Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a debate among the Rabbis whether the word “earth” is significant or not. There are authorities who maintain that the word “earth” implies that the land must be fit to sow. Others maintain that it is not that significant. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:1) cite the latter view.

A kor is 30 se’ah. A portion of land 50 cubits by 50 cubits (2500 square cubits) is required to sow a se’ah. Thus, the portion of land required to sow a kor is 75000 square cubits.

As reflected in the laws of separate domains on the Sabbath, a pit ten handbreadths deep or a mound ten handbreadths high is considered a distinct entity. We borrow that principle from its ritual context and apply it to the acquisition of property (Maggid Mishneh). On this basis, we must also assume that the hollows or the rocks must be at least four handbreadths wide [Ramah (loc. cit.)].

And thus, crops could be grown within them.

I.e., when measuring the land, there must be 75000 square cubits without counting these hollows and rocks.

If the hollows are large enough to sow a quarter of a kav of grain, they are considered to be a significant, independent entity and are not included in the sale of the field as a whole.
The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) differ with the Rambam and maintain that the hollows and the rocks remain the property of the seller.

Even if they are filled with water [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:2)].

This is one forty-fifth of the entire field. Any larger portion is considered too great a loss for the purchaser to forfeit.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises the possibility that the proper version of the text is ten kabbim. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:2), however, he states “five.”

If they are closer together than that, they are considered to be a single stone the size of the entire area (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:9). The rationale is that if they were so concentrated, crops could not easily be sown and harvested in an area with so many rocks.

I.e., this area where the rocks are concentrated is itself spread out over the majority of the field and not contracted in a minor portion. Thus, it will not prevent a portion of the field from being used.
Implied is that the rocks must be concentrated in one area, but not so tightly concentrated that the space between the rocks cannot be used; dispersed throughout the field, but not so widely dispersed so as to create an impression that rocks are everywhere.

The field as a whole is considered too rocky.

The dispersion of the rocks makes the field as a whole difficult to use.

The tight concentration of the rocks prevents this entire area from being used.

They must, however, be at least three handbreadths high or deep to disqualify the field [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:2)]. Any obstruction less than three handbreadths high is considered to be an ordinary part of the field, because of the principle of l’vud.

The standard text of the Mishneh Torah [and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:3)] understands these to be two separate clauses connected by the Hebrew word או, meaning “or.” The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this is a printing error, and instead a vav connects the two. Thus, they are one description - i.e., there is one long line of rocks.

See diagram a. The rocks are in the center of the field, but their ends project from the corners (Maggid Mishneh).
Diagram A
The protrusions from the star represent the ends of the rocks that project outward.

Our translation is based on the diagram that accompanies the standard text of the Maggid Mishneh. (See diagram b.) Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:18 maintains that the interpretation is “on the diagonals of the field” and gives the following diagram (diagram c).
Diagram B
The Conception of the Maggid Mishneh
Diagram C

In these instances, it is difficult to plow in between the rocks, and there is thus a doubt whether the sale is effective.

Hence, if the purchaser has not yet paid for the land, the seller cannot expropriate the money for these portions of land from him. If he has already paid, he is required to accept the land from the seller [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 218)].

In such a situation, it is possible to sow the field because there is a certain measure of earth above the rocks. Nevertheless, the roots of the plants cannot penetrate deeply, and thus certain crops will not grow well (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:20).

In which case, it is possible - albeit with difficulty - to clear the rocks from the field (ibid.:21).

The previous halachah spoke about an area of small rocks, with none of them being of significant size. When, however, a rock is of the size mentioned in this halachah, it is considered to be a distinct entity and is not counted within the measure of the field.

Since it is on the border of the field, and it cannot be used to sow grain, we begin the measurement of the field from it and not from the border.

Because the portion of earth between the rock and the border can be sown.
The Rambam’s rulings are quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:5). The Ramah states that the Tur has a different conception of these matters.

Implied is that the parcel of land is the same size as one in which a kor can be sown, but that a kor cannot be sown within it, because of rocks, hollows or other factors.

The Ramah and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 218:6) differ and maintain that if the stones cover an area larger than that which is necessary to sow four kabbim, this leniency does not apply.
According to this view [which is based on the interpretation of the Rashbam (Bava Batra 102b)], the only leniency that results from the use of this expression is that if the stones are ten handbreadths or more high, they are not considered to be separate entities, but are measured together with the field.

