Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., twelve years old, after manifesting signs of physical maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:1).

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 2, a woman past majority is not sold by the court for a theft, nor does she have the right to sell herself. Nor can a girl below majority sell herself, for she does not have an independent financial capacity. Exodus 21:7 states that the right to sell a girl is granted to a father. The Mechilta states that her mother is not given this prerogative.

See Hilchot Ishut 2:2.

Arichin 76a derives this law through deduction. If manifesting signs of physical maturity is a sufficient cause for a maid-servant to be released (Halachah 5), it is certainly sufficient to prevent her from being sold.

See Hilchot Ishut 3:11.

An aylonit is a woman who will never manifest signs of female sexual maturity. Hilchot Ishut 2:6 lists several physical signs that are considered definite indicators of such a condition.

In the case of an aylonit, she is considered to be below the age of majority until the age of 20 even though she has manifested signs of her physical condition. If she does not manifest physical signs that she is an aylonit or physical signs of sexual maturity, she is considered to be below majority until she reaches the age of 35. See Ibid.:4.

A person whose genital area is covered by a sheet of flesh, and thus it cannot be determined whether the person is male or female. Because of the doubt, all the stringencies that apply with regard to both males and females are applied to this person. (See Ibid. 2:25.)

A person who has both male and female sexual organs, and thus it was not determined by the Sages whether such a person is considered as a male or a female. Because of the doubt, all the stringencies that apply with regard to both males and females are applied to this person. (See Ibid.:24.)

Neither by the court, nor by himself.

By her father.

As mentioned in the commentary to Chapter 2. Halachah 9, the father does not have a Scriptural commandment to redeem his daughter. Therefore the Rambam offers an explanation why the father is compelled to redeem his daughter.

I.e., the family’s reputation will suffer from the shame of having sold a daughter into servitude.

I.e., we do not compel her relatives to redeem her.

And anything less than a p’rutah is not significant.

Or an agent of his.

In contrast to a servant who sells himself, who may sell himself for a longer period as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 12.

This proof-text refers to a servant sold by the court, not one who sells himself, and it concludes: “He shall serve you for six years and in the seventh year, you shall send him away free.”

See Chapter 3, Halachah 7, in contrast to a Hebrew servant who must serve his deceased master’s son, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 12.

And this proof-text refers to a servant whose ear is pierced.

Although this proof-text was also used to teach us that a Hebrew maid-servant receives a severance gift (Chapter 3, Halachah 13), Kiddushin 17b explains that it can be used to teach both concepts.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 11.

See Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 2, for a description of these signs.

Entirely, as is true with regard to any young girl.

At the age of 20 or 35, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:4-5.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 4, which explains that Canaanite slaves are released when their master destroys one of their prominent limbs.

4:10.

I.e., by selling his daughter as a servant, a father is also giving her master the right to marry her, as implied by Exodus 21:8 - or have his son marry her (Ibid.:9) - if the master desires. Since the father has the authority to consecrate her while she is below the age of majority without her consent (Hilchot Ishut 3:11), his sale of her can retroactively become a consecration. See Halachah 8.

For once she is designated as a wife, she is no longer considered a servant,, and her marriage is dissolved in the same manner as that of any other woman.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 233) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 43) consider designation of a Hebrew maid-servant as a wife to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

For the consecration of a woman as a wife must be performed in the presence of two witnesses (Hilchot Ishut 1:1).

I.e., even if a p’rutah’s worth of time does not remain from her period of servitude, she may be designated as a wife.

I.e., the money given her father for her purchase as a maid-servant.

The Kessef Mishneh states that once the master designates the maid-servant as a wife, the consecration takes effect retroactively from the time of her purchase. See Halachah 15.

I.e., one woman.

For a man cannot consecrate a woman until he reaches majority. No exception is made in the case of the designation of a maid-servant (Kiddushin 19a).

Appointing him as his agent. For a man must either consecrate his wife himself or charge an agent with doing so.

Kiddushin 19a states that the maid-servant must be notified that she has been designated as a wife. The Kessef Mishneh interprets this to mean that she must consent to the marriage. Otherwise, of what value would notifying her be? Tosafot and the Rashba in their commentaries on that Talmudic passage differ and maintain that once the girl is sold as a maid-servant, her master may marry her without her consent or the consent of her father.

