Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In the first five chapters, the Rambam dealt with morals in terms of the individual himself; what man should do to develop proper character. In this chapter, he turns to behavior within the context of society; how man should treat his fellow men.
The first halachah of the chapter joins these two components of the ethical whole. In Chapter 5, the Rambam painted a picture of the ideal personality — the wise man. In this halachah, he points out the benefits a person can reap by associating with these individuals.

As the Rambam emphasizes in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 8), man’s ethical makeup is a combination of character and action.

People are, by nature, social beings and there is a constant give and take between the individual and the people with whom he associates (See Guide For the Perplexed, Vol. I, Chapter 31).

Avot 1:4 advises: “Let your house be a meeting place for the wise.” See the following halachah.

In Halachah 2, the Rambam states that it is a mitzvah to associate with the righteous, while here he describes the need for such association as morally compelling. Note our commentary to that halachah.

Avot 1:7 states: “Stay away from a bad neighbor and do not become a friend of the wicked.” (See also the Rambam’s commentary to that mishnah.)

Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer (Chapter 25) explains this verse with an analogy of a person who spends time in a perfumery. Some of the pleasant fragrance attaches itself to him, even though he does not purchase anything.

Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer (ibid.) continues the analogy: Conversely, when a person spends time in a tannery, the unpleasant odor of the tannery imparts a foul smell even though he did not take anything from there.

The verse from Proverbs supports the previously stated concept that a person is influenced by his environment. The verse from Psalms introduces the concept which follows; that bad company should be avoided.

Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 23, states that this restriction does not apply to a person who settles in a community for the expressed purpose of spreading Torah. He need not worry about being influenced by his surroundings, because, to borrow a concept from Yoreh De’ah, Chapter 69, out of context, “one who is preoccupied with giving will not receive.”

See the commentary to Chapter 1, Halachah 4. In Iggeret HaShmad, the Rambam states that even when the difference between the two is relative, “a person who fears God is obligated to move from a country whose norms are not so proper to a good country.”

The Rambam was speaking about his age. One can only guess what the Rambam would say about our present society.

The Rambam apparently does not suggest risking one’s life to make such a move. However, note the passage from Iggeret HaShmad quoted below.

The obligation to find a proper society is not offered simply as a suggestion. The Rambam makes it a firm directive, incumbent upon us even if great difficulty must be endured to insure that the improper society be avoided.

This phrase is borrowed out of context, as is frequently the Rambam’s practice, from I Samuel 13:6: “and the people hid in the caves and crannies.”

In Iggeret HaShmad, the Rambam also discusses this question, albeit in connection with more extreme circumstances, addressing himself to people who live in countries whose governments do not allow them to follow Torah and mitzvot:
The advice which I give myself... my friends, and all those who seek counsel from me is to
leave those places and go to a place where he can establish his faith and follow the Torah
without interference or fear... He should try to do this even if it involves danger... It has
already been expressed by the prophets that whoever dwells among the nonbelievers becomes
like them as implied by the statements of King David of blessed memory (I Samuel 26:19):
“You have driven me away from dwelling in the heritage of God, telling me, ‘Go serve other
gods;’ i.e., [King David] equated his living among the gentiles with idol worship.

The conclusion of this verse: “I will leave my people and go from them for they are all adulterers, a faithless band,” demonstrates that the Rambam was not merely borrowing Biblical phraseology, but rather, quoting a verse that addresses itself specifically to the problem of living within a corrupt society.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 6) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 434) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Halachah 1, the Rambam described the association with the wise as a moral imperative and, here, he states that it is a Torah commandment. We saw a similar pattern in Chapter 1. First, he outlined his theory of the middle path of behavior as the optimal moral position. Only afterwards, did he equate it with the commandment to “walk in His ways.”
This approach is characteristic of the Rambam who maintains that the Torah does not impose a Divine Will upon man which he cannot grasp or understand. Rather, the Torah teaches rules and principles that can be comprehended as good by human thought and appreciated by our minds as a beneficial path of life. Thus, the workings of the Halachah can be seen as having been instituted as an organic part of the makeup of the world at large and man in particular. (See the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, ch. 48.)

To God.

Ketubot 111b, Sifri, Deuteronomy 11:22.

Since God is infinite, transcending the reaches of our emotions and intellect, there is no way we can cling to Him in a simple sense. Hence, the commandment cannot be interpreted literally.

Since they are identified with the Torah and thus bonded with God, clinging to them is, in essence, clinging to Him.

Pesachim 49a states: “At all times, a man should sell all his possessions [in order to] marry a daughter of a wise man and marry off his daughter to a wise man.”

Berachot 64a states: “Anyone who partakes of a meal at which a Torah Sage is present is considered like one who has benefited from the radiance of the Divine Presence.”

I.e., the Torah sage may be a silent partner who puts up a share of the capital in a partnership and the other person takes care of the actual buying and selling.
The Rambam harshly criticizes individuals who try to derive material benefit from their Torah knowledge (See Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:10-11). Therefore, though Ketubot (loc. cit.), the source for these statements, also mentions “granting a sage benefit from one’s possessions,” the Rambam omits this clause. Nevertheless, he does allow one to do business on behalf of a sage as described above. See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10.

Avot 1:4.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 206) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 243) count this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

In Hilchot Eivel (14:1, quoted in its entirety below), the Rambam states that the deeds associated with the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow Jew apply to “your brother in Torah and mitzvot.” The Hagahot Maimoni (See also Avot D’Rabbi Natan 16:5) specifically states that the mitzvah only applies to such people and that the wicked who do not observe the Torah must be hated. Nevertheless, the fact that the Rambam’s statements here do not mention such a restriction leads to the conclusion that they should be interpreted simply, i.e., that the mitzvah of loving a fellow Jew applies to everyone. Some of the privileges associated with that mitzvah, however, may only be afforded to those who are observant.
[Yad Malachi (Klallei HaRambam 6) states that the Rambam does not rely on statements made later in the Mishneh Torah to explain those made previously. Thus, the obligation to love all Jews which is stated in this halachah should not be interpreted as limited by his statements in Hilchot Eivel. Note also the Maharam Shik (Taryag Mitzvot) who states that since the commandment “Love your fellow man as yourself” is applied even With regard to a wicked man awaiting execution (See Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1), we can conclude that it is applicable to every Jew.]
Note Tanya (ch. 32) which explains that there is no contradiction between the mitzvah of loving every Jew and the commandment to hate the sinners. One must love them as people and hate their deeds. See also the conclusion of Iggeret HaShmad:
It is not proper to drive away those who desecrate the Sabbath and to despise them. Rather,
one should draw them close and encourage them to perform mitzvoth.

In his commentary to the Torah, the Ramban questions: How one can possibly have the same degree of love for another person as one has for himself? However, since all Jews share the same Godly essence, when one relates to that essence, there is really no difference between loving another person and oneself (Tanya).

The question often raised in connection with this mitzvah is: How can one command feeling? Therefore, certain commentaries have stated that the mitzvah merely requires us to perform deeds which would normally be motivated by feelings of love. However, in Sefer HaMitzvot (Shoresh 9), the Rambam specifically states that this mitzvah involves our emotions. Therefore, it must be interpreted to mean that we are commanded to bring ourselves to a state of mind that will inspire feelings of love. Though the mitzvah involves our feelings, it also requires a specific course of behavior as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

I.e., the following are the applications of this mitzvah in the ethical realm. However, since “’Love your fellow man as yourself’ is a great general principle in the Torah” (Sifra, Leviticus 19:18), there are also applications of this principle in many other spheres. Thus, Hilchot Eivel 14:1 states:
It is a positive commandment ordained by the Rabbis to visit the sick, comfort mourners,
participate in a funeral or a wedding, accompany guests, arrange for all the needs of burial...,
and to bring joy to a bride and a groom and assist them with all their needs.
These are deeds of kindness performed with one’s person for which there is no measure.
Although these are Rabbinic commands, they are included in [the commandment], “Love your
fellow man as yourself,” [which implies that] all the things that you would like others to do for
you, you should do for your brother in Torah and mitzvot.
The Rambam also mentions this commandment in connection with choosing a bride (Hilchot Ishut 3:19), ransoming captives (Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 8:10), and even determining the proper manner of execution (Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1).

