Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Or is divorced (Siftei Cohen 33:8).

Note, however, the guidelines spelled out in the following halachah.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:12) emphasizes that if a ruling was rendered while a couple was still married and then the woman died, the case may not be reopened on the basis of the testimony that her relative may give. See, however, the gloss of the Siftei Cohen 33:9.

I.e., the witness’ wife. With her death, the family connection between the witness and his former father-in-law is dissolved.

I.e., when he observes the event.

I.e., when he delivers testimony.

Bava Batra 128a derives this concept from Leviticus 5:1: “If he witnessed or saw... if he does not testify.” Implied is that the person must be acceptable as a witness at the time he sees and at the time he testifies.

I.e., he was not acceptable as a witness when he observed the evidence.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2, where the Rambam qualifies this leniency, stating: “[This applies] provided he is joined by another person who [learned to] recognize these signatures while an adult.”

See Hilchot Ishut 16:25 which mentions some of the details of these customs, e.g., wearing a crown or a special garment, celebrating in a particular manner.

As Ibid. 10:7 states, it is an obligation ordained by the Sages so that a man would not consider divorce a casual matter. If a woman is a virgin at marriage, her husband’s fundamental responsibility is 200 zuz, while if she is not a virgin at marriage, his fundamental responsibility is 100 zuz.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Hilchot lshut 16:25) states that in contrast to the previous instance, in this and the latter instance, the word of the minor who attained majority is accepted even when no one else testifies together with him. The Radbaz defines the general principle as follows: Whenever the testimony of two witnesses are required, then the other witness must have observed the matter when he was an adult. Whenever the testimony of two witnesses is not required, there is no need for another witness at all.

I.e., this place alone and not a larger area (see Kessef Mishneh).

The term beit hapras refers to a field where a corpse was buried and accidentally the grave was plowed over causing the bones to be strewn over the entire field. Our Sages (see Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Tumat Meit 2:16) decreed that the area within 100 cubits of the original grave is considered as impure by Rabbinic decree.

As explained in Hilchot Shabbat 27:1, according to Scriptural Law, the Sabbath limits are 12 mil (a mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure). Our Sages, however, restricted these limits to 2000 cubits. As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat, ch. 28, at times there can be questions regarding the determination of a city’s Sabbath limits. Our present halachah is teaching that a person’s word is accepted when he states that he remembers being allowed to proceed until a particular point on the Sabbath, indicating that this point was within the Sabbath limits.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 20:15 which describes this situation in slightly greater detail. By saying “he would receive a portion,” the Rambam emphasizes that the person whose lineage is being questioned is not a servant, because although a servant may partake of terumah given his master, he is not given a portion of terumah himself.

In this context, the Hebrew term matanot refers particular to the forearm, jaw, and the maw, presents that must be given to a priest when slaughtering a kosher animal (Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 9). There are times when the term is used in an expanded context to refer to alI the priestly presents.

In this and the above instance, the person would be accepted as a priest, because of this testimony.
If, however, the person testifies that he remembers seeing the presents sent with others, his testimony is not accepted, for we fear that his recollections are not precise.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim who interprets this as referring to a situation where there are two families in the same priestly clan. It is rumored that one is acceptable and one is not acceptable. We rely on the statements of the child who attained majority to determine which is acceptable and which is not.

See Ketubot 28b. In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim as explaining that we are referring to a situation where there were already suspicions regarding the acceptability of the lineage of the family in question.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Terumah 1:26, from the time of the exile of the Ten Tribes onward, the obligation to separate terumah is Rabbinic in origin. Since the entire Jewish people do not live on the land, the regulations governing its produce do not apply according to Scriptural law. Hence certain leniencies are taken in the determination of whether or not a person is a priest. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah, ch. 20.

Ketubot 28b states that this applies even if the gentile had the intent of converting when he observed the matter of concern. We are not certain that he would be careful with regard to all the particulars involved.
The commentaries note that with regard to the Sabbath limits, the Rambam rules that the word of a servant or maid-servant is accepted even if they were not freed (Hilchot Shabbat 28:19).

For, as a robber, his testimony is not acceptable.

We do not disqualify it because the person became a robber afterwards. Implied is that, although the person was acceptable as a witness when he signed the legal document, if he became a robber before the document was validated by the court, the document is not acceptable.

