Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Note the parallel to a woman’s bill of divorce, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 1:1.

I.e., it makes no difference whether the object the owner retains is landed property or movable property [Kessef Mishneh; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe’ah 3:9)].

For the bill of release mentions an article over which the master still possesses authority. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:57) quotes the Rambam’s decision. Tosafot, Gittin 9a and the Tur offer a different interpretation of the Talmudic passage on which this ruling is based. Therefore they rule slightly differently and do not accept the decision of the Rambam.

Even though the owner intended to free the slave, since the wording of the bill of release is not proper, the bill is not effective.

For as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, if a slave brings his bill of release and says: “It was written and signed in my presence,” his word is accepted.

I.e., if the owner (or his heirs, in the event of his death) protest, the property is considered his until the servant has the authenticity of the legal document verified.
The laws governing the verification of the legal documents are explained in Hilchot Eidut, ch. 6.

This also includes the slave himself, for he is part of his master’s property.

Although the master did not make a distinction between the slave and the property as in the first clause, we nevertheless make that distinction. This is an extension of the Talmudic principle palginin diburo.

Rashi (Gittin 42a) derives this concept as follows: With regard to a woman’s bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: “And he shall write a bill of divorce for her.” As the Rambam states (Hilchot Gerushin 4:19), this is interpreted to mean that a bill of divorce must be written for each woman individually. This is considered part of the requirement to write a bill of divorce lishmah, “for the sake of the woman being divorced.” And since the requirement to write a bill of release for a slave lishmah is equated with the requirement that applies to a woman’s bill of divorce (Chapter 6, Halachah 6), this principle also applies with regard to a slave (Radbaz).
Others (see Turei Zahav 267:25; Siftei Cohen 267:69) derive this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 19:20: “And freedom was not given to her” – i.e., freedom must be given to her individually.

I.e., they are not freed, because the two servants were mentioned in the same legal document. And since they are not freed, they do not acquire the other property, because a slave cannot acquire property until he is free.

They must free each other, because each is considered to have acquired half of his own person and half of the other slave.

The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:59) state that for the law stated by the Rambam to apply, the owner must give both documents to a third party to acquire on behalf of the two slaves. In that way, they acquire the property at the same time. If, however, one of the legal documents is given to one of the slaves or to another person on his behalf before the second document is given, the first slave acquires all of his master’s possessions, including the second slave.

More precisely, half was not released in the same document. For the master did not retain ownership of the slave at all. Nevertheless, since the slave was not released as a whole in a single document, he is not granted his freedom (Rabbenu Nissim, as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh).

As stated in Halachah 1.

Gittin 41b states that just as a woman cannot be half divorced with a bill of divorce, so too, a slave cannot be half released.

The Turei Zahav 267:28 explains that the equation with a woman applies only with regard to release through the medium of a legal document, because that is the subject of the verse upon which the equation is based. There is, by contrast, no such equation with regard to freeing a slave with money.

That the release of half of the slave through a bill of release is not effective.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that for the transaction to be effective, the purchase or the present must be made before the bill of release is given. Otherwise, the slave will not have left the master’s domain entirely with the bill of release.

While the other half is owned by the person to whom it was sold or given.

In this instance, the deed of release is effective, because the owner released his entire portion of the slave (Rashi, Gittin 42a).

For although the child-to-be can be considered to be part of the mother, as in the second clause, the mother can certainly be considered an independent entity whose fate is not dependent on that of the child (Siftei Cohen 267:75). This distinction refutes the question raised by the Ra’avad in his gloss on this halachah.

Which is not effective, as stated in the previous halachah.

This term (taken from Leviticus 19:20) refers to a woman who is half Canaanite maid-servant and half free, who is consecrated by a Hebrew servant.

Before she was freed, the consecration involved only the half of her that was freed. For a Canaanite maid-servant cannot be consecrated (Hilchot Ishut 4:15). After she is released, however, the consecration automatically spreads to her other half (Ibid.:16). See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13.