I.e., thus the son can never be the active agent in designating the maid-servant as his wife.

As stated in Halachah 4.

I.e., if the husband is a priest who is forbidden to become impure because of contact with a human corpse. He may - and indeed is obligated to - become impure in burying his wife. This applies only with regard to a woman with whom the husband has entered nisuin, marriage, not merely erusin, consecration (Hilchot Eivel 2:7).

Our Sages granted a husband the right to inherit his wife’s estate, but this also applies only after nisuin, not after erusin (Hilchot Ishut 22:1-3).

After a woman is consecrated, her husband and her father must both decide to nullify her vows together. Once she is married, her husband nullifies her vows alone (Hilchot Nedarim 11:9).

I.e., entering into privacy with her husband, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 10:1.

In Halachah 5.

The completion of six years, the advent of the Jubilee, the death of the master and the transfer of a bill of release, as stated in Halachah 6.
In the standard printings of the Mishneh Torah, the latter phrase is part of Halachah 10. We have placed it at the conclusion of Halachah 9 on the basis of authoritative manuscripts and because of the easier conceptual flow.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 261) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 45) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

By not designating her as his wife, he is considered to have betrayed her.

I.e., since it is forbidden to sell a Hebrew servant as a slave (see Chapter 1, Halachah 3 and notes), one could conclude that it is forbidden to sell him to another person. Nevertheless, since the Torah granted a master permission to give a maid-servant to his son as a wife, one might assume that she could also be given to other persons. Therefore, the Torah explicitly states that this is forbidden.

As opposed to marriages between close relatives as the Rambam continues to explain.

For a marriage between a person and his granddaughter (– or the other close relatives mentioned in this halachah –) is forbidden and is not binding (Hilchot Ishut 1:7).

And not only is one permitted to marry a brother’s daughter, it is a mitzvah to do so.
In his gloss on this halachah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this law applies only when the father in fact has another son who is past majority – or will reach majority during the maiden’s servitude. Otherwise, it is not possible for the maid-servant to be designated as a wife.

The rite that frees a woman from her obligation to perform levirate marriage to her deceased husband’s brother when her husband dies childless. See Deuteronomy, Chapter 25.

The Rambam is speaking about an instance where the woman became widowed or divorced after erusin. If she became widowed or divorced after nisuin, she cannot be sold as a maid-servant, as stated in the following halachah.

After nisuin. Kiddushin 18a derives this as follows: Exodus 21:8 states: “He does not have the authority to sell her to a different man, when he betrays her.” Even though on a simple level the verse refers to the prohibition against a master selling a maid-servant, it also can be interpreted as a prohibition against the father selling his daughter after she was married. In that context, bibigdo baw, translated as “when he betrays her,” can be interpreted as “and he [the girl’s husband] spread his garment over her.”

The Rambam exemplifies this concept in the following halachah. Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:2, the Rambam states that a Hebrew maid-servant may not be sold a second time.

This is speaking about an instance where the master designated the maid-servant as his wife, but died before completing nisuin. As mentioned in Halachah 9, the designation of a maid-servant as a wife is considered as erusin and not nisuin.

Her deceased husband’s brother.

For chalitzah to be effective, the widow must be above majority, as stated in Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:16.

Ibid.:26.

In Halachah 12.

For as mentioned in Halachah 7, when the master designates the maid-servant as his wife retroactively it is considered as if the consecration took effect from the time the girl was sold. Thus, at the time when her father consecrated her to the second person she was already consecrated, and his act is of no consequence.
The situation can be compared to a person who consecrates a woman with the stipulation that after 30 days, the consecration will take effect retroactively. If another person consecrates her during that time, she is consecrated to the first individual (Kiddushin 19b).

But until the girl’s servitude is completed, the marriage cannot be consummated, lest the master decide to designate her as his wife.

This is a principle that applies not only in the present context, but with regard to the entire Torah. See other examples in Hilchot Ishut 6:9-10 and Hilchot Nezirut 1:13.

The term Canaanite refers to any gentile slave. Perhaps the term is derived from the Biblical malediction (Genesis 9:5): “Cursed is Canaan; he shall be a slave to slaves.”
See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:9, which states that a Canaanite slave must accept the mitzvot that he is obligated to observe (all the negative commandments, and those positive commandments whose observance is not dependent on time). If he is not willing to accept those commandments, he must be sold to gentiles. He must also be immersed in the mikveh, and a male slave must be circumcised. When these steps are taken, “he has departed from the general category of gentiles, but has not yet entered the general category of Jews” (ibid. 12:11).

