Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah. The Maggid Mishneh and others interpret the word differently.

This refers to items that appear to have been placed down intentionally. If these articles appear to have fallen, their number is not considered an effective means of identification (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 262:32).

For these are standard articles that do not have a mark by which they can be identified.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, which questions why two needles are considered a mark of identification, and not two coins. The Darchei Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 262 and the Merkevet HaMishneh distinguish between the two as follows. Coins are frequently carried by people. Thus, if several are found together, it is not considered an adequate mark of identification, for they could have fallen together accidentally. Hence, it is necessary for them to be piled together in a specific way. Needles, by contrast, are not frequently carried.

I.e., with regard to all the instances mentioned in this clause, one can clearly see that the coins were intentionally placed down. Therefore, their discovery should be announced, and the number of the coins and/or their formation can serve as a mark of identification.

Bava Metzia 25a mentions a difference of opinion among our Sages if the intent is three coins of the same size piled upon each other or three coins of different sizes, with the largest coin on the bottom and the smallest coin on top. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 262:12) quotes the latter view.

I.e., like a triangle.

According to our text (and Rashi’s interpretation) of Bava Metzia 25a, the question of “like steps” is resolved, and it is considered a mark. The Rambam, however, apparently had a different version of the text.

We are not certain whether these formations indicate that the coins were intentionally placed there and can therefore serve as marks of identification. Therefore, at the outset, one should not take the coins, because their owner will not have a proper means of recovering them. If, however, one did take them, they may be kept.

This halachah follows the same principles as Chapter 15, Halachot 12-13.

For we presume that he dropped it.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 260) differs with the Rambam and maintains that from Bava Metzia 26b, one can conclude that money left on the counter belongs to the store owner. The rationale is that a money-changer’s clients will often place their money on his counter, but the purchasers who frequent a store are less likely to do so.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam’s position, and he cites this ruling in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:5). The Ramah cites the Tur’s position. Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the question is one of fact and not theory, and depends on the structure of a store and the habits of its customers.

For we presume that it was dropped by one of the customers.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even to an object with a mark by which it can be identified, provided the majority of the store’s clientele are gentiles, as explained in the following halachah.
He also mentions an interpretation (which is shared by Rabbenu Asher) that maintains that even if the majority of the store’s clientele are Jewish, and the money has a mark by which it can be identified, it can be kept by the finder. The rationale is that unlike a moneychanger whose store was merely a business location, a storekeeper would generally dwell on the premises of his store. Thus, the person who lost the money will presume that the storekeeper will find the money, but the storekeeper will keep it for himself. For he can always rationalize his failure to announce its discovery by saying that it was found by an unethical person.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:17 states that the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:5) follow the first view mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh. The Siftei Cohen 260:19 states that this approach is also shared by the Ramah.

For a person’s domain can acquire property on his behalf even when he is not conscious of its presence (Bava Metzia 11a). For example, if an article is placed in a person’s home, he acquires it.

Because of the presence of the customers, the owner is not in full control of what goes on in his store.

Chapter 17, Halachah 8.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that even if the storekeeper were to say: “may my store acquire it for me,” he would not acquire the property, because:
a) there is no way of knowing whether the customer who dropped the money despaired of its recovery;
b) יאוש, abandoning hope of an object’s recovery, is effective only with regard to a lost object, but not with regard to an object entrusted for safekeeping. Money left in a person’s store would be placed in the latter category.
The Maggid Mishneh accepts the first of the Ra’avad’s objections, but rejects the second, for this money appears similar to other lost objects. The acceptance of the first objection is also reflected in the wording of the law chosen by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:5). See Sefer Meirat Einayim 260:18.

Our translation of כסא follows the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah.

This follows the same principles mentioned in the previous halachah.

As stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, since most of the people who frequent the place are gentiles who will not return the lost article if they discover it, the owner will despair of its recovery even if it has a mark by which it can be identified.

If, however, there is no mark by which the money can be identified, it may be kept by the finder even if most of the clientele are Jewish.

The manner in which the purse is tied serves as a mark of identification.

In this instance as well, the manner in which the purse is tied serves as a mark of identification.

For they do not have a mark by which they can be identified.

I.e., the permission to keep the money that was found.

A merchant purchases produce from many individuals and the purchaser has no way of knowing from whom which batch of produce was taken. Hence, he may keep the money as his own.

