Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Here and in the following halachot, the word “form” refers to the entity’s spiritual qualities, and not its physical shape.

Since the heavens are spherical, anything past the midpoint of the Earth can be considered to be “higher” when approaching from the opposite side.

From the above statements, it appears that the ‘fundamental elements’ of fire, wind, water, and earth are different from the entities to which we generally refer with these names.

The cycle of change is discussed in the following halachah.

This refers to the spheres and the stars. As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 3, and Chapter 2, Halachah 3, they are composed of a different type of matter from the creations in our world.

This refers to the angels. As explained in Chapter 2, Halachah 4, they are spiritual beings without material bodies.

This refers to both animals and man. All animals possess a soul, which is conscious and feeling, and can thus be distinguished as higher forms of life than the plant kingdom.

This refers to the aspect of soul which gives life to the body and allows it to perform its physical functions. In the following halachah, the Rambam refers to this dimension of soul within man as the neshamah.

Though animals also think, all their thoughts are associated with material things: how to get objects which bring gratification and how to avoid situations which cause pain. In contrast, man can conceive of abstract ideas that are not associated with his actual experience. (See also the following halachah.)

In English, the word soul and its synonyms are not specific terms, precisely defining the different dimensions of soul. In contrast, each of the three Hebrew terms used in this and following halachah — nefesh, ruach, and neshamah — refers to a different spiritual quality, and they should not be used interchangeably.

As will be explained, Ma’aseh Bereishit refers to the Divine life-force which invests itself within creation. Thus, it deals with a context that relates to limitation. Ma’aseh Merkavah deals with God as He transcends creation, and thus is truly infinite in nature.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Chaggigah 2:1, the Rambam defines this realm of study as “the study of nature and the research into the beginning of creation.”

Chaggigah 11b.

There is less selectivity about the people to whom the subjects are taught.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Chaggigah 2:1, the Rambam writes: “The masses will understand very little of these matters. Should a simple person be exposed to them, his faith will be confused and he will think that they contradict the truth.”

I.e., the heavenly spheres whose bodies are more refined than ours and whose knowledge surpasses man’s (Chapter 3, Halachah 9).

I.e., the angels; see Chapter 2, Halachah 3.

Even if a person’s conduct is refined and he is careful in his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos, he will realize how his very humanity places limitations upon him and his material concerns will cause him to feel utter humility and smallness in God’s presence.

a) the knowledge of God’s being; b) His unity; c) love of Him; d) fear of Him; e) the negation of the existence of other gods.

Literally, the term means “orchard.” However, it was used by our Sages to refer to the knowledge of God. The Perush explains that this metaphor was chosen for two reasons:
a) An orchard is attractive and arouses man’s desire and pleasure,
b) An orchard contains many trees with different fruits, which require study to appreciate their benefits.
From the passage from Chaggigah quoted below, the term “Pardes” would appear to refer to mystic experience as well as spiritual knowledge. However, no such understanding is apparent from the Rambam’s words.

Chaggigah 14b.

The passage continues:

Likkutei Sichot (Vol. 26) notes the expression “stroll in Pardes” and explains that a stroll implies a leisurely pleasure walk — i.e., study in depth and in detail until one derives satisfaction from the comprehension of the matter. The Torah’s mystic truths should not be studied in this manner until one has undergone the necessary preparations.

Bread is used as a metaphor for Torah study in Proverbs 9:5, “Come eat of my bread.” Our Sages use the metaphor of meat with a similar intent in Eruvin 21b.

Sukkah 28a.

Thus, before undertaking an in-depth study of the Torah’s mystic truths, it is proper to master the points of Torah law that can be comprehended by all. For studying Torah trains a person’s thinking processes, giving him the depth of understanding necessary to comprehend spiritual truth.

Following Torah law will lead one to a meaningful and well-balanced life within the realm of worldly experience.

Both men and women (Avodat HaMelech). The Rambam’s words also imply an exclusion. Thus, in Hilchot Melachim 10:2 (based on Sanhedrin 75a), he states that a gentile is not obligated to sacrifice his life rather than violate any of the seven commandments which gentiles are obligated to fulfill. Even if they are forced to worship other gods, they may do so rather than give up their lives. It must be noted that there are other authorities who differ with the Rambam regarding the interpretation of Sanhedrin, op. cit., and therefore object to this decision.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 9) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 296) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. The previous chapters described the mitzvot of love and fear of God. This chapter concerns itself with the ultimate expression of these emotions (note Halachah 7): a person’s willingness to sacrifice His life in the sanctification of God’s name. The concept of Kiddush HaShem, the sanctification of God’s name, is a question with which the Rambam was forced to deal on a practical as well as a theoretical level. In his time, many kingdoms issued decrees attempting to force the Jews to abandon their faith at the pain of death. From all over the world, Jews turned to the Rambam for advice and consolation. He responded to them in emotional letters that reveal — in addition to his mastery of halachah — his deep love for every Jew. Two of these epistles, Iggeret HaSh’mad and Iggeret Teiman, have become classic texts and will be referred to from time to time in our commentary.

This command implies that a Jew must act in a manner which causes others to regard God’s name with reverence.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 63) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 295) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

The question is not answered in this halachah alone. Indeed, the entire chapter can be considered to be a response to it.

In any circumstance other than those mentioned in Halachot 2 and 3.

Our Sages (Yoma 82b, Sanhedrin 74a) offered the following interpretation of this verse.

Rashi, in his commentary to the above passages, states: “The reason for this decision is that a Jewish soul is dearer to God than the mitzvot. God says: ‘Let the mitzvah be nullified so that this person can live.’”