Because the part of him that is free is forbidden to have relations with such a woman.

For a free woman is not allowed to have relations with a slave.

We have used indefinite wording, because the commentaries differ whether the obligation to compose the promissory note is incumbent on the freed slave or the master. It must, however, be noted that the Rambam’s wording leads to the conclusion that the master composes the document.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 15:2, this is a mitzvah incumbent on a man and not on a woman. Gittin 41b states as the rationale for this ruling: “The world was created solely for the sake of procreation.” In order to allow this person to fulfill this mitzvah, the master is compelled to free him. It must, however, be emphasized that this compulsion is a Rabbinic law without a source in our Scriptural obligations.

And engage in lewd behavior with her.

So that she will marry and her husband will prevent her from engaging in wanton behavior.

According to Scriptural Law, a minor may acquire property, but he may not transfer ownership of it to others. Even according to Rabbinic Law, he certainly cannot be forced to transfer ownership to another person.

Generally, a guardian is not allowed to free slaves (see Hilchot Nachalot 11:8). Nevertheless, since the father attempted to circumvent the law, we empower – and indeed require – the guardian to release the slave.

I.e., we give the child a small amount of money to play with, so that he will be willing to part with the slave (Rashi, Gittin 40b).

But not part, as in Halachah 1.

As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapter 8, when a dying man apportions his property, his gifts are provisional, and if he recovers, he regains possession of them.

As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, the gift of a dying man does not take effect until after his death, and ordinarily, the slave’s bill of release would not be effective after his master’s death, for the slave would already have become the property of his heirs. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that an exception be made in this instance.
The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:22, where this halachah is stated, quotes the Rashba as explaining the rationale for this law as follows: Once a slave is freed, he can never be enslaved again. This is a point of common knowledge; certainly the master is aware of it. Therefore, we assume that the master’s intent was to free him when making this statement.
The Maggid Mishneh thus explains that the slave is actually freed. Rashi (Gittin 9a) offers a different interpretation, stating that the master is not allowed to use him as a slave, because people at large will be operating under the impression that he has already been freed.
It appears that the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:15) shares this conception for it changes the Rambam’s wording, stating kol shehu ben chorin, a rumor that he is free, rather than shem ben chorin, “the reputation of being free.” The Sefer Meirat Einayim 250:48, however, interprets the Shulchan Aruch according to the Maggid Mishneh’s explanation.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:15) states that if the master gives the slave the property “from today, if I die,” the slave is not granted his freedom if the master recovers. The rationale is that the present was obviously conditional in nature.

This penalty was imposed because the slave has already become - to a certain extent - part of the Jewish people. If he were sold to a gentile, we fear that he would cease Jewish practice entirely.

For it is the bill of release that formalizes his change in status.

Any payment of more or less than the worth involved is considered a fine.

I.e., a court composed of judges who possess the unique semichah (ordination) passed down from one Sage to another from the time of Moses onward. Only a court made up of such judges may preside over cases involving fines (Chapter 5, Halachah 17, Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:5). There are no judges who possess such semichah in the present age.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that these laws should be applied in the present age as well. For this is not a fine in the legal sense of the term, but rather a measure imposed to uphold the observance of the Torah. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:80), he quotes the Rambam’s ruling.
The commentaries have noted that in Hilchot Shabbat 20:3, the Rambam states that a person is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile, and if he does, he is fined and required to repurchase it even at ten times its price. There, however, he does not mention the requirement for expert judges.

I.e., to buy him back from the gentiles. For the obligation is incumbent only on the master who committed the transgression by selling him to the gentiles. If the slave flees from the gentile, however, the heir is obligated to give him a bill of release.

Our Sages feared that the Jew would not be able to pay the gentile and considered this designation as equivalent to selling the slave to him.
The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this law. The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:80) mentions it, but states that for the slave to be freed, the borrower must give the gentile the slave when he designates him as collateral. If he does not give him the slave, the slave is not freed until he defaults on the loan.