I.e., if the son-in-law signed the legal document before marrying the person’s daughter, the document may be validated by others.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:35) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, it also mentions the qualifying words of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi who states that this leniency applies only when the legal document is in the possession of another person. If, however, it is in the possession of the witnesses, it is disqualified.

I.e., we fear that the unacceptable witness composed a false document and dated it falsely, writing a date that preceded his disqualification. A witness disqualified because of a family connection, by contrast, is not suspected of lying or falsifying documents. He is disqualified only because of a Scriptural decree, without any rational explanation (see Chapter 13, Halachah 15, and notes).
According to the Rambam’s explanation, if the document was in the possession of others before the witness was disqualified because of his transgression, it may be acceptable even though it was not validated by the court until afterwards. This conclusion is reflected in Rav Yosef Karo’s commentary in his Kessef Mishneh and his ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:34).

If, however, many witnesses signed it, it is possible that it is acceptable as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 6.

When a legal document is not signed by witnesses at all and is transferred in the presence of acceptable witnesses, it is considered as binding evidence (Gittin 3b). The signature of the unacceptable witness[es], however, causes the legal document to be disqualified. Compare to Hilchot Gerushin 1:5-17.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 51:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but also quotes the opinion of the Baal Halachot Gedolot and the Tur who refer to the explanations given in Chapter 5, Halachah 6: that perhaps the witness signed merely to fill up the empty space on the legal document. On this basis, these authorities maintain that the legal document is considered as a legal document signed by one witness. The Siftei Cohen 51:4 laboriously argues that even the Rambam would accept this view.

Without dividing the property and specifying which person receives which portion.

And if a portion of the testimony is nullified, the entire testimony is nullified [Kessef Mishneh, citing the Jerusalem Talmud (Makkot 1:7)].
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo elaborates in support of the Rambam’s position although Rav Hai Gaon and other Rishonim rule differently. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 51:6), however, he mentions a leniency. If the recipient who is related to the witnesses renounces all claims to the property, the other recipient may receive his share. The Siftei Cohen 51:6 disputes this ruling, stating that according to the principle: “If a portion of the testimony is nullified, the entire testimony is nullified,” the testimony cannot be restored by any means.

Since the statements are distinct, we divide the testimony and accept the portion which is acceptable and reject the other portion.

A person who has a vested interest in the outcome of a judgment is likely to lie or at least distort the evidence (perhaps subconsciously) in favor of the desired result. The Rambam, however, goes further, stating that when a person has a vested interest, it is as if he is a principal in the case and he is disqualified as a witness by Scriptural Law. Even if there is no suspicion at all that he will lie, he is unacceptable. See the commentaries of the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 37:1 and the Siftei Cohen 37:1 where this subject is discussed.

For they have a vested interest.

As validated by a kinyan suder, the exchange of a handkerchief; see Hilchot Mechirah, ch. 5.

I.e., the fact that he was once an interested party does not disqualify him after he withdraws his interest. Although as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 2, a witness must be acceptable both at the time he observes the matter of concern and at the time he delivers his testimony, the Rambam maintains that this principle does not apply in the present situation because the difficulty with the witness does not concern his person, but his vested interest. Hence, when he rids himself of that vested interest, he is fit to testify. Tosafot, Niddah 50a, differs and maintains that in this instance as well, if a person is not fit to testify when he observes the evidence, his testimony is not acceptable. This view is also cited in the Hagahot Maimoniot.

Bava Batra 43a, the source for this ruling, mentions only that such an individual may serve as a judge. The Rambam extends this conclusion and applies it to witnesses as well.

Since the person will continue to listen to the Torah being read from that scroll, he will still be deriving benefit from it remaining in the city.
The Radbaz states that, according to the Rambam, this ruling applies even when the city also possesses another Torah scroll. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 7:12) and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 37:19) quote the opinion of Rabbeinu Asher who maintains that if the city has another Torah scroll, a judge or a witness may withdraw his share in the Torah scroll in question.

Questions involving other religious articles that are required for communal use [Ramah (Ibid.)].

As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam’s statements, since the poor people are dependent upon them, when the poor people receive money from other sources, that will release their burden. Hence, they are considered to have a vested interest.

And thus they would have no immediate benefit from their testimony.

For in this way, in the future, they will not have to give them the same amount. Alternatively, the general benefit to the city will also affect them in an indirect manner.