Significantly, here the Rambam does not mention hagbahah, lifting up the slave, although he does mention that means of acquisition in Hilchot Mechirah 2:2. See also the notes on that halachah.

See Halachot 4-17.
The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:26) maintain that a slave may also be granted his freedom through chalifin.

Thus, if the master calls to him and the slave comes, he acquires him. This does not apply with regard to a slave past the age of majority, for he is considered to be acting on his own volition and not on the impetus of the master.

See Hilchot Mechirah 2:1-4, which states:
1. A Canaanite slave is considered as landed property with regard to [the laws of] acquisition and can be acquired through [the transfer of] money and a deed of sale, or through chazakah.
2. What manifestation of ownership is [effective] in acquiring a slave? To make use of him as one makes use of a slave in the presence of his [previous] master.
3. If [the new owner] pushes [the slave] and brings him close to him, he acquires him. For a Canaanite slave can be acquired through meshichah in this manner. If, however, he called the slave and he came to him, or [the slave’s] previous owner told him to go to the purchaser, and he followed [those instructions], [the new owner] does not acquire him.
And Hilchot Mechirah 5:5 states:
Landed property, slaves, livestock and all other movable property can be acquired through [the kinyan referred to as] chalifin. The fundamental manner in which [such a transaction is effected is as follows]: The purchaser gives the seller any type of article and tells him: “Acquire this article for the courtyard,...” “... wine,...” “... animal,...” or “... slave that you sold me for this and this [amount of money].”

In this instance, the Rambam’s question is more than a stylistic introduction. There is a theoretical difficulty. A Canaanite slave does not have an independent financial capacity. Everything that he acquires belongs to his master. And thus it is impossible for him to possess money - or to be given money - that becomes his own property. Therefore, the money must be given to the master by another person or given to the slave specifically with this intent in mind. In this instance, the master does not acquire the money until he grants the slave his freedom. See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13-14.

It is taken for granted that a person would rather be free than serve as a slave.

This is a general principle applying with regard to all matters of financial law. (See also Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2.)
See also the statements of the Lechem Mishneh, who states that if the slave protests and does not desire his freedom, he cannot be required to become free against his will. The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 267) differs and maintains that the slave can be freed again this will. Rabbenu Nissim, however, states that according to the Rambam and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, the slave must consent. See Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 267:43). From the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:41), it would appear that he accepts the latter view.

I.e., in contrast to a Hebrew servant, a master is not obligated to free his Canaanite slave when he is offered the money for his redemption. Instead, the option is the master’s. If he desires to retain the slave he may, and if he desires to release him, he may.

In most instances, merchandise worth money serves the same purpose as money. The only exceptions are matters like the redemption of the firstborn or the redemption of produce from the second tithe, where the Torah explicitly states that silver is required.

The observance of the transfer by the witnesses makes the slave’s release effective. See the parallel in Hilchot Gerushin 1:15.

The signature of the witnesses on the document validates it and effects the release. See Ibid.:16 and notes.
This is the Rambam’s view. Tosafot maintain that the signature of the witnesses on the deed of release does not, in and of itself, validate the document. Nevertheless, if we see that a deed of release is signed by witnesses, we assume that it was transferred to the slave in an acceptable manner. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:44), which quotes both opinions without indicating which is favored.

Since the slave does not possess an independent financial capacity, one might think that he is not capable of taking possession of the deed of release. Hence, the Rambam provides these words of explanation.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that if a kinyan chalifin is performed, a slave is released. The Ra’avad’s assertions are based on Gittin 39b. The Rambam interprets that passage differently, however, and according to his interpretation, chalifin is not effective. See Kessef Mishneh.

Although the master’s verbal statement is not sufficient to grant the slave freedom in and of itself, once that statement is made we compel the master to free the servant, as the Rambam states in Chapter 8, Halachah 17.

This is the expression that is used in a bill of divorce. Nevertheless, it is appropriate only in that context and not with regard to the release of a Canaanite maid-servant (Kiddushin 6b).

As indicated in Halachah 13, the master need not have the intent of harming the slave. Nevertheless, he must have the intent to strike him, as stated in Halachah 11. Note also the sources cited by the Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 267:46.