Not only is he not considered to have performed a holy act of martyrdom, it is as if he committed suicide. Note also Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4, where the Rambam severely criticizes a rabbi who advised martyrdom in an instance when it was not necessary. Many other rabbis have differed with the Rambam on this point, explaining that a person who sacrifices his life in order to observe Torah and mitzvot is considered to have sanctified God’s name even if he was not required to do so. (Note the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 157:1, which grants this license.) Indeed, throughout history many pious Sages and common people alike have sacrificed their lives in the sanctification of God’s name, even when they were not required to do so by Torah law. The Lechem Mishneh explains that these people may not have realized that their Torah practice was being observed by the gentiles and did not appreciate that their lives were actually in danger. Alternatively, the Nimukei Yosef (Sanhedrin) explains that an exception can be made regarding a pious sage whose martyrdom would inspire the nation. Note also Iggeret HaSh’mad (Chapter 4), where the Rambam mentions a specific instance where a person is not obligated to sacrifice his life and yet does so, and states that such a person is considered to have sanctified God’s name, and is on the highest level of piety.

The Rambam explains the rationale why these three sins were singled out in Halachah 7.

Even if ten people are not present (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 157:1). This distinction should not be interpreted to mean that these are the three most severe prohibitions in the Torah. On the contrary, we find that a person who flagrantly violates the Sabbath is judged more severely than one who flagrantly indulges in forbidden sexual relations (Tanya, Chapter 24). See also Tosafot, Sanhedrin 74a, who mention that the obligation to sacrifice one’s life rather than transgress applies only when the transgression is committed by performing a deed. If, however, the person assists in the commission of such a transgression in a totally passive way — e.g., he allows his body to be used to crush that of a baby — he is not held responsible. Support for this concept is brought from the principle of קרקע עולם discussed below. In his gloss to the Rambam, Rav Chayim Soloveichik explains that this logic does not necessarily apply with regard to be a passive participant to the murder of another Jew. Even though he does not do anything himself, a Jew should never willingly be a party, even passively, to the death of a fellow Jew.

The leniency enabling a person to transgress rather than sacrifice his life.

Since the gentile is not seeking to have the Jew renounce any aspect of the Torah, the violation of Torah law on the pain of death is not considered to be a desecration of God’s name serious enough to warrant the sacrifice of a Jew’s life (Rashi, Sanhedrin 74b).

The Rambam’s mention of rape raises a number of issues. Firstly, the leniency applies to a woman who is forcibly raped and not to a man who is compelled to engage in sexual relations. Yevamot 53b states that an erection is a conscious act for which a man is always held accountable. Therefore, even if a man was compelled to engage in forbidden sexual relations, his actions are never considered to have been performed against his will. See Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 1:9. The mention of rape involves another question, since, as stated above, forbidden sexual relations are among the sins for which one is obligated to sacrifice one’s life rather than violate. Rabbenu Nissim explains that the above refers only to incestuous and adulterous relations with other Jews. Sexual relations with gentiles, even when adulterous, though a very severe sin, are not included in this category. The Lechem Mishneh differs and explains that adulterous relations with a gentile are also included in the above category, and that the Rambam is speaking of an unmarried girl in this halachah. Also, Sanhedrin 74b holds Esther blameless for her relations with Achashverosh because she was קרקע עולם (like the ground of the earth) — i.e., since her involvement in the forbidden act was totally passive, she bears no burden of responsibility whatsoever. Accordingly, the Rambam’s statements here must be referring to an instance in which the woman actively participates in sexual relations. Nevertheless, since she was compelled to do so, and the person compelling her had his own pleasure in mind, her actions are not considered to be a desecration of God’s name.

The leniency is granted in these instances even if there are ten other Jews present.

Sanhedrin (op. cit.) states that Esther’s relations with Achashverosh were b’farhesiah (in public), even though surely ten Jews were not present in the king’s private chamber. Accordingly, the commentaries explain that whenever ten Jews know of a transgression, the same laws apply as if they were physically present. See T’shuvos D’var Shmuel, Responsum 63 and Pitchei Teshuvah Yoreh De’ah 157:7 which discuss whether the person committing the transgression is counted among the ten or not.

The command to sanctify God’s name states that He shall be sanctified “amidst the children of Israel.” Through a process of Biblical exegesis, Sanhedrin (op. cit.) demonstrates that this refers to a minimum of ten Jews. If these many Jews are not present, one should not sacrifice one’s life.

The authoritative manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah state “in times of sh’mad” instead of “in times of a decree” in both these instances. Sh’mad is generally interpreted as meaning “forced conversion away from Judaism” or “religious persecution.”

Who tried to compel the Jewish people to worship false deities after exiling them to Babylon.

The Lechem Mishneh infers that the decree must be issued against the Jews specifically and not against many nations, among them Israel (see Rama, Yoreh De’ah 157:1).