When, however, the poor are supported from donations coming from outside the city, the inhabitants of the city may testify if they take precautions so that they do not have a vested interest (Radbaz).

I.e., he claims that the person who sold the land to the partners stole it from him and sold it illegally. Moreover, he brings witnesses to prove his claim. In such an instance, he has the right to expropriate the land and the partners must sue the thief to receive reimbursement.

I.e., he would be testifying that the witnesses who testified on behalf of the claimant were not acceptable because they transgressed. Hence their testimony would not be fit to take into consideration.

I.e., even the portion of the land belonging to the other partner.

He may, however, withdraw his ownership after the protest has been raised [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:1)].

I.e., he gives his portion to him as a present without receiving anything in return. He will lose his portion of the field regardless - for his own testimony will not avail him. Nevertheless, by giving his portion to his partner and testifying, he prevents his partner from suffering a loss.

We are speaking about a creditor from whom the partner borrowed money before he divested himself of a connection to the land. That creditor thus has a lien on the land and is entitled to expropriate it from the person in possession. Accordingly, the partner would still have a vested interest in keeping it in the other partner's possession. When, however, he undertakes a commitment to make restitution if the field is expropriated, it does not matter to him at all who is in possession of the field. Hence he may testify about it.

For if it is granted to the claimant, he is entitled to all its produce. The sharecropper receives only compensation for his expenses - and that only when the yield is sufficient to pay those expenses.

Even if the claimant is given the field, the sharecropper is not obligated to pay him for the previous years. Nor do we say that the sharecropper fears that he will lose the opportunity of working this field, for we assume that there are many fields of similar value available. Hence it is not considered as if he has a vested interest (Kessef Mishneh).
This is speaking about a situation where the sharecropper did not till the field and prepare it for sowing before the claimant demanded its return. If he had tilled the field, he may not testify, because he has a vested interest since all the work he invested will be for naught if the field is expropriated (Radbaz).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:12) states that the owner may give the rent back to the renter to enable him to bring it to court so that he may testify without any vested interest.

Even though he is entitled to receive reimbursement from the person who rented him the field, that requires suing him in court and no one enjoys the possibility of entering legal proceedings (Siftei Cohen 37:13).

This applies even with regard to an ordinary guarantor, not necessarily an orev kablam (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

If, however, Shimon does not possess a field, but does possess movable property,
Reuven is not acceptable as a · witness. For the movable property can be concealed or disposed of and the debt left to Reuven (Radbaz).

Hence even if the field is expropriated by Yehudah, Reuven will not suffer a loss. If, however, Shimon does not possess another field, Reuven is considered to have a vested interest in Shimon retaining possession. For if he does not possess the field, Reuven may be called upon to pay the debt (see Bava Batra 46b).

Reuven purchased a field from Shimon and afterwards, Levi purchased a field from Shimon. Yehudah then comes to Levi and claims that he, Yehudah, is the rightful owner of that field and it was stolen from him. Reuven can testify on behalf of Levi and establish him as the rightful owner of the field.

That is in his possession and not encumbered by any loans. In this instance, as the Rambam continues to explain, Reuven is protected, because he can always sue Shimon and expropriate the unencumbered field. If, however, Shimon does not have. such a field, Reuven is considered as having a vested interest for he has no security for his purchase as we will continue to explain.
The Ra’avad adds that Shimon must designate this field as an apotiki for Reuven, assuring him that he will receive it if the field he purchased is expropriated. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:14), however, does not mention this requirement. See the Siftei Cohen 37:18

I.e., Dan, a creditor of Shimon’s, comes and seeks to expropriate the field Reuven purchased. Had Yehudah not prevailed against Levi, Dan would have expropriated the field Levi purchased, for that was purchased after Reuven’s field. Nevertheless, even though that field is not available, Reuven will not suffer a loss, because he can rely on the unencumbered field. Hence, it makes no difference to him whether or not the field remains in Levi’s possession.
If, however, Shimon does not possess an unencumbered field, Reuven would derive an advantage from the field remaining in Levi’s possession. For then the creditor would expropriate Levi’s field first.

I.e., the laws apply with regard to both movable and landed property.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 37) quotes two opinions: one which maintains that this law applies even when Shimon merely suspects that Reuven stole from him, and the other that it applies only when he is certain of the matter.

E. g., testifying that Yehudah’s witnesses are unacceptable or the like.

I.e., he will bring witnesses who testify that Reuven stole it from him.