A Canaanite servant or maidservant does not have any independent financial capacity. Any money they possess belongs to their master.

For the finder can be reasonably certain that the money belongs to the person who sold him the produce. The seller, moreover, does not despair of the recovery of the money, even though it does not have a mark by which it can be recognized, because he knows the person to whom the money was sold.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 262:17) state that if a merchant finds money in produce that he purchased from a private person, he is not obligated to return it, even if he knows the identity of its owner. For the owner will despair of the money’s recovery when he realizes that it was sold to a merchant who will mix it together with other funds.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:1) interprets this as referring to a wall that we do not know who built, and was not an ancestral heritage of the person to whom it presently belongs.

A Canaanite nation that lived in Eretz Yisrael before its conquest by the Jews.

Our translation reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Metzia 25b. Our text of that passage is slightly different. According to it, the treasure must appear rusted and aged. This interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), although it as well as Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:3 and the Siftei Cohen 260:3 also make reference to the Rambam’s view.

And the owner intends to collect it in the future. Therefore, it should not be taken by the finder, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

Chapter 17, Halachah 8.

See Chapter 14, Halachah 4.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding the rationale for this ruling, for he states that the Rambam’s logic can be disproved. With regard to the article washed away by the sea, there is no one to acquire it, but this article buried in the wall can be acquired by its owner. He therefore explains that the reason why the owner does not acquire the article is that he does not have complete control over his courtyard; it is not a חצר המשתמרת.
The Merkevet HaMishneh and others defend the Rambam’s logic. They explain that even though the owner of the courtyard can legally acquire the article, in actuality it is impossible for him to do so, for he has no knowledge of it at all and no immediate access to it. Thus, it is further removed from his mind than an object washed away by the sea.

The Maggid Mishneh questions why, in such a situation, the finder is allowed to keep an article that has a mark by which it can be distinguished. He gives two explanations: a) since the article has been left there for an extended period of time, it appears that the owner has forgotten about it and despaired of its recovery; b) since the article faces the public domain, it can be taken by other passersby. Therefore, in a city inhabited n1ostly by gentiles, there would be no need to announce this discovery.

The general rule with regard to buried articles is stated in the following halachah. When, however, the nature of the article clearly indicates who placed it there, the general rule is not followed. For example, a knife is always held by its handle. Therefore, even if it is found on the outer side of the wall, if its handle is toward the inside, we can assume that it was placed there by the owner.

I.e., a purse is always held by its opening. Therefore, even if it is found closer to the inner side of the wall, if its opening is facing the outer side, we can assume that it was placed there by a passerby.

Based on the Maharam of Padua, Rav Yosef Karo explains in both his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:1) that this is a printing error, and interprets this clause as referring to the following halachah. The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1664) and the Bayit Chadash differ and maintain that there is no printing error, and the Rambam’s words should be interpreted within the context of this halachah.

This expression indicates that the law that follows is a conclusion reached by the Rambam without the support of an explicit Rabbinic source from the Talmudic period.

I.e., he himself does not know whether or not his ancestors owned the article.

I.e., it never belonged to him or to his family.

Although the article was found in the portion of the wall closest to the house, since the owner did not claim it as his own, he does not acquire it by virtue of his domain. Since the hole in the wall is open to the public domain, the owner is not considered as having control over his own domain, and thus the presence of an article in that domain is not sufficient to establish ownership (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., because when an owner does not have control over his own domain, the presence of an article in that domain is not sufficient to establish ownership (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:8).

If he is Jewish (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:10). If he is gentile, the article belongs to the finder (Siftei Cohen 260:11).
The Siftei Cohen makes two other points: a) if the owner dwells together with his guests, he is considered the last resident, and the article is awarded to him; b) if the article has marks by which it can be identified, the finder should not take it for himself, but instead, announce its discovery.

Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:11 and the Siftei Cohen 260:12, who question whether the intent is three people, or the same laws would apply even when fewer than three are involved.

The Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher maintain that, based on Bava Metzia 26b, this law applies even if three Jews are involved. The Maggid Mishneh explains that with regard to three Jews, the Rambam follows the opinion that perhaps they are partners.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:3) quotes the Rambam’s view. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:11 mentions the other view.

I.e., since many people are passing through it, a person who left an article buried there will assume that it was taken by those who came afterwards.

