Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Rashi, Ketubot 20a, explains that this concept is derived from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 19:15: “The matter will be established on the basis of the testimony... of two witness.” Al pi, translated as “on the basis of the testimony,” literally means “on the mouth.” Testimony must come from the mouths of the witnesses and not from their written statements.
The Rambam’s principle is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra’avad (gloss to Halachah 4) and Rabbenu Asher state that if there is another witness who recognizes the signature of the first witness, the two of them may testify that the signature is authentic and the legal document is validated. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:10) quotes both of these views without saying which is favored. The Siftei Cohen 46:32 elaborates in support of the Rambam’s position. See also Halachah 4 and notes.

According to the Rambam, this applies even if the witness is a Torah scholar. See the notes to the following halachah.

After discussing the question of reminding witnesses, Ketubot 20b states: “If he is a Torah scholar, even [the litigant] himself may remind him.” The Rambam interprets the pronoun “he” as referring to the plaintiff. Rashi, by contrast, interprets it as referring to the witness; if the witness is a Torah scholar, even the litigant may remind him. For we assume a Torah scholar will not lie. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:14) quotes Rashi’s view. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 28:46 also mentions the Rambam’s view.

Implied is that in cases involving capital punishment, such testimony is not acceptable.

Who are unacceptable as witnesses (Chapter 9, Halachah 1). Others interpret the words as meaning “the legal document is like a useless shard.”

The Ra’avad responds just as caustically, stating: “There are those who rule in this manner who are just as knowledgeable in law as he.” As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 1, there is a difference of opinion among the later authorities which opinion should be followed.

Which is not acceptable. As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 6, once witnesses sign a legal document, their testimony is binding.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 7.

With this halachah, the Rambam is emphasizing that there is no difference in this regard between a private note a person records for himself and an official legal document signed by another witness as well. If he remembers the matter, he may testify; if he does not, he may not.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, some of these individuals are disqualified on the basis of Scriptural Law, and others on the basis of Rabbinic decree.

See Halachah 2.

I.e., Canaanite servants. See Halachot 3-6.

See Halachot 7-8.

See Halachot 9-10.

See Halachah 11.

See Halachah 12.

See Chapters 10 and 12.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.

See Chapters 13 and 14.

See Chapter 15.

See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 35:14) who states that in situations where male witnesses are unlikely to be found, the Rabbis ordained that the testimony of women should be accepted.

Sh’vuot 30a derives this concept from Deuteronomy 19:17: “And the two men will stand,” implying “men,” and not women. To this writer’s knowledge, the commentaries have not found a prior Rabbinic source that employs the Rambam’s prooftext. Indeed, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh question the use of that prooftext, noting that the entire Torah is written using male declinations.

A person whose sexual organ is covered by flesh and it is impossible to detect whether he is a male or female (Hilchot Ishut 2:25).

A person who has both male and female sexual organs (ibid.:24).

See also Chapter 12, Halachah 3.

I.e., capital punishment or lashes.

We follow the principle: When a person desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this is inferred from the ruling with regard to financial penalties. If we do not impose a financial penalty when there is a doubt involved, certainly we do not inflict punishment on an individual’s physical person.

The verse speaks about the punishment given to an ed zomeim, a witness who delivers false testimony against a colleague.

And servants are not considered full-fledged members of the covenant. As the Rambam states (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:17): “A servant... has already left the category of gentiles... but has not yet entered the category of Jews.” See the Or Sameach who cites sources (e.g., Gittin 23b) which appear to indicate that servants are considered as members of the covenant although they do not have the same status as the Jewish people. Indeed, Deuteronomy 29:10-11 speaks about the covenant with God including “your wood-cutters and water-drawers,” which our Sages interpret as referring to Canaanite servants.

For example, a servant who had been owned by two Jews in partnership and was freed by one and not freed by the other. See also Hilchot Avadim 7:4.

Because the dimension of him which is a servant involves everything that he does.

Although a person states that he is willing to free his servant, until he formalizes that statement with a legal document, the servant is not formally freed and may not marry a Jewish woman.

Which is necessary to bring about his change of status as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:12.

Two pubic hairs.

I.e., reaches the age of 35. For Psalms 90:10: speaks of "the years of our lives" as being "70."

Chapter 2.

Hairs in his beard or hair on his underarms.

To see whether he manifested signs of physical maturity in his pubic area. Even though he has reached the required age, he must also manifest physical maturity.

I.e., when he reaches his thirteenth birthday. After any portion of the day passes, we follow the principle (Pesachim 4a): “A portion of the day is like the entire day,” and he is considered as thirteen and a day.