I.e., even mitzvot other than the worship of false gods, forbidden sexual relations, and murder, for which one must sacrifice one’s life at all times. Sanhedrin 74a-b states that under these circumstances one must sacrifice one’s life even for a “mitzvah of little consequence... What is a mitzvah of little consequence?... Changing one’s shoelaces.” Rashi explains that the Jews were accustomed to tying their shoes in a different manner from the gentiles, and a person should sacrifice his life rather than adopt the gentile practice. The Kessef Mishneh states that this implies that one must give up his life for the observance of a custom, and questions why the Rambam uses the term mitzvah. However, he explains that tying one’s laces in this fashion would violate the prohibition (see Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:1) against adopting gentile dress habits. Note also the She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (Va’era), which states that such an action could be interpreted as bowing down to false gods. Rabbenu Nissim explains that we are obligated to sacrifice our lives only when the violation of a prohibition is involved. If, however, the gentiles forbid the observance of a positive commandment, a Jew is not obligated to risk his life to observe it, because if the gentiles desire, they can imprison a person and prevent him from fulfilling all positive commandments. Nevertheless, the Kessef Mishneh and others disagree, citing the example of Daniel, who risked his life in order to pray; Rabbi Chananyah ben Teradion, who sacrificed his life to study Torah; and Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava, who sacrificed his life in order to perpetuate the practice of semichah (Rabbinic ordination). Support for the latter opinion can be brought from Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4, where the Rambam includes the study of Torah and circumcision among the mitzvot for which Jews have been forced to sacrifice their lives over the ages.

Rashi, Sanhedrin 74a, states that one is obligated to sacrifice one’s life in the latter instance, so the gentiles will not become accustomed to oppressing the Jews in this manner. Note Iggeret HaSh’mad in which the Rambam states that even in the time of sh’mad, a Jew is allowed to violate Torah law — with the exception of the three sins mentioned in the previous halachah — if he is compelled to do so for a gentile’s benefit. However, the Lechem Mishneh and others do not accept this decision.

Even though the proof text for the mitzvah includes the phrase, “amidst the children of Israel,” which implies the presence of ten Jews, if one is required to sacrifice one’s life in private — when forced to worship idols or in the time of a decree — one fulfills the mitzvah of sanctifying God’s name (Matteh Efrayim). Note the Lechem Mishneh, who interprets the Rambam’s statements otherwise.

Note the Rambam’s description of these individuals in Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 9): Nebuchadnezzar, the wicked, compelled everyone to bow down to the idol and every Jewish person bowed down without anyone’s sanctifying God’s name, thus bringing great shame to the Jews.... There was an obligation to publicize and make known God’s oneness at that time. God had already promised — as Isaiah the prophet related, that Israel would not be utterly shamed at that time, but rather, despite the difficult situation, young men would appear who would not be frightened by death. They would be willing to forfeit their lives to publicize the true faith and sanctify God’s name... as Isaiah 29:22-23 states: “Jacob shall not be ashamed, neither shall his face grow pale when he sees his children, the work of My hands... sanctifying My name.”

Bava Batra 10b states: “Those who are slain by the wicked kingdom — no created being can stand in their chamber.” Our version of the Talmud continues: Who are those slain by the wicked kingdom? If you say they are Rabbi Akiva and their colleagues — Is their only positive quality that they were slain by the wicked kingdom? Rather, this refers to those slain in Lod (Pappus and Lulianus, two common people who sacrificed their lives to save the entire Jewish community, Rashi). The Rambam’s text of this Talmudic passage is slightly different (see Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4). According to his version, the Talmud is saying that though surely Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues possessed this quality, even others of a lesser level could also be described with this exalted term.

See Iggeret Teiman, Chapter 1, where the Rambam also quotes this verse and continues: We should rejoice in carrying this burden. This is all glory for us before our Creator.... Everything which we lose is considered to be a burnt offering upon the altar. The Torah alludes to this, saying (Exodus 32:29): “Today, you have been ordained unto God, each man with his son and brother, to give you, today, a special blessing.”

In Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4, the Rambam writes: “A person to whom God has given the merit to rise to this great level, to die in sanctification of God’s name — even if his sins are great like Yorov’am and his colleagues — merits a portion of the world to come.”

Note Avot 4:5: “Whenever one desecrates God’s name in secret, punishment will be meted out to him in public.”

The Pri Chadash maintains that a person violates the prohibition against desecrating God’s name only when he commits a transgression in public. However, in Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam explicitly states that a person violates this prohibition even when he transgresses in private. (Note the difference of opinion between the Lechem Mishneh and the Matteh Efrayim mentioned above regarding the performance of the positive commandment.)

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:1, where the Rambam explains the necessity for witnesses to testify to a person’s guilt before he is punished and, ibid. 12:1-2, where he discusses the warning the witnesses must give the transgressor.

An Ammonite deity whom the Torah frequently warns against worshiping. (See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 6:3.)

The implication is that he is punished by God’s hand and not by the court.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam refers to the Sifri as his source. The commentaries have cited the comments of the Sifri on Deuteronomy 17:5. However, a more exact source for this passage would be the Sifra, Parashat Kedoshim.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1 and 6:3, where the Rambam requires a person who mistakenly performs an act of idol worship to bring a sacrifice as atonement. However, no punishment is imposed upon him by an earthly court.

Nevertheless, as can be inferred from Megillah 12a, a certain measure of Divine anger is aroused when the Jewish people as a whole fail to sanctify God’s name.

The rape of a consecrated maiden.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:2, the Rambam explains that this verse is “a warning to the court not to punish someone who is forced to violate a transgression.”

The entire paragraph that follows is not included in the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah (a very significant fact in view of some of the comments below). The Rambam does, however, make somewhat similar statements in Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4.

In Iggeret HaSh’mad and in Iggeret Teiman, the Rambam strongly advises people living in countries where Jewish practice is prohibited to flee to other lands: It is proper to flee... and enter the deserts and unsettled wastelands, without thinking of one’s separation from humanity or the loss of money, because these are small and insignificant things in contrast to the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.... How could a person not turn away in disgust from his homeland... for the sake of the entire Torah! (Iggeret Teiman, Chapter 1).

