Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Numbers 6:5 states that the nazir’s hair “will be holy” il’i”I’ imp. Nazir 5a notes that Yihiyeh il”i”I’ is numerically equivalent to 30 and states that this is the span of an ordinary nazirite vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 1 :3), the Rambam writes that the numerical equivalence is merely a support and that the concept was taught as as part of the Oral Tradition.

And 30 days can be considered “an excessively long and protracted time.’’

Hence if the time span he mentioned is less than 30 days, he is required to observe the vow for 30 days. When he says 30 days and an hour, the ruling is that since he mentioned more than 30 days, he is required to observe 31 days.

Which is 30 days as explained above.

For as above, there is no conception of observing a nazirite vow for a shorter time.

I.e., he accepted the nazirite vow in the hope that its merit would arouse protective spiritual forces that would guard him over the course of the journey (Tosafot, Nazir 7a).

I.e., he is not considered a nazirite for life as mentioned in Halachah 12.

Hilchot Nedarim 9:1.

Each one being 30 days. Since he spoke of nazirite vows, we understand that his intent was to observe more than one nazirite vow. Since there is no concept of observing half a nazirite vow, we require him to observe two.

Each of the extra statements is considered as adding a nazirite vow.

For it is not clear that he wanted to observe two nazirite vows.

The person himself denies taking any nazirite vows or says that he forgot about the matter (Nazir 20a and commentaries).

I.e., there is no disagreement regarding that, so he is obligated to observe the two nazirite vows.

In which instance he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow for an entire month (Halachah 2).

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

In this context, this statement means that as long as the first vow is being observed, the days cannot be reckoned as part of the observance of the second vow. Implied is that if they are not considered as part of the observance of the first vow, they can be considered as part of the observance of the second.

See Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:17-18 which explains that a sage’s absolution of a vow causes it to be considered as if it was never made.

The differences between these two categories are discussed in the following halachah. The Ra’avad notes that the Rambam’s ruling appears to be based on the Tosefta and the Jerusalem Talmud (Nazir 1:4). The Babylonian Talmud (Nazir 8b) appears to differ, but the version of that text seems distorted.

He should not, however, shave his head entirely.

As is required when a person completes a nazirite vow in pm-ity. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Even though the concept is reinforced by a verse, were the Oral Tradition not to have conveyed this idea, the verse could have been interpreted otherwise (Kessef Mishneh).

Although the angel gave instructions (Judges 13:5): “The youth shall be a nazirite unto God,” Samson never took a nazirite vow himself, nor did his father administer one to him. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVIII, pp. 68-70, which compares this situation to one in which a Jewish court converts a gentile child. When the child comes of age, if he does not protest, the conversion is binding upon him. Similarly, since Samson - and Samuel - did not protest, the nazirite restrictions conveyed from above became binding upon them.

See Judges 13 :4.

As Judges 16:17 states: “A razor has never been brought up against my head, for I am a nazirite unto God from my mother’s womb.”

Hence he was not forbidden to come in contact with the corpses of the Philistines whom he killed (Nazir 4b).

For Samson was not allowed to cut his hair at all, as indicated by the verse cited above.

This is permitted even as an initial and preferred option [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir I :2)].

See Hilchot Nedarim 2:12 which explains that a person is given the option of explaining his intent with regard to a vow that he took. See the glosses of the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz to the following halachah which discuss in detail whether this rule applies when it seems obvious that the person’s intent was to take a vow to be a nazirite like Samson was.

Since Samson’s nazirite vow was imposed upon him by an angel at God’s command, it could not be absolved as other vows taken because of man’s desires (Rashi, Makkot 22a).

This applies if the person making the vow remains silent. If, however, he specifically states that his intent was another person, his word is accepted as stated in the previous halachah (Radbaz).

Nazir 66a derives this concept through the principles of Biblical exegesis.

See Halachah 1.

I.e., with the intent that my words be interpreted by the sages according to their principles.

For he did not specify a time at which point his vow is concluded. See Halachah 12.

And bring the required sacrifices.

For there are more hairs on one's head than 30 day periods in a person's life.

Because the second nazirite vow begins as soon as the first one is concluded.

I.e., he makes three successive vows concerning the same loaf of bread.