Since he prefers having the property remain in Reuven’s possession, he is considered as having a vested interest in the matter and is disqualified from testifying.

But not the garment, for this law does not apply with regard to movable property as stated in the following halachah. Landed property can never be stolen, but instead remains in the possession of the legal owner even when it is not in his physical possession. Hence the original owner is always expecting to receive his property (Bava Batra 44a and commentaries).

I.e., since Levi assumes the position held by Reuven. The same laws which apply with regard to testifying on behalf of Reuven apply with regard to testifying on his behalf.
From Bava Batra 43b, it appears that “it is more comfortable for him...” means that the claimant is a difficult person while the heir or the purchaser is easier to deal with and will surrender the property more graciously. There are some who also use this same explanation in the first clause. The Rambam, however, does not, because it is highly unlikely that it will be “more comfortable” for the owner to deal with the thief than with the claimant (Radbaz).

According to the Rambam, it does not matter whether the sale precedes the legal Owner’s despair that the article will be returned to him or whether he despaired afterwards (Hilchot Geneivah 5:3). Many Ashkenazic authorities differ. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 37:48.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, he. is not considered as having a vested interest in the matter, because the garment will never be returned to him.

See Hilchot Geneivah 5:3, Hilchot Gezeilah 5:7, where this concept is explained. A thief himself can never acquire the stolen article while it remains in the same state as when it was stolen. And if its owner never despairs of recovering it, another person may also not acquire it. If, however, the owner despairs of recovering it and the thief sells or gives it to another person, that other person acquires the article. The thief is required to reimburse the owner for the article, but the article itself remains in possession of the person who acquired it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:17) clarifies that in Talmudic times, this ruling applied only when the thief did not leave any landed property in his estate. If, however, he left landed property, that property is on lien to his debts. Hence, there is still a possibility of the original owner recovering the value of the object stolen from him. Accordingly, he is considered as having a vested interest. Moreover, in the present age, we follow the ruling of the Geonim who maintain that even movable property left in a person’s estate is on lien to his debts. As such, as long as the thief leaves any estate whatsoever, the person from whom the property was stolen is considered as an involved party.

I.e., as long as they do not receive the stolen article itself as an inheritance, the thief’s heirs are under no responsibility to the owner of the stolen article.

As long as the article itself is in the heir’s possession, they must return it to the original owner. Inheritance - in contrast to purchase - is not considered as a change of domain. Instead, the domain of the heir is considered as an extension of the domain of the thief (Bava Batra, loc. cit. and commentaries).

I.e., Reuven had a clause included in the contract of sale, stating that he does not accept any responsibility if the field is expropriated from Shimon the purchaser. Even if the field is taken because of a legitimate claim for which he would ordinarily be responsible, he is freed of liability because of this clause. See Hilchot Mechirah 19:3.

I.e., Yehudah claims that Reuven purchased the field from a thief before selling it to Shimon [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 37)].
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 37:15) emphasize that if Yehudah’s claim to the field would be effective only against Shimon the purchaser and not against Reuven, the seller, Reuven is allowed to testify on Shimon’s behalf. For his creditor would have the right to expropriate the property from Yehudah, just as he could have expropriated it from Shimon.

E. g., by disqualifying Yehudah’s witnesses.

Cf. Psalms 37:21. I.e., if the field is taken by Yehudah, it will not be able to be used as security for his debt. Reuven will not have such feelings if the field is expropriated from Shimon, for he can tell Shimon that by selling the field to him without accepting responsibility, it was as if he informed him of the likelihood that it would be expropriated from him.
The above applies provided Reuven does not possess another field of equivalent value in his own possession. If, however, he possesses another field, that field will be expropriated by a creditor and not the field that was sold previously. Hence, it will make no difference to him whether or not Yehudah expropriates that field. As such, he is acceptable as a witness (Kessef Mishneh, based on Bava Batra 45a and commentaries).
The Merkevat HaMishneh differs and maintains that the Rambam follows the approach of his teacher, Rav Yosef Migash who interprets the above passage as implying that even when the seller possesses another field, he is disqualified as a witness. This view is quoted by the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 37:37 and the Siftei Cohen 37:22.

I.e., movable property. This also refers to an instance where Reuven did not accept financial responsibility for the sale [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:16)]. There are those who maintain that this is not necessarily the Rambam’s intent, but the Siftei Cohen 37:25 cites Hilchot Mechirah 19:3 as indication that it is.