See also Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4, where the Rambam states that anyone who has the opportunity to leave a land where he is forced to violate Torah law and refrains from doing so “desecrates God’s name and is close to one who transgresses willingly.”

This latter statement is extremely significant within a totally different frame of reference. In Hilchot Teshuvah (8:5), the Rambam mentions that the punishment of karet involves the cutting off of the soul — i.e., that the soul is not granted a portion of the world to come. Other commentaries have protested, questioning why the Rambam makes no mention of the punishment such a soul will receive in the afterlife. In reply, other rabbis have cited this halachah — which states that in addition to failing to reach the world to come, the soul is also punished — as proof that the Rambam agrees that a soul also suffers spiritual afflictions. He, nevertheless, does not mention these punishments in Hilchot Teshuvah, because that text focuses primarily on the ultimate spiritual dimensions of reward and punishment.

Without specifying the individual’s identity.

In a responsum, the Rashba writes that this decision applies even when one of the women is known to be immoral and to engage in forbidden sexual relations.

As explained in Halachah 7, the reason why a person is not allowed to kill another person to save his own life is that “one soul should not be sacrificed for another.” In this instance this rationale does not apply, because all of them will be slain (Kessef Mishneh, Lechem Mishneh). The Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the problem is in “delivering over” a Jewish soul to be killed. In no way may one be the direct cause of another Jew’s death. On this basis, he explains that if the gentiles say: “Allow us to kill one of you, or we will kill you all,” it is preferable to allow them to slay the single individual so that the other Jewish lives will be preserved. Other opinions maintain that in all instances the people must hope to be saved, and because of that hope, defend every Jewish life.

II Samuel, Chapter 20, relates that Sheva ben Bichri called for a mutiny against King David after the kingship was restored to him following the revolt of Avshalom.
Yo’av, David’s commander in chief, pursued Sheva, who took refuge in the city of Avel. Yo’av besieged the city with the intent of laying waste to it. A wise old woman (according to tradition, Serach bat Asher) implored Yo’av not to destroy the city. He agreed on the condition that Sheva be delivered to him. Shortly afterwards, the city’s elders had Sheva executed for rebelling against the king.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot 8:4, relates that a Jew fled from the Roman authorities and took refuge in Lod. The Romans surrounded the city and demanded his surrender, threatening to slay all its inhabitants if the specific individual was not handed over to them. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, the chief rabbi of the city, handed over the fugitive. Until that event, Elijah the prophet was wont to visit Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Afterwards, he ceased coming. Rabbi Yehoshua fasted in penitence so that Elijah would return. Ultimately, his efforts bore fruit and Elijah did come. He was, however, irate. “Am I to appear to collaborators?” he asked Rabbi Yehoshua.
“Did I not act according to the guidance of the Mishnah?” replied Rabbi Yehoshua.
“Is that Mishnah an expression of pious conduct?” answered Elijah.
The implication is that even when Torah Law might require the community to sacrifice a person’s life, they should make every endeavor to avoid doing so.

The rabbis have questioned the Rambam’s decision, which is based on the opinion of Resh Lakish (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.). Now, that source also quotes Rabbi Yochanan who maintains that whenever the gentiles single out a particular individual, he should be given over to them, whether he is obligated to die or not. Generally, in differences of opinion between these two sages, the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan. The Kessef Mishneh explains that in this instance, since human life is in question and the Talmud does not render a final judgment on the matter, the more lenient position is followed. The Avodat HaMelech writes that, on the contrary, the Rambam’s position is not more lenient, since ultimately all the people are to be slain. He explains that the Rambam’s text of the Jerusalem Talmud quoted the difference of opinion as being between Rabbi Yochanan and a later sage, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi (and not Resh Lakish). The halachah follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s opinion, according to the principle that, in such disputes, the halachah follows the opinion of the sages of the later generation. The Turei Zahav (Yoreh De’ah 157:7) also explains that the incident from the Jerusalem Talmud quoted above indicates that the letter of the law follows Resh Lakish’s opinion and accepts the Rambam’s statements as the binding halachah.

Moreover, a physician’s recommendation is not always required. For example, if on Yom Kippur a person feels dangerously weak, his own feelings are sufficient to allow him to eat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 608:1). Similarly, whenever any person becomes aware of the danger to another Jew’s life, he may violate Torah law to save him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:1).

Though the person is allowed to commit a transgression in order to save his life, one cannot say that the prohibitions have been lifted entirely. Thus, Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:16 states that when a person is seized by hunger and in danger of dying, he may be fed forbidden foods. However, care should be taken to feed him those substances which are forbidden by prohibitions of lesser severity.

Note the Rambam’s statements, Hilchot Shabbat 2:3: When these acts — the violation of the Sabbath for the sake of a person who is dangerously ill are performed — they should not be performed by gentiles, children, or servants.... Rather, they should be performed by Israel’s great and wise men. It is forbidden to hesitate to desecrate the Sabbath for a person who is dangerously ill, as [Leviticus 18:5] states: “which a man will perform and live by them.” “Live by them” and not die by them. Behold, we learn that the judgments of the Torah are not vengeance... but mercy, kindness, and peace.

The commentaries have noted the apparent contradiction between this statement and those of Halachah 4, which state that when a person is forced to commit a transgression, no punishment is imposed upon him. The Ma’aseh Rokeach offers the following distinction: When a person is forced to commit a transgression, his actions are performed involuntarily. He is not controlling his behavior, and hence, he is not held responsible for it. In contrast, when a person is ill, he is still in control of his own behavior and must accept the responsibility for violating Torah law.

