Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

Never does the Talmud impose physical punishment (blows or imprisonment) for monetary claims (Maggid Mishneh).

For all these are means to coerce him to pay his debt.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4, which describes the function of the court’s agent.

The verse continues: “And he will bring the collateral to you outside” - i.e., the initiative is left solely to the debtor.
Although that verse refers to taking property for the sake of collateral, and this halachah speaks of expropriating property as payment for the loan, the Rambam equates the two. This is in contrast to the perspective of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher, who make a distinction, explaining that when expropriating property to pay the loan, the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s home to take his possessions.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 97:15) quotes the other opinions. The Siftei Cohen 97:7 brings further support for the other views.

The Hagahot Maimoniot attributes this ordinance to the Savoraim, the first generation of sages who arose after the compilation of the Talmud.

Who claim bankruptcy even though they have possessions that they could sell to pay their debts.

For people would refuse to lend money out of fear that it would not be returned.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Sefer HaTerumot, which states that this oath is administered even when the creditor has merely a suspicion, but no definite knowledge, that the debtor is withholding money from him.

This oath resembles the Scriptural oath imposed on a person who admits a portion of the claim lodged against him. In both instances, we assume that the person does not desire to deny entirely the debt he owes. Nevertheless, because he is presently strapped for funds, he tries to postpone payment slightly. Compelling him to take this oath precludes this type of procrastination (Ibid.).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

Although the Sages instituted certain ordinances to maintain the norms of business practice, they never did so at the expense of violating an explicit Scriptural prohibition.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Siftei Cohen 99:2, which states that if money is found in the possession of the debtor, even if he brings proof that it was given to him by another person, that other person is just like any other creditor and the money can be expropriated to pay other debts.

Chapter 1, Halachah 4, states similar concepts with regard to property seen in his possession before this oath is taken.

That he will manage for a share of the profits (see Hilchot Shluchim V’Shutafim, Chapters 6-7).

For we assume that any money that is found in a person’s possession belongs to him.

Witnesses who corroborate his testimony.
With regard to this law, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 99:1) mentions the difference of opinion cited in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 4, which questions whether or not the principle of miggo should be applied in this instance.

There is a responsum from the Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, to this effect.

I.e., sages who arose after the compilation of the Talmud.

And is not having the oath administered to clarify that point.

Who would obviously require him to pay interest.

That she is not obligated to give him, as reflected in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 13:3.

For the oath will not justly advance the creditor’s position; it will not generate a source of income for the debtor. Instead, it will either - or both - cause him embarrassment or compel to pay the debt in a manner not desired by the Torah.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:14, which states that a person may be placed under a ban of ostracism for “treat[ing] even one point of Rabbinic Law with disrespect; needless to say, this applies with regard to [matters of] Scriptural Law.”

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 97:15) states that the debtor may also be imprisoned in order to compel him to pay his debt.

We find this expression in Ketubot 86a, which states that a person should be subjected to corporal punishment until he dies or agrees to fulfill this mitzvah. This ruling is quoted by the Ramah (loc. cit.).
Significantly, the Rambam does not include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah or mention it as a mitzvah in his listing of the mitzvot at the beginning of these halachot. We see similar concepts with regard to the mitzvah to mention the exodus from Egypt daily. Although the Rambam uses such wording (Hilchot Kri’at Shema 1:3), he does not include it as one of the mitzvot of the Torah. This would indicate that at times, the Rambam employs the term mitzvah to refer to a desirable and positive activity required by Scriptural Law, even though it is not included as one of the 613 mitzvot.

Deuteronomy 22:3 states: “Justice, justice, shall you pursue.” Sanhedrin 36b interprets this as an injunction to judge righteously in a suit involving a deceitful person.

From God.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh note that with these statements the Rambam is giving a judge powers that extend beyond the ordinary parameters of the law. Although in the Talmudic period a judge was given that authority, in subsequent generations, when the integrity and impartiality of the court system declined, the initiative to exercise such authority was withheld from the courts. The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam himself makes such a distinction in Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:2. It is possible that in the present halachah, he was stating the law as an abstract theory, relying on his later statements to clarify the practical application.

These people claimed that the debtor owed them money and that these obligations preceded those mentioned in the promissory notes, but they had neither witnesses nor a promissory note to support their claim. The debtor, however, admitted these obligations. If the debtor had sufficient assets, such an admission would ordinarily create a lien upon them.
The Kessef Mishneh states that if the debtor acknowledges the debt owed to the other person on his own initiative, his admission is not considered of consequence. If, however, the creditor comes first and brings witness who substantiate his claim, his word is accepted. He does not mention what would be the ruling if the debtor admitted the obligation, the creditor agreed and brought witnesses to substantiate the claim. See also Siftei Cohen 99:3 who takes issue with the Kessef Mishneh to a certain extent.