In this instance as well, Yehudah claims that Reuven purchased the article from a thief and Yehudah was the rightful owner [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:16)].

I.e., as above, he testifies to disqualify the witnesses Yehudah brings.

In contrast to landed property which remains in the same place and therefore its ownership is a matter of public knowledge, movable property can be transferred from hand to hand and is not as identifiable. Accordingly, our Sages did not consider it on lien to a person’s debts. For if a creditor could expropriate movable property from a purchaser, no one would purchase such property, for they would always be afraid that it could be expropriated (Bava Batra 44b and commentaries).

I.e., it was specifically stated that this movable property would be used to pay the debt. Even if a contract included such a clause, the clause is not valid and the purchaser may maintain possession of the movable property. See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 18:5.
Since Reuven's creditors may not expropriate the property from Shimon, Reuven has no benefit in the property remaining in Shimon's possession Hence, he is allowed to serve as a witness on his behalf (Kessef Mishneh).

Therefore even if Yehudah's claim prevails and the property is expropriated from Shimon, Shimon does not have a claim against Reuven. For Shimon acknowledges that Reuven had the right to sell the property to him.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:16) does not mention this point in his statement of the law. There are commentaries that explain that since the Shulchan Aruch mentions that one does not accept responsibility, this point is not necessary. The Siftei Cohen, however, differs and maintains that the practice cited by the Shulchan Aruch is not followed in all places. In the places that did not accept that practice, even if the seller does not accept responsibility, the purchaser must recognize that the property is his.

According to the opinion that the Rambam is speaking about a situation where Reuven the seller accepted financial responsibility, the clause is understood simply: He is considered as having a vested interest, for if his testimony is not accepted, the purchaser will sue him for the value of the property and he will have to make restitution.
According to the view that the seller did not accept financial responsibility, he will not be held liable if the seller sues him. Nevertheless, he is considered as having a vested interest. For no person desires that the to whom he sells property have complaints against him and call him to court because of them [Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 37)].

For then the factors which the Rambam mentions in the following clause are not relevant.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Malveh v’Loveh 18:2, a lender may place all of his movable property on lien to a debt by stating in the promissory note that he establishes this lien by virtue of the establishment of a lien on landed property. Moreover, he can include a stipulation that the lien will also include all movable property that the debtor will acquire in the future.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 37:16, 60:1) states that in the present age, the Rabbis invalidated both these stipulations and do not allow a lien on movable property at all. According to this view, the seller is allowed to testify, even if he once owned landed property. The Siftei Cohen 37:26, 60:4, however, differs and maintains that such stipulations are valid even at present.

Hence he is considered to have a vested interest, as stated in Halachah 3.

I.e., the disqualification of witnesses for having a vested interest is not a cut and dry matter, conforming to set rules. Instead, it is one which a judge must think over, considering all the possible ramifications.

The Kessef Mishneh states that a person is disqualified for having a vested interest only when his testimony appears to advance that interest. If he testifies against his own interest, his testimony is accepted, just as we accept the acknowledgment of liability of a person sued with owing a debt.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 23:3 which elaborates on the care a judge must show with regard to having a vested interest in a case.

I.e., needless to say, the judges may not be transgressors. Nor may they be related to the litigants, the witnesses, or to each other (Kessef Mishneh). Similarly, all of the factors mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 1, disqualify a judge.

A court of 23 judges.

Israel’s highest court.

Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 4:9-10.

The first three judges who make the fundamental calculations with regard to the declaration of the leap year may not be related (Lechem Mishneh).

For we fear that their love or hate of the principals may influence their subconscious thinking process. As mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 15, we do not suspect that a person will consciously transgress and deliver false testimony on behalf of a colleague. Similarly, we do not believe that a person will willfully deliver a wrong judgment because of his feelings for or against a particular individual. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that without knowing, his feelings will influence his decisions.

For a judge is not acceptable until his mother is a native-born Jewess, as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9, 11:11. These individuals are, however, acceptable as witnesses.

For we suspect that because of the judge’s age or because the eunuch never had children, they will have cruel tendencies and will not be merciful (Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9).

For judges who adjudicate cases involving capital punishment must be fit to marry into the priesthood and they must have no physical blemishes (ibid. 2:9, 11:11).