This term implies that the measurement must be precise.

See Chapter 15, which describes the laws governing an error in measurement.

See the Maggid Mishneh and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:28, which state that these laws apply only when the person names a specific field, is standing in the field under consideration when the sale is made, or when the seller says: “I am selling you this parcel of earth fit to sow a kor.”

The area fit to sow a fourth of a kav is considered significant. In each se’ah, there are six kabbim. Thus, one twenty-fourth of the area fit to sow a se’ah of grain is considered a significant measure.

I.e., the purchaser or the seller would be willing to sacrifice such an amount.

I.e., The restitution must include not only the amount more than a fourth of a kav for each [parcel of earth fit to sow a se’ah], but also that amount itself. Since restitution is necessary, it must include the entire amount needed to match the measure quoted at the outset.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:8) adds two points:
a) If the field is much less than the land necessary to sow a kor to the extent that it would never be described in that manner, the sale is nullified. It is not sufficient to make up the difference financially.
b) If the field is smaller and the seller has additional land, he should give the purchaser land and not money.

The question is: When the seller gave a greater amount of land than necessary, should land be returned to him or money?

Any field smaller than this figure is not considered to be of significant size to be called a field. Because the field is so small, the seller is given the option of receiving payment for it.

I.e., the seller is given the option of receiving money or taking his land back. If the price of the land increased in the interim, however, the purchaser is not required to pay the seller the additional amount.

Even if the additional amount is less than [an area fit to sow] nine kabbim.

The Maggid Mishneh asks why it is necessary to have an area fit to sow nine kabbim in addition to the fourth [of-a-kav parcels]. Seemingly, if the land to be returned to the seller is fit to sow nine kabbim, it is of sufficient size to be considered a field. Of what difference is it that this land is made up of the fourth [of-a-kav parcels]?
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:10) quotes the Rambam’s rulings. The Ramah (ibid.:12) cites the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh that an area fit to sow nine kabbim alone is sufficient. [Significantly, from his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 7:2), it would appear that the Rambam does not require that this parcel contain the extra land.]

In this instance, in contrast to the first clause, the seller is not obligated to make this purchase.

I.e., the proper version is כשעה, and not בשעה, as stated in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah.

I.e., even if the price of land rose.

I.e., that the fluctuation in price is considered to the advantage of the purchaser, and he is required to pay only the price at the time of the sale.

The purchaser is not given the advantage of purchasing the extra parcel of land at its present market value. Instead, he must give the advantage to the seller, as the Rambam continues to explain.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:12) differ and do not require the purchaser to pay more than the present value of the land.

I.e., return the extra parcel of land to him. The seller must accept the land despite its decrease in value.

A garden is always smaller than a field. Hence, the minimum amount of land necessary for a plot to be considered a garden is also less.

As explained in Halachah 7.

As explained in the previous halachah.

Bava Batra 104b explains that originally there was no water on the land, and suddenly a flowing stream was discovered.

A stream that had been located there dried out (ibid.).

I.e., our Sages did not resolve the question.

The Rambam does not state what is done to resolve the question. The Maggid Mishneh states that the purchaser is not required to pay for the additional amount, but may return the land. We follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” In this instance, since the seller cannot prove that the purchaser is obligated to pay him for the additional land, the purchaser is not under obligation. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:39 rules in a similar fashion.

This expression implies an exact measurement, as stated in Halachah 5.

This expression implies an approximation, as stated in Halachah 6.

I.e., it is not significant which of these statements he makes first.

Since the seller is in possession of the land, he has the upper hand. The purchaser receives the smallest amount of land that either of the expressions imply. Should the land be less than that necessary to sow a kor, the purchaser must accept it, and if it is more than what is necessary to sow a kor, he receives only the amount necessary to sow a kor.
The Ra’avad differs and explains that if the purchaser has paid the money, the laws stated by the Rambam apply. But if the purchaser has not paid the money yet, the seller is judged at a disadvantage. Should the land be less than that necessary to sow a kor, the seller must make up the difference, and if it is more than what is necessary to sow a kor, it is granted to the purchaser (Maggid Mishneh).