I.e., he must take possession of it by executing a formal kinyan.

The Maggid Mishneh points to Bava Metzia 10a, which questions why the finder does not acquire the object by virtue of its being found within the square of four cubits by four cubits around him. He explains that the Talmud gives two answers:
a) that we are speaking of an object discovered in the public domain. The provision of our Sages that a person can acquire an article by virtue of its being found within four cubits of his person does not apply in the public domain.
b) that since the person fell on the article, he indicated that he did not desire to acquire it by virtue of its being found within four cubits of his person.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam follows the second interpretation. For if he followed the first interpretation, it would have been necessary to be more explicit and say that this law applies only in the public domain.
In the Kessef Mishneh and the Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 268), Rav Yosef Karo differs and explains that the Rambam follows the first interpretation (as do Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher). On this basis, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 268:1) rules that a person who falls on an article in an alleyway (which is not considered part of the public domain) acquires it because it is found within four cubits of his person. See, however, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 198:12).

For the rider’s colleague acts as his agent and acquires it for him.

For he did not accept the agency given him by the rider. If the rider had told his colleague, “Acquire the article on my behalf,” the colleague would have had to protest the appointment for his claim not to be accepted [Bava Metzia 9b, 10a; Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 269:6)].

For had he really intended to take it for himself originally, he would never have given it to the rider.

E. g., Reuven picked up a lost object on behalf of Shimon without receiving any instructions from him. Since Reuven’s action is to Shimon’s advantage, we assume that Shimon would consent. Thus, de facto, Reuven is accepted as his שליח [“agent” (Bava Metzia 9b)]. Even if later Reuven desires to recant and take the object for himself, he cannot. For Shimon has already become its legal owner (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 269:1).

This refers to an instance where each person acknowledges the assistance of the other. By lifting the article up together, each is thus taking possession of the article for himself and for his colleague. Thus, they become partners, each with a share of half the article.

The acquisition of an article on behalf of another person is a function of שליחות “agency.” Since these three types of individuals do not have a developed mental capacity, they are unable to serve as agents.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, when two people lift up an article, each is acquiring the article on behalf of himself and the other person. In this instance, the deaf mute cannot acquire the article on behalf of the mentally competent individual, so the mentally competent individual does not acquire his share.
One might think, however, that the deaf mute would acquire half of the article, for, as stated in Halachah 12, according to Rabbinic law he can acquire an article for himself, and a mentally competent individual can surely acquire an article on his behalf. Nevertheless, Bava Metzia 8a rules that since the mentally competent individual did not acquire his half of the article, he does not act as an agent for the deaf mute regarding the other half.
Thus, if a third person pulls the article away from both of them, he becomes its legal owner. He must, however, reimburse both the mentally competent individual and the deaf mute for the portion that they held in their hands. For they do acquire at least that portion of the article [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 269:4)].

See Halachah 12, which explains that one deaf mute can acquire an article he picks up for that reason. The same principle applies when two pick up an article together.

Leading means to direct an animal, as the driver of a carriage does to his horses. It is also a form of meshichah.

In Hilchot Mechirah 2:6, the Rambam defines meshichah as causing the animal to move both a foreleg and a rear 1eg in the direction one desires.

I.e., both leading and drawing an animal after one are considered effective means of acquiring the animal. Hence, both individuals share in the ownership of the article, as stated in Halachah 3.

I.e., when are 1eading the animal and drawing it after oneself equal?

I.e., if one or two people lead a camel, they acquire it, but when one leads and one draws it after himself, the 1atter alone makes acquisition, for a donkey is normally led, while a camel is drawn after one.
This represents the opinion of the Rambam. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 197) quotes the opinion of his father, Rabbenu Asher, that one of the two - leading a camel or drawing a donkey after one - is not an effective means of acquisition. The Sages did not know which one was not effective. Therefore, each alone is considered an effective means of acquiring an ownerless article. When, however, a person must press his claim to ownership against a person who has used an effective means of acquisition, the matter is one of doubt. This is also the opinion of the Ra’avad. In the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 271:1), Rav Yosef Karo follows the Rambam’s view.

With regard to a sale, this wou1d be an effective means of transfer, for it would constitute the kinyan of mesirah. When, however, there is not another person involved, this process is not effective.

Holding the animal’s reins is not sufficient. To acquire the animal, the person must cause it to move in the direction he desires.