I.e., this teaches that a nazirite vow can become binding even though one is already obligated to observe an existing vow.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 1. As mentioned there, he also brings the appropriate sacrifices.

For unless he specifies otherwise, a nazirite vow must be upheld for 30 days.

This leniency is granted based on the principle that a portion of a day is considered as the entire day. Hence it is considered as if he observed his vow for 30 days.

Since he explicitly mentioned 30 days, we assume that he meant thirty complete days.

For the thirty-first day is considered as the first day of the second vow.

In this instance, the thirtieth day is considered as the first day of the second vow.

For a portion of the day is considered as the entire day.

I.e., he is vowing to observe two nazirite vows. One is unconditional and the other is dependent on whether or not a son is born to him.

The Radbaz emphasizes that these laws apply when he began observing his own nazirite vow before his son was born. If his son was born before he began observing his own nazirite vow, he may observe whichever vow he desires first.

I.e., the vow he took without making it conditional on the birth of a son.

As illustrated in the conclusion of the halachah.

Because he has already observed the rites marking the completion of the nazirite vow associated with his son.
According to the Rambam, in such an instance, the person’s observance of the days of his vow that preceded the vow associated with his son is considered significant. The rationale is that if the observance of the vow associated with his son is considered significant, the days that preceded it are likewise significant. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that although the observance of the vow associated with his son is significant, none of the days associated with his own vow should be counted. For his own vow is an integral unit and should be considered as such.

I.e., in a situation where he does not become impure and must complete his own vow after completing the vow associated with the birth of his son. See the illustrations in the following halachot.

I.e., his own nazirite vow was prolonged, extending more than the required 30 days.

I.e., he takes an ordinary nazirite vow which extends 30 days.

And thus the two vows clash.

Thus he will have observed 20 of the I 00 days of his longer vow.

He does not, however, perform a shaving or bring sacrifices.

Completing the observance of that vow.

Because it is superceded by the second vow which is binding for life. The observance of that vow prevents the observance of the original vow.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 13-14.

The rationale is that he is not allowed to shave because of his first vow. He must, however, observe the stringencies of an ordinary nazirite vow for the first 20 days and perhaps, even for the first 30 days (Radbaz).

For that day might be the day of his death in which instance retroactively the vow he took would take effect. See the notes to the following halachah.

I.e., the Mashiach.

For perhaps the Mashiach will come that day. As we say in the popular restatement of the Rambam's Thirteen Principles of Faith, "I await his coming every day."

The Rambam’s ruling is based on Eruvin 43b. The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s understanding of that passage as follows: There is a question whether the prohibition against going beyond one’s Sabbath boundaries (see Hilchot Shabbat, ch. 27) applies ten handbreadths above the ground or not. Thus there is a question whether Mashiach - who obviously will observe the Sabbath laws - can come on the Sabbath for that will require him descending from heaven and thus going beyond his Sabbath boundaries.
(Kin’at Eliyahu questions the entire issue, noting that according to the Rambam, Mashiach will be a flesh and blood human being who will “wage the wars of G‑d... build the Temple” (see Hilchot Melachim 11:1). Nowhere does the Rambam make mention of him descending from heaven.)

Seemingly, every day, there is a question whether the Mashiach will come and hence, we should rule leniently every day. The Radbaz explains that since we are certain that it is possible for Mashiach to come that day, he must observe the nazirite restrictions. For if Mashiach would actually come that day, retroactively the vow he took would take effect.

As evident from Chapter 8, Halachah S, more precisely, it is the nazirite’s offering of his sacrifices and not his shaving which completes his nazirite vow.

Nazir 15a derives this concept from the exegesis of Numbers 6:6.

The laws mentioned here apply only to drinking wine. Shaving or becoming impure nullify his nazirite vow and require him to begin counting again anew. See Chapter 6, Halachot 1-3.

When these days are completed, according to Scriptural law, he is no longer obligated to observe his nazirite vow even though he did not observe it for the full amount of time that he vowed.

This is the punishment given for breaking a Rabbinic decree.

A nazirite vow of 30 days.

A vow for a longer period.