For the slave never becomes the property of the gentile.

Without the Jew designating the slave as collateral.

Hence, there is no reason to penalize the owner.

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Gittin 44b. Rashi, Tosafot, and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:80) offer a slightly different interpretation.

Although the seller is afraid that the king’s servants will harm him – and thus, there is a certain parallel to the law stated in the previous halachah – he is nevertheless judged stringently, because he could have given them other property instead of the slave.

After which time, he would revert to the ownership of the Jew.

I.e., although the slave becomes the property of the purchaser, the purchaser agrees not to require him to work. For he purchased him only to marry a maid-servant and breed slaves for him. In such an arrangement, the slave would not be forced to work on Sabbaths and festivals.

I.e., the purchaser agrees to the stipulation that the slave be allowed to perform the mitzvot.

Gittin 44a raises these questions and does not resolve them.

The Ra’avad and the Tur differ with this ruling and maintain that the slave is not allowed to keep his master’s property. The Ramah quotes both opinions without stating which one he favors.

A gentile who has formally accepted the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. He is called a ger toshav, “resident alien,” because he - in contrast to an idolatrous gentile - is allowed to live in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 6. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this is referring to the kutim in the era after it was decreed that they be considered gentiles. According to this view, we do not know what the ruling would be in the era before that decree.

For in all these instances, the new master may be a hindrance to the slave’s Torah observance.

As explained in the previous halachah.

Even if the purchaser did not pay the money before he discovered that he would have to free the slave, he is required to suffer the loss and not the seller. He must pay the money and release the slave (Siftei Cohen 267:110).
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:82) states that this law applies even when the new master states: “I do not want to take him to the diaspora. I will have him work for me in Eretz Yisrael.” For we fear that the master will ultimately convince the slave to go the diaspora with him (Siftei Cohen 267:111).

Thus, as a measure of deference to the cherished position Eretz Yisrael is granted (see also Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 5), our Sages granted the slave his freedom. Note the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:82), who states that these laws apply even in the present age.

Which, as Hilchot Terumah, Chapter 1, explains, is considered to be Eretz Yisrael with regard to certain laws.

Which is on the border between Eretz Yisrael and the diaspora, half in Eretz Yisrael and half in the diaspora.

This refers to slaves that are nichsei tzon barzel. Different laws apply with regard to slaves that are nichsei m’log. See Hilchot Ishut 16:1 with regard to the distinction between the two terms.

And he is returning to the diaspora.

And in the event of divorce or the husband’s death, we assume that she will return to her family in Eretz Yisrael.
Because this question is unresolved, the status quo is maintained, and the slaves are not granted their freedom (Siftei Cohen 267:111).

Since the slave voluntarily left Eretz Yisrael, he cannot claim his freedom afterwards, asserting his love for the land.

For the slave never consented to leave Eretz Yisrael.

The Siftei Cohen 267:112 writes that in this instance, the purchaser should not lose the money he paid, because unlike the instance mentioned in Halachah 6, it was the seller who caused the slave to go to the diaspora, not the purchaser.

Rashi, in his commentary on Ketubot 110b, the source for this halachah, interprets the passage as referring to a Hebrew servant. The majority of commentaries, however, share the Rambam’s view that the passage refers even to a Canaanite slave.

If the master cannot find a prospective purchaser in Eretz Yisrael, he should free the slave and have a promissory note composed for his worth (Tur, Yoreh De’ah 267).

And must, instead, sell the slave to someone in Eretz Yisrael or free him.

See Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 5, where the Rambam explains that the special prominence granted to Eretz Yisrael applies in the present age as well, despite the fact that the majority of the mitzvot whose observance is dependent on the sanctity of the land do not apply in the present age.