See Exodus 21:26-27.

And on the basis of this extrapolation, require a slave to be freed when he is caused to lose any of the other 24 limbs.

Castration violates a negative commandment of the Torah. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 16:10-11.) Similarly, cutting out a slave’s tongue is an act of cruelty that is improper, as indicated by Chapter 9, Halachah 8. Nevertheless, if the master does perform such an act the slave is not freed.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:28, based on the ruling of Rabbenu Asher) states that if the servant’s testicles are cut off from his body entirely, he should be freed. If, however, the testicles remain in their sac, he accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

As required of a slave purchased by a Jew. See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:9, 12:11.

The positive mitzvot whose observance is not dependent on time, and all of the negative commandments - i.e., all the mitzvot in which women are obligated.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:9, a Jew may own a gentile slave for up to 12 months while the slave considers the acceptance of the religious obligations incumbent upon him. If, at the end of that period, the slave does not desire to accept those obligations, the Jew must sell him to a gentile. He may not maintain possession for a longer time.

The Rambam’s ruling indicates that the freeing of a slave because of the loss of the tips of his limbs or organs is a measure of consideration shown to a slave who has – at least to a limited degree – joined the Jewish people. Otherwise, since a slave is the property of his master, the master is not penalized for causing such an injury.

Rashi, Kiddushin 25a, states that a man’s nipples do not project outward significantly enough to be considered as the tip of an organ. He makes these statements with regard to the laws of tzara’at. There are, however, commentaries which explain that the same rationale applies in this instance. Others explain that a man’s nipples – in contrast to a woman’s – are not at all functional.

See also Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:7, which considers such a finger to be one of a person’s limbs.

Note the contrast to Halachah 9.

Tosafot, Bava Kama 98a ask why the servant is released because of such a loss, for the loss is not necessarily evident in the slave’s body. They offer two answers: a) the loss is evident in the slave’s functioning, b) our Sages did not require that the loss be evident, but rather that a loss take place in a limb that is evident.

I.e., the master did not strike the slave’s eye directly, but instead struck another portion of his head that caused his eye – or ear – to lose its function. Rashi, Kiddushin 24b, offers a different interpretation of the passage on which this law is based, and it is Rashi’s interpretation that is quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:35).

For the blemish is not comprehensive enough to warrant the slave’s being released.

For it is as if the eye or the tooth had already been removed.

For ultimately, the slave will be able to use that hand.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, based on Halachah 4, which states that a person who castrates a slave is not required to free him. What, he asks, is the difference between the two instances? In both cases the master prevents the servant from using the organ in question. He offers two resolutions, both of them somewhat forced, but in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:30), he quotes the Rambam’s ruling verbatim.

Significantly, Kiddushin 24b uses a different proof-text. The proof-text stated by the Rambam is, however, quoted in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai.

As evident from Halachah 13, the master need not have the intent to damage the slave; he must, however, have the intent to strike him.
As will be mentioned in the notes on Halachah 13, the Rambam’s ruling is based on his interpretation of Bava Kama 26b and Kiddushin 24b. Tosafot and the Tur have a different interpretation of this passage, on which basis they rule that the slave is freed even if the master does not intend to injure him. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:36) quote the Rambam’s ruling. but the Siftei Cohen 267:46 mentions the other views.

I.e., the fetus after it is born. The mother is certainly not granted her freedom.

Kiddushin 24b cites this instance as an example of the principle mentioned in the previous halachah, that one must intend to strike the servant for him to be freed.

The commentaries note that the concept mentioned in Halachah 11 and the instance mentioned in this halachah are considered by Bava Kama 26b as representing opposing views. Hence, the commentaries question how the Rambam could accept both perspectives as law.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that from Kiddushin 24b (which quotes the instance mentioned in Halachah 12), one can conclude that a distinction must be made between an instance where the master had the intent of touching the slave and erred and damaged his eye, and an instance where he had no intent of touching him at all.

In this instance, although the master’s intent was for the slave’s benefit, he did intend to remove the slave’s eye. In the first instance, by contrast, the removal of the eye was a mistake.