The sages pay no attention to him. Even if there is legitimate reason for him to ask for his vow to be released, his request is not heeded (Ra’avad).

For he has the right to nullify a nazirite vow which his wife takes (Chapter 2, Halachah 1 7).

For the impurity nullifies the observance of the nazirite vow entirely.

See Halachah 15 and onward.

See Halachah 11.

Whether grapes or wine.

E. g., peels or pits. See the following halachah.

Numbers 6:3.

E. g., a brandy, vermouth, or the like.

I.e., a quarter of a larger measure called a log. A revi’it is 86 cc according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc according to Chazon Ish.

This represents a contrast to other Torah prohibitions. As stated in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 4:16, “when a person takes a small amount of fat, a small amount of blood, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher animal, a small amount of the meat of a nevelah, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher fish, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher fowl, or the like from other prohibited substances, although he collects an olive-sized portion from the entire mixture and partakes of it, he is not liable for lashes.”

He must, however, eat the olived-sized portion within the time it takes to eat three eggs, as explained in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 14:8.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that eating and drinking are not combined to reach a single measure.

This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages (Nazir 35b-37b). Although there is an opinion which maintains that with regard to a nazirite - in contrast to all the other prohibitions of the Torah - the permitted food should be counted as part of the forbidden measure, the Rambam does not accept this view as Halachah.

Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 15:3.

The measure described in the previous halachah.

See Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 14:9 where the Rambam states that to be liable for lashes, one must drink a prohibited substance in the time it takes to drink a revi ‘it. Here, however, he mentions the time it takes to eat k’dei achilat p ‘ras. It is possible to explain that here, the person is “eating” the wine, i.e., ingesting it as it is absorbed in solid food. Hence, he uses a measure of time that involves eating. In Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot, he speaks about drinking. Hence, he uses a measure of time that involves drinking.

We have translated the verse according to its halachic interpretation. Its literal meaning is somewhat different.

Nazir 37a exemplifies this concept as follows: One soaked grapes in water and the flavor of the water became that of grape juice.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 15:3.

I.e., as stated in Hile hot Ma’ achalot Assurot 15:12, if a prohibited substance becomes mixed into another entity, its presence is nullified if there is so much of the permitted entity that the flavor of the prohibited substance cannot be detected. (When it is impossible to have someone taste the mixture, we require 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance.)

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 15:2-3. There the Rambam states that if there was less than an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat in a portion the size of three eggs, it is considered as if the substance of the prohibited substance is not present. Hence, according to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition, even if the flavor of the forbidden fat is detectable.
The Ra’avad differs and quotes authorities who maintain that although lashes are not given in such an instance, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.

The Rambam is indicating that grape juice and wine are governed by the same laws. Alternatively, that grapes and grape juice are not considered as part of the same prohibition.

See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :5; see also Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

I.e., the verse uses vinegar as a descriptive term for wine and mentions only one prohibition. Thus the prohibition is against drinking wine, even wine that has become vinegar. Even though two separate adjurations are mentioned in the prooftext, there is no separate prohibition for drinking vinegar from wine and vinegar from alcoholic beverages coming from wine, because the end product, vinegar, is the same in both instances.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that there is a separate prohibition against drinking vinegar, just like there are separate prohibitions against eating grapes and eating raisins. See the gloss of the Radbaz for a discussion of this matter.

And God will mete out punishment to him for every violation [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 6:4)].

See Halachah 8.

The warning causes every violation to be considered independently (Radbaz).

Avodah Zarah 59a.

For if he comes close, he might be tempted to partake of the grapes.

The prooftext cited below indicates that the hair must be removed as effectively as a razor does. It does not, however, indicate that only cutting it with a razor makes a person liable. Note the contrast to the prohibition against cutting the hairs of one’s beard. As mentioned in Hi/chot Avodat Kochavim 12:1, that prohibition applies only to removal of one’s hair with a razor.

From a comparison to the laws governing the prohibition against shaving the comers of one’s head (lbid.:l), it would appear that the person whose hair is cut is not liable for lashes unless he assists the person doing the shaving by moving his head or the like. Otherwise, he will not have performed a deed and one is liable for lashes only when his violation involves a deed.

Nor are the days of one’s nazirite vow nullified by such an act (Nazir 39b).