The borders with which the seller defined the property being sold are at least a sixth more or less than the area fit to sow a kor. We assume that either the seller or the purchaser was willing to forgo any difference up to one sixth.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not specify whether compensation must be made for the entire extra amount, or only that portion beyond one sixth. The Tur and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 318:45 state that compensation must be made for the entire extra amount, as in Halachah 6.

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that the Rambam is not citing a particular ratio here. The intent is that regardless of the discrepancy between the seller’s description of the field and its actual size, since the purchaser is familiar with it, he is assumed to have accepted it. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:47.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:48 quotes the Tur and the Rashbam, who maintain that the field must be actually far more productive than an ordinary field its size.

I.e., a specifically designated parcel of land. If he does not designate a specific parcel of land, the seller is required to give the purchaser enough land to sow an entire kor (Ketzot HaChoshen 218:1).

A smaller measure of land, for a letech is half a kor.

The Song of Songs 4:13 associates an orchard with pomegranates.

See the conclusion of Chapters 26 and 27.

The Rambam does not mention the law with regard to the acquisition of a present. The Maggid Mishneh explains that since another person is willfully transferring the property to him, a minor may acquire a present that he is given. He cites Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:7 and Hilchot Lulav 8:10 in support of this thesis.

See also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 18:2, which states that these types of individuals cannot acquire ownerless property. The rationale for these rulings is that these individuals are not considered to be in control of their conduct.

We have used this translation because this is the intent whenever the term חרש is linked with a mentally incompetent individual and a minor (Chaggigah 4b). From the following halachah, it might appear that any person who is deaf is also placed in this category, but this is not necessarily so. The following halachah speaks about how a transaction with a deaf person is conducted. The guidelines mentioned apply whether we are speaking about someone who is both deaf and dumb (in which case the transaction is binding only according to Rabbinic law), or a person who is only deaf (in which case the transaction is binding according to Scriptural Law).
To cite a parallel, Halachah 12 mentions restrictions against a young person’s sale of landed property. According to Scriptural Law, the transaction would be binding. Nevertheless, our Sages placed a restriction on the matter. (See the commentaries of the Maggid Mishneh and Netivot HaMishpat 235:20.)

A person who is hard of hearing, but can hear when spoken to in a loud voice, is not included in this category, but is instead considered to be an ordinary individual [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:19)].

I.e., hand gestures. The movement of his mouth is not considered an adequate indicator of his intent (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:47).

Since the sale of landed property is a more serious matter, our Sages restricted the freedom of these individuals to engage in such a transaction, because of their mental shortcomings. For even a person who can speak but cannot hear does not have full awareness of what is happening around him. For that reason, we check his thinking even with regard to the sale of movable property.

He is tested like a person who cannot speak, as explained in the following halachah. With regard to a person who cannot speak, however, three correct answers are sufficient. With regard to a person who cannot hear, by contrast, it appears that more questions are necessary to establish that he is intellectually sound (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:48).
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the questioning process must be different from that described in the following halachah, because this person cannot hear the questions he is being asked.

For because of his limited awareness, his thoughts may not be clear.

A person who was born with this disorder.

See Hilchot Gerushin 2:16, which explains that the mute is asked a set of three questions requiring two positive answers and one negative answer (or two negative and one positive). If he answers correctly, we assume that he understands the implications of the answers he gives.

The fact that he can write out instructions indicates that he is consciously aware of what he is doing. It is not necessary that he be tested.

Our translation of the term שוטה reflects the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Edut 9:9-10.

Such a person is considered to be incapable of appreciating the implications of his deeds. Hence, their consequences are not binding upon him.

I.e., a trustworthy person is given the responsibility of caring for the person’s property and providing him - and his family - with their needs.
See Hilchot Nachalot 10:8, which states that similar provisions are made for a deaf mute.

See Hilchot Edut 9:9, where the Rambam writes that even when an epileptic is not in the midst of a seizure, his understanding may be clouded to the extent that he is incapable of fully comprehending the details of a situation.

He may, however, acquire property for himself.

We take it for granted that he is not able to make responsible decisions.

The commentaries interpret this as referring to a child who has lived at least six complete years.

I.e., twelve for a girl, thirteen for a boy. See Halachah 12.

