Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Here we are not speaking about the price of the land, but its value per acre. There are times when a very large stretch of land is not very valuable, because the soil is of inferior quality, it is very far from water and the like. On the other hand, there may be a small stretch of land that is extremely valuable.
Our Sages divided land into three categories: inferior, intermediate and superior, and, as the Rambam proceeds to explain, determined which types of creditors are entitled to expropriate which type of land.
This categorization is dependent on the property each person individually possesses and not on universal standards. For example, if a person has several properties that would all be considered to be intermediate or superior when compared to the value of property at large, the least valuable among them is considered to be inferior. Conversely, if all the properties that he owned were of inferior quality, the most valuable among them is considered to be superior [Tur, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 102:1)].

Since the option is his, he will choose that which is of least value.

Literally, “doors would not be shut in the face of borrowers.” I.e., if a lender knew that he would receive only property of inferior quality, he would hesitate before - and perhaps refrain from - giving a loan.

In this instance, our Sages did not change the Scriptural ruling, because a person does not consider the possibility of the borrower’s dying before he lends him money (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 108:53).

Or his estate.
This principle applies not only to the repayment of loans, but also with regard to payment for damages, as reflected in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11.

The property that a person sold is considered to be a guarantor for his debts. Payment cannot be demanded from a guarantor before it is demanded from the debtor himself.

We do not say that the property of intermediate quality should be given to the debtor. Although our Sages granted him that advantage, they did not do so when it would come at the expense of anyone else.

Gittin 50b questions if a present is given the same status as a sale, for the recipient of a present did not spend anything for his acquisition, while the creditor did make an outlay of money. Nevertheless, the question is not resolved, and hence, the property is allowed to remain in the possession of the recipient.

And no longer fit to be sown.

For since the property was originally on lien to this debt, the fact that it was sold a second time does not destroy the lien.

The commentaries explain that this is referring to a situation where Levi purchased all the fields of intermediate value from Shimon. Since these are the fields that are designated for the creditor, the creditor has the right to expropriate them from Levi. On the other hand, he may choose to expropriate the fields of superior or inferior value from Shimon. He has that option because Shimon, as the purchaser of Reuven’ s fields, took responsibility for the debt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is speaking about a situation where Shimon purchased all Reuven’s fields at one time. Otherwise, the lien remains on the field that he purchased last. This interpretation is also cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 119:1).

Leaving Shimon with property of intermediate value.

And since Shimon was the one who purchased the property from Levi, the burden of payment rests on him first.

As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:7.

As stated in Halachah 1.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 16:3.

The lender should not be granted a higher grade of property than is due him according to law. Similarly, in all the cases that follow, unless there is no alternative, each person should be granted the grade of property due him or her according to law.

The woman is granted a higher grade of property because there is no alternative.

Since there is no alternative, the person who suffered damages is given a lesser grade of property.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Hagahot Maimoniot question why the damages can be collected from property that has been sold. Seemingly, as in the case of a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone, the matter is not one of public knowledge and the purchasers are unable to protect their interests. The Maggid Mishneh states that when a person causes damages to a colleague, the matter is spread by word of mouth and becomes public knowledge to a greater extent than a loan. Therefore, a person who has suffered damages has the right to expropriate property that was sold.
The Hagahot Maimoniot offer a different interpretation, explaining that this is speaking about an instance where the claim was brought to court and a decision rendered against the person who caused the damage. Such a matter, like a promissory note, will become public knowledge. Alternatively, they explain, since the obligation is of Scriptural origin, it is considered as if a promissory note was written.

In such an instance, the claimant might protest that he is entitled to a higher grade of property. The purchaser can, however, respond that (as stated in Halachah 2) this principle applies only when the original debtor possesses the higher grade. After the debtor sold the higher grade properties, all of the liens from the other debts - even those that previously were associated with other properties - fall on the property that remains in his possession, even if it is of inferior quality. When that last property is sold, it remains encumbered by all of these liens.

I.e., each type of creditor is allowed to expropriate property according to the principles stated above.