Avot 2:15 states: “Your friend’s money should be as dear to your as your own.”

This corresponds to speaking praise of others. See Avot 2:13: “Your friend’s dignity should be as dear to you as your own.”

I.e., builds his reputation by emphasizing a colleague’s faults.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14.

Here, the Rambam is referring to a גר צדק, a convert to Judaism, as distinct from a גר תושב, a gentile who accepts the seven mitzvot commanded to Noah and his descendants (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, chs. 13-14).

This phrase is borrowed from the comforting words spoken by Boaz to Ruth in praise of her dedication in confronting the challenges faced by a convert (Ruth 2:12).

I.e., he is a full-fledged member of the Jewish people.

As mentioned in the previous halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 207) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 431) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

I.e., just as one’s love of God must be unlimited, so too, must one have boundless love for a convert (Mahari, commentary to Sefer HaMitzvot).

The Midrash Tanchumah (Vayikra 2) states: “The Holy One, blessed be He, states: ‘It is sufficient that he left idols behind and came [to live] among you. I adjure you to love him, for I love him.’”
In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) the Rambam also emphasizes that the sacrifices a convert made in coming to Judaism are the reason “God has offered him additional love and created an additional mitzvah for him.” A number of the Rambam’s responsa are also dedicated to strengthening the spirits of converts. He wrote to a convert named Ovadiah, that although the Jews trace their lineage to Abraham, the converts’ connection to Judaism is dependent on God, Himself and is, therefore, more praiseworthy. Similarly, he praises another convert for “leaving his father and homeland... pursuing God... and reaching such heights.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 302) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 238) include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

The minimum punishment given for violating a Torah command.

This is a principle followed throughout Torah law; a court administers punishment only for actions, not for thoughts or feelings (See Hilchot Temurah 1:1).

Thus, here, we see a prohibition that involves only our emotions, i.e., we are forbidden to harbor such feelings in our hearts.

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) goes further and states that if a person makes known his hatred for his colleague, even though he transgresses the prohibitions against seeking vengeance and/or bearing a grudge, he does not violate this prohibition. Thus, this mitzvah forbids holding feelings of enmity in one’s heart when they are never expressed.

The Rambam mentions the prohibition against insulting a fellow Jew in Halachah 8 (and against cursing a fellow Jew in Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:1-2) and the prohibition against hitting a fellow Jew in Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:12.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes this hatred “as more severe than anything else.” Once hatred has been expressed, it is possible to reconcile differences. However, if it is kept hidden in one’s heart, there is no possibility of improving relations and establishing unity.

See Halachah 9.

Avshalom had just reason for hating Amnon who had raped and disgraced Tamar, Avshalom’s sister.
Nevertheless, Avshalom is criticized for not making his ill feelings known and failing to try to resolve his differences with Amnon peacefully. The choice of this example appears to be the Rambam’s own, for the commentaries have not cited any sources which he quotes. Perhaps the Rambam cites this instance to demonstrate the negative effects of such hatred. Ultimately, Avshalom slew Amnon, triggering a series of unfortunate events which culminated in a bitter civil war and his own death.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 205) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 239) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This commandment has two dimensions: a) to bring the complaints one has against a colleague into the open as stated in this halachah; b) to rebuke a sinner as stated in the following halachah.

Leviticus 19:17-18 states:
(17) Do not hate your brother in your heart. You must surely admonish your fellow man and
not bear a sin because of him. (18) Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against the children
of your people. Love your fellow man as yourself.
Each of the clauses in these two verses is halachically significant. The first verse informs us that hatred of a fellow Jew is prohibited (Halachah 5). Then, it explains how one should respond if negative feelings towards a colleague arise (Halachah 6, here). Afterwards, it teaches that one’s negative feelings must be expressed in a manner that does not embarrass one’s fellow Jew (Halachah 8). Thus, the verse can be rendered: Do not bear hate in your heart, instead, inform your fellow Jew of your complaint, but do so in a manner that is not sinful. (Note the Ramban’s commentary to the verse.) The second verse teaches that vengeance or bearing a grudge is forbidden (Chapter 7, Halachot 7-8) and then, concludes with a positive statement obligating us to love our fellow Jew (Halachah 3).

See Yoma 87a which gives several examples of Sages who went out of their way to create circumstances that would allow a person who had wronged them to ask for forgiveness.

The narrative in Genesis describes how after God punished Avimelech, King of the Philistines, for taking Sarah, he returned her to Abraham and Abraham prayed for Avimelech’s recovery. Though Abraham had been wronged, he was willing to forgive Avimelech.

The mitzvah הוכח תוכיח mentioned in the previous halachah.

Though the Hebrew חבירו literally means friend, we have used this translation since this term extends beyond one’s immediate circle of friends. However, it is possible that the Rambam desired the term to be interpreted more narrowly. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 156:7 states that one is obligated to admonish only a close friend. There is no requirement to admonish a person with whom one does not share such ties when there is little likelihood that one’s words will have any effect.

The Avodat HaMelech states that the expression “improper path” refers to incorrect behavior even if no actual violation of Torah law is involved. See also Berachot 31b, Arachin 16b.

The word חטא, generally translated as “sin” can also be rendered as “lack.”

The Torah mentions the mitzvah of admonishment directly after the prohibition against hating a fellow Jew, implying that admonishing is intended as a safeguard to prevent hatred from arising between Jews. The previous halachah dealt with this concept in terms of our interpersonal relationships. The present halachah deals with this concept within the context of a person’s relationship with God.
Pesachim 113a teaches we must hate a sinner. As a preventive measure, the Torah offers us an alternative, admonishing him, which hopefully will cause him to correct his behavior and thus, do away with the need for such hatred (Sefer Yeraim).

To prevent the person being rebuked from becoming embarrassed. However, note the latter portion of the following halachah. The Magen Avraham (608:3) states that we are only required to administer a rebuke privately for a sin committed in private. If a person sees a colleague commit a sin in public, he should immediately rebuke him to prevent chillul HaShem, the descration of God’s name.

For we are all naturally defensive when our actions are being criticized. We must demonstrate more consideration for a fellow Jew’s feelings if we wish our statements to be effective. The Sifri derives the need for privacy and gentleness from the manner in which God rebuked Miriam and Aaron for speaking against Moses.

Which is the ultimate good as explained in Hilchot Teshuvah, ch. 8.

And the latter persists in his negative behavior.

In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam quotes the Sifra which mentions repeating a rebuke four or five times. Bava Metzia 31b states one must rebuke a colleague even one hundred times.

Arachin 16b mentions a second limit, when the transgressor curses the one who rebukes him. The Rema (Orach Chayim 608:2) accepts this view as halachah. Nevertheless, in Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam specifically writes: “even if one is cursed or belittled, he should not slacken or cease admonishing until he hits him.” The Rema also mentions that the obligation to rebuke a colleague an unlimited number of times only applies when the rebuke is being given to a single individual. When one is admonishing many people for transgressing together, a single rebuke is sufficient.

