of respect for his Torah knowledge, the father should show the son this mark of deference and thus they should both stand for each other. This is the position taken by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:7).

By making such statements, he enhances his father’s prestige. Conversely, if he is unsure of whether speaking in the name of his father will not produce such positive results - and certainly if he is certain that it will not - he may or should make the request in his own name [Rashi (Kiddushin 32b); Siftei Cohen 240:8-9].

I.e., may any misfortune to be visited upon him in the spiritual realms be visited upon me.

After twelve months, however, this is unnecessary, for our Sages say that even the wicked are not judged in Gehinnom for longer than twelve months. Hence, all retribution will have already been visited upon him (Kessef Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:9) states that one should say: “May his memory be blessed.” The Turei Zahav 240:13 states that a combination of both expressions should be used.

Kiddushin 30b derives this concept from the fact that the command to fear one’s parents uses a plural verb, implying both a man and a woman.

I.e., her first obligation is to her husband.
Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:17) states that a woman is not obligated to honor her father while she is married for this reason. One might infer that she is liable to fear him even when married.

Or if her husband consents (Siftei Cohen 240:19).

Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text is slightly different.

The Rambam’s words are taken from Kiddushin 32a. The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for as stated above, a son is not obligated to suffer financial loss in order to honor his father. Indeed, Kiddushin, loc. cit., speaks of the purse as belonging to the father, explaining that although the son is fit to inherit that purse, since the money is presently his father’s, the son may not protest. Implied is that if the purse is the son’s, he may.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that although he is not obligated to honor his father with his own funds, he must sacrifice all the money in the world not to cause him discomfort. The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh Deah 240:8) state that if the father has already thrown the purse into the sea, the son must remain silent. Before he throws it, however, the son may try to prevent him from doing so. The Bayit Chadash and the Siftei Cohen 240:11 state that the son may sue the father for any loss he causes him. Hence, he may not embarrass him for causing him that loss.

The Rambam’s words are taken from Kiddushin 31a which cites the example of a gentile in Ashkelon who conducted himself in this manner. Our Sages explain that, in this regard, he should be looked up to as an exemplar.

I.e., by presenting extensive demands, he may cause them to transgress and spurn the mitzvah. The Kessef Mishneh implies that this law is the Rambam’s own deduction which he derived from the following halachah.

And thus a son will not be punished for failing to show the required honor; the son nevertheless fulfills a mitzvah by doing so (Radbaz, Vol. I, Responsum 524).

We have translated the term gadol according to its usual halachic meaning. The Ramah (Yoreh Deah 240:20) interprets this as referring to a son who has reached the age of 22 or 24.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14, this command is interpreted as meaning, "Do not cause the spiritually blind to transgress." In this instance, by hitting his son after he has reached adulthood, the father is provoking him to perhaps respond in kind or to dishonor him in some way.

And heal them.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on a narrative in Kiddushin 31 b which relates how Rav Assi cared for his senile mother.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that if a son will not care for his parents, no one else will. The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the parents will take advantage of the child’s obligation to respect them and make no effort to control their behavior. Other people, by contrast, will rebuke the parents severely and rather than suffer such rebuke, they will control themselves. (See, however, the Turei Zahav who offers a different interpretation of the Ra’avad’s position.)

A person born out of an incestuous or an adulterous relationship.

For as reflected in the notes to Chapter 5, Halachah 12, a person is liable for striking and cursing his parents only when they are observant. And hence, until the father repents, the son is not liable for execution for his deeds. He is nevertheless forbidden to conduct himself in this manner (Radbaz).

For rebuking his fathers in this manner would cause him aggravation (Kiddushin 32a).
From this ruling, the Radbaz states that it would appear that one is obligated to honor one’s parents, even if they are transgressors. He notes, however, that (as the Hagahot Maimomiot question), Bava Metzia 62a appears to imply that if a person’s father died without repenting, one is not obligated to honor him. Hence the Radbaz explains that the passage in Bava Metzia, is speaking about a situation in which the person already died. We, by contrast, are speaking about an instance when the father is alive and there is hope that he will repent. Hence, throughout his lifetime, while there is still hope that he will repent, his son is obligated to honor him.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo offers a different resolution from which it appears that even if the father died without repenting, his sons are obligated to honor him, and he follows this understanding in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:18). The Ramah differs, stating that unless the father has repented, his son is not obligated to honor him during his lifetime. He may not, however, cause him aggravation.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:11) quotes these words and continues: “In this manner, he will understand on his own, without being embarrassed.”

From this statement, the Radbaz derives the ruling that a person is not considered wicked - in which instance, the son would not be obligated to heed his father at all - from merely making undesirable statements. To be placed in that category, he must perform an act of transgression.

For ultimately, the obligation to heed Rabbinic Law is a Scriptural command (Kessef Mishneh).

This is speaking about a mitzvah whose observance cannot be delayed, e.g., the burial of a corpse. If the observance of the mitzvah can be delayed, one should honor one's parents and then observe the mitzvah [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh Dea'ah 240:12)].

If, however, he had already begun the performance of the other mitzvah, he should complete it before concerning himself with his father’s honor. For a person involved in the observance of one mitzvah is not obligated in others [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh Dea’ah 240:12)].

Honoring one’s father.

As Pe’ah 1:1 states: “Torah study surpasses all [other mitzvot].” Megilah 16b gives an example of the relationship of Torah study to the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents, stating that Jacob was punished for the 22 years in which he did not honor his father while he sojourned in Charan and tarried on the way. Although before that Jacob spent 14 years studying the Torah - and during this time, he also did not honor his father - he was not held liable for that, because “Torah study surpasses honoring one’s parents.”

See Hilchot Ishut 15:20 which states that a woman is obligated to honor her husband “exceedingly.” The Radbaz emphasizes that if the couple are divorced, the father receives no priority over the mother. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:14) also quotes this understanding, stating that in such a situation the son may honor whomever he desires first.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:21) states that even though there is no obligation for a son to continue to honor his step-mother after his father’s death, it is proper for him to do so. The commentaries note that this ruling appears to be based on the words of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi who, at the time of his death, instructed his sons to continue to honor their step-mother (Ketubot 103a).

In his gloss to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Megilat Esther states that from the fact that the Rambam does not qualify this ruling by stating that it applies only during the father’s lifetime, we can conclude that it applies even after his death.