For then, it will be to the purchaser's advantage to follow this pattern of expropriation.
There are, however, other opinions that as long as the debtor is alive, in all instances, the creditors must expropriate the property of inferior value, for the purchaser had the right to return that property (or give any other present) to the seller/debtor and tell the creditors: “Now the debtor has property. You do not have the right to expropriate property from me until everything he possesses is taken” [Rabbenu Chanan’el as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh, Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 119:5)]. According to that view, the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the debtor died.

If, however, that property is not sufficient to pay all the debts, the remainder should be collected from the property that was sold second to last, even if it is of superior value (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

For when the property was in the purchaser’s possession, all of the debts should have been expropriated from this property. Hence, when this property was sold, the liens for all of the debts remain attached to it.

To say: “I left you a place from where you can expropriate your due.”

Since the ordinance was instituted for the purchaser’s benefit, he has this privilege (Bava Kama 8b).

Since this was the last property he purchased, at the time he purchased it all of the liens for the other debts were attached to it. If, however, the creditors desire to collect their due from the property that was sold to the second purchaser, they have that option (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 119:30).

As explained in Halachah 3, in such a situation the creditor has the option of collecting his due from either the first purchaser or the second purchaser, because this lien was originally associated with the property of superior quality. We assume that the creditor will desire to expropriate the property of superior value.

For these were the properties to which their liens were originally attached. Since he purchased the property of superior value last, the purchaser takes over the debtor’s position, as stated in Halachah 6. Hence, these creditors should expropriate their due from him.

The kinyan is necessary to make the note a binding legal document.

As stated above, as long as the debtor possessed property that was not sold, the creditor does not have the right to collect the debt from property that was sold. Hence, the primary lien for the debt is on the property that was sold last.

Since the loss was caused by the creditor himself, this situation does not resemble the circumstance described in Halachah 2, where a field was flooded. Although in both cases the creditor is unable to collect his debt from the property sold last, in the instance described by our halachah he himself caused himself this loss (Maggid Mishneh).

On the contrary, the property sold to the second purchaser was always on lien to the debt.

The only property he possesses.

For the creditor has a lien on the property and did not waive his privileges to expropriate the property from this purchaser.

I.e., the second purchaser can sue the first purchaser to return the money he paid for the field. When the first purchaser pays him, he can sue the original debtor, for he is responsible. He, however, will not have the resources to pay the debt, and that purchaser will look for another medium to recoup his loss and will tum to the creditor.

The creditor did not expropriate the property from the first purchaser directly. Nevertheless, since he did expropriate the property and the first creditor suffered the loss, the first creditor has the right to claim the property from him.

I.e., the second purchaser has the right to claim the property from the first purchaser, because he paid for the land. Hence, once the land is in the possession of the first purchaser, the second purchaser can demand that it be returned to him, and then he will pay the first purchaser the price of the field.

For as above, he has not agreed to exonerate him from having the property expropriated from him.

Where each party will forgo something so that a final settlement can be reached.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling on several counts:
a) There are only two parties who are required to sacrifice to engage in the compromise, the creditor and one of the purchasers, because one of the purchasers received his money.
b) When the first purchaser expropriates the property from creditor, the creditor suffered the loss and he has no one to whom he can appeal to for redress. Why should the cycle continue any further?
c) The second purchaser does not have to surrender the property to the creditor, because he can declare, “Desist; otherwise, I will return the field to the first purchaser and nullify his sale of the property to me.”
The Maggid Mishneh sustains the Ra’avad’s objections. He maintains, however, that the text possessed by the Ra’avad was incorrect. The version of this halachah that he suggests [and which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 118:2)] states:
The borrower sold a field to a purchaser and then sold another field to another purchaser. The creditor writes to the second purchaser, pledging that he would not expropriate the property.... The creditor may expropriate the first field from the first purchaser. The first purchaser may then expropriate the second field from the second purchaser.... The second purchaser may expropriate the first field from the creditor.... And the cycle continues....

I.e., the person who received the promissory note first or who first engaged in a binding kinyan in the presence of witnesses.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the lender possesses property, a lender whose loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone is given the same status as a person whose loan is supported by a promissory note.