The Rambam (Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 1:7) states:
Women who eat and drink until darkness [on the eve of Yom Kippur, because] they do not
know we are commanded to add from the mundane to the holy [day] should not be
admonished, lest they [continue] doing so consciously... It is better to allow them to remain
unaware [of this transgression than risk] their willful violation of it. The same applies
concerning similar cases.
Commenting on this law, the Rema (loc. cit.) mentions that a person should not rebuke a colleague for the inadvertent transgression of a Torah law if he knows that the transgressor will not listen. However, this only applies regarding instances like the obligation to add to the Yom Kippur fast which are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah.

This statement is quoted from Shabbat 54b which relates that, after the destruction of the first Temple, the righteous were also slain mercilessly. Why were they subjected to this punishment? Because they failed to rebuke the transgressors. See also Sanhedrin 93a.

And perhaps, had he rebuked them, the sin would not have been committed. In Hilchot Teshuvah 4:1, the Rambam lists the failure to rebuke a transgressor as one of four sins that are so severe that “God will not allow a person who commits these deeds to repent.”

Arachin 16b quotes Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah: “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to admonish his fellow man.”

I.e., from this verse, we can derive that embarrassing a colleague is a sin.

Arachin (loc. cit.)

In the second half of the verse requiring us to rebuke a colleague.

In Hilchot Chovel U’Mazik, ch. 3, the Rambam discusses the sin of embarrassing another person from the perspective of damages. Here, he focuses on the ethical aspect of the sin.

Even in private. The Avodat HaMelech states that when a person feels that a colleague wronged him, he should admonish the latter gently. If the person admonished does not respond, he may speak to him in harsher terms and even embarrass him in private. However, under no circumstances may he embarrass him publicly for his own personal reasons. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav (156:8) and other commentaries disagree with this view and forbid embarrassing a colleague for personal reasons whether privately or publicly.

Where he will suffer greater shame.

Avot 3:14

The above-mentioned mishnah states that this applies “even if he possesses good deeds.” In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that, generally, when a person dies amidst suffering, his death atones for his sins and he is granted a share in the world to come. In this case, even the person’s suffering and death does not bring about atonement. See also Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14.

Alternatively, “whether an adult or a minor.” Bava Kama 86b relates that even minors and fools can suffer from public embarrassment.

Hilchot Teshuvah (loc. cit.) also states that one’s share in the world to come is withheld because of this transgression.

The Rambam discusses mentioning such matters outside a person’s presence in Chapter 7, Halachah 2.

Prohibition against admonishing a person in public.

Even in such a case, the person should first be rebuked in private. (However, note the statement of the Magen Avraham quoted in the previous halachah.)

The commentaries point to Nechemiah 13:23-25: “I saw Jews who had married wives of Ashdod and of Ammon... and I contended with them, cursed them, beat some of them, and pulled out their hair.” See also Hilchot Teshuvah 4:2 which describes how the prophets would publicly rebuke the people for their sins.

Though the previous halachot spoke of the need to admonish a colleague who wrongs us, there is no binding obligation to do so.

The Rambam’s words appear to indicate that if the person who committed the wrong was sophisticated enough to learn from the rebuke, he should be admonished so that he will develop his character. Only when the person would be incapable of benefiting from the rebuke, does the Rambam suggest withholding admonishment.

See Megillah 28a which mentions that each night, Rabbi Nechuniah ben HaKanah and Rabbi Zeira would make a statement forgiving anyone who wronged them. The Ari zal includes such a statement in his order of the prayers recited before retiring at night.

Since the Torah mentions the mitzvah to admonish directly after the prohibition against hating a fellow Jew, there is obviously a connection between the two. The mitzvah to admonish is necessary to prevent feelings of hatred. If one is able to rise above those feelings without admonishing, there is no need to do so.

These people tend to be oversensitive and the smallest harshness or slight might cause them pain and thus, constitute a transgression of the prohibition mentioned below.

In addition to the possibility of financial difficulties which are often experienced by widows and orphans, the loss of a husband or parent is an emotional crisis which creates stress and heightens the sensitivity of the family members. Even a family whose financial status is secure may suffer strain and emotional upheaval.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 256) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 65) consider this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Berachot 18b relates that Shmuel’s father was given money belonging to orphans to guard. He placed his own money above and below theirs so that he would suffer any possible loss and not they. Similarly, many leniencies and provisions have been instituted within Torah law to protect the interests of orphans. For example, a person who collects a debt from an estate left to orphans must take an oath that the debt had not been repaid even though, had the debtor remained alive, the oath would not have been required. See also Hilchot Nachalot, ch. 11.

The violation of the prohibition is thus dependent on the feelings of the widow or orphans in question. There is no objective standard of behavior. Rather, one must become sensitive to the feelings of the people who have suffered the loss and conduct himself accordingly.

Beating and cursing also involve the transgression of other prohibitions. Thus, a person who beats or curses an orphan violates two prohibitions by that act.

The commentaries have questioned why, in fact, the punishment of lashes is never given. Though punishment is not given for a transgression that does not involve a deed as mentioned in Halachah 5, it is possible that a person will commit a deed that aggravates a widow or orphan. Why does he not receive lashes in such an instance?
The Sefer HaChinuch states that since the nature of the prohibition is very subjective, the Torah does not specify any punishment. The Minchat Chinuch quotes an opinion which maintains that any prohibition that can be violated by speech or thought alone (as is possible in this case) is not punished by lashes even when it is transgressed with a deed. The Avodat HaMelech states that the reason one does not receive lashes is stated by the Rambam himself: that retribution is visited upon him from above.

And this punishment is more severe than lashes. Hence, the lesser punishment is not administered.

When people lose a loved one, they often despair and feel that the world is run in a random and arbitrary manner. Perhaps the Rambam uses this term for God — “He who spoke...” — to stress how He is the One who brought the world into being and controls every facet of its existence.

The use of a Biblical prooftext generally indicates a quote from a Talmudic or Midrashic source. However, though the concept the Rambam mentions is also alluded to in Bava Kama 93a, the exact expression he uses is not mentioned there.
This instance supports an opinion frequently expressed by certain commentaries, i.e., that the Rambam had at his disposal midrashic sources which are not available to us. Alternatively, we are forced to say the Rambam takes the liberty of developing Halachic interpretations of Biblical verses on his own. Scholars of the post-Talmudic period would rarely make such interpretations.

This point is mentioned explicitly in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. The Mechilta which is most commonly quoted is that composed by Rabbi Yishmael. Many of the Rabbis who have devoted themselves to the study of the sources used by the Rambam note his partiality for the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his frequent use of it as a source.

Even though he is given permission to discipline them.

The Or Sameach notes that, although this verse may be understood as referring to the oppression of widows and orphans, it makes no explicit mention of such. Therefore, he suggests that the Rambam actually cited part of Proverbs 23:11 which states: “Do not enter orphans’ fields for their redeemer is powerful, He will take up their cause” and a printing error caused the other verse to be substituted.
Rav Kapach notes that manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah do not include the word שנאמר — “as it states.” Accordingly, he maintains that the Rambam was merely borrowing the phrasing of a verse (as is his frequent custom), but not quoting it as a prooftext.

This point is also mentioned explicitly in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. The commentaries note only one other source which alludes to this concept, the description of Mar Ukva’s children as orphans (Bava Metzia 70a) although other references imply that they had only lost their mother.

Note Hilchot Nachalot 11:10 which mentions a guardian’s responsibilities to train the orphans in his charge to perform mitzvot.