Even in Eretz Yisrael he should not be put into slavery.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 254) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 568) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
According to the Rambam, the verse is speaking about a Canaanite slave who fled to Eretz Yisrael against his Jewish master’s will. Onkelos in his translation of the Torah (Deuteronomy 23:16), however, interprets the verse as referring to a gentile slave belonging to a gentile master who fled to Eretz Yisrael.
The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 267) follows the understanding of Onkelos. Thus though he agrees that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against requiring a Canaanite slave who fled to Eretz Yisrael to return to his master in the diaspora, there is no Scriptural prohibition involved.
This difference of opinion also relates to the status of the Canaanite slave. According to the Rambam, he is a righteous gentile and has the rights of a freed slave immediately. According to the Tur, he may be sold by his master to another Jew in Eretz Yisrael. At the very least, the master must compose a bill of release before the slave is considered a free man.

I.e., as explained in Hilchot Mechirah 14:16, in addition to the prohibition against abusing other Jews, there is a special prohibition against abusing converts. The rationale for this commandment is that, because of his past, a convert feels humble when compared to a native-born Israelite. This ex-slave, however, feels more humble than a convert, because he did not convert as a free man.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 255) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 569) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Hilchot Mechirah 14:16-17 states:
Similarly, if [a person] oppresses [a convert] and takes unfair financial advantage of him, he transgresses three negative prohibitions: “A person should not abuse his colleague,” “One man should not take unfair advantage of his brother,” and “Do not oppress him.”
Why does a person transgress the prohibition against verbal abuse when he takes unfair financial advantage [of a convert], and the prohibition against taking unfair financial advantage if he verbally abuses him? Because the Torah uses the word ona’ah with regard to both these prohibitions, without being more specific, and repeats these two prohibitions with regard to a convert explicitly: “Do not abuse” and “Do not oppress him.”

The Rambam mentions this concept both in Hilchot Milah 1:6 and Hilchot Issurei 14:9, and there he does not mention the possibility of selling the slave to the diaspora.

Commenting on this law, the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:4) states that in his time, it was forbidden for gentiles to convert to Judaism. Hence, when purchasing a slave in his time, it was considered as if the slave refused to accept the mitzvot.

In the sources cited in note 40, the Rambam mentions that the slave must agree to adhere to the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants.

For the prohibitions against selling a slave in such situations apply only to a slave who has been circumcised, immersed in the mikveh and accepted the mitzvot incumbent on slaves.

When quoting this law, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:81) mention that we are speaking about a situation in which the slave cannot be redeemed either. In clarification, the Turei Zahav 267:50 states the intent is not that the master is required to pay the full value of the slave, but rather if it is possible to redeem him for a minimal amount, he is required to do so.

I.e., since there is no way that that the master will be able to retrieve the slave – and the slave voluntary abandoned the Jewish people - there is no prohibition against receiving the money from the gentiles. On the contrary, not to accept the money would be making a sacrifice for no purpose.

Once property is declared ownerless, it becomes the possession of the person who seeks to acquire it. In this instance, the slave is considered to be in possession of his physical person. Hence, he is the first to acquire it. [According to this explanation, this law applies only with regard to a slave who is past majority and not to a minor, for a minor does not have the capacity to acquire himself (Kin’at Eliyahu, based on Hilchot Zechiyah 2:17).]

For the bill of release completes the slave’s transition of status and grants him permission to marry a Jewish woman.

By despairing of the return of the slave, the master renounces his ownership of him. Therefore, the slave is considered ownerless and acquires his freedom, as stated in the previous halachah.

It is desirable to redeem the slave, for since he has accepted some mitzvot, he is already different from other gentiles.

Since the slave’s owner has already despaired of his return, he is free to be acquired by others.

Since his owner has already despaired of his return, he no longer has any claim to him. And since the person redeeming him was willing to free him, he is considered to be free.
This ruling follows the opinion of the Sages in Gittin 37b. The Ra’avad differs and cites the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:67) quotes the Rambam’s view.

For the owner would have had to spend this money himself to redeem him.