Even when the due date of the second creditor precedes that of the first, if the second creditor expropriated the property and the borrower is unable to pay the first creditor, the first creditor may expropriate the property from the second creditor [Rashba, Responsum 1115; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 104:1)].

With regard to movable property, see the following halachah and notes.

Note, however, the following halachah which suggests a provision that extends the creditor’s rights.

Bava Batra 157b states that ideally, the properties should be equally divided among all the creditors.

The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 104:6) states that this ruling applies even if a creditor seized the property on his own initiative. Even though this is not what our Sages desired, since no other creditor has a greater claim than he, he is allowed to maintain possession. The Siftei Cohen 104:14 differs and maintains that it applies only in a situation where the debtor himself gave this creditor the property, or it was awarded to him erroneously by the court.

Since the field was already on lien to one creditor, the fact that the debtor took on another responsibility does not detract from that lien.

In one of his responsa (Responsum 61, quoted by the Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 104), the Ramban writes that a person whose debt precedes another has the right to expropriate movable property before the person whose debt comes afterwards. It is only when a person whose debt was made afterwards has already expropriated the property that we say that there is no concept of precedence with regard to movable property. This approach is quoted as halachah by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 104:3). The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 104:1 differs with this ruling and supports the simple meaning of the Rambam’s statements in Halachah 4.

Indeed, if the initial debtor seizes the movable property from the later debtor who expropriated it, it is removed from his possession and returned to the person who expropriated it (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., a person who is not himself a creditor.

Based on the principle that a person can act on his colleague’s behalf without that person’s knowledge, he seeks to acquire the property for him. Ordinarily, this would be acceptable, because it is as if he was appointed as an agent by him. Nevertheless, in this instance, since he is causing a loss to another person, this principle is not applied.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 105:1) state that even when the lender explicitly appoints a person as his agent, when a loss is caused to another person, the agent may not expropriate property on behalf of the principle.

I.e., the other creditors who cannot acquire the property if it is being seized by this person.

If, however, the person seizing the property for his colleague is himself a creditor, since he would have the right to seize this property for himself, he may seize it for his colleague [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 105:2)].

I.e., there are no other creditors.

The borrower cannot protest: “I have no business with you. You have no right to expropriate my property.”
Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi states that this law applies only in an instance where the creditor for whom the person is trying to acquire is likely to suffer a loss - e.g., the debtor is dying and all he owns is movable property, or the debtor is in a difficult financial position and may lose all his resources. If, however, the debtor is solvent and healthy, he can tell the person: “You are not an involved party. Let the creditor come to collect his debt himself.” This concept is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 105:4).

This applies even when this will cause the other creditors a loss. See Chapter 16, Halachah 2.

This applies to the date when the loan was given, at which time the lien begins. The date when the loan is due is not at all significant in this context (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 104:22).

In this instance, as in Halachah 1, it would be preferable at the outset for the property to be divided equally among all the creditors. If, however, one of the creditors seizes it, after the fact it is not expropriated from him. The Ra’avad and other authorities protest the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that he should have stated that the property should be equally divided. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 104:8), however, follow the Rambam’s perspective.

This statement appears to imply that even at the outset, there is no concept of precedence with regard to movable property and it should be divided equally among all claimants. As mentioned above, there is a responsum from the Ramban, on which basis the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 104:1) rules that the creditor whose promissory note is dated first has the right to expropriate movable property first.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this law applies only to movable property on which the borrower did not establish a lien by virtue of the lien on the landed property.

In all these cases, none of the creditors is given priority over the others.

According to this perspective, the fact that one creditor is owed more than another is not significant and each are given equal shares. Thus, those that are owed more lose not only a greater amount, but a greater percentage of the amount they lent.

100 zuz.

For he has received all the money due him.

The commentaries question why the Rambam adds the word “only.” For this creditor has also received all the money owed him.

This approach is suggested by Rabbenu Chanan’el. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 104:10) and the later authorities, however, all follow the approach explained by the Rambam (which is based on the teachings of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi).

Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 43:43, which states that the same laws apply even if Reuven’s promissory note is dated the 28th of Nissan.