Although we learn the obligation to sanctify God’s name from the verse, “And I shall be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel,” it is still necessary to define when a person is required to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name.

When the Romans were combing Rabbi Akiva’s flesh with iron combs, he recited the Shema. His students were amazed at his dedication. He told them: “All my life I was agitated by the verse, ‘with all your soul.’... I said to myself, ‘When will I have the opportunity of fulfilling it?’”

Sanhedrin 74a gives the following rationale: Why should the blood of one person be considered as redder than that of another?

Accordingly, it can be concluded that just as a person must sacrifice his life rather than kill another person, he must sacrifice his life rather than engage in forbidden sexual relations.

There are certain substances which the Torah forbids eating and others from which the Torah forbids deriving any benefit (issurei hana’ah). However, a person who derives physical benefit from these forbidden substances is not liable for violating either of these types of prohibition unless he derives benefit from them in an ordinary manner. For example, if one swallowed any type of prohibited substance [with the exception of kilai hakerem (mixed species that grew in a vineyard) or a mixture of milk and meat] without tasting it, one is not held liable (Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:10-11, Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 187). There is a Rabbinic prohibition against ingesting these substances in a way that does not afford satisfaction. However, the Sages did not enforce that prohibition (or other Rabbinic prohibitions) in the face of illness, even when there was no danger to life involved (Kessef Mishneh). Based on this ruling, there is room for leniency with regard to ingesting forbidden substances for medicinal reasons if one does not taste them.

This refers to chametz belonging to a gentile (Rashba). If the chametz belongs to a Jew, it must be destroyed and may be used only if there is a danger to life. Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 4:10 states that if one adds chametz to a compress before Pesach, and by Pesach the chametz is no longer fit for human consumption, that compress may be used on Pesach. However, here the Rambam is speaking of chametz that is fit for human consumption, and, therefore, it must belong to a gentile.

Fruit from the first three years of a tree’s growth. (See Leviticus 19:23; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:9-14.) It is forbidden not only to eat, but also to benefit from both orlah and chametz. Nevertheless, the prohibition against their use does not apply in this instance.

Even though the forbidden foods are themselves tasty, since the mixture as a whole is not palatable, there is no prohibition according to Scriptural Law.

However, the person must be sick. A healthy person with a slight disability cannot use any Torah prohibition for relief.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot:10-11 and in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 187), the Rambam explains that this stringency was instituted because the Torah used an expression other than “do not eat” to prohibit benefit from these substances.

Sanhedrin 75a relates such a problem and the instructions quoted by the Rambam with regard to an incident which actually occurred and not merely as an abstract, theoretical question.

And thus there is no Scriptural transgression involved. Sanhedrin (loc. cit.) questions: If she is unmarried, why doesn’t he marry her, and thus engage in physical intimacy without any prohibitions involved?
The Talmud answers: “Stolen waters are sweet.” If he marries her, he would not derive the full measure of satisfaction.

Rashi explains that if such license were granted, women might lure men into becoming attracted to them so that they be allowed to engage in relations, lest they fall ill. It appears that the Rambam places the onus on the men and explains that if they knew that license would be granted under these circumstances, they would take advantage of the situation and, ultimately, a licentious atmosphere would prevail.

The sanctification of God’s name involves not merely choosing martyrdom, but also living in a manner that sanctifies Him. Conversely, the desecration of God’s name involves not merely failing to sacrifice one’s life, but also failing to live in such a manner. The Rambam deals with these dimensions of these mitzvot in this and the following halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 63), where the Rambam states: The second aspect of the prohibition against Chillul HaShem... is when a person commits a sin without any desire and without deriving satisfaction. Instead, his intent is simply to rebel [against God] and to remove the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven.

Note the Rambam’s statements (Hilchot Sh’vuot 12:2) which describe this as more severe than any other sin.

See Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 10, which explains that all our service of God should stem from such motives. In the preliminary stages of service, one may serve out of a desire for reward or because of fear of punishment. Ultimately, however, a Jew should serve God for His sake and not for his own.

Genesis, Chapter 39, describes how Joseph could have shared intimacy with his master’s wife without fear of detection. Nevertheless, his fear of God caused him to refrain from doing so. Sotah 37a describes such actions as Kiddush HaShem.

Note Shabbat 114a, which states that a sage is deserving of death for having a stain on his clothing. Rashi explains that the common people identify the sages with the Torah. When they see a sage dressed in this fashion, they do not lose respect for the sage alone, but for the Torah he represents. Therefore, he is considered deserving of such severe punishment. Similarly, in the present context, when a sage acts in a reprehensible manner, he does not damage his personal reputation alone; he desecrates the name of God.

The Rambam also refers to this dimension of Chillul HaShem in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 63), stating: “If a person who is renowned for his piety and for the propriety of his actions performs a deed which is unbecoming to such a pious person, even though the deed is permitted, it is Chillul HaShem.” Similarly, in Iggeret HaSh’mad, Chapter 4, the Rambam writes: If a person is lax and does not correct his material affairs until the common people speak disparagingly of him... even though he does not commit a sin, he desecrates God’s name. Therefore, a person must be as careful with regard to sins (i.e., what others may consider to be sins) between one man and his fellow, as he is careful between himself and God. This is alluded to in the expression (Numbers 32:22): “And you shall be blameless before God and Israel.” Similarly, Yoma 86a declares, when a person studies Torah and reviews the oral law and does not carry out his business affairs faithfully, the common people say, “Woe is it to so and so that he studies Torah! Woe is it to so and so’s teacher who taught him Torah!”