Since the original owner did not despair of regaining the slave, the slave is not considered to have left his domain. The person who redeemed him is not entitled to payment, for since his intent was to free the slave, it is clear that he had no thought of receiving anything in return when he redeemed him.

I.e., he states that the creditor should take possession of the slave as repayment for the debt.

Leaving the creditor without payment for the debt.

For freeing the slave removes the lien of the debt. The debtor must, however, pay the debt, for by freeing the slave he prevented the creditor from receiving his due. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:11 and Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:6, where this subject is discussed.

Our translation is based on authentic manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text contains a slightly different version.

I.e., there is no legal obligation for the creditor to free the slave. Our Sages, nevertheless, compelled him to do so for the reason stated by the Rambam.

I.e., helps him in arranging for the wedding.

A slave is forbidden to marry a free woman. We assume that the master is not assisting his slave in performing a transgression, but instead had the intent to free him. It must, however, be emphasized that the passage is somewhat problematic, for until the slave receives the bill of release, he is not permitted to marry a free woman.

Wearing tefillin is a positive commandment whose observance is associated with a specific time. Hence, a slave is not obligated to wear them. Nevertheless, the fact that a master has his slave fulfill any mitzvah associated with time - even wearing the arm tefillin - is not enough to require him to free his slave. Instead, this is a special measure associated with the head tefillin, for they are a sign of the unique relation hip between God and the Jewish people. As Deuteronomy 28:10 states: “And all the nations of the world shall see that the name of God is called upon you,” and Berachot 6a states: “This refers to the head tefillin.”

Gittin 40a states that if a slave reads the Torah in the presence of his master, he is not free. The Rambam, however, makes a distinction between the slave’s reading on his own initiative and being asked to read by his master.

See Hilchot Nezirut 2:17-18, which speaks about a slave taking nazirite vows. The master must force the slave to partake of wine. If he nullifies the vow, the slave is considered to have been freed and must observe his nazirite vows.

The concept of nullification applies to a husband’s rights with regard to vows taken by his wife, or a father’s prerogative with regard to vows taken by his daughter. The fact that a master uses this wording with regard to a slave instead of simply compelling him to violate the vow, as is his privilege, shows that he grants the slave a certain measure of equality. That is interpreted as a sign that he has freed him.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of Nazir 62b, the source for this halachah, and maintains that the slave is not freed by virtue of this statement. If, however, he is ever freed. he must observe his nazirite vow.

For the slave to be freed, the master must carry out an act that indicates his willingness to accept his freedom. The fact that he refrains from rebuking him is not sufficient.

Although Rabban Gamliel described his servant Tavi as a Torah scholar (Sukkah 20b), we do not find examples of Rabban Gamliel’s teaching him. Perhaps Tavi studied on his own initiative.

As reflected by the contrast to the following clause, this applies even if the slave does not specify this intent.

The slave’s willingness to enter the Jewish faith nullifies the lien of ownership his master has over him (Yevamot 46a). This is possible because unlike a Jew, a gentile does not own the physical person of his servants; he has dominion only over their labor. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 5.) The concept of owning the physical person of a slave applies only with regard to a Jewish master, and is established when the master converts the slave to that status. Thus, the lesser dominion that the gentile owner possessed and that he transferred to the Jewish owner can be abrogated by the slave’s taking the initiative of making a full conversion to the Jewish faith. See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:11. Since the slave’s Jewish master never established his possession over him, a bill of release is not required (Siftei Cohen 267:18).
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:9) emphasizes that the slave who is granted his freedom must reimburse his master for the funds he spent in purchasing him.

This demonstrates that the slave enters the Jewish faith under the authority of his master.

The immersion of a male slave or convert should be preceded by circumcision. Nevertheless, if the order is reversed, the conversion is still valid.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:7, which states that a person can convert a gentile child by compulsion. When the child attains majority, however, he has the choice to affirm this conversion or reject it.