Thus, this is not a matter of objectively determined chronological age and may vary from society to society according to the different socio-economic norms.

The Hebrew מרגל would usually be translated as “spy.” Rashi, in his commentary to the verse in Leviticus, explains that a spy and a gossiper act very similarly. Both gather information to tell others.
His commentary also explains that the Hebrew letters ג and כ are sometimes interchangeable, so that רכיל which is usually translated as “gossip’’ is synonymous with רגל. Thus, Psalms 15:3 uses the word רגל to mean “gossip’’ and II Samuel 19:28 employs וירגל to mean “slander.’’

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 301) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 236) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. As mentioned in the following halachah, this prohibition also includes lashon hora.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1, the Rambam states that lashes are not administered for this transgression, because it does not involve a deed. (Generally, speech is not considered equivalent to action in halachic terms).

Derech Eretz Rabbah also notes the placement of these two prohibitions side by side and concludes: “Gossipers are murderers.”

I Samuel, ch. 22, relates how Do’eg told King Saul that Achimelech, the priest in charge of the sanctuary at Nob, gave David food and a sword. In rage at the assistance afforded to the man he was pursuing, Saul ordered the slaying of Achimelech and all the priests of Nob. Although Do’eg told the truth and Achimelech himself would have offered King Saul the same information if he had been asked, since he had not intended to act against King Saul, Do’eg’s remarks brought about the deaths of many (See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 30:1).

רוכל translated as gossiper sometimes means “peddler.” Rashi (loc. cit.) comments on the similarity between the two. A peddler takes his wares and travels around offering them to potential clients. In much the same way, a gossiper peddles his words.

As in the case of Do’eg mentioned above.

In his commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 1:16), the Rambam writes:
Since I have mentioned lashon hora, l will explain it... because people are terribly blind about
the matter. It is a very serious sin which people frequently violate.

It appears that lashon hora is more serious than gossip because in lashon hora, one’s intent is obviously defamatory.
The Radbaz (Vo1. 5, Responsum 1374) sees lashon hora as more serious than gossip because it often does not involve an ulterior motive. Generally, a person relates gossip in order to derive benefit from the person to whom he tells it. In contrast, lashon hora involves committing a sin without the motive of personal benefit; i.e., transgressing for the sake of transgression.

For this reason, we have left the term lashon hora in Hebrew, without translating it. Often, it is translated as “slander’’. However, slander by definition involves the invention of false information. Thus, we see the uniqueness of the ethical approach required by the Torah. Even though everything one says is true, relating such information is prohibited.

The commentaries question which prohibition includes the sin of defamation of character. The Rambam does not say that it is included in the sin of gossip. In Hilchot Sanhedrin (21:7) and Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 281), he states that the prohibition “Do not accept a false report’’ (Exodus 23:1) also applies to lashon hora. However, perhaps his terminology in those sources is less precise and he is referring to defamation of character as well as lashon hora.

The Hebrew בעל לשון הרע literally means “a master of lashon hora;” i.e., one who is constantly involved with lashon hora (Kessef Mishneh).

Arachin 15b states:
What is considered lashon hora? For example, a person asks another: “Where can I find fire?”
and the latter replied “Where is fire? In so and so’s house there is an abundance of meat and
fish, and they are always cooking there.”
As Arachin, ibid., states such statements are considered as lashon hora only when one’s intent is derogatory.

Tosefta, Peah 1:2, Arachin 15b.
There is also an allusion to this concept in the verse: “May God cut off all guileful lips, the tongues which speak proud things,” quoted above. In Hilchot Teshuvah 8:5, the Rambam defines being “cut off”, as being denied a portion in the world to come (Merkevat HaMishneh).

Hilchot Teshuvah 3:6 states: The following individuals do not have a portion in the world to come. Rather, their [souls] are cut off and they are judged for their great wickedness and sins forever.
All four sins (i.e., idol worship... lashon hora) mentioned here are listed in that halachah. For a more precise understanding of what it means to be deprived of a share in the world to come, see Hilchot Teshuvah 8:5.

In the above-mentioned halachah, the Rambam uses the expression בעלי לשון הרע, meaning people who frequently speak lashon hora. Accordingly, most authorities maintain that a person who unwittingly speaks lashon hora from time to time, is not punished in this manner.

The Chafetz Chayim (Shemiras HaLashon, Chapter 1) explains this concept as follows: Torah study surpasses all the other mitzvot. Why? Because it involves speech and thought, in contrast to the other mitzvot which involve only our actions. Conversely, since lashon hora involves using these higher faculties for undesirable purposes, it is considered more severe than other sins that involve only deed.

Arachin (loc. cit.)

Rabbenu Yonah explains that lashon hora is judged so severely because such capricious behavior shows that the person is not conscious of God’s presence.
The Maharal (Chiddushei Aggadot, Arachin, loc. cit.) explains a spiritual dimension of this concept. God created the world with speech. Therefore, one who uses his quality of speech against God’s will is denying God’s creative power.

Arachin (loc. cit.), The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 21:7, the Rambam writes that a person who listens to lashon hora also violates a Torah commandment. (However, see our commentary to Halachah 2.) Pesachim 118a states: “A person who listens to lashon hora is worse than one who recites it.’’

Our Sages point to the instance mentioned in Halachah 1, where Do’eg spoke lashon hora about Achimelech to King Saul. Ultimately, all three of them were killed.

This clause is not included in our text of the passage from the Jerusalem [or the Babylonian] Talmud cited above. (Some commentaries surmise that it might have been included in the text possessed by the Rambam). As a source, the commentaries point to Shabbat 56b which relates that when King David believed the lashon hora he was told about Mephiboshet (II Samuel, Chapter 19) and ordered that he lose half his field, God ordained that David’s descendants would lose half his kingdom.
Alternatively, the severity of the listener’s culpability can be deduced from the instance involving King Saul and Doeg. Doeg alone was slain, while Saul was killed together with his three sons (Knesset HaGedolah).

I.e., though such speech is not lashon hora, it is an extension of that sin, for it leads to people saying (or at least, thinking) negative things about a colleague.

Which implies that obviously this was not the person’s ordinary mode of conduct.

The Chafetz Chayim (1:8) states that even hinting at a person’s unfavorable qualities or actions is considered as actual lashon hora and not merely, “the tinge of lashon hora.’’ However, he accepts the Rambam’s contention that remarks similar to those mentioned here can be considered as “the tinge of lashon hora” if no details are mentioned and thus, the hint remains very vague.

“In the presence of his enemies” is the Rambam’s addition to Arachin 16a. One may conclude that he permits praising someone in the presence of his friends (Kessef Mishneh). The Hagahot Maimoniot, however, mentions that it is not proper to praise a person extensively, even in the presence of his friends, lest some envy be aroused.

Bava Batra 164b relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi spoke to his son admiringly about the way a book of Psalms had been copied. When his son informed him of the identity of the scribe, he told him, “Cease speaking lashon hora.” The Talmud explains that the scribe’s enemies would surely respond by criticizing the scribe, thus turning his praise into shame. See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, (Avot 1:16).

See Arachin 16a.

The notes to the text Chafetz Chayim (3:2) explain that although he includes this law in this halachah, the Rambam does not mean to imply that such speech is mere “the tinge of lashon hora.” Instead, it must be considered as actual lashon hora.