If, however, a child is familiar with business dealings, his testimony is accepted, even though he has just past his thirteenth birthday (Kessef Mishneh).

And we are very careful when it comes to matters involving landed property, because a person’s livelihood is dependent on land (Radbaz). See Hilchot Mechirah 29:12-13 which mentions restrictions with regard to a youth’s sale of his own landed property until he reaches the age of 20.

For we assume that such a person will not be capable of giving accurate testimony. In a certain way, a feeble-minded person like this is worse than an emotionally unstable person. For an emotionally unstable person is often intellectually capable and able to perceive information; the difficulty with him involves his intemperate excesses. A simpleton, by contrast, has difficulty comprehending; that is why he is unacceptable (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 35:21).

The definition of a person as mentally or emotionally unstable is a very delicate matter, because there are times when a person is on the border of being placed in this category and yet his testimony could be useful in enabling a woman to receive license to remarry and similar matters. Over the years, the Rabbis have frequently dealt with questions of this nature.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4, testimony must be delivered orally. Moreover, a person may not even sign on a legal document unless he is fit to testify orally.
As noted by the Kessef Mishneh and others, the Rambam’s statements here are interpreted by some as an indication that if a person is fit to deliver testimony in court, he need not actually testify orally, but may instead send a record of his testimony. This understanding - both as a halachic ruling and as the interpretation of the Rambam’s position - is not accepted by all authorities.

See Chapter 17, Halachah 2; see also Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:3.

In contrast to the individuals mentioned in the previous clause who had congenital difficulties, this person was able to speak and hear, but lost these abilities due to accident or illness.

See Hilchot Gerushin 2:16 which explains that a person whose mind is sound, but who has lost his ability to speak is asked a series of questions requiring both positive and negative answers. If it is obvious from the way he nods his head that he is responding intelligently, he is allowed to initiate divorce proceedings.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12:15, 13:28-29.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9, 11:11, which rules that a person who can see with only one eye is not acceptable as a judge for cases involving capital punishment. He may, however, adjudicate cases involving monetary law.

It is not merely that we suspect that the wicked person may be lying and therefore, we disqualify his testimony. Instead, even in situations where we are certain that he is telling the truth, he is unacceptable as a witness (Tzaphnat Paneach, Klallei HaTorah Umitzvot; Yayin Malchut).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 286) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 75) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. In that source, the Rambam cites the interpretation of the verse offered by the Mechilta.

Although our Sages extended the meaning of the verse, they did not nullify its simple interpretation.

I.e., he knows that the witness did not actually observe the event in question and will be lying in court.

The Siftei Cohen 34:3 questions this law, asking why shouldn’t the witness testify honestly. He has information that has bearing on a case, why shouldn’t he bring this information to the attention of the court?
He explains that he personally would interpret the command as meaning that a person should not join together with an unacceptable witness to observe testimony. For example, at a wedding, witnesses are selected to observe the consecration of the bride. If one of the witnesses selected is unacceptable, an acceptable witness should not join together with him.
The Siftei Cohen, nevertheless, humbly submits to the authority of the authorities of the previous generations and accepts the Rambam’s ruling. He also gives support for it, explaining that since (as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 3) when three witnesses testify about a situation, their testimony is nullified if one of them is not acceptable, there would be no value in the acceptable witness testifying.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 18, which outlines the criteria for the prohibitions that are punishable by lashes. The Radbaz states that any person who violates a Scriptural prohibition is disqualified as a witness even if he does not receive lashes. It appears from the gloss of his Kessef Mishneh to Halachah 4 that Rav Yosef Karo does not accept this ruling and in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:2), he quotes the Rambam’s wording without further clarification. The Ramah quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that such a transgressor is disqualified by Rabbinic decree.

See also Chapter 12, Halachah 1, which explains that there are situations where a person is disqualified as a witness even though he is not liable for lashes. See also Halachah 4.

As explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 1, the person must know that he is performing a transgression to be disqualified for this lack of observance.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah, however, quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yerucham that, to be disqualified for the transgression of a Rabbinic prohibition, a person must have a financial motive.

For all these are Scriptural prohibitions.

E. g., the non-kosher meat is less expensive than the kosher meat and the person purchases the non-kosher meat in order to save money. Such an individual is certainly suspect to accept a bribe to deliver false testimony.

Even though we do not suspect such a person of being willing to accept a bribe, he is nevertheless disqualified as a witness, because he is “wicked,” i.e., a transgressor.
This is one of the six instances where there is a difference of opinion between the Sages, Ravva and Abbaye, and the halachah is decided according to Abbaye’s opinion. In all other instances, the halachah follows Ravva’s view. See Sanhedrin 27a.