To see whether or not he is responsible. See Halachah 8.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapters 8-12, which describe this convention, a matnat sh’chiv me’ra, in detail.

Halachah 1.

As stated in Halachah 1, the minor was granted the potential to buy and sell so that he could provide for his livelihood. Giving presents is also necessary for that purpose, because at times it is necessary to give a person a present to cultivate his good will.

In contrast to these restrictions, as stated in Halachah 11, a minor may purchase landed property.

For there is no one to provide for his livelihood.

Who was appointed to provide for the child.

For our Sages placed limitations on their enactment, empowering a minor only when there was no alternative.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:3, which states that the Rambam’s wording implies that even when a child comes of age, he must manifest signs of physical maturity for his transactions to be accepted without his business sagacity being evaluated.
See also the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 235:1), who states that once a child reaches the age of ten, he or she is assumed to have an understanding of financial matters unless he or she has shown signs of being mentally incapable or emotionally unstable.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that a minor does not have the legal right to waive his ownership over property. The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s decision, stating that when our Sages granted minors the right to engage in business transactions, they also granted them the right to waive their ownership, so that all the laws applying to an adult would apply to them. This is necessary, for unless such an equation were made, no one would be willing to engage in a transaction with a minor. The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:3) without objections by the major commentaries.

Chapter 12, Halachot 2-4.

This preface indicates that the law that follows is a product of the Rambam’s deductive reasoning without a specific Rabbinic source. The Rambam’s logic appears to be based on the laws stated in Chapter 9, Halachot 4-6.

With regard to this point as well, the Ra’avad differs and maintains that a transaction with a minor may be finalized through the payment of money. Here also, the Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:4) without objections by the major commentaries.

See Chapter 7.

Chapter 5.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 96:15 states that a kinyan in which a minor engages is not binding, because the verse on which the tradition of a kinyan sudar is based (Ruth 4:7): “A man removed his shoe and gave it to his colleague,” speaks of “a man,” thereby excluding a minor.

In this way, the purchaser would acquire the movable property by virtue of its presence in his domain.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that a kinyan sudar that was made with a minor is effective. The Rambam’s opinion is, however, cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:5) without objections by any of the major commentaries.

A minor cannot be sued in court, because a suit must be conducted in the presence of the defendant. In this instance, since the defendant is under age, it is considered as if he were not present.
When meshichah is performed on the movable property, it is physically taken into the possession of the purchaser. Thus, the minor has no way of maintaining possession. In the instances mentioned in this halachah, the movable property is in the physical possession of the minor, and the purchaser must resort to legal process to expropriate it. Hence, the minor is allowed to maintain possession.
The Ra’avad gives another reason why the transaction is not effective when the minor rents the place where the movable property is stored. Just as a minor may not sell landed property, he may not rent it. And since the landed property was never transferred to the purchaser, the movable property was also not transferred to him.

I.e., even if the movable property is not in the physical possession of the minor (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:25),

This is the version found in most texts of the Mishneh Torah. Some manuscripts, however, read “A kinyan is like a legal document.” This version is cited by the Shulchan Aruch.

I.e., the legal value of a kinyan is that the witnesses can draw up a legal document that is recognized by the court.

Note the statements of the Ra’avad cited in the commentary on the following halachah.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:8-9.

Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:10. Since a minor cannot appoint an agent, his property cannot acquire the article for him.
Kiddushin 41a derives the principle that a minor cannot appoint an agent from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 24:1, the verse that teaches us that an agent may act on a person’s behalf. For that verse speaks about a person past the age of majority. (See also Hilchot Sh’luchim VeShutafim 2:2.)

Numbers 21:26 uses the word miyado, literally “from his hand,” as meaning “from his possession.” A similar usage is frequent within the Torah and within Talmudic sources. On this basis, the Rambam (Hilchot Gerushin 5:1, based on Gittin 76b) explains:
The Torah’s expression [Deuteronomy, 24:1], “He shall... place it in her hand,” need not be interpreted only [according to its strict literal meaning] that the bill of divorce must be placed in her hand. Regardless of whether the bill of divorce is placed in her hand, her bosom or her courtyard, or given to her agent whom she charged that his hand would be as her hand, the same law applies.
On that basis, Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:10 states:
We derive [the concept that] a female minor [may acquire property by virtue of its presence in her] courtyard from [the fact that] she is able to acquire an article that is placed in her hand...
Just as her courtyard is effective with regard to [the acquisition of a] bill of divorce, so too, it is effective with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost object. [From this we also conclude that she may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in the area within a radius of] four cubits of her, for this area is considered her courtyard with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost article.