I.e., the slave deserves his freedom because of the loss of his tooth. Therefore, he deserves payment for the damages to his eye.
The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, based on the Rambam’s own statements (Hilchot Chovel Umazik 4:11):
For this reason, if an owner knocks out one of his slave’s teeth and then blinds his eye, he must free him because of his tooth, but he is not required to pay him because of the eye. If, however, the servant seizes the assessment [that would be due him], it is not expropriated from him.
The ruling in Hilchot Chovel UMazik is based on the concept that Bava Kama 74a questions whether or not causing the slave the injury is considered as freeing him and thus granting him an independent financial capacity or whether he must be given a bill of release to attain that capacity.
Since there is a doubt whether or not the slave possesses such a capacity, the owner is not required to pay him the damages, for until the slave receives that capacity all moneys due him belong to his master, and his master is never obligated to pay him anything. On the other hand, if the servant seizes the money due him, it is possible that the money is rightfully his, for he may already have attained his independent financial capacity. Therefore, he is not required to return it.
Based on the above explanation, the Kessef Mishneh explains that in our halachah, the Rambam is speaking about an instance where the second injury was made after the master wrote the bill of release. Alternatively, his intent is that if the servant does in fact seize the money, it should not be taken from him.

I.e., he blinds his eye and then knocks out his tooth or causes him to lose the tips of any other limbs or organs. If, however, he blinds both eyes, knocks out two teeth or causes him to lose two other tips of limbs and organs, simultaneously, he is not liable (Mechilta, Exodus 21:27).

For example, the slave had been jointly owned by two masters and one freed him, and one did not. See Chapter 7, Halachah 2.

The Radbaz notes that Chapter 7, Halachah 7, states that the master of a slave who is half free is compelled to free him. ln such an instance, however the freed slave is obligated to reimburse the master for half his value. If the slave would be released because of the loss of the tips of his limbs or organs, by contrast, he would not be under any obligation to his former master.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that although Bava Kama 90a mentions the opinions of many Sages of the Mishnah who differ with this ruling, since the Sages of the Gemara debate concerning it, we assume that it is accepted as law.

The term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property that a woman brought to the home, for which the husband accepts a fixed responsibility. They are evaluated at the beginning of the marriage and in the event of his death or divorce, his estate or he must pay the value determined to his wife. Thus, such property does not belong to the woman any longer. See Hilchot Ishut 16:1.

For he is their sole owner.

For he is no longer their owner.

The term nichsei m’log refers to property that a woman brought to the home, for which the husband accepts no responsibility. He is allowed to use this in an ordinary way. In the event of the husband’s death or divorce, the woman receives the property back in whatever state it is in. If it is damaged or destroyed the husband is not liable. See Hilchot Ishut, ibid.

And not their bodies. Ownership of an object’s use does not define a person as their owner. (See Hilchot Bechorot 4:6.) Moreover, even if he were considered their owner, the ownership would be joint, together with his wife, in which case the law mentioned in the previous halachah would apply.

For her husband has the right to use them.

I.e., both in Eretz Yisrael and in the Diaspora.

I.e., its practice is not, as is the observance of certain other commandments including the laws governing a Hebrew servant, limited to the time when the Temple exists or the Jubilee year is practiced.

This refers to the semichah, the ordination of judges that extends back to Moses our teacher, as described in Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 4.
On the basis of this statement, the commentaries have raised question with regard to the Rambam’s previous statement that this law is practiced “in every time.” For the type of Rabbinical ordination we are speaking about was nullified in the era following the composition of the Mishnah. The commentaries explain that as mentioned in Hilchot Sanhedrin 4:11, the practice of semichah can be renewed even in the Diaspora, under certain conditions.
The Kessef Mishneh offers a different interpretation, explaining that the intent is not that in the present era, the release of slaves because of an injury is not practiced. This is not so, for in the present era (see Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:17), if a person to whom a fine is owed seizes what is due him, he is allowed to maintain possession. Thus, in this instance, since the servant is in possession of his own physical person, he is granted his release.
Thus, the Kessef Mishneh continues, the intent is that in the era when there were judges with semichah, if a person admitting injuring his slave before witnesses testified, he would not be liable, for a person is not liable to pay a fine unless witnesses testify to his guilt before he admits it in court, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8. In the present era, since there are no judges with semichah, this law does not apply.
The Radbaz accepts the first part of the Kessef Mishneh’s reasoning and notes that the second portion is accepted by the Ramban. It cannot, however, be used as an explanation of the Rambam’s position. For in Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:18, he states that an admission made in a court today is considered binding.