Since Shimon’s promissory note does not explicitly state when his lien takes effect, Reuven’s claim supersedes his. For Reuven has a definite claim, while Shimon’s is not definite.

I.e., if in addition to the field that was in Levi’s possession, Levi had owned another field that he had sold in Iyyar or afterwards. That field is on lien to the debts. Nevertheless, the purchaser can prevent Shimon from expropriating it from him by using the argument the Rambam advances.

The month after Nissan. If the field was sold during Nissan, Shimon does not have the right to expropriate the field, because the purchaser can claim that the field was sold before the debt was made.

The purchaser can claim that Shimon is not the one who should be presenting the claim to him. For Shimon should be given the field that had not been sold. He should expropriate that field from Reuven, and Reuven should then claim the property that the purchaser acquired.

If Reuven alone came demanding payment, the purchaser could also rebuff his claim, saying that the claim should be advanced by Shimon, and not Reuven. For he could claim that Reuven should receive the field that was not sold, and Shimon should seek to expropriate the field. It is only when one person comes demanding payment jointly on behalf of both creditors that he is forced to relinquish the field.

This halachah is based on a Talmudic passage from Ketubot 94b. Rashi interprets that passage as referring to a situation where a person sold the same field to two persons, as in the final instance mentioned by the Rambam. The Rambam interprets the passage as dealing with promissory notes as in the first instance he describes. As a corollary, however, he adds that the same principles would apply with regard to deeds of sale.

For, as stated in Halachah 3, when a person purchases the field, the seller explicitly states that he will make restitution if the property and its increase are expropriated from the purchaser (Bava Metzia 15a).
The Maggid Mishneh states that, according to the Rambam - as evident from the clauses of this halachah - a creditor can expropriate a field’s increase in value only when the borrower extended the lien to property that he would acquire in the future. And as the Rambam states in Chapter 18, Halachah 1, if the borrower does not stipulate that the lender has this right, it is not granted to him.
The Siftei Cohen 115:2,5 differs with the Maggid Mishneh and maintains that the Rambam’s intent is that the increase in the field’s value that comes as a matter of course can be expropriated by the creditor even if the borrower did not make such a stipulation. When, however, the increase in value comes because of the purchaser’s investment, the creditor cannot expropriate the increase in value unless such a stipulation was made. He supports this contention with a comparison to the rights of a firstborn for a double share of his father’s inheritance. The firstborn is not given a double share of property that is ra’ui - i.e., ultimately, it will accrue to the estate, but is not possessed by the estate at present. The ruling is that a firstborn receives a double share of a property’s increase in value when the increase comes about as a matter of course, but not when the increase comes about through investment in the estate.

For had the field remained in the possession of the debtor, this increase also would have taken place (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:2).
The Rashba, Rabbenu Zarchiyah HaLevi and many other authorities differ with the Rambam on this issue and maintain that even when the field’s increase in value comes as a matter of course, the purchaser is allowed to retain half. The Tur and the Ramah accept the view of these authorities, while the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1) quotes the Rambam’s view. The Siftei Cohen, loc. cit. defends the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of his earlier ruling. The property is considered as if it belonged to the creditor at the outset, and thus he is entitled to the increase.

Since this increase comes as a direct result of the purchaser’s investment, he is given a share in the increase. Nevertheless, the purchaser receives only half of the increase, because the investment was made on an existing property. The increase was due to the inherent value of that property, and that property was on lien to another creditor. Thus, as the Rambam explains in the later clauses of the halachah, it is considered as if the property is on lien to two creditors and the increase is divided between them.

100 zuz.

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes - although he does not accept - this view in his commentary on Bava Metzia, Chapter 2. This approach is attributed to Rabbenu Chanan’el.

I.e., first the purchaser should be reimbursed for his expenses as due a squatter, and then in addition, he should be given half of the increase in value above those expenses.

I.e., a squatter is either reimbursed for his expenses or given the increase in the value of the field, whichever is less. For example, if he invests 50 zuz and causes the value of the field to increase 100 zuz, as the Rambam states, he receives 50. If, however, the value would increase only 25, that would be all that he would receive (Hilchot Gezelah 10:4).