In this instance as well, the notes to the text Chafetz Chayim (3:5) explain that the Rambam does not consider such speech as merely “tinge of lashon hora.” Instead, it must be considered as actual lashon hora.
To illustrate this case, the Jerusalem Talmud (Peah 1:1) relates the following incident: A number of Jews from Tzippori were conscripted by the Romans for a certain task. One of those conscripted, Yochanan, did not appear for work one morning. At first, the Romans did not notice his absence. However, afterwards, the workers began talking among themselves and one said to the other, “Let’s visit our friend, Yochanan, after work.” The Romans overheard and noticed that he was missing.

The commentaries note Rashi’s comments (Numbers 12:1) which explain that Miriam’s remarks about Moses were considered as lashon hora even though she personally had no intention of embarrassing him.

Note Arachin 15b which states:
Rabbah declares: Any statements made in the presence of the person involved are not lashon
hora.
Abbaye told him: Surely, it is both arrogance and lashon hora.
Rabbah answered him: I follow the approach of Rabbi Yossi... [who said]: “I never made a
statement for which I [would have to] turn around [and check whether the person about whom
I was talking was present].”
The Rambam appears to follow Abbaye’s opinion. The Kessef Mishneh and others had a different version of this Talmudic passage which caused them to question the Rambam’s definition of lashon hora here. However, based on the statements of Tosafot, Arachin, loc. cit., the Avodat HaMelech explains that both Rabbah and Abbaye agree that a derogatory remark is considered lashon hora whether it was made in the presence of the person involved or not. Their difference of opinion cited involves only matters which are considered as lashon hora within an extended context.
The commentaries also cite the Sifri (Devarim 24:9) which defines Miriam’s remarks about Moses as lashon hora even though they were not made in his presence.

The commentaries cite Shabbat 33b which relates that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai made unfavorable remarks about the Roman authorities. Rabbi Yehudah ben Garim passed on the statements — without meaning to cause Rabbi Shimon any harm — to others. The report spread, and ultimately, became known to the Roman authorities, forcing Rabbi Shimon to hide for thirteen years.

Generally, the phrase “such statements” is interpreted to refer to information about another person which could be considered derogatory (Chafetz Chayim 2:3). The Avodat HaMelech, however, understands this law as a continuation of the previous concept and thus, the term is referring to information that, if made public, could harm the person involved.

Arachin 16a. The Kessef Mishneh states that this only applies when the person making the statement does not tell his listeners to keep the matter a secret.

Casually without any negative intent.

In which case it would be forbidden. The Chafetz Chayim (2:3-9) explains that even in this instance, there is no outright license regarding the matter and he advises refraining from such speech if possible.

Arachin 15b quotes God as saying: “I cannot dwell in the world together with people who speak lashon hora.” It is not proper for a Jew to dwell where God’s presence cannot be found. See also Midrash Tanchuma, Korach, sec. 4, which notes that many members of the tribe of Reuven were drawn into Korach’s mutiny because they were his neighbors.

In his last testament to his son, Hurkanos, Rabbi Eliezer warns him: My son, do not sit among a company of people who speak unfavorably of their fellow men. These words ascend to the heavens and are written in a book and all those assembled there are recorded as an evil company and slanderers (Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer). See also Chafetz Chayim 6:5-6.

Compelling them to wander 40 years.

I.e., because of the spies’ unfavorable report of Eretz Yisrael and the Jewish people’s acceptance of it.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 304) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 241) consider this one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Since the prohibition does not involve a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin18:1). Even if one performs a deed of revenge, the prohibition is not in the deed itself, but rather on having the feelings which motivated such an act (Avodat HaMelech).

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam quotes the Sifra the source for this example.

I.e., surely anyone who seeks to harm a colleague violates this prohibition, however, even such a refusal is forbidden.

Note, however, Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:13, which obligates a Torah Sage to seek revenge for any public affront to his honor.

The Minchat Chinuch notes that Yoma 23a appears to imply that the prohibition against taking revenge only applies to monetary matters, but not to causing emotional discomfort. Hence, he questions the Rambam’s statements. Nevertheless, other commentaries resolve the difficulty by offering a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage.

This refers to David’s sparing of King Saul who pursued him. Though David was given two opportunities to kill Saul, he did not take revenge and prevented his men from harming the king (1 Samuel, chs. 24 and 26).

The commentaries question why the Rambam mentions “another Jew” in this halachah, while in the previous halachah, he speaks about “a colleague.” The Avodat HaMelech explains that this prohibition has a larger scope. Vengeance is forbidden against only “a colleague,” i.e., a peer, a person who is on one’s own level, while bearing a grudge against any Jew is forbidden, regardless of his social status.
[This interpretation is somewhat problematic for, according to the Rambam, bearing a grudge is only a safeguard against revenge.]

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 305) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 242) consider this one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Here, as well, the Sifra prefaces this example with the question, “How far does (the prohibition against) bearing a grudge extend?” implying that this is an extreme example.

Here, the Rambam gives us an ideal example of ethical development. Not only does the person control expression of an undesirable emotion, he wipes the negative feelings from his heart entirely.

The Rambam’s statements shed light on a question discussed by the Rabbis: Does each mitzvah have a self-contained purpose or are there mitzvot which exist only as a safeguard to prevent the transgression of more serious prohibitions? (See Lekach Tov chapter 8.) The Rambam’s statements here clearly indicate that he accepts the latter position.

To the extent that one feel the same way to a person who wronged one as to any other individual.

Human nature being what it is, it is natural that people will say or do things that will upset each other. lf everyone were to take revenge and hold grudges, we would soon be faced with a continuous see-saw of negative feeling that would prevent the creation of a stable social framework.
The Rambam begins Hilchot De’ot with directives for the development of one’s own personality and concludes with guidelines regarding relations with others. The two are interdependent. The only way a person is able to develop viable and meaningful relationships with others is when he works on developing his own character. Conversely, a person cannot concentrate solely on self-development and ignore his ties with others. It is fusion of both self-development and social interaction that constitutes the middle path, “the path of God,” the heritage which Abraham transmitted to his descendants throughout the generations.

. Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:14) quotes this law, but also states that women are obligated to study the laws pertaining to all the mitzvot that they are required to fulfill. (See also Agur, Hilchot Tefillah 2; Sefer Mitzvot Katan, Introduction; and Sefer Chassidim 313.) This includes a large number of mitzvot — e.g., Shabbat, Nidah, and Kashrut — to the extent that many men would be proud if their Torah knowledge encompassed these areas. Furthermore, women are also obligated to perform “spiritual” mitzvot — e.g., to love God, fear Him, and believe in Him. Thus, they must also study those aspects of Torah which relate to these commandments. See also Halachah 13 and its commentary.

I.e., gentile slaves. The Torah obligations of women and slaves are identical. Furthermore, Ketubot 28a states that a person is forbidden to teach Torah to his slaves.

The latter are considered as lacking intellectual maturity. Hence, they are under no obligation at all according to Scriptural Law. This concept is so clearly understood that some commentaries maintain that this word should not be included in the text of the Mishneh Torah. The authoritative Oxford manuscript of the Mishneh Torah indeed omits it.

The question arises: Why does the Rambam begin his discussion of this mitzvah with the mention of those who are not obligated? Why does he not begin with a discussion of the obligations the mitzvah implies?

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 11) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 419) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Nazir 29a also mentions a Rabbinic obligation to train one’s children in the performance of mitzvot.

Though this verse mentions teaching Torah only to one’s children, the Rambam also maintains that the mitzvah of Torah study includes an adult’s study of Torah (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.). Nevertheless, he begins his description of the mitzvah with the obligation to teach one’s sons, since that is explicitly mentioned in the Torah.
It must be noted that Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) derives this mitzvah from a different verse, Deuteronomy 6:7, “And you shall teach them to your sons...”[Homiletically, it is possible to explain that the reason the Torah mentions the commandment to study Torah with regard only to children is to teach us that we must apply ourselves to Torah study with the openness and simple faith of young children.]