I.e., he transgressed a Rabbinical prohibition like those mentioned by the Rambam.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 6, which distinguishes between a person disqualified as a witness by Scriptural Law and one disqualified by Rabbinic decree.

Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 19.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2 which states that whenever a person is liable for both lashes and a financial penalty, he is required to pay the financial penalty and is not punished by lashes.

The Rambam clarifies the definition of this term later in the halachah.
The Kessef Mishneh and others note that in this clause, the Rambam is speaking about individuals who are disqualified according to Scriptural Law. People who seize property - as the Rambam himself states - are disqualified only according to Rabbinic Law. For this reason, there are some who maintain that a printing error crept into the Mishneh Torah and the proper text should read “thieves and robbers.” This version appears appropriate from the later wording in the clause and indeed is found in some authoritative manuscripts. The majority of the manuscripts and all printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, however, follow the version found in the standard printed text.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 34) questions the Rambam’s wording, asking why the thief is disqualified after he made restitution. Seemingly, once he has made restitution, he has corrected his fault and should be deemed acceptable.
The Tur tries to resolve the Rambam’s ruling by stating that he is speaking about a situation in which the thief was compelled by the court to make restitution. Since he did not do so willingly, he is not acceptable as a witness until he takes such a step on his own initiative.
The Radbaz rejects the Tur’s explanation, stating that the Rambam does not qualify why the thief returned the money. He could also be referring to an instance where he returned it willingly. Instead, the Radbaz offers the explanation that the intent is that the testimony he delivers between the time he testified falsely and the time he returned the money is disqualified.
The Radbaz, however, is also not satisfied with this explanation, noting that Chapter 12, Halachah 4, states explicitly that even if a thief makes financial restitution, he is disqualified until he repents. Therefore the Radbaz explains that even after a thief returns the money he stole, he is still under suspicion, for perhaps he will be willing to lie for a greater sum. This understanding is also accepted by Rav Yosef Karo in his Kessef Mishneh and quoted by him in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:7).

For we fear that he would accept a bribe to testify falsely.

Hence, if he delivered testimony in court concerning another matter between the time he testified falsely and the time - the falsehood is discovered, that other testimony is disqualified and the case retried. Similarly, all legal documents on which he signed are disqualified from the time he gave false testimony.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 4, which discusses when such individuals may be reinstated as witnesses.

If, however, he testified falsely with regard to other matters, different laws apply. Such a person is required to be lashed. After this punishment is administered, he is again acceptable as a witness.

In this instance as well, we fear that he will accept a bribe in order to testify falsely.
With the term “for all matters,” the Rambam is referring to Sanhedrin 27a which states that such a witness is disqualified even for cases involving capital punishment. We do not say that he will appreciate that these matters are more severe than mere financial questions. Instead, we suspect that will accept a bribe to testify falsely even in such cases.

For both are considered to have transgressed a Scriptural prohibition, as stated in Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 4:2.
Rabbenu Yerucham notes that the witnesses and the guarantor to such a loan are also considered to have transgressed a Scriptural prohibition. Hence, he maintains, they should also be disqualified as witnesses. The Kessef Mishneh differs and explains that since they are punished for their transgression by lashes and they themselves do not receive any financial gain, there is no proof that they are not acceptable as witnesses. This understanding is also borne out by the Maggid Mishneh ruling in his gloss to Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 4:6 and the ruling of the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 52:1.

I.e., interest forbidden by Rabbinic decree; see Hilchot Malveh VLoveh 4:14. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:10) quotes opinions which maintain that if the interest is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law, the borrower is not disqualified as a witness.

E. g., he takes an ownerless object found by a minor, deafmute, or mentally or emotionally unstable person [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:13)].

Although taking property without the owner’s consent violates the prohibition (Exodus 20:14) “Do not crave,” Tosafot, Sanhedrin 25b, states that this applies only when the person does not pay the article’s worth. The Lechem Mishneh brings support from other sources to demonstrate that the Rambam does not follow this approach.
The Kessef Mishneh states that since the prohibition “Do not crave” does not involve a deed, it is not punishable by lashes. Hence it does not cause a person to be disqualified by Scriptural Law.

But, by contrast, a person paid to herd animals belonging to a colleague is not disqualified. Since the animals are not his own, we do not suspect that he will transgress for the sake of his colleague’s benefit. Instead, he will take care to pasture the animals where it is permitted to do so (see Bava Metzia 5b).

I.e., sheep or goats.

I.e., cattle.

By Rabbinic decree. Similarly, all. of the subsequent offenders mentioned are disqualified by Rabbinic decree unless it is stated otherwise.