For everything in his estate is ownerless, as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:6, 2:1.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 271:4 maintains that the person acquires the entire reins (in contrast to the situation mentioned in the following halachah), because he can draw them into his possession. The Siftei Cohen 271:2 maintains that as long as he does not actually draw the reins into his possession, he acquires only the portion that he is holding, as in the following halachah.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if a person who rides on an animal must force it to move with his feet in order to acquire it. It would appear that the Rambam considers riding alone to be sufficient. Rabbenu Asher maintains that the rider must also cause the animal to move. See the Kessef Mishneh and also the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Mechirah 2:6.

A person’s courtyard is considered an extension of his person. Therefore, just as he acquires an article placed in his hand, he acquires an article placed in his courtyard.

E. g., it is surrounded by a fence or the like. In such an instance, an article that is placed there will not ordinarily be taken by anyone other than the owner of the property. Therefore, he acquires it without having to make a statement of intent.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 268:3) quotes the Mordechai, who states that this applies only when a person knows of the lost object or has reason to suppose that it might be located in his property. If, however, he is totally unaware of its presence, like the buried treasure mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachot 7-8, he does not acquire it.

Since they are accessible to the public, articles placed there may be taken by anyone other than the owner of the property.

As the Rambam continues to explain, for an article to be acquired by virtue of its being placed in such a property, the two conditions he mentions must be met. The Rashba and Rabbenu Asher differ and maintain that as long as the person is standing within his field, he need not declare his intent to acquire the article.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 268:3) follows the Rambam’s opinion, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the intent is, within his field, at its side. If he is outside the property, he does not acquire the lost object.

See Halachah 11, from which it is obvious that the laws stated in this halachah apply only to immobile objects.

This measure was chosen because it represents the breadth of an ordinary person standing with outstretched arms.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 268:3, which cites an opinion that maintains that a person can acquire an object by virtue of its entering the four cubits adjacent to him only when he is standing still. If he is walking, this is not an effective means of acquisition.

As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, our Sages ordained that the area in a person’s immediate reach be considered equivalent to his private, guarded courtyard. In such an instance, he is not required to make a statement of intent regarding the acquisition of an article.

If two people both saw an article and each claimed it as his own, it is likely that an argument, and perhaps even a physical struggle, would break out. To avoid this, our Sages ordained that the article be given to the person in whose four cubits it is found.

If two people are standing close to each other in such a place, and a lost object comes to rest in a place that is within four cubits of both of them, they both share equally in its ownership [Tur; Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 268:2)].

Since the public domain is crowded, no one person will have a radius of four cubits that will be able to remain his own private area. As such, strife will not be prevented by considering this area to be one person’s private domain.

Since this property has an owner, it cannot be automatically considered to belong to another individual. The Ramban states that this law applies even when the field is not an enclosed and protected property.

Numbers 21:26 uses the word miyado, literally “from his hand,” as meaning “from his possession.” A similar usage is frequent within the Torah and within Talmudic sources. On this basis, the Rambam (Hilchot Gerushin 5:1, based on Gittin 76b) explains:
The Torah’s expression [Deuteronomy, 24:1], “He shall... place it in her hand,” need not be interpreted only [according to its strict literal meaning], that the bill of divorce must be placed in her hand. Regardless of whether the bill of divorce is placed in her hand, her bosom, her courtyard, or given to her agent whom she charged that his hand would be as her hand, the same law applies.

Kiddushin 41 a derives this law from the fact that Deuteronomy 24:1, the verse that teaches us that an agent may act on a person’s behalf, speaks about a person past the age of majority. (See also Hilchot Sh’luchim VeShutafim 2:2.)

At which point his acquisition is valid according to Rabbinic law alone, as stated in Halachah 12.

I.e., even if the other pursuers actually capture the deer or the doves, since the owner of the field could have captured them, and they were in his field, he is granted possession.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 268:15 states that in this instance, as in the instance described in Halachah 8, the Tur does not require the owner to state “May my field acquire them for me.” In this instance, however, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 268:4) accepts the Rambam’s view.

For he has no way of actually taking possession of these animals.

I.e., if one of the other people chasing the animal(s) catches it, he acquires it although he and the animal are located in a field that belongs to another person.

Even if he could not catch the deer or the doves, since the ownership of them is transferred by another person, he can acquire them.