However, according to some opinions (see Sh’lah, Sha’ar Ha’Otiot), she is obligated to train him in the performance of mitzvot.

However, Sefer HaChinuch (loc. cit.) writes: Nevertheless, it is fitting for a woman to endeavor that her children not be of the common people. Even though she is not commanded [to teach them to study], she will receive a good reward for her efforts

More precisely, the Hebrew should be translated as “your son’s son.” There is a difference between the obligation one has to one’s son’s son and one’s obligation to one’s daughter’s son or one’s great grandson (Kessef Mishneh).

Kiddushin 30a praises the grandfather of Zevulun ben Dan for teaching him “the written law, the Mishnah, the Talmud, halachot, and aggadot.”

Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah, Kuntres Acharon 1) states that this applies only to an individual who merits this description. Even a student of Torah is not bound by this obligation until he attains a sufficient degree of knowledge himself.

Sifri, Va’etchanan. The Hebrew, מפי השמועה, refers to a halachah transmitted by Moses from Mount Sinai for which an allusion can be found in the written law (Yad Malachi).

See also Chapter 5, Halachah 12, for a different dimension of this comparison.

To greet Elisha at Bet-El. That same narrative (loc. cit., 12) relates how Elisha called his teacher, Elijah, “Father, Father.” Sanhedrin 68a relates that Rabbi Akiva used the same expression to refer to his teacher, Rabbi Eliezer ben Horkanus. The Rambam’s words are quoted from the Sifri. Similarly, Sanhedrin 19b relates, “Whoever teaches his colleague’s son Torah is considered as if he sired him.” Note Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:5, where the Rambam defines more precisely his understanding of the term, “the sons of the prophets.”

See also the following halachah.

The Kessef Mishneh questions whether one is obligated to give precedence to one’s other descendants over people at large. However, the Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 245:1) and Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:8) accept that principle.

I.e., another difference between one’s son and others. According to some editions of the Mishneh Torah, this sentence is included in the previous halachah.

The Lechem Mishneh questions the source for this ruling. He quotes Rav Yosef Kolon, who explains that since we find that the teachers of children are allowed to charge for their services (Halachah 7), it is obvious that the fathers are required to pay them. Others explain that since the obligation is placed upon a father’s person, we may assume that it extends to his financial resources as well.
Since a person is obligated to pay for his children’s studies, he cannot deduct those costs from the tithes he is required to give to charity. Nevertheless, there is no need to stint in fulfilling this obligation. Beitzah 16a relates that a person’s income for the entire year is established during his judgment on Rosh HaShanah with the exception of the money he spends to prepare for the Sabbaths and festivals and that spent in teaching his sons Torah. With regard to these matters, if he spends more, he will be granted more, and if he spends less, he will be granted less.
In addition, once children pass the age of six, the cost of their living expenses can be deducted from one’s tithes if their time is being devoted to Torah study (Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:16). The commentaries question whether the obligation to pay for a teacher applies to one’s grandson as well. The Maharshal and the Siftei Cohen (loc. cit.) impose such a requirement, while the Radbaz frees one of the obligation.

As part of one’s obligation to teach Torah. Nevertheless, every Jew is obligated to give charity, and one of the most important priorities (particularly, at present) for charity is the education of children.

Even if it involves an expense (see Halachah 7.)

The Tzemach Tzedek (Piskei Dinim) notes that the Rambam does not state “when he matures and can understand,” and questions whether, in this unique instance, the Torah has placed an obligation on a minor.

I.e., the performance of mitzvot.

The commentaries explain that a Jew’s ultimate goal in life is the fulfillment of God’s will as revealed in the mitzvot. By performing the mitzvot, a person steps beyond his humanity and performs Godly acts, thus establishing a connection with God’s essence.

This clause is the Rambam’s own addition to the above Talmudic passage.

And his financial capability allows only one of them to study.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah, Kuntres Acharon 1) limits this license, noting that a father has no right to ignore his son’s Torah education entirely, regardless of his own ability for advancement. Rather, this applies after the son has gained a basis of Torah knowledge and seeks to continue his studies.

Even though the father has not received any grounding in Torah study (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:7).

Rather, he should establish fixed times for Torah study.

I.e., though enabling one’s son to study and studying by oneself are included in the same mitzvah, a person cannot fulfill his obligation solely through facilitating his son’s study. Rather, he must set aside time to learn himself, because the mitzvah is twofold in nature (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., even if he is older than seventeen [the age, at which according to the Rambam’s interpretation, the Mishnah, Avot 5:22, suggests one should marry (Merchevet HaMishneh)].

In Hilchot Ishut 15:2-3, the Rambam writes that the mitzvah of studying Torah is sufficient cause to postpone the mitzvah of having children. Furthermore, even if one’s desire to study is so great that one never marries, it is not considered a sin.

“With a millstone around his neck, will he be able to occupy himself in Torah study!” (Kiddushin 29b).

And he is continually preoccupied with sexual thoughts. Concerning these, Yoma 29a teaches: “The thoughts of sin are more severe than sin itself.”

Consoling himself with the knowledge that he will still be able to study for two or three years before his financial burden becomes great (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:1, 2).

Though Avot 5:22 states: “At five, one should begin the study of Scripture,” the Rambam, based on Sukkah 42a, explains that certain elements of a child’s study must begin earlier.

How to use that potential for Torah study. Two verses are selected as being of fundamental importance.

“The Torah Moses commanded us is the inheritance of the congregation of Jacob.” This verse emphasizes the fundamental connection a Jew has to the Torah. As soon as an heir is born, he becomes the legal owner of the inheritance left to him. Thus, since the Torah is every Jew’s inheritance, as soon as a child is born, he acquires his full share of our nation’s spiritual heirtage. (See also Chapter 3, Halachah 1.)

“Hear Israel, God is our Lord, God is One.” This verse emphasizes the fundamental unity between God and creation, teaching us, not only that there is only one God, but also that all creation is at one with Him. The Menorat HaMaor and Rashi (Deuteronomy 11:19) emphasize that the child need not understand the verses he is reciting. The recitation of these verses refines his power of speech and makes lasting impressions on his thinking processes, even though he is unaware of their intellectual message.

Until this age, the child lacks sufficient maturity to apply himself to his studies diligently (Bava Batra 21a). The Kessef Mishneh 2:2 explains that this decision is no contradiction to the Mishnah in Avot quoted above. The latter can be interpreted to mean “after completing five years” — i.e., at the beginning of the sixth year. However, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (Positive Commandment 12) interprets the injunction from Avot to mean that when the child becomes five, his father teaches him to read at home, and when he becomes six or seven, he is taken to school. It is also possible to interpret the Rambam’s words in this fashion.
[Indeed, that interpretation is more likely. Though the above mentioned mishnah states: “At eighteen, one should marry,” the Rambam (Hilchut Ishut 15:2) states a man is obligated to marry at the age of seventeen. Thus, we see that he interprets the different clauses of the Mishnah to mean “in his... th year, one should...”]

See Tosafot, Bava Batra, loc. cit.

Kiddushin 30a relates that the Sages would physically take their children to their teachers.

Where the child will begin the study of the written Torah in an organized fashion. Bava Batra (loc. cit.) relates that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Gamla established a fixed ruled requiring all parents to take their children to teachers at this time. (See Chapter 2, Halachot 1 and 2 for further elaboration.)