In the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, this sentence is placed in brackets, and some commentaries maintain that it should be admitted. It is, however, found in many authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. Hence, in many contemporary printings it is included without brackets.
The question is whether or not the Rambam accepts this approach. As mentioned, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes - although he does not accept - this view in his commentary on Bava Metzia, Chapter 2. There are many other authorities who follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s perspective. Although - in his Bet Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo tries to equate the Rambam’s approach with that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi - in his Bedek HaBayit, he states that the authentic texts of the Mishneh Torah follow the other version. He therefore accepts that approach and cites it in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1). See the notes on Halachah 6, which also dwell on the question of whether the Rambam accepts the position of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi or that of the “great Sages.”
The Tur and the Ramah follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s approach. The Siftei Cohen 115:9-10 explains that this is also the Rambam’s view and explains at length why it should be followed. Among his arguments is that a squatter has no one to turn to but the owner of the land. The purchaser, by contrast, can - and will - turn to the seller and ask him to reimburse him for the entire value - the principal and the increase - of the field expropriated from him.

The Maggid Mishneh asks: If there was property that the debtor sold after he sold the property to Levi, why is Reuven the creditor allowed to expropriate the property from Levi? Levi can tell him: “When I purchased this property I left you a source from which to collect your debt. Expropriate your due from there.”
The Maggid Mishneh offers several possible explanations. Among them is that the other property is in a different country. Hence - although it is on lien to the original debt since taking possession of it involves effort and expense, we do not require the creditor to accept it instead of the property that is immediately available.

When the increase came because of an investment.

When it came as a matter of course.

I.e., according to law, the purchaser would have the right to expropriate property on the basis of such a claim. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the continued flow of commercial dealings, our Sages ordained that neither such a person - nor the others mentioned by the Rambam - have the right to expropriate property on this basis.

This refers to an instance where a thief stole a field full of produce and partook of the produce. We do not allow the owner of the field to expropriate property sold by the thief to recover the value of the produce. All that he can do is expropriate the property in the thief’s possession (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Gittin 5:1). [Rashi offers a different explanation of that mishnah. Although the Rambam accepts the law that results from Rashi’s interpretation (see Hilchot Gezelah 9:5), he does not associate it with that particular teaching.]
The Lechem Mishneh questions the logic of the Rambam’s interpretation, for the theft is not a matter of public knowledge. Hence, it should not have any greater power than a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 18, one of the stipulations of the ketubah is that a woman will continue to receive her sustenance from her husband’s estate after his death. And, as explained in Hilchot Ishut (the second half of Chapter 19) another of the stipulations of the ketubah is that the daughters of the deceased will be given their sustenance from his estate. Hilchot Ishut 16:5 states that these obligations should not be paid from the estate’s increase in value.

I.e., there is no way of knowing to what degree a person will increase the value of his property, how much produce the thief will eat, and what will be the sustenance required by the widow or the daughters.
To explain the rationale: When a purchaser acquires a property, he takes into consideration the possibility that since the property is on lien to debts and to other sales, it can be expropriated from him. Nevertheless, since those debts and sales are matters of legal record, the purchaser can estimate the degree of risk involved. With regard to the increase in a property’s value and the other matters mentioned above, since these are not a cut and dry matter, there is no way the purchaser can foresee the extent of his risk.

When establishing the conditions of the financial arrangements between a husband and his wife, our Sages granted the husband certain advantages. This is one of them (Bechorot 52a).

I.e., the increase in the field's value is considered comparable to a property that the borrower/seller acquired after the loan and sale, and it is thus on lien to both the lender and the purchaser.

See Chapter 20, Halachah 1.

I.e., based on the principle that the increase in the field’s value is considered comparable to a property that the borrower/seller acquired after the loan and sale, the following corollary applies.

As mentioned in note I, the Maggid Mishneh uses this clause as proof that the principles stated above apply only when the borrower agreed to such a stipulation.