The Radbaz notes that the terms “convert” and “free man” apparently share the same meaning and therefore questions the Rambam’s intent. He suggests that possibly his intent was that a convert means a person whom he does not own as he does a Canaanite slave, but who is obligated to work for him, while a free man implies that the gentile has no further obligation to him.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that this law restates the principle stated in Halachah 19. Therefore, he suggests that the text be altered to read: “immersed themselves before he did” - i.e., before the convert immersed himself to complete his own conversion, his slaves immersed themselves.

With the inclusion of this phrase, the Rambam emphasizes that we do not assume that the man freed his Canaanite slave so that he could marry her and have relations with her in a permitted manner. In certain contexts, we follow the principle that a person does not enter into licentious sexual relations when he could have carried out the same relations in a permitted fashion. There are some commentaries (e.g., the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher) who apply this principle in the context at hand. The Rambam, however, does not accept this view. He states his position forthrightly in Hilchot Gerushin 10:19:
All these matters are far from the [proper] approach to Torah law, and it is improper to rely upon them. Our Sages accepted this presumption only in a situation where a person divorced his wife, [and then entered into relations with her], or when a person consecrated a woman with a stipulation and then engaged in relations without mentioning that stipulation. For in these instances, the woman is his wife. And with regard to a person’s wife, we assume that he will not carry out licentious relations. With regard to other women by contrast, [relations with] any promiscuous woman are considered licentious unless the person explicitly states that he is carrying out the relations for the sake of consecration.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:69) mentions both opinions and also a compromise opinion that considers the maid-servant’s offspring a free man, but does not allow him to marry a Jewish woman until he undergoes a formal conversion. All three of these views are cited without a binding ruling being made.

For a Canaanite maid-servant’s offspring has the same ritual status as she does, as implied by Exodus 21:4: “The woman and her offspring will belong to her master.”

Hence if the master dies, leaving his wife childless, she is obligated to perform the ritual of either yibbum or chalitzah. See Hilchot Yibbum 1:4.

This is the version found in the authoritative manuscript and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The version in the standard printed text is slightly different and appears to be the result of a typesetting error.
As explained in Halachah 5, the definition of a Jew’s ownership of a slave is different from a gentile’s ownership of him. Nevertheless, when a gentile sells a slave to a Jew, the Jew establishes ownership of him according to the definition appropriate for a Jew.

I.e., when a Canaanite maid-servant gives birth, her offspring are considered slaves.
It must be emphasized that the Ra’avad and Rashi (in his commentary on Yevamot 78b) differ and rule directly opposite to the decisions of the Rambam in this instance, maintaining that the nationality of the father determines the status of the offspring. According to the Rambam, it can be explained that although that principle applies with regard to gentiles, a Canaanite maid-servant is no longer considered in that category.

And therefore, the offspring are not given his status.

For as the Rambam rules (Hilchot Gezelah 5:11-15): “The laws of a kingdom are binding.”

Note the contrast to the ruling that applies to a Jew, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 8, and in Hilchot Gezelah 5:16.

As stated in Halachah 2.
Although he offers explanations for the Rambam’s ruling in his Kessef Mishneh, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:17) Rav Yosef Karo follows the perspective of Tosafot (Yevamot 46a), who rule that the Jew does not acquire any greater rights than the gentile seller possessed.

For below the age of nine, a boy is incapable of engaging in sexual relations.
The commentaries note that a slave who is purchased as a child will ultimately mature and be capable of engaging in relations. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that since the prohibition was instituted only because of a suspicion, we do not extend it this far. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:19). he follows the ruling of the Tur, who forbids a woman from purchasing all slaves, even those below the age of nine.

The Kessef Mishneh and others question the inclusion of this term, ‘for seemingly this clause is not connected to the previous one.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 235) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 347) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 17.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 6-7.