As stated in Halachah 3.

The Kovetz and other commentaries explain that this word was added to include the works of the prophets and the holy writings (i.e., the entire Tanach). Rashi (Bava Batra, loc. cit.) is not of this opinion, and maintains that having him taught the five books of Moses is sufficient. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 245:5) follows the latter opinion, while Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:1) quotes the former view.

In the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 245:6), he explains that a father’s obligation also includes arranging for his son’s instruction in the Oral Law, unless his financial situation is too pressing to allow him to do so.

Nedarim 37a relates that the wage a teacher receives is not for his actual tutelage, but rather for the effort involved in caring for the children. Alternatively, the money can be taken for teaching the proper cantillation notes. [At that time, there were few if any written texts, and the students were taught the entire Torah by heart.]
The difference between the two opinions is that according to the latter, one may also charge adults. Since the Rambam allows a wage to be charged without qualifying his words, one may assume that this applies even to teaching adults. This decision can also be derived from his Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:3.

In his commentary to Nedarim 37a, Rabbenu Nissim quotes the Jerusalem Talmud, which allows a teacher of Torah to receive compensation for the fact that were he not to teach, he could occupy himself in another profession which would yield him profit. The Hagahot Maimoniot develops this matter further, noting that Ketubot 106a relates that the Temple treasury would pay people to instruct the priests regarding the laws of ritual slaughter. He also notes that authors of works of Torah scholarship are allowed to demand pay for their services. These ideas are quoted as halachah by the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 246:5).
Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the Rambam would accept such an opinion. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), he writes:
According to our Torah, it is in no way permitted to take a wage for teaching any one of the Torah’s professions... I am amazed at the men of stature who, aroused by desire, denied the truth and had wages designated for themselves for Torah decisions and teachings, using flimsy supports.
See also the citation from the Rambam’s commentary to Avot below.

Nedarim, interprets that verse to mean that Moses taught the people at no cost.

I.e., “I have taught you” at no cost, “as God commanded (i.e., taught) me” at no cost. Moses continues, commanding the people to emulate his example.

Though the resulting decision is the same, the Rambam’s interpretation of this passage differs slightly from Rabbenu Asher’s and Rabbenu Nissim’s.

I.e., Torah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam interprets Avot 4:7, which states: “’Do not make it (the Torah) an axe to chop with...’ do not consider it a medium with which to derive a livelihood.” He continues elaborating on how it is both undesirable — and forbidden — to derive benefit from Torah study or its instruction:
Some people thought foolishly that it is obligatory and fitting to support the wise men and students... who occupy themselves in Torah study... This is all erroneous. No source in the Torah or in the words of the Sages can be found to... support it.
Among the Sages [of the Talmud], one does not find that they asked for money from other people. They did not receive any funding for their precious and glorious yeshivot... Heaven forbid to say that those generations were not generous and did not give charity. Had a poor person stretched out his hand, they would have filled it with gold and pearls. But the poor person did not do so; rather, he was satisfied with what he could earn in his profession, whether a little or a lot... Hillel the Elder was a wood-chopper who would study before Shemayah and Avtalion and lived in extreme poverty. He was so great that his students were compared to Moses and Aaron... There is no doubt that if he had taught the people to give him benefit, they would not have allowed him to continue chopping trees...
The Sages would not allow themselves to take money from people. They considered taking such funds as a desecration of God’s name in public, because the people would thus consider Torah as similar to any other profession and come to scorn it.
See also Chapter 3, Halachot 10 and 11.

This represents the second aspect of the mitzvah of Torah study; studying oneself.

Yoma 35b states: “Hillel obligates the poor [in Torah study], Rabbi Elazar ben Charsom obligates the rich.” The Talmud elaborates: Hillel would work and earn a tarp’eick [a coin of little value] daily. Half, he would give to the watchman at the Hall of Study, and half, he would use for his livelihood and that of his family. One day, he could not find work. The watchman at the entrance did not let him enter and so he hung himself over the window to hear “the words of the living God” from Shemayah and Avtalion.
In contrast, Rabbi Elazar ben Charsom was extremely wealthy: His father left him one thousand villages on land and one thousand ships at sea. Each day, he would take a sack of flour on his shoulders and go from city to city to study Torah... Throughout his entire life, he did not go to see them [the villages and the ships], but rather sat and studied Torah the entire day and night

Eruvin 54a counsels that Torah study will help a person with health problems recover.

And his youthful exuberance might prevent him from concentrating on his studies.

See Halachah 10.

At one extreme, Eruvin 22a relates: “Who will you find possessing Torah? A person who is cruel to his wife and children” — i.e., one who gives up some of the time he would spend with his family to dedicate himself to Torah study. However, even a person who does not make such an all-encompassing commitment to Torah must find time for study despite his family responsibilities.

There are two aspects to Torah study:
a) One which requires total devotion, dedicating all of one’s time and effort to Torah, because “the study of Torah has no limit.” Though it is fitting for each Jew to apply himself to Torah study in this fashion, such a practice cannot be required of a person. Rather, this remains a voluntary decision to be made by a person, to quote Chapter 3, Halachah 6, “whose heart inspires him to fulfill this mitzvah in a fitting manner and to become crowned with the crown of Torah.”
b) The establishment of fixed times for Torah study. Regardless of the responsibilities and difficulties a person may have, he is obligated to set aside a certain portion of his day for Torah study.
On Psalms 119:126: “It is a time to act for God. They have made void Your Torah,” our Sages commented: “Those who have established fixed times for Torah (i.e., “a time to act for God”) have ‘made void your Torah.’ The Sh’lah (Masechet Shavuot) questions that statement, noting that the establishment of fixed times for Torah is considered of fundamental importance. He resolves the contradiction by explaining that a person who is overburdened by financial responsibilities can be expected only to “establish fixed times for Torah study.” However, someone who is free of financial burdens must devote himself totally to Torah study. For him, keeping to fixed times represents “making void the Torah.”
Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:4) mentions these concepts, but also emphasizes a person’s potential for achievement. An individual who has the potential to achieve in Torah study should devote himself to this goal. In contrast, a person whose abilities are limited should establish fixed times for Torah study and devote his energies to business affairs, using that income to support Torah scholars.
The above concepts can be related to a more general discussion in Berachot 35b. The Talmud notes the apparent contradiction between Joshua 1:8, which commands “This Torah shall not depart from your mouth” and Deuteronomy 11:14, which relates how “you will collect your grain, your wine, and your oil,” implying that a person should involve himself in work and/or commerce.
Rabbi Yishmael explains that a person should follow “the way of the world,” involving himself in work and devoting only part of his energies to Torah study. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai exclaims: “If a person will plow in the plowing season, sow in the sowing season,... what will happen to the Torah! Rather, when the Jews do God’s will, their work is performed by others.”
The Talmud concludes: Many followed Rabbi Yishmael’s advice and were successful. Many followed Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s advice and were not successful. Though the complete and total dedication demanded by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is beyond the reach of all at present, the passage is useful in order to appreciate two different approaches to the obligation of Torah study:
a) That of Rabbi Yishmael, who sees it as a responsibility to be considered within the context of our daily activities;
b) That of Rabbi Shimon, who sees Torah study as the paramount aspect of a person’s life, to which he should be devoted without considering the demands of his financial position.

Many, including the Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah, Avot 4:7), cite the example of Hillel. However, as of yet, no explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source has been found which states that Hillel was occupied in this profession. Avot D’Rabbi Natan (ch. 6) states that Rabbi Akiva was so employed.