As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 115:9 maintains that the Rambam did not accept the opinion of the “great Sages” and gives the creditor half the field’s increase in value, regardless of the purchaser’s investment. He cites this clause as proof of his position, for here the Rambam does not mention deducting the amount of the investment. The Maggid Mishneh, who maintains that the Rambam accepts the view of the “Sages”, explains that the Rambam is using concise language, and his intent is that after the investment is subtracted, it is worth 300 zuz.

The 150 zuz for which the field was sold.

See Chapter 20, Halachah 4.

First 75 zuz is divided in three portions, so that Shimon receives his entire claim. Then the remaining 75 is divided between Levi and Yehudah.

Similarly, any produce that has been harvested is considered the property of the purchaser. The Siftei Cohen 115:17 explains that the produce that has been harvested is considered to be movable property, and movable property that has been sold is never on lien to a creditor.

I.e., one might assume that since it is considered as if the property is in the possession of the lender from the outset, the purchaser might be required to reimburse him for the benefit he received. Hence, the Rambam states that the fact that he purchased the land gives him at least the benefit of partaking of its produce while it is in his possession.

The commentaries have spoken at length of the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and in Hilchot Sechirut 2:4, on the one hand, and his rulings in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:4 and Hilchot Mechirah 1:17, on the other hand, in which he equates produce that is ready to be harvested with movable property. The Siftei Cohen 115:18 notes the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh on Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, which differentiates between serving as a watchman over landed property and other instances. The Siftei Cohen explains that since a watchman does not intend to harvest the crops himself, they are considered to be part of the landed property. Similarly, he explains that the creditor considers the landed property and the produce as a single entity.
The status of crops that are ready to be harvested is a point of controversy among the Rabbinic authorities. The Rambam’s ruling has its source in the Halachot of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The Ramban, Rashi and others maintain that if the produce is ready to be harvested, it is considered to be movable property. And the Rashba and Rav Zarchiyah HaLevi maintain that all produce is considered to be movable property in this context. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1) quotes the Rambam’s view. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:9 and the Siftei Cohen 115:18-19 mention the other perspectives.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:3) states that the same laws apply when a person purchases property, and the seller explicitly states that he does not accept financial responsibility if the property is expropriated from him.

For it is as if this increase was given together with the property itself. Rabbenu Ephraim and Rav Zerachyah HaLevi differ and maintain that the creditor may not expropriate any increase in value from the recipient of a present. The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) quote their opinion.

I.e., the giver agrees to reimburse the recipient if one of the giver’s creditors expropriates the field from the recipient.

This law is an obvious consequence of the rationale mentioned by the Rambam at the conclusion of the halachah (Maggid Mishneh).

As described in Halachah 1.

And hence, the seller is bound by this commitment.

For a person generally does not take financial responsibility for a present, and if he does, the commitment must be explicitly stated in the deed of transfer.

For he will not have any way of recovering this loss from the person who gave the present.

Through investment.

The Rambam compares an heir to the recipient of a present, for an heir also has no one to reimburse him for his investment.

The authorities who maintain that a creditor may not expropriate any increase in value from the recipient of a present contend that the same laws also apply with regard to heirs.

I.e., If the field was originally sold for 100 zuz, the purchaser caused its value to increase to 200, and thus when the creditor expropriates 150 (the principal and half of the increase), 50 zuz (114 of the field) remain. The question is: What should be given to the purchaser - the money or the land? The Rambam continues to explain the principles on which that decision should be made.

A kab is 1382 cubic centimeters according to Shi'urei Torah and 2389 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Shechenim 1:4, a field that is too small to sow nine kabbim of grain in is not large enough to be considered a field, and a garden too small to sow half a kab in it is not large enough to be considered a garden. A garden is generally smaller than a field, and even if it is of a lesser size, it is considered valuable.

The Siftei Cohen 115:23 states that the Rambam’s wording is not precise. The intent is that the land should be divided between them.