He does not have to state: “May my field acquire them for me.”

If these individuals were denied the right to possession, this would probably cause strife between their relatives and the person who took the article from them.

Since these three individuals are not mentally competent, they are not capable of acquiring an ownerless object according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, our Sages gave them this prerogative for the above reason.

The person who took the article is its legal owner according to Scriptural law. Therefore, even according to Rabbinic law it is not expropriated from him.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 16.

Since these children derive their livelihood from their father’s household, our Sages granted him the right to any lost object they find, lest strife arise if they withheld it and took it as their own (Bava Metzia 12b).

The term na’arah refers to the six month period following the time when a girl of twelve or more exhibits signs of physical maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:1-2).

A father is entitled to all the financial benefit that accrues because of his daughter who is below the age of majority. This law applies independent of whether or not he supports her. There are even situations where he is entitled to sell her as a maidservant. Even when he is forced to take this step, he does not forfeit his privilege to her earnings.

For they are considered an extension of his person, having no independent financial capacity of their own.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 12:3, one of the privileges a woman grants a husband as pan of the marriage contract is the right to any ownerless articles that she discovers. This is a Rabbinic decree, enacted for the same rationale described above: Since he supports her, he is likely to become upset if she is allowed to maintain possession of a lost article that she discovers.

Since he is not supported by his father, he is granted an independent financial capacity according to Rabbinic law (Bava Metzia 12a).

For they retain their own financial capacity during servitude (ibid.).

In such a situation, the woman’s husband is still obligated to support her. Nevertheless, our Sages did not require her to give him a lost object that she discovers. The rationale is that there is strife between them anyway, and the woman is therefore allowed to keep what is rightfully hers.

Neither to the creditor, so that he can use it to collect the debt, nor to the debtor.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:6) adds three other factors:
a) Even if the promissory note contains a clause stating that the debtor accepts the creditor’s word;
b) Even if the date on which the loan is due has not arrived; and
c) Even if the creditor or the debtor can identify the note with a very exact mark.
Despite all these factors, the promissory note should not be returned, because of the suspicions mentioned by the Rambam.

For the debtor alone, and no one who purchased his property, will be held responsible for the debt.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:7) states that if the debtor owns other landed property that has not been sold, which is equivalent to the value of the promissory note, the note may be returned. For in this instance, it is unlikely that the people who purchased the debtor’s property will be forced to accept this obligation.

The very fact that the promissory note was lost leads to the conclusion that it had been repaid. For otherwise, the creditor would not have been careless about it (Bava Metzia 16b).

Every promissory note should be dated, so that the date on which the obligation was made is recorded.

The Maggid Mishneh questions why, in this instance, it is necessary that the signatures of the witnesses be validated. Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 65:22 and the Siftei Cohen 65:23, which discuss this issue.

For it is very uncommon for a loan to be repaid on the day that it was taken. Thus, we assume that the note was dropped by the creditor, and the debt is still outstanding. Moreover, if the debtor had desired, he could have had a new promissory note written for the creditor for this same date.

I.e., either the creditor or the debtor.

In the previous halachot, it was not acceptable for the claimant to identify the promissory note itself via a mark, for we are certain that he once had the note in his possession and could have seen any sign of identification. In this instance, however, he is not identifying the promissory notes, but rather their container.

In this instance, the number of promissory notes, or the manner in which they are connected can serve as a means of identification.

Based on the comments of Rabbenu Yerucham, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 65:11) rules that even two documents from the same borrower (or the same lender) are sufficient for the rules mentioned in this halachah to apply.

This applies even if a lender cannot identify one of the promissory notes by a mark. The fact that the three notes are found together is conclusive evidence that they fell from the borrower’s hand [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:11)].

In this instance, since there is a rationale that can explain why the three notes were found together, the borrower is required to identify the notes before they are given to him, and the lenders are also given the prerogative of doing so.

The Rambam’s wording is somewhat confusing, because he mentions both a scribe and a judge. The validation of a legal document involves both, for a judge must supervise the validation process, but a scribe is the one who actually writes out the validation. Indeed, some of the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute “scribe” for “judge.”

For the evidence leads to the conclusion that the lender dropped them [Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.)].

The borrower or the lender.