I.e., we assume that since our Sages saw that the Torah granted her certain privileges with regard to the acquisition of property, they extended them further and granted her the privilege of these halachic mechanisms to acquire property (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:28). The Siftei Cohen 235:3 takes issue with this logic and questions why a female minor should be granted these privileges.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:29 emphasizes that even if the minor manifests ownership, he does not acquire the property until he pays for it. The rationale is that a minor feels attached to money and does not part with it easily. Until he pays, we fear that he may retract.

In support of the Rambam’s statements, the Maggid Mishneh cites Kiddushin 42a, which brings proof that one may acquire land on behalf of a minor, from the distribution of the land of Israel described in Numbers, Chapter 23. In that instance, the Nasi of each tribe took possession of the land on behalf of every one of the members of his tribe, including several minors.

On the basis of the Rambam’s ruling in this halachah, the Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling in the previous halachah with regard to the rental of land in order to acquire movable property stored on it. Seemingly, since another person is renting him the land, he should be able to acquire both the land and the property. On this basis, the Ra’avad advances the thesis that our Sages’ statement that a male minor cannot acquire an object by virtue of its presence in his courtyard applies only with regard to the acquisition of ownerless property.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s rationale was not that the rental was not effective in acquiring the land for the minor, but that our Sages did not allow the minor to acquire the movable property in this manner. He does not, however, discount entirely the thesis advanced by the Ra’avad.

As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2, this is an accepted principle in Jewish business law. It is as if the person acquiring the property were acting as the agent of the person for whom he is acquiring the property. Although he has not been formally appointed in that capacity, since the proposition involved is to his benefit, we assume that he would agree.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the minor’s acquisition of the property is effective because another person is transferring it to him. As the Ketzot HaChoshen 235:4 points out, a minor cannot acquire ownerless property, nor can he acquire landed property if he manifests his ownership upon it. Why then can he acquire the property in this instance? Because it is as if the person selling the property were acting on the minor’s behalf and acquired the property for him.

For we cannot engage in a practice that is to a person’s detriment unless he explicitly authorizes it.

This applies according to both Scriptural and Rabbinic Law.

From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that the license for a youth to sell movable property even if he does not understand business matters applies also to movable property that a youth inherits. This ruling is borne out by the Vilna Gaon [in his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:9)].

This is a Rabbinic decree, enacted to protect young adults as they enter the financial world.

I.e., when can a youth sell landed property directly after attaining majority?

I.e., landed property that he purchased with his own money, or that was given to him as a present. If, however. property was given to him in someone’s will, it is considered to be an inheritance [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:9)].

Gittin 65a mentions this concept with regard to property inherited from one’s parents, but not with regard to property inherited from others. The Rambam maintains that the same logic applies and, therefore, the restriction also pertains. The Rashba differs and maintains that since it is uncommon to inherit property from anyone other than one’s parents, our Sages did not include such instances in their decree. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam’s view.

With regard to land that he bought, the fact that he spent money to purchase the land indicates that he is not overly attracted by money and is willing to invest it. Even when land is given to him as a present, we follow the principle that a present will not be given away unless the recipient expended effort for it. Hence, the youth will value the property that he worked for.

But past the age of majority, as obvious from Halachah 6.

In contrast to a sale, which is not binding.

Nevertheless, when making a sale, the youth also receives significant benefit. Why then is a present considered any different? Because, as the Rambam continues to explain, giving a present of landed property is an abnormal occurrence.

And our Sages did not pass enactments with regard to rare circumstances.

I.e., if his present is upheld, he will be given a certain degree of respect. If the present is rescinded, his honor will suffer and his words will not be taken seriously. Thus, it is to his benefit that his present be upheld.

I.e., it is as if he were below the age of thirteen. See Hilchot Ishut 2:11-13, which explains these concepts in greater detail. As explained in Hilchot Ishut, these concepts apply to both males and females.