The Rambam defines a fine (k’nas) as any case in which a person pays more or less than the value of the damage or injury he caused (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8). Since the injury he caused the slave is not worth the slave’s entire value, this case falls into this category.

Our translation follows the version of the Mishneh Torah found in authentic manuscripts and early printings, and it is the version followed by the Kessef Mishneh. The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah states “admits to him.”

I.e., the master is not liable to bring a guilt offering if he takes an oath that he did not injure his servant, and then it is discovered that he did injure him (Kessef Mishneh).
The rationale is that a person is liable to bring a guilt offering only when his admission would have obligated him to pay money. In this instance, a person who admits the obligation is not liable to pay. Hence, he would not be liable to bring a sacrifice.
Alternatively, the intent is that abstractly, according to Scriptural Law, the master is not liable to free the servant (Kessef Mishneh). According to this interpretation, the text found in the standard printed versions of the Mishneh Torah, “the master admits,” is preferable – i.e., because of his admission, he is not liable (Kin’at Eliyahu).

Chapter 1, Halachah 4.

From that point onward, he attains his own financial capacity and is no longer considered his master’s property. If his master desires to retract, he no longer has the capacity.

I.e., even without his knowledge. As stated above, it is taken for granted that a servant will desire his freedom.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s ruling (which echoes that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi) is based on the concept that the word “Give” indicates that the master does not desire the release to take effect until the deed is given.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that Rashi and Tosafot in their commentaries on Gittin 13a offer a slightly different interpretation, explaining that the intent is that the master did not give the agent a bill of release. Instead, he instructed the agent to compose a bill and give it to the slave. According to these views [as stated by the Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:76)], if the master gave the agent a bill of release, the slave is released even if he told him to give it to him.

Since the master died before the bill of release reached the slave’s hands, it is no longer effective. For the slave has already become the property of the master’s heirs.

See the commentary of the Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De’ah 267) which states that there is a doubt whether or not these expressions are effective. Therefore, although the master may not compel the slave to perform work, the slave is not considered a free man and may not marry into the Jewish community.

Gittin 40b explains that in contrast to the expressions mentioned in the first clause, this expression indicates merely a promise to free the slave. It does not bring about the slave’s release.

We do not accept the slave’s statements as proof that he has not been released, because it is possible that, without the slave’s knowing, the master had another person acquire the bill of release for him as stated in Halachah 1. Therefore, the slave is considered a free man. Rabbenu Asher maintains that not only is he forbidden to enter into relations with a Canaanite maid-servant, he is even granted the right to marry into the Jewish people. Rabbenu Nissim does not accept the latter point and requires him to produce a bill of release before he marries a Jewish woman. See Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 267:96.

This is a principle applied in many areas of Jewish business law. Although the owner also has made a statement – that the slave is no longer his property – priority is given to the statement made by the slave. Perhaps the owner considered the option of freeing the slave, and although he did not actually do so, thought that he did. Alternatively, the slave was previously the property of the owner, and thus he is considered his property until it is proven otherwise (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:12).
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:75) states that if the master does not admit having erred, he is compelled to free him.

She is not freed, and any children she bears are considered slaves.

I.e., they cannot compel her to perform labor.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:5.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 9:12, which with regard to a similar situation states: “She should be given only the type of work she desires from all the types of work that are known [to be performed] by servants in that locale.”
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:77) states that this maid-servant may not be sold to another person. The Siftei Cohen 267:98 states that there are authorities who maintain that if the maid-servant will not be satisfied unless she is freed, she must be freed.

Each of the six matters are discussed at length in the following halachot. See Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 579), which adds another point, stating that a slave’s bill of release should be written on twelve lines like a woman’s bill of divorce.

The term kuti refers to the Samaritans, gentiles who were brought by the King of Assyria to live in Eretz Yisrael after the Ten Tribes were exiled (See II Kings 17:24.) Afterwards, they converted to Judaism. They were not, however, precise in their observance and hence were always considered different from the Jewish people as a whole (see Bava Kama 38b). See the following halachah, which states that in the present era, they are placed in an entirely different category.

According to some authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this clause is included in the previous halachah.

Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 27:1.