Even if he was not seen pasturing his animals in his colleague’s property, he is disqualified unless it is proved otherwise.

This applies even if the people raise these animals in their homes or courtyards and do not intentionally let them pasture at all. The rationale is that the animals will most likely break loose and pasture on another person's property. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:2,8 where the prohibition against raising such animals is discussed. As mentioned there, the prohibition was enacted as a special measure to encourage and protect the settlement of our Holy Land.

I.e., even in Eretz Yisrael. The rationale is that cattle are easier to restrain and they are more necessary for working the fields and providing milk products (Bava Kama 79b). Even cattle, however, may not be allowed to pasture freely without their owners taking safeguards that they will not enter other people’s fields.

This term refers to a practice common in the Roman era in which a person would pay the tax duty for a particular region to the king in advance. He would then collect that duty - and more - from the inhabitants of that region. Since he is making a profit, and in many instances, an inordinate profit, from the inhabitants, he is considered as a robber and disqualified as a witness. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:34 interprets this term slightly differently, explaining that it refers to customs collectors and income tax collectors. Since the rules governing these duties are not so clear cut and it is possible for the collector to overcharge, it is suspected that he will do so and keep the remainder for himself.
If such a collector is not known to have taken more than is required, he is disqualified only according to Rabbinic decree. If it is known that he took more, he is disqualified according to Scriptural Law (Kessef Mishneh).
In the present era, since taxes and duties are generally standardized and these standards are public knowledge, there is less possibility for wrongdoing of this nature and such individuals are not disqualified as a rule. If, however, there are situations where offenses of this type are common, the same rules would apply.

The collectors of a fixed head tax or property tax.

I.e., we suspect that this person will lead doves belonging to others from their own dovecotes to dovecotes owned by others. See Hilchot Gezeilah 6:7-8. As stated in that source, the prohibition applies only in a settled area. In the desert, by contrast, the doves are assumed to be ownerless and one may lead them wherever one desires.

The Radbaz states that with this phrase, the Rambam implies that if these individuals have another occupation, they are not disqualified even if they also do business with the produce of the Sabbatical year.

In the Sabbatical year, it is as if all the fields and orchards are ownerless and the produce which is in them may be taken by anyone. It may, however, be taken only for immediate consumption, but not to be hoarded and sold (see Hilchot Shemitah 6:1-4).
Since the person transgresses this prohibition for the sake of monetary gain, we suspect that he might also accept a bribe to deliver false testimony (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Gezelah 6:10-11 where the Rambam speaks about gambling and states: This is robbery according to Rabbinic decree. Although the person himself consents to [the other person’s] taking his money, since he is taking it for nothing, as part of the frivolous sport, it is equivalent to robbery.
When a person plays dice with gentiles, he does not violate the prohibition against robbery. He does, however, violate the prohibition against occupying oneself with empty matters. It is not fitting for a person to spend any of his days occupied in anything other than words of wisdom or [pursuits that lead to] a stable world.

There is a slight difficulty with the Rambam’s statement. As mentioned by the commentaries to Sanhedrin 25a, there are two interpretations given to why dove-trainers are unacceptable as witnesses: a) they steal doves, as the Rambam mentioned above; b) they gamble by racing doves against each other, as mentioned in this clause.
Apparently, the Rambam does not see these rationales as mutually exclusive. Hence, he prohibits both types of dove trainers.

The Rambam’s wording implies that if the person has another source of income, even if he frequently gambles, he is not disqualified. Thus it is not gambling itself, although it involves a Rabbinic prohibition, which causes him to be disqualified, but rather the fact that the person has no other source of income. As such, we suspect that he might be willing to accept a bribe to deliver false testimony.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 34) elaborates on this concept, stating that “since these people do not know how much a person must labor for money, causing a colleague financial loss through false testimony is insignificant in their eyes.”
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo questions the Rambam’s statements, wondering why, if gambling is equivalent to robbery, is that not alone a sufficient reason to have the person disqualified. He therefore explains that the Rambam is speaking about a person who gambles with gentiles - or is seen gambling just for sport. Since he has no other occupation, we suspect that he also gambles with Jews for profit. Hence he is disqualified as a witness. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:16), he quotes the Rambam’s wording without emendation. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:40.

Nisan is the time when fresh grain begins to be harvested, and Tishrei, the time when fruits begin to be harvested.

Since the harvest is not finished, he takes the license of taking some of the produce because of the extra work he performs. Although this is forbidden, he is not disqualified as the Rambam continues to explain.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:15) differ with the Rambam and state that this law applies if the sharecropper takes the produce after the harvest has been completed, but not before.