The literal translation of the Rambam’s words is “until he attains the majority of his lifetime.”

Their claim is that the youth did not manifest signs of physical maturity (or sterility).

And thus, the sale is invalid and the property belongs to them, for they are the youth’s rightful heirs.

This law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, not only in Choshen Mishpat 235:13, but also in Yoreh De’ah 363:7. From the latter source, it would appear that it is considered to be “debasing a corpse” only if the corpse must be disinterred for the examination to be made. If an external examination is carried out before burial, this would not be considered to be “debasing.” The rationales that the Rambam states in the later clauses of the halachah, however, appear to apply whether or not the corpse was buried.

As reflected by Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 24:5, this is a principle applied in many contexts of Jewish business law.

Since the sale is not viable, it can be nullified at any time.

Since the purchase of the property is nullified, retroactively, it is as if the purchaser bad no right to benefit from the property.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:41 questions whether he is considered to be a person who worked land belonging to a colleague with permission, or whether he is considered to be one who worked the land without permission. See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah, Chapter 10, for the laws governing these situations.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam compares this situation to one involving a female minor whose marriage was arranged by her brother. She has the right to nullify her marriage without a formal bill of divorce if she does so before she attains the age of majority. If, however she passes that age without protesting her marriage, she no longer has the right to annul her marriage (Hilchot Gerushin 11:6).
Another example is that of a minor who was converted to Judaism by the court. Until he attains majority, he has the right to nullify his conversion. Once he attains majority, he is irrevocably identified as a Jew (Hilchot Melachim 10:3).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:14) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:42 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger mention authorities who rule according to the perspective of the Rambam’s teachers.

Who had relations with his daughters without realizing it. See Genesis 19:33.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2, which explains that when a person wants to give a present to a colleague, that person can act on the recipient’s behalf without the recipient’s knowledge. Since it is an advantage for him, we assume that the recipient would desire to receive the property, and defacto, it is considered as if the person were appointed as the recipient’s agent.

For property acquired by an agent is considered as if it has been acquired by the principal. Thus, the transaction has been finalized.

For a person cannot be forced to acquire property against his will.

For the deed of sale is only to the purchaser’s benefit; it cannot cause him any loss. And if he does not desire the purchase, he can destroy the deed.
When citing this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 238:1) adds the comments of the Tur, which state that this law applies only when the witnesses saw the recipient of the field (or his agent) acquire the field through a valid kinyan, or when the seller testifies that it was acquired through a valid kinyan.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim explains that the Tur’s ruling is intended to negate an opinion that maintains that when the witnesses sign the deed of sale, they effect the transfer of the property. In Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 23:5, the Rambam states that a contract of loan can be written for the lender even though the borrower is not present, only when the contract contains a kinyan - otherwise, it is forbidden to write such a contract, lest the loan not have been given and the date thus be incorrect. Nevertheless, here and in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 24:1, the Rambam does not make such a statement with regard to a deed of sale.

Because the composition of the deed is to his benefit.

In which instance, it is to the seller’s benefit for the sale to be finalized. Nevertheless, the responsibility for paying for the deed of sale is the purchaser’s.

See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh.

A Canaanite servant does not have an independent financial capacity. Whatever he owns or acquires belongs to his master. Moreover, he cannot acquire anything - even for his master - on his own initiative alone; his master must approve his actions.
The master is not, however, obligated to accept his servant’s acts. If he desires to confirm his servant’s act, retroactively, the kinyan performed by the servant is binding. If he does not, the servant’s act is of no consequence.

With regard to a purchase, the money that was given for the purpose must be returned.

This refers both to the acceptance and to the rejection of the servant’s act. The owner need not perform a kinyan to acquire the object if he desires to confirm the servant’s act, nor must the original owner of the object perform a kinyan to regain possession of it, if the servant’s master decides to nullify his deeds. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:54.)

Over which she has no control whatsoever.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut 16:1, nichsei tzon barzel refers to property owned by a woman that she brings to her new home and for which her husband takes responsibility, promising to return its cash value to his wife in the event of his death or divorce.

I.e., the husband promised his wife a sum in a prenuptial agreement in the event of his death or divorce and designated a specific property for her from which she could collect this sum.

See Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., which defines nichsei m’log as property owned by a woman that she brings to her new home, for which her husband does not take responsibility. Instead, in the event of his death or divorce, the property is returned to her as is.

With regard to property that belongs to the husband, the rationale is that if he approves of the transfer, the woman is retroactively considered to be her husband’s agent. If, however, he does not approve of the transfer, it is nullified, for she has no right to sell his property.
With regard to property that belongs to the woman, she would have the right to sell it. Nevertheless, part of the financial dimensions of the marriage contract is that a woman’s husband is given full control of all property that she owns. Therefore, unless he consents to the sale, it is nullified.

This applies to property designated as nichsei tzon barzel. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 3:5).] The laws governing property designated as nichsei m’log are stated in the following halachah.

If, however, the woman agreed to the sale of the property first, and then the husband performed the sale, the sale is binding. (See Halachah 5.) Similarly, if she writes a legal document taking responsibility for the property, the sale is binding.

Thus, the purchaser covered himself, receiving the approval of both the husband and the wife.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the sale is nullified immediately and is not binding at all. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 5:5), the Rambam appears to rule differently, staling that when the woman comes to claim the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract (i.e., at her husband’s death or the couple’s divorce), the property is granted to the woman. Implied is that until then, it remains in the possession of the purchaser. From the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Ishut 22:15, it would appear that he changed his perspective and followed the approach mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh.

I.e., her acceptance did not reflect a genuine commitment. It is as if she had been forced to do it, lest her husband become upset at her failure to uphold his decisions.

For this property belongs to her.

A second kinyan is not required. Retroactively, we consider the husband to have acted as the woman’s agent.
With regard to nichsei m’log, we do not say that a woman can claim that she agreed to a sale conducted by her husband in order to grant him satisfaction. The rationale is that he has no claim to the ownership of this property at all, and he would not be justified in pressuring his wife to agree to its sale.
With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, by contrast, since the husband has already guaranteed to pay the woman the value of the property, she might acquiesce to his demands in order to preserve peace within the home. Therefore, our Sages protected her rights.

For in the event of her husband’s death or the couple’s divorce, the woman has the right to receive these goods themselves.

The rationale is that unlike the case with landed property, the woman does not expect that she is certain to receive this movable property, for movable property is subject to destruction. As the Maggid Mishneh states. this view is not accepted by all authorities.

I.e., should her husband’s estate lack the resources to settle her marriage contract in the event of his death or the-couple’s divorce.

Since landed property is involved, we assume that the property will not be destroyed by the purchaser - and that if the necessity arises, she will be able to obtain her due through legal process.
Our Sages enacted certain provisions because they were aware that women did not like appearing in court and would at times forfeit claims rather than do so. Nevertheless, in this instance, they felt that it was preferable not to enforce this restriction, because it is possible that the man’s estate will have the money to meet his obligation.

I.e., before her husband sold the property. If she agrees to the disclaimer afterwards, she can retract, claiming that she agreed so as not to create strife with her husband, as explained above.

Stating that she agreed to the sale and would not expropriate the property from him.

But not nichsei m’log, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4.

Hilchot Ishut 22:6, 18. In this instance as well, we explain that she can rationalize her conduct, explaining that she merely wanted to satisfy her husband’s demands and prevent strife from arising between them.

This refers to orphans below the age of majority (or under the age of 20), who cannot take financial responsibility for the property in their possession. The court serves as “the father of the orphans” and must either administer their property itself or appoint a guardian to do so.
These laws are mentioned in this chapter because the court and the guardians serve as agents for the orphans. The Rambam defines when they have the authority to act on the orphans’ behalf and when they do not.

See Hilchot Nachalot 11:10, which states that a guardian may not even give charity on behalf of his ward. Note also the preceding halachot of that chapter, which place certain restrictions on the sales that he may undertake on a minor’s behalf.

See Hilchot Shabbat 23:12-13, which explains that these activities are forbidden lest a person write.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:28) adds that these laws also apply on Yom Kippur.
See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:11), which states that a present may be given on a holiday, if it is necessary to do so for the observance of the holiday.

I.e., stripes for rebellious conduct (makkot mardut), the punishment given for the violation of a Rabbinic command.

This applies even when the person is compelled to sell or give away his property.

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 195:11).