The examples of Chillul HaShem and the converse of these traits which the Rambam describes as Kiddush HaShem, are all positive qualities which should become permanent aspects of our characters. Accordingly, he elaborates on the positive nature of these traits in Hilchot De’ot, the text he devotes to explaining the mitzvah of personality development. Since that text deals with the subject of personality development in its totality, here, we will not provide a lengthy commentary to the subject of the character traits the Rambam considers desirable, hoping that the interested reader will look up the topics, as cited in Hilchot De’ot. Nevertheless, we will offer certain comparisons between the Rambam’s statements here and those in Hilchot De’ot.

Yoma 86a quotes the great sage, Rav, as saying: “What is Chillul HaShem? Were I to purchase meat and not pay the butcher immediately.”

In Hilchot De’ot 5:13, the Rambam states that a Torah sage “pays for his purchases immediately,” without qualifying whether this applies when he possesses the means to pay or not. The commentaries question whether the omission of this qualification in Hilchot De’ot implies that although buying on credit when one cannot immediately pay is not Chillul HaShem, it is, nevertheless, not befitting a Torah sage.

There is a slight difference between the Rambam’s statements here and our text of Yoma (loc. cit.), which states: “This applies only in a place where the sellers do not demand payment; but in a place where the sellers demand payment, it does not apply.” The Kessef Mishneh resolves the difficulty, explaining the Rambam possessed a different version of the Talmud than the standard published text. The question appears to be: Which is less becoming for a Torah sage? Pushing off one’s creditors (the Rambam’s view) or failing to pay a creditor who waits patiently for payment (our text of the Talmud).

Hilchot De’ot 1:4 states: “One should not be overly elated and laugh excessively,” and ibid. 2:7 states: “One should not be constantly laughing and a jester.”

Hilchot De’ot 5:2 states: “A wise man... should not eat together with the common people.”

See Avot 1:14: “Receive every person with a friendly countenance.” (See also Hilchot De’ot 2:7.)

See Hilchot De’ot 2:3, which states: Anger is also an exceptionally bad quality. It is fitting and proper that one distance himself from it and adopt the other extreme. One should school himself not to become angry even when it is fitting to be angry. If a communal leader desires to arouse fear... within the community... he should present an angry front to them, but he should be inwardly calm.

A Torah sage must be willing to accept financial obligations upon himself even when Torah law would not hold him liable, so that the common people will feel that he treated them fairly. (See Hilchot De’ot 5:13.)

I.e., in his business dealings, giving others the benefit of the doubt.

Hilchot De’ot 2:3 states: This is the way of the righteous: They accept humiliation, but do not humiliate others. They hear others humble them, but do not answer. They do this with love.... Of them, Judges 5:31 states: “And those who love Him are like the sun which comes out in its strength.”

Yoma (loc. cit.) states: “What is Chillul HaShem?... Rabbi Yochanan said: ‘If someone like me were to walk four cubits without Torah or tefillin.’”

Yoma (ibid.) states: “What is the meaning of [Deuteronomy 6:5:] ‘Love God, your Lord’? That you should make God’s name beloved.... That your conduct should be such that others say: ‘How fortunate is so and so to have studied Torah!’”

Note Hilchot De’ot, where the Rambam mentions many similar qualities as the proper course of behavior for a wise man, and concludes by quoting the same proof text from Isaiah.

Since the previous chapter dealt with the desecration of God’s name, the Rambam continues with the description of a similar prohibition: the actual destruction of God’s name.

Generally, the Sages use the verb “erases” when referring to this prohibition. The Rambam employs the term “destroys” to include destroying an engraving of God’s name (Avodat HaMelech). Alternatively, he is using the language of his Biblical prooftext (Kin’at Eliyahu).

These names are mentioned in Halachah 2.

This is the minimum punishment given for the violation of a Torah prohibition. In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 65) and in Halachah 6, the Rambam writes that this prohibition also includes removing a stone from the altar and destroying wood belonging to the Temple. In all these instances, one is destroying an article upon which the name of God is called.

I.e., destroy one of His names.

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 437) include this in their reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

The Rambam’s definition of God’s names which cannot be erased appears to be based on Sh’vuot 35a. However, as will be explained, there are questions concerning the correct text of that Talmudic portion. It is significant to note that this Talmudic portion does not mention only seven names, and the source for the expression “the seven ineffable names [of God]” is the Zohar, Vol. III, 272b.

This name was to be pronounced only in the Temple (by the High Priest in the Yom Kippur confessions and by the priests in the Priestly Blessings). In the later years of the second Temple, even this practice was discontinued, and this name was never pronounced.

Our version follows the printed text of the Mishneh Torah, which considers both Yud-Hey-Vav-Hey and Alef-Daled-Nun-Yud as a single name of God. Support for this text can be taken from Kiddushin 71a, which states: “I am not referred to as [My name] is written. My name is written Yud-Hey-Vav-Hey, and it is pronounced אדני.” (See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:7.) Nevertheless, other authorities consider the above as two separate names and eliminate one of the others mentioned by the Rambam. For example, the Radbaz (Vol. 5, Responsum 1407) states that the name Elo’ah should not be included as a name in its own right, for it is the singular form of the name Elohim. Other opinions (Kessef Mishneh) include Elo’ah, but omit Eil. (There are manuscript and printed editions of the Mishneh Torah which support these different views.) When mentioning this prohibition, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 276:9) counts Yud-Hey-Vav-Hey and Alef-Daled-Nun-Yud as separate names, eliminating the name Elohai. Alef-Daled-Nun-Yud — Adonai — means “My Lord.” This name refers to God as He manifests Himself as Lord of the world.

