Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

See Chapter 12, Halachah 18, which explains that even if the woman intended to transgress, if her father or husband nullified the vow beforehand, she is not liable.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:37) mentions the Rambam’s view, it also mentions that of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that this last phrase is not effective in nullifying a vow.

For his wording does not imply that the vow is nullified.

I.e., although these expressions are effective for a sage when absolving a vow, they are not effective for a husband or a father.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 13:8), the Rambam explains the statements he makes here. The term “nullify” implies nullifying an entity to the extent that it is as if it never existed. “Releasing,” by contrast, implies that a connection existed, but it was released and will not have any effect in the future.
The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries for they appear to run contrary to the understandings of other authorities and the Ram barn’s own rulings. To explain: Halachah 15 of this chapter and Chapter 12, Halachah 19, appear to indicate that until a father or a husband nullifies a vow, the vow is binding. Even when he nullifies it, the nullification affects only the future. See Hi/chat Nazirut 9:11. When a sage absolves a vow, by contrast, it is as if the vow was never taken. See Hilchot /shut 7:8•9, Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the terminology employed by the Rambam here can be explained as follows: A sage does not “uproot” a vow; he causes it to be considered as if a vow was not taken originally. A father or a husband, by contrast, uproot a vow,
causing an entity that did exist to be nullified.

I.e., the Rambam is making a distinction between hafarah, “nullification,” and bittul, “voiding,” as he proceeds to explain. See also his Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.,, where he elaborates on the distinction between these two activities.

E. g., if she took a vow not to drink wine, he causes her to drink wine.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that there is no concept of voiding a woman’s vow by causing her to break it. Such concepts apply only with regard to servants. The Radbaz explains the Rambam’s wording, stating that with regard to servants, it is necessary to actually compel them to break their vows. Such conduct is not appropriate with regard to one’s wife or daughter. Nevertheless, if a husband or a father gently cause a woman to break their vow, that vow is nullified. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:39) mentions both views though it appears to favor the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., since the vow has been nullified, she is under no obligation to keep it. On the other hand, she is not obligated to perform the act forbidden by the vow.

Without him saying anything.

I.e., she took a vow not to wear jewelry or not to partake of a particular food.

Even though this vow has no connection to the Sabbath and it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath, we allow him to nullify it. The rationale is that, otherwise, he will not be able to nullify it on Saturday night, because the time for nullification will have already passed. As stated in Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:6, generally, on the Sabbath, a sage may absolve only those vows that concern the Sabbath (Kessef Mishneh).

Because it is the Sabbath, it is preferable to change the wording one uses. Even if one uses this wording during the week, the vow is nullified, as indicated by Halachah 6.

This concept is also derived from the prooftext cited below. Until a vow comes into existence and can be upheld, it cannot be nullified (Turei Zahav 234:28).

See Chapter 4, Halachah 11, Chapter 8, Halachah 6. The rationale is that a sage nullifies the vow from the outset, causing it to be considered as if it were never taken. Therefore the entire vow is considered as a single entity. A husband, by contrast, nullifies a vow as it exists. Hence, each element of the vow can be considered independently.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:36). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that a husband must also nullify the entire vow. Once a portion of a vow is upheld, the vow cannot be nullified.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 3, for an explanation regarding the convention of extending a vow.

For by attaching himself to her vow, he shows that he considers ii a viable entity.

As Nedarim 3a states, the laws that apply to the nullification of other vows also apply to the nullification of nazirite vows.

For the reason mentioned in the previous halachah.

For his vow is not at all dependent on hers.

She must, however, state her consent, for he cannot compel her to take a vow against her will.

He is forbidden to nullify his wife’s vow, because by doing so, his own vow would be nullified as stated in the conclusion of the halachah. Since he is forbidden to cause his own vow to be nullified, he is forbidden to nullify her vow (see Nazir 22b).

For his commitment is not dependent on hers at all. Even if she refuses to accept a nazirite vow, he is obligated to keep his vow. Hence, his right to nullify her vow is intact.

This refers to the first clause. It is as if he made his vow and her vow a single statement. Thus nullifying her vow would cause his vow also to be nullified. This is forbidden, because he is bound to uphold his vow. Nevertheless, after the fact, if he does nullify her vow, his vow is also nullified (Radbaz). See the Nekudot HaKessef [to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:54)]. There it is ‘explained that the Rambam’s version of Nazir 22b follows the Jerusalem Talmud and differs from the standard text of the Babylonian Talmud.

As stated in Halachah 11.

The rationale for this ruling is that the husband’s nullification affects the vow only from the time he made it onward. It does not nullify it from the outset. Hence, any extension of a vow that was made before the vow is nullified is binding [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:51)].

I.e., alone, without the nullification of the father (Chapter 11, Halachah 10).

Chapter 11, Halachot 20, 22.

I.e., whether or not his nullification takes effect depends on their relationship at the time he nullifies the vow (Nedarim 89a).

Because he cannot nullify the vows that were taken before marriage, as explained above.

Here also, what is important is the woman’s status at the time of the vow and not what her status will be when the vow takes effect.

As stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18, when a husband remains silent throughout the day, his wife’s vow is upheld. This is a sign that his tacit acceptance of a vow is sufficient for it to be binding (Rabbenu Nissim).

As stated in Halachah 7, he must make a verbal statement of nullification. If, however, he voids his wife’s vow, her nullification is not binding, as stated in Halachot 4-5.

This term has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Alecha Rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).

Since a person can nullify a vow or an oath if he retracts within this time, he may certainly retract his acceptance of his wife’s oath in thought.

I.e., just as he can appeal to a sage to absolve him of a vow he took, so, too, he may absolve his acceptance of a vow.

I.e., the day he changed his mind, even if it is several days afterwards, is equivalent to the day he heard of his wife’s vow. Since he cannot have his acceptance nullified unless he changes his mind, the days when he does not change his mind are consideredequivalent to days when he does not know of the vow [Tur (Yoreh De’ah 234)].
There are other Rishonim who maintain that he can ask the sage to have his acceptance absolved only on the day he heard of the vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:49) mentions both views without indicating which one should be favored. The Rama maintains that we should be stringent and follow the second view.

Upholding a vow is considered equivalent to taking a vow. Hence, just as a vow can be absolved, the acceptance of one can be absolved. The nullification of a vow, by contrast, cannot be considered as a vow and cannot be absolved. The Radbaz adds that if the person does not know that he can have his acceptance absolved, the day he finds out that information is equivalent to the day he heard of the vow.

The Siftei Cohen 234:16 states that this applies even if he has the acceptance absolved on the day he hears of the vow.

Even if the first one nullified the vow again so that they make a combined statement, their nullification is not accepted.

At the time he stated his acceptance of the vow a second time, his acceptance was of no consequence, because it was unnecessary. Nevertheless, after he nullifies his first acceptance, the second acceptance becomes significant.

As stated in Halachah 20.

The Radbaz states that this ruling applies even if he does not add the words “at the same time.”

The two statements cancel each other out. It is as if he remained silent and the vow is therefore upheld. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's rationale is that since the nullification cannot take effect after the vow is upheld, it cannot take effect if it is made simultaneously with the upholding of the vow.

Since, as the Rambam states later on, he did not verbally express his nullification of the vow, it remains binding even after the day passes.

For a vow must be nullified on the day the man heard about it. In his Nekudot HaKessef, the Siftei Cohen explains that the Rambam’s wording implies that he may nullify it that day. The Turei Zahav 234:39-40, however, infers that he cannot nuJlify it at all once it takes effect for that day.

The instances cited by the Rambam are questions posed by Nedarim 69b, 70a. Since the Talmud continues asking questions, using one instance as a springboard for another, following the pattern of im timtzeh lomar, the Rambam concludes that each of the instances used as a basis for a further question is accepted as halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the last of the series of instances concerning which the Talmud asks in that passage.

Lest her vow in fact be binding.

Because punishment is not given when we are uncertain whether a prohibition exists.

This requires him to allow his hair to grow untrimmed and thus will prevent him from beautifying his appearance. See Nedarim 9b which relates that Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach would almost never partake of the sacrifices of a nazirite. Once, however, he saw a particularly handsome young man who had taken a nazirite vow. He asked him why he had done so and the young man explained that, because of his good looks, he was being tempted by his evil inclination. To rise above the temptation, he took the nazirite vow. Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach praised him for his actions.

Avot 3:13.

In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam explains that “taking and maintaining vows to abstain from certain [undesirable] elements [of conduct] ingrains in a person the tendency to bridle the desires he seeks to curb. This tendency will continue and it will be easy for him to acquire the quality of restraint - i.e., the tendency to protect oneself from impurity.” See also Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, the conclusion of ch. 48, which discusses the Divine service associated with taking and maintaining vows.
Nevertheless, the Rambam is not praising restraint as a mode of conduct that is always desirable. On the contrary, in Hile hot De’ ot 3:1, he explains that a nazirite is called “a sinner” because he abstains from wine and states: Our Sages directed man to abstain only from those things which the Torah denies him and not to forbid himself permitted things by vows and oaths. Thus our Sages (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:1) asked rhetorically: “Are not the things which the Torah has prohibited sufficient for you? [Why] must you add further prohibitions?” In the instances mentioned here, however, the person taking the vow is not doing so because he thinks that abstinence is desirable. Instead, he wishes to develop self-control and inner discipline and feels that taking a vow is an effective means to encourage him to do so.

Lest he not keep the vow, and in this way transgress.

Nedarim 22a.

During the time the Sanctuary stood at Shilo and from the time the Temple was built in Jerusalem afterwards, it was forbidden to offer sacrifices on private altars. Similarly, taking a vow is considered undesirable and comparable to building such an altar. Rabbenu Nissim explains the comparison based on the passage from Hilchot De’ot cited above, i.e., just as a person who builds a private altar offers a sacrifice to God in an undesirable manner, so, too, a person who takes a vow adds a restriction that the Torah does not require him to observe.

As explained in ch. 4.