Neither to the borrower nor to the lender. It should not be returned to the borrower, because the fact that it was not torn indicates that it might not have been paid. It should not, however, be given to the lender either, for the fact that it is found among the torn documents indicates that it was probably paid.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that Bava Metzia 18a and Gittin 27a mention certain conditions that must be fulfilled for a bill of divorce to be returned. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam has already dealt with these issues in Hilchot Gerushin 3:10-12. In these halachot, he is speaking only about the dimensions of the law that parallel the discovery of a lost object.

And the woman is considered as having been divorced. The rationale is that if the husband desires, he can divorce her now. We do not suspect that he would have a bill of divorce given to her if the divorce had not been carried out, for that would not be of any benefit to him.
Our Rabbis note that there is also a financial dimension to a bill of divorce, for on this basis the woman can demand payment of the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract. Also, if her husband sold the proceeds of her property after her divorce, she may expropriate them from the seller. The Rabbis, however, explain that the bill of divorce should be returned because its primary purpose is to enable the woman to remarry. If she tries to collect money from others afterwards, she will be required to prove when the bill of divorce entered her possession (Bava Metzia 19a).

For, as the Rambam continues to explain, this indicates that the bill of divorce was given to her.

The bill of divorce was obviously once in the husband’s possession. Hence, the fact that he can recognize it is not significant for us. What is significant is that the woman can recognize it.

The wording used by the Rambam has attracted the attention of the commentaries. As explained in the notes on Chapter 13, Halachot 3-5, there are three category of marks: simanim muvhakim b’yoter (extremely distinctive marks), simanim muvhakim (distinctive marks), and simanim g’ru’im, “unsatisfactory marks.” Here the Rambam uses the term “distinctive marks,” yet he mentions “a hole next to a letter,” which is considered a very distinctive mark. This lends credence to the Kessef Mishneh’s explanation that with regard to prohibitions, it is only upon “very distinctive marks” that the Rambam allows us to rely.

Perhaps she saw it tied with this string in her husband’s possession. The position of a hole in a specific place, by contrast, indicates that she closely examined the document, and that would be likely only if it had already been given to her.

For the woman may know that her husband keeps his legal documents in such a container.

If on the basis of this document, the servant claims that his master owes him money, and he desires to expropriate property that had been sold to others, he is required to prove the date on which the bill of freedom was given to him [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:13)].

Although he admits having had the document composed, he claims that he had not given it yet, and the servant remains his property.

I.e., he regrets having made the sale or given the present.

In this instance, the latter sale or present would be invalidated.
The Ramban and the Rashba maintain that if the document states that the present was formalized by an act of contract, the document should be retumed to the recipient. Rabbenu Chanan’el, Rashi and the Ri Migash maintain that this is not sufficient, and the recipient must prove that the document reached his possession. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:10) follows the former view.

This convention, also known as an oral will, was established by our Sages in order to allow a person to divide his property before his death without extensive difficulty.

Thus, there is nothing to lose by returning the document to the first recipient. For if the dying person desires to change his mind, he has that option. For that same reason, if he does not acknowledge the note, we do not return it. For this surely indicates that he has withdrawn his desire to give the person the present.

Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 9:16.

For it will appear that the heir had no right to sell the property, since it was never rightfully his.

I.e., the debtor.
The commentaries explain that we do not suspect that perhaps the original creditor sold the promissory note to another person and now is conspiring with the debtor to deceive that person. Although we do hold similar suspicions in other instances, this instance is an exception, because the creditor has the right to waive payment of a promissory note even after selling it to another person. Therefore, he gains nothing by acknowledging the receipt.

For example, the creditor claims that he prepared the receipt in the event that the debt would be paid, but that it was never paid.

I.e., the marriage contract is considered an ordinary promissory note (Maggid Mishneh).

Since that property is on lien to the marriage contract, the woman would be able to expropriate it from the purchaser.

See Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:29-30.

See Hilchot Gerushin 11:10-11.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 24:1.

E. g., a document recording a court’s decision to expropriate property belonging to a debtor for a creditor.

I.e., one may even expropriate property that has been sold or given as a present.
The Ra’avad differs with this ruling, maintaining that this law applies only if the finder returns the document without its discovery becoming public knowledge. If, however, it becomes known to a court or even to witnesses that a legal document has fallen, and the law is that such a document should not be returned, then the document is no longer acceptable in court. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:16) quotes both opinions without stating which one is favored.