I.e., although he did not possess enough assets to pay his debts, he possessed more than the minimum amount allotted to him for his sustenance, as described in Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

I.e., the admission is not considered significant for the reasons mentioned by the Rambam.
The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 99) states that if the borrower makes the admission of debt before he obtains financial resources, and then receives financial resources, his admission is binding. For at the time he made the admission, he is not causing a loss to the person holding the promissory note.
The Siftei Cohen 99:1 does not accept this conception, for the borrower may know that money is coming him and plan the deception in advance.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the person who admits that the debtor owes him money may think he is performing a mitzvah by ensuring that the debtor has slightly more resources at his disposal without paying attention to the fact that he is depriving another person of what is due him.

I.e., we suspect that he did not in fact owe the money to the people whose claims were not supported by a promissory note, but made the admission to them so that all his property would not be given to the creditors whose claims were supported by promissory notes, but instead, divided equally among all those to whom he admits owing money. The people whose claims were not supported by promissory notes would then return a portion of the property that they were allocated to the debtor.
To prevent this from happening, we grant the money only to those individuals whose claims are supported by promissory notes, If, however, there are witnesses who support the claims of the creditors who do not possess promissory notes, these claims are accepted. If they predate the promissory notes, these creditors are given the right to collect the money owed them first (Maggid Mishneh).

See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 86:1), which states that this applies with regard to all debts: i.e., loans, unpaid wages and proceeds from sales.

Seifer Me’irat Einayim 86: I states that this principle applies regardless that of the loans were given first. Even when the debt that Reuven owes Shimon predates the debt that Levi owes Reuven, Levi is still obligated to pay Shimon.

This concept - referred to as shi'abudo d'Rabbi Natan - recalling the name of the sage who conceived of this idea - is a significant point in contemporary business dealings, for it allows the transfer of obligations from one debtor to another.
The commentaries agree that the lien established from one debtor to the other is binding according to Scriptural Law. On this basis, the Ritva writes that the first debtor is not entitled to waive payment of the debt owed him by the second debtor, for it is already on lien to his creditor. In contrast, when a promissory note is sold, the sale is binding only according to Rabbinic Law. Hence, if the seller waives payment, the waiver is binding.

This is a fundamental requirement. If Reuven has other property, we use it to pay his creditors before exercising the lien against Levi’s property.
This is the view of most authorities. The Siftei Cohen 86:5 differs and explains at length that even when the first debtor has other property, the debt creates a lien on the second debtor’s assets.

I.e., it was composed before the loan was actually given, with the understanding that if the loan were given, it would serve as a valid promissory note, but that if the loan were not given, the note would not be of consequence. The debtor claims - and the lender agrees - that the loan was never given, and therefore the promissory note is of no consequence.

I.e., the debt was paid, but the promissory note had not been returned to the debtor, and so it appeared outstanding.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ra’avad as saying that if afterwards, Reuven paid Shimon himself and then demanded payment from Levi, Levi is required to pay him. He cannot claim that Reuven already admitted that the debt was no longer binding.

We fear that in fact the loan was made and never repaid, and that Levi will later pay Reuven. They are denying the existence of the debt at present so that the money will not be given to Shimon.

As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, this applies in an instance where there are no witnesses who support the claim (Maggid Mishneh).

Whom one would not suspect to deny receiving the loan, for he might forget having taken it. See Bava Metzia 75b.

Because this creates the possibility of the borrower’s denying the obligation.

When collateral for a loan is given, the lender’s word is accepted, provided that he takes an oath supporting his claim, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 3.

Seifer Me’irat Einayim 70:4 explains that a promissory note is preferable - because it clearly spells out all the terms of the loan - in contrast to collateral, concerning which the borrower can claim that it was worth more than the money given as a loan (Chapter 13, Halachah 4).

This prohibition is interpreted as applying to the morally blind (Hilchot Rotze’ach UShemirat Nefesh 12:14). By lending money in this manner, the lender “invites” the borrower to deny the debt, as it were.

For people will curse the lender, because they will think that he is making a false claim against the borrower (Rashi, Bava Metzia, loc. cit.).

Indeed, we can assume the reason the master “borrowed” the money was to have the servant give it to him instead of keeping it hidden from him. (Compare to Hilchot Ishut 22:29.)

The Maggid Mishneh quotes certain opinions that differ and explain that there are instances when a woman or a servant can have money that does not belong to the husband or the master. Hence, if the money had been held openly - so that we do not think that the husband (or the master) took the loan only to reveal the money - the money can be considered as the property of the woman (or the servant). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 127:1) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah mentions the other opinions.