Ketubot 105a states that Rav Huna earned his livelihood in this manner.

Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet, two of the more prominent Amoraim, were so afflicted (Pesachim 116b).

See the commentary to Halachah 7, and on Chapter 3, Halachot 9-11.

In his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam lists the chain of teachers who transmitted Torah from generation to generation. There he mentions that Hillel received the tradition from Shemayah and Avtalion and transmitted it to Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai. Rav Huna transmitted the tradition to Rabbah and Rav Yosef, who in turn, transmitted it to Abbaye and Ravva.

Shabbat 83b states that even when a person feels death approaching, he should not neglect his Torah studies.

The failure to study can be considered as “removing” one’s previous study from one’s heart.

Chaggigah 15a states: “The words of Torah are as difficult to acquire as gold vessels, and as easy to lose as glass utensils.” Avot D’Rabbi Natan 24:6 elaborates on how easy it is to forget one’s Torah knowledge. Deuteronomy 4:9 states: “Be extremely careful... lest you forget these things.”
The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, the Sefer Mitzvot Kattan, and others consider this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments, prohibiting forgetting the Torah one has studied. (See also Menachot 99b, Rav
Ovadiah of Bartenura on Avot 3:10 and Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:4-10.) The Rambam does not include this as one of the Torah’s prohibitions in Sefer HaMitzvot, nor does he explicitly mention the prohibition in our halachot. Nevertheless, it is possible to explain that he considers this charge as part of the command to study Torah for one’s entire life explained in this halachah.

Kiddushin 30a states: “A person should always divide his years: One third should be devoted to the Written Law; one third to the Mishnah; and one third to the Talmud.” In this halachah, the Rambam defines each of the three categories mentioned. In the following halachah, he defines what it means to “divide one’s years.”

The entire Tanach, as mentioned in the following halachah.

.. I.e., Mishnah. This is not intended to mean only the Mishnah authored by Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi per se, but rather “halachic decisions without being concerned with their motivating principles” (Rashi, Sotah 22a). As is obvious from his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, where he defines it as “a collection of the entire Oral Law,” the Rambam desired that his Mishneh Torah serve this purpose.

Each law stated in a previous source has elements which are specific to the situation described, and general principles of greater relevance. In order to understand the proper course of action to follow in a different circumstance, one must be able to differentiate between the two. In this manner, one will be able to derive new halachic principles applicable to situations that were not described previously.
Similarly, by understanding the process by which a halachic concept is developed, one can understand how similar laws could be derived. [Note also Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:1, Kuntres Acharon), which contrasts the Rambam’s perspective on this issue with that of Rashi and Rabbenu Asher.]

E. g., the thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis mentioned by Rabbi Yishmael (introduction to the Sifra), the 32 principles mentioned by Rabbi Elazar ben Yossi.

See the note on Halachah 2.

It must be noted that most original manuscripts and early editions of the Mishneh Torah use the word Talmud rather than Gemara in this and the following halachah. This is consistent with the composition of the text, which is almost exclusively in Hebrew, with little use of Aramaic terminology.

Kiddushin, loc. cit., asks this question, noting that, on the surface, it is impossible to divide one’s years in three, since no one knows how long he will live. There, the Talmud explains that one must divide “one’s days.”

Examples chosen by the Rabbis reflect common situations. Thus, these statements teach us what would be considered a commonplace division of one’s time in the Rambam’s age.

I.e., Gemara; dividing his daily study sessions equally among these three areas of study.

The remainder of the Bible — i.e., the works of the prophets and the Holy Scriptures.

Berachot 5a relates that the entire Tanach has its source in the revelation at Sinai. Accordingly, though in certain regards the Five Books of Moses are given greater prominence, the entire Written Law is generally considered on the same footing.

I.e., commentary and the explanation of the Tanach.

The mystic secrets describing the nature of Godliness and His creative power, which are mentioned in brief in the first four chapters of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah. In particular, see Chapter 4, Halachah 13 there.

And should be studied according to the guidelines mentioned in the halachah cited above.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam offered this explanation to resolve the apparent contradiction between the commonly accepted practice of devoting most of one’s time to the study of the Babylonian Talmud, and the injunction to divide one’s study time in three. In response to the same question, Tosafot, Kiddushin 30a explains that the study of the Babylonian Talmud also fulfills that directive, because it combines all three areas of study in a single text.
At present, this pattern of study is not followed even in the early stages of a child’s learning. Note the Maharal of Prague, Tiferet Yisrael, Chapter 56, and the Sh’lah, Masechet Shavuot, who complain that the advice given in Avot 5:22: “At five, to the study of the Written Law; at ten, to the study of the Mishnah; and at fifteen, to the study of the Gemara” is not generally followed.
The basis for this departure can be explained in terms of two differences that exist between our contemporary circumstances and the situation which prevailed in Talmudic times:
a) During the Talmudic era, written texts were rare, and it was necessary for a student to commit all his subject matter to memory. Thus, the emphasis was on teaching students by rote.
b) Hebrew was a spoken language and, therefore, it was not necessary to spend time teaching the children the meaning of the subject matter.
At present, the major emphasis is on teaching learning skills and developing a student’s powers of comprehension with the understanding that once one knows how to study, since the texts are easily available, he will be able to apply himself to the actual study at his convenience. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:6, 11; Eglei Tal, Introduction.)

Because he has already mastered them.

As mentioned above, a lack of review will cause an individual to forget what he has already learned.

The first halachah of this chapter relates that women are not obligated to study Torah.

Chassidic thought explains the concept. The Hebrew word מצוה (commandment) shares the same root as the word צוותא (connection). Fulfilling the commandments establishes a transcendent bond with Godliness. In contrast, a good deed that is not commanded, no matter how worthy, remains an act of man and does not establish such a connection.

As mentioned in the commentary to Halachah 1, the Rabbis require a woman to study the laws governing the mitzvot which she is obligated to fulfill. Based on that decision, many commentaries explain that the Rambam’s statements refer only to intensive study of the subject matter described as Gemara in the previous halachot.

Commentaries have mentioned that by adding the word “most,” the Rambam implies that if a father sees that his daughter is capable of such study, he should afford her the opportunity.

Kin’at Eliyahu notes the contrast between the first clause, “A woman who studies,” and the command the Sages gave “a father.” He differentiates between study that a woman undertakes voluntarily, which is considered desirable, and a father’s training his daughter in matters which are not necessarily relevant to her.

Sotah 21b.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 3:3). From Sotah 21b, it would appear that תפלות could be translated as “romance.” The Meiri renders it as “vanity,” explaining that a woman who has studied will boast of her achievements.

Though the Rambam’s statements are quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 246:6), the source for his statements has been questioned. Some point to the Mishnah, Nedarim 3:3, which, in passing, mentions a daughter’s study of the Written Law. However, the Rambam’s own text of that Mishnah lacks the words “or daughter.” Others point to Chaggigah 3a (and more specifically, to the Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit. 1:1), which describes the reading of the Torah by the king during the Hakhel celebration, which women were also required to attend. Nevertheless, there is a difference between study of the Written Law in its entirety and hearing the reading of a few inspirational passages. (See Turei Zahav 246:4.)
In this context, it might be noted that the Tur’s text of the Rambam reverses these statements and mentions teaching women the Oral Law as preferable to the Written Law. This can easily be reconciled with the opinions mentioned above, which require a woman to learn the laws governing the mitzvot she is obligated to fulfill. In contrast, the Written Law is a less closely defined field of study. There, a greater possibility exists that a woman who is not gifted may misinterpret the teachings.