This word also means ‘power’ (See Genesis 31:29). Thus, as a name for God, it is translated as ‘the Almighty.’

Generally, this name is translated simply as “God.” Since, as explained above, it is also the singular form of Elohim, the meanings of that name are also appropriate. As mentioned, some editions of the Mishneh Torah do not include it as one of God’s seven names.

This name is also applied to judges and thus can be understood to refer to God as the Supreme Judge (Shmot Rabbah 3:6). Our Sages also associate this name, like the name Eil, with power. Thus, it refers to God as “the source of all power and potential.”

This term means ‘my God.’

In the Guide for the Perplexed (loc. cit.), the Rambam translates this name as “Who has enough” — i.e., it expresses the concept that God does not require any other entity for His existence.

Shmot Rabbah (loc. cit.) explains that this refers to God as He wages war.

We are liable not only for erasing an entire name, but for erasing any one letter. The rationale is that once a single letter is erased, the original meaning of the name is no longer preserved

Sh’vuot 35b quotes one opinion which forbids erasing them, but concludes that it is permitted to do so.

Rav Kapach’s Yemenite manuscripts state בקדושת השם, rather than כקדושת השם. According to that version, this sentence would translate, “They are not sanctified with the holiness of [God’s] name.”

As explained below, there is a question if this prohibition stems from the Torah itself or is Rabbinic in origin.

Since they follow God’s name without interruption, the holiness of God’s name is also transmitted to them.

The punishment given for transgressing a Rabbinic command. The Rambam’s statements appear to imply that the prohibition against erasing these letters is Rabbinic in origin, and many authorities share that view. Nevertheless, others compare this situation to a person who eats less than an olive’s size of most of the foods forbidden by the Torah. Although he receives only “stripes for rebelliousness” and is not punished by lashes, he is considered to have violated a Torah prohibition.

I.e., he wrote those letters with the intention of completing these names, but was prevented from doing so.

Even though one did not write the entire name, the letters that one did write refer to

Because these combinations of letters have no meaning or significance in their own right, no holiness is attached to them. Note Rama (Yoreh De’ah 276:10), who states that it is also improper to erase the letters אד from the name Adonai, or the letters אה from the name Eh’yeh.

In the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. 1, ch. 63), the Rambam writes that the name י-ה reflects God’s eternality.

There is a slight difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. The initial clause of this sentence states that י-ה is considered a name in its own right, but the concluding clause implies that its holiness stems from the fact that it is part of God’s explicit name, and not that it possesses any intrinsic holiness in its own right. Also, the question has been raised: If it is a name in its own right, why is it not included among the seven names which cannot be erased? The Ben Yedid quotes our Sages’ statement that the name י-ה comes about because, until the elimination of Amalek, God’s name will not be complete (i.e., it will be read as י-ה, rather than Yud-Hey-Vav-Hey). Thus, although י-ה is itself a name of God, its holiness stems from the name Yud-Hey-Vav-Hey.

Because these combinations of letters have no meaning or significance in their own right, no holiness is attached to them.

Sh’vuot 35a, the source for this halachah, mentions other adjectives. Perhaps the Rambam limited himself to these for they are all mentioned in the Torah or in the works of the prophets (Rav Kapach).

And, therefore, must be treated with respect, as mentioned in Halachah 8.

For they are not considered to be on the same level of holiness as the names of God.

This law applies, not only when one desires to destroy the utensil, but even when one wants to continue using it.

For engraving is considered as writing.

And thus destroys the name which is engraved.

As one is for erasing a name of God which is written.

In ink, without tattooing.

Lest one cause the name to be erased.

For it is forbidden to bring God’s name into such a place (see Hilchot Kri’at Shema 3:4-5).

This entire clause is somewhat superfluous, for there is no difference between reeds and clothes. It has, therefore, attracted the attention of many commentaries. The Seder Mishneh notes that according to the authoritative manuscripts, the clause should read, “If he does not find reeds, he should search for them,” quoting, albeit in slightly different phraseology, Shabbat 120b, the source for this halachah.

Between one’s flesh and the water. Such intervention nullifies an immersion, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Mikva’ot 1:12. (Note the Kessef Mishneh, which cites Shabbat [loc. cit.], which states that there are times when the ink in which the name is written would itself be considered a separation.)

Even though water will penetrate and reach the name of God.

Since the person does not intentionally make an erasure and it is possible that, in fact, God’s name will not be erased, the Sages did not forbid an immersion associated with a mitzvah. Shabbat (ibid.) differentiates between an instance where the person’s activity is merely גרמא — “a cause” for the name being erased — and does not hold him liable, and the melting of a name engraved on metal, in which he is considered to have “destroyed” the name of God.

Note Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:17, where the Rambam specifies that this applies only to the area of the Temple courtyard between the Temple building and the altar.

However, it is permitted to tear down the Temple with the intent of rebuilding it. Note Bava Batra 3a, which describes how the Sage Bava ben Buta advised Herod to tear down the Second Temple in order to rebuild it in a more beautiful manner.