Jewish witnesses are required for these documents since the transfer of these documents brings about a transition in ritual status. In contrast to other legal documents that record transactions concluded by other kinyanim, these documents are not merely records of a transactions; they are the means that bring about the transition.
Similarly, as the Rambam writes in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, loc. cit., acknowledgments of debts, presents, compromises, waivers and other financial matters that are concluded by the transfer of the legal document are also unacceptable unless they are signed by Jewish witnesses.

This law is dependent on the principle stated later on, that witnesses to a bill of divorce and a bill of release must sign in each other’s presence. With regard to other matters, we do not accept the signature of the kuti, because we fear that he might not be an acceptable witness. With regard to these documents, by contrast, since the kuti signs in the presence of the Jew, we do not suspect that the Jew would have signed unless he knew that the kuti was an acceptable witness (Turei Zahav 267:19).

Chulin 6a relates that an image of a dove that they worshipped was found in their sanctuary, and from that time onward they were considered outright gentiles.

The students of Tzadok and Boethus who broke away from Jewish observance and denied the validity of the Oral Law.
In a related issue, the Siftei Cohen 267:59 states that the Karaites in the present age are not acceptable as witnesses in any context. Contemporary authorities place the same restrictions on Conservative and Reform Jews today.

I.e., with her in mind. See Hilchot Gerushin 1:3 and 3:1-4.

The Tosefta, Gittin 2:9 explains that the use of the term law, “to her,” in both verses, established an equation (gezerah shavah) between the two instances. The Turei Zahav 267:20 explains that even without establishing an equation between the two, the same exegesis can be applied in both instances.

I.e., the substance on which the bill of divorce is written must be able to be given directly to the woman to be divorced. There may not be a need to detach the substance from the ground or from any other substance to which it is connected. See Hilchot Gerushin 1:6.

In this instance, the Turei Zahav 267:21 states that a gezerah shavah is necessary to teach the concept.

See Hilchot Gerushin 9:29, which states that this law was instituted as a precaution lest a person instruct a group of many people to sign a bill of divorce and the bill be given to the woman after it was signed by only two witnesses. We fear that she will not know about the stipulation and think that the bill of divorce is acceptable.

See Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 7, which explains that when a person brings a bill of divorce from one place to another in the diaspora, or from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael, he must state that the bill of divorce was written and signed in his presence. Gittin 2a explains that although we assume that a legal document is acceptable, after it is presented, one of the principals may protest and claim that the document is a forgery. In that instance, the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses must be verified. Since the bill of divorce was brought from the diaspora, we fear that witnesses to verify the signatures will not be found. Therefore, our Sages ordained that if the agent bringing the bill of divorce states that it was written and signed in his presence, it is considered as if the signatures were verified.

See Hilchot Gerushin 7:6, which states that once the agent makes these statements, the husband’s protests alone are not sufficient to cast aspersions on the authenticity of the legal document. To disqualify it, he must prove that the witnesses’ signatures are forgeries.

I.e., she does not have to say that the bill of divorce was written and signed in her presence, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 7:24.

We accept the woman’s statements because of the principle of migo – i.e., had she desired to lie, she could have told a more encompassing falsehood. Instead of saying that the bill of divorce was written and signed in her presence, she could have claimed that the all divorce proceedings had been completed. Had she made such statements, her word would have been accepted, because she had the bill of divorce in her possession.

Hilchot Gerushin 7:23 states that this law applies when the husband gives the bill of divorce to the woman on the condition that she act as an agent and take it to another locale, where the divorce would be completed. Once she makes such statements her word is accepted. The Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s statements here and in Hilchot Gerushin. In his gloss on Hilchot Gerushin 7:24, the Maggid Mishneh resolves the Rambam’s ruling.

As Hilchot Gerushin 6:6 states, this excludes a gentile, a slave, a deaf-mute, a mentally or emotionally incapable person and a minor.

For the slave does not possess an independent financial capacity. When he accepts something, he is accepting it on behalf of his master. And so, when the slave receiving the bill of release belongs to another person, it is as if the bill were given to his master for the sake of the slave being freed. This is acceptable, as stated in Halachah 1. But when the slave receiving the bill of release belongs to the same master as the slave being freed, the bill of release has never left the master’s domain, and therefore the slave is not freed.

I.e., because she is not freed, she is not consecrated, since a person may not consecrate a Canaanite maid-servant. If, however, he tells her only: “Be consecrated,” we assume that he freed her previously, and his consecration is binding (Kessef Mishneh).