The commentaries have questioned: How can a mitzvah of Rabbinic origin supersede the Torah commandment to have one’s slaves work forever? In resolution, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who explains that the commandment to work with slaves forever stems from the same principle that forbids giving a gentile a present for nothing (see Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 10) - i.e., he should not be granted his freedom as a present for him. When, however, his freedom is being granted to fulfill a mitzvah, even if the mitzvah is only Rabbinic in origin, he is not being granted anything as a personal favor. Instead, his freedom is serving a Torah purpose.
As an alternate explanation, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Berachot 47b, which explains that a special dispensation was given in this instance, because communal prayer is a very important mitzvah.

And communal prayer is only a Rabbinic requirement.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:79) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Siftei Cohen 279:100 states that from the wording of the Tur, it appears that only when a woman is half free and half maid-servant is her master compelled to free her (see Chapter 7, Halachah 7), but when the maid-servant is fully owned, the option is totally in the owner’s hands.

But not his Hebrew servant.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:20) quotes the ruling of the Rambam. The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Tur, who rules that this applies only in ordinary years. In a time of drought, however, this does not apply. For we fear that others would not give the slave a sufficient quantity of alms. Even in such a situation, however, the master can tell the slave: “Go work and sustain yourself.”

See Hilchot Nachalot 10:8.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 16:1, nichsei m’log refers to property belonging to a woman that she brings to the household, for which her husband does not accept responsibility. Instead, it remains in the woman’s possession. The husband may not intentionally do anything to diminish the value of these possessions. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, by not feeding the slaves he will certainly cause them to flee or die, thus diminishing the value of his wife's property.

From the Rambam’s wording, one may conclude that if the slaves were classified as nichsei tzon barzel – i.e., at the time of the marriage, the husband agreed to pay a fixed amount for them, regardless of their worth at the time payment is required – he may choose not to sustain them.

Although this is forbidden with regard to a Jewish servant. See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

The Rambam mentions both piety and wisdom although in Hilchot De’ot, ch. 1, he distinguishes them as two different character traits. Wisdom reflects an appreciation of the importance of doing what is correct and proper, while piety implies a willingness to go beyond the measure of what is correct. It is possible to explain that the Rambam is implying that once a person makes a commitment based on piety, this will influence the nature of his understanding and give him the insight to appreciate how this conduct is also appropriate according to wisdom (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XXXVII, p. 72ff.).

The commentaries note that the obligation to provide food for one’s animals before one partakes of one’s own meal is specifically mentioned in the Talmud (Berachot 40a, Gittin 62a), but those sources do not mention servants. Also, the prooftext cited by the Talmud differs. These two distinctions are dependent on each other. The Rambam cites a different prooftext because here his focus is on servants not on animals (Likkutei Sichot, loc. cit).
It must be noted that the researchers have found no explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source stating that one should feed one’s servants before one’s own self. As examples of kind conduct to servants, one can point to the Jerusalem Talmud’s description of the conduct of Rabbi Yochanan (Bava Kama 8:4), and the Babylonian Talmud’s description (Ketubot 61a) of the conduct of Avuha bar Ihi and Minimin bar Ihi.

Implied is that we should treat our slaves with mercy and kindness as we expect God to treat us.

In the curse of Canaan (Genesis 9:25).

The uncensored texts of the Mishneh Torah state “among the uncircumcised gentiles.”

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 19:17 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:2 which explain that such traits are characteristic of the Jewish people and when a person fails to manifest them, there is a question regarding his lineage.
It must, however, be noted that these sources do not mention the fact that God granted us “the goodness of the Torah” or our obligation to emulate God’s qualities. It is possible to explain that a person’s natural tendency to mercy has limitations. Certainly, a merciful person will not be cruel to his servants or animals. Nevertheless, these natural feelings will not necessarily motivate him to be generous to the extent that he would see to their needs before his own. Such a commitment will result only from “the goodness of the Torah” and the emulation of God’s qualities (Likkutei Sichot, loc. cit.).

See Hilchot De’ot 1:6 which explains that man must endeavor to shape his character by emulating the attributes which God manifests.