Though the Rambam restates this law in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah (“The Laws of the Temple”), he also mentions it here, since the Biblical prohibition that forbids this activity is the same as that which forbids erasing God’s name. In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 65), the Rambam states that this prohibition also includes “destroying God’s houses of worship.” However, the fact that this prohibition is not mentioned in this halachah appears to indicate that the Rambam does not include the destruction of synagogues in this prohibition. (See also Hilchot Tefillah 11:12, which mentions the prohibition against destroying a synagogue, without defining it as a Biblical prohibition.)

Destroy the altar.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam specifies that this refers to beams dedicated for the purpose of construction, and not wood to be burned on the altar.

Avodat HaMelech notes that, in contrast to the two laws mentioned in this halachah, with regard to erasing God’s name, the Rambam does not mention the need for a destructive intent. Thus, he concludes that it is forbidden to erase God’s name under all circumstances. Other authorities, however, maintain that if one’s intent is not destructive, but instead, he seeks to correct a text, he is permitted to erase some of the letters of God’s name and write them correctly. See Chatam Sofer, Yoreh De’ah, Responsum 267.

Trees which are worshiped.

Destroy wood that was consecrated.

The term כתבי קדש particularly refers to the books of the Bible (Rashi, Shabbat 115a).

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction to the statements concerning divrei kodesh in Halachah 5. There are authorities who note that the Talmud or the other early works of Torah law do not mention the need to entomb any sacred texts aside from a Torah scroll. As the Rambam mentions in Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:5, we may not treat any holy text, even books of the Oral Law, with disrespect. According to their view, there is, however, no prohibition against leaving them neatly piled for a gentile to dispose of them. All that is forbidden is to burn or to destroy by direct action. The Magen Avraham 154:9 and the Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh De’ah 282:23 differ and require all sacred texts to be entombed. Their opinion is followed almost universally today.

This punishment is given for violating a Rabbinic commandment and, therefore, the Kessef Mishneh places the prohibition against destroying sacred texts in that category. Nevertheless, in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 65, where the Rambam describes the scope of the Torah prohibition), he also mentions the destruction of sacred texts.

Our text of Shabbat 116a, the source for this halachah, uses the term min (“nonbeliever”) rather than apikoros. Rav Kapach writes that the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah also use that term. He explains that though at times the two terms are used interchangeably, in this instance the substitution of one term for the other is significant: In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam defines a min as a person who does not believe in God. In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, he defines an apikoros as one who denies the Torah and/or the prophetic tradition. When a min writes a Torah scroll, the names of God it contains do not possess any holiness, because he does not believe in God at all. In contrast, were an apikoros to write a Torah scroll, since he believes in God, the names he writes would possess a dimension of holiness. Support for this distinction can be brought from Hilchot Tefillin UM’zuzah V’Sefer Torah 1:13, which states that a Torah scroll written by a min must be burned, but one written by a apostate Jew should be buried. (Note that the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 281:1 uses the term apikoros. See also the commentary of the Turei Zahav 281:1.)

. Shabbat (loc. cit.) relates that just as we see that God allows His name to be erased to preserve peace between a husband and his wife (in the process of the trial of a sotah), so, too, will He allow His name to be destroyed because of these people who disturb the peace between Him and His people.

These statements imply that the holiness of the name depends on the intent of the person writing it. On this basis, the commentaries question the status of a name of God which a believing Jew wrote casually or by mistake, without intending that it become holy. Note Hilchot Tefillin 1:15 where the Rambam writes: “When a person writes a Torah scroll, tefillin, or mezuzah without having [the proper] intention, should he write one of God’s names without the desired intent, they are not acceptable.” Similarly, in ch. 10 of those halachot, he includes a lack of intent when writing God’s names as a factor that can disqualify a Torah scroll.

Shabbat (loc. cit.) states that such heretics are worse than gentiles, for the heretics have been raised within the Jewish tradition and have rebelled against it.

In Hilchot Tefillin UMezuzah V’Sefer Torah 1:13, the Rambam quotes Gittin 45b, which states that tefillin, mezuzot, and Torah scrolls may be written only by those who believe in what they state and observe the precepts they contain.

Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:3 states that a worn Torah scroll should be placed in an earthenware container and buried next to a Torah sage.

And, therefore, may not be erased.

Sh’vuot 35b explains that Abraham was asking God not to depart while he tended to the guests. This teaches us that receiving guests properly is greater than having an audience with the Divine Presence. The word adonai here means “my lords,” referring to the angels.

The word adonai here means “my lords,” referring to the angels. Lot addresses his request to God, the One who has the power to save his life (Sh’vuot, ibid.).

Lot addresses his request to God, the One who has the power to save his life (Sh’vuot, ibid.).

Where the Jewish people waged war against the tribe of Benjamin because of the sin of the concubine of the hill [Judges, Chapter 20].

The fact that initially, after enquiring whether to wage war, the Jews met with defeat, might lead to the conclusion that their initial enquiries had been to idols. However, Sh’vuot (ibid.) explains that even these inquiries had been directed to God.

Who served as a priest to an idol (Judges, Chapters 16 and 17).

But rather refer to Michah’s idol.

Who owned a vineyard coveted by King Achav (I Kings, Chapter 21). Izevel, Achav’s wife, framed Navot for blaspheming against God.

And refer to the true God.

And refers to ‘the One who possesses peace’ (Sh’vuot, loc. cit.).

Which refers to King Solomon.

But rather, refers to the Babylonian kings whom Daniel served.

Though this phrase was apparently addressed to Nebuchadnezzar, it is unlikely that Daniel would refer to a mortal king in this fashion (Rashi, Sh’vuot, ibid.).

E. g., ‘Gracious’ or ‘Merciful,’ as mentioned in Halachah 5