Before quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:2) quotes the Tur’s ruling that - unless the debtor/seller designated the field an ipotiki - the purchaser has the option of paying the debt owed the creditor and preventing him from expropriating the field. (See Chapter 18, Halachah 8.) This makes it evident that this law applies only “[when] a creditor expropriates [property]”- i.e., in a situation where the purchaser gives him this option. Nevertheless, even though the creditor expropriates the field, if the amount due the purchaser is large enough, the creditor must give a portion of the field to the purchaser.

The commentaries question whether the purchaser can demand a portion of the land even though on the surface, it would not be worthwhile for him to do so. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:2) state that the purchaser is given the option and may take the land if he so desires. There are those who maintain that the Rambam also shares this view.

I.e., the debtor/owner told the creditor: “Derive payment from this.” See Chapter 18, Halachah 3.

I.e., in contrast to the ordinary situation described in the previous halachah, in this instance, even if the portion of the field due the purchaser because of the field’s increase in value is large enough to be considered a field, it is not given to the purchaser. Instead, he is given money.
The purchaser is placed at a disadvantage, because it was stated in the promissory note that the field was designated an ipotiki, and thus the matter is considered to be public knowledge. The purchaser must be aware of the risk involved and take the fact that the field may be expropriated from him into consideration when purchasing it.

As mentioned in Hilchot Gezelah 10:4, a squatter is either reimbursed for his expenses or given the increase in the value of the field, whichever is less. See the following halachah.

This wording appears to indicate that the Rambam accepts the opinion of the “great Sages” mentioned in Halachah 1, who maintain that ordinarily the investment is deducted before the field’s increase in value is calculated. In this instance, however, the creditor’s position is strengthened, because the field was designated an ipotiki. Therefore, he is required to reimburse the purchaser only for the investment he made.

Together with the principal.

We have interpreted the Rambam’s rulings according to the commentary of the Merkevet HaMishneh, which maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the opinion of the “great Sages.” The Ra’avad, by contrast, understands the Rambam as following the approach of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, and hence raises questions with regard to this halachah, asking why the purchaser receives payment for both the investment and the field’s increase in value. (It must, however, be noted that the Maggid Mishneh understands the Rambam as following the approach of the “great Sages,” but nevertheless sustains the Ra’avad’ s objections to this halachah.)
The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this law at all. The Tur [and his perspective is quoted by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:3)] maintains that if the field was designated an ipotiki, a creditor can expropriate the entire field together with its increase in value, even if the original debt was only for the value of the principal. In such a situation, the purchaser is reimbursed for his expenses by the creditor, and for the increase in value by the seller/debtor. If, however, his expenses exceeded the field’s increase, the creditor is required to reimburse him only for the field’s increase in value, so that he loses the remainder.

The purchaser thus loses the difference between his expenses and the field’s increase in value.

And hence, the creditor is not entitled to that increase in value, as the Rambam states in Halachah 4.

Bava Metzia 110b states that the creditor claims: “Your father caused the property to increase in value.” The word “perhaps” is the Rambam’s addition, teaching that these principles apply even when the creditor is not able to issue a definite claim.

And hence, he may expropriate the increase.

If the heirs do not prove their claim, the creditor is allowed to expropriate the property’s increase in value.
The Lechem Mishneh and the Siftei Cohen 115:33 explain that this ruling applies even when the field was not designated an ipotiki. Since the field is on lien to the creditor, it is considered as having been in the creditor’s possession, and the heirs are considered as seeking to take the increase in value from him. Hence, following the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him,” the heirs are required to prove their claim. The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that when the field was not designated an ipotiki, the creditor is required to prove his claim.

They cannot demand a portion of the land.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:6, as interpreted by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:23) state that this applies when the debt was not equal to the principal and the increase in value. If, however, it is equal to that amount, the field can be expropriated from the heirs, and the purchaser is required to reimburse them only for their expenses. The Siftei Cohen 115:36 offers a different interpretation.

He is required to accept the money, for as explained in the notes on Chapter 18, Halachah 8, since the creditor paid money, he cannot demand anything but money to be given him in return.

As stated in Halachah 4, the heirs are entitled to the entire increase in the value of the property brought about by their investment. If, however, the property increases in value as a matter of course, the Rambam maintains that the creditor is entitled to the increase.