The Radbaz explains the rationale for this leniency: When applying the potion, the person is not removing the hair with his own hands.

Even though he had no intention of removing hairs, were it impossible to scrape his head with his nails without removing hair, it would be forbidden for him, because doing so would be tantamount to willfully removing hairs, as the Rambam continues. Compare to Hilchot Shabbat l :6.

For he did not intentionally remove the hairs (Kessef Mishneh). The Shiurei HaKorban explains that since these activities do not produce a razor-clean shave, he is not liable for the violation of a negative commandment. According to the Radbaz who maintains that such a commandment is in fact involved, the question arises: Since it is inevitable (a p ‘sik reishah) that the hairs will be removed, why is he not liable?

I.e., the ritual impurity incurred when he touches or carries a corpse or is located under the same covering as it.

See Chapter 7, where this subject is discussed in detail.

The Mishneh LiMelech and other commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling, noting that in Hilchot Tumat Meit 3:3, he writes: “All ritual impurity resulting from a corpse for which a nazirite is not required to shave does not stem from Scriptural Law.” If the impurity does not stem from Scriptural Law, why is the nazirite punished by lashes?
The Ma ‘aseh Rokeach explains that there are times when the Rambam uses the tenn midivrei sofrim, which usually means “stemming from Rabbinic decree” to refer to matters that are of Scriptural origin, but derived by our Sages using the accepted principles of Biblical exegesis (see Hilchot] shut 1 :2; Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 2). Similarly, with regard to the contraction of ritual impurity in question: Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, it could be considered of Scriptural origin, because it was derived through the laws of Biblical exegesis. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 1, where this issue is discussed.

The Rambam’s ruling can be explained based on the following concept: When a person is in contact with a corpse, a person he touches is impure for seven days. When, however, he is not in contact with a corpse, a person he touches is impure only until the evening.
Thus if he is in contact with a corpse, there is no difference halachically if he touches another corpse. If, however, he is not in contact with a corpse, it is halachically significant if he touches another corpse, because the impurity resulting from touching him is more severe. And since touching the corpse is halachically significant for others, it is also halachically significant for him. Hence he is liable for lashes for such contact.

I.e., while he is in a closed container, it is as if he is not under the same shelter as the corpse and he does not contract ritual impurity.

If the container is opened without his consent, he is not liable, for he is considered to have transgressed due to forces beyond his control. See Hilchot Eve! 3:5.

For as mentioned in the mitzvot cited in the introduction to these halachot and in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, there are two prohibitions involved in this instance as the Rambam continues to explain.

The removal of the top of the container brings about his “entry” into the place where the corpse is located and, at that same time, he becomes impure.

See Hilchot Tuma ‘at Meit I: 11.

Compare to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:18. In this instance, since he is already ritually impure, the prohibition against entering a place of ritual impurity does not appl to him (Nazir 43a).

I.e., he was not aware that a corpse was located in this place or that it was a cemetery.

The commentaries question why the person is liable for lashes. Although he is performing a transgression by remaining in the cemetery, seemingly, the performance of that transgression does not involve a deed and hence, he should not be liable for lashes. The Lechem Mishneh explains that since he performed a deed when he entered in violation of the prohibition, he is liable when he remained afterwards in conscious violation of the prohibition. Others cite the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Sechirut 13:2 which explains that whenever a transgression usually involves a deed, as a nazirite would usually perform a deed to contract ritual impurity - one is liable for lashes even when one violates the transgression without performing a deed. See also Hilchot Eve! 3 :4.

See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:21-24.

See Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14 which interprets this as a general prohibition, warning a person against causing a colleague to transgress.

The nazirite is not liable because he did not transgress intentionally. The other person is not liable for the reasons the Rambam proceeds to explain.

See Hilchot Evel 3:5 which states that in a parallel situation when a person causes a priest to become ritually impure, the person who causes him to incur the impurity is indeed, liable. For it is the person who causes him to incur impurity who violates the prohibition. And similarly, one who shaves a nazirite’s head is liable (Halachah 11).

See the gloss of the Radbaz to Hilchot Kilayim 10:31 which comments on the apparent contradiction between that halachah and the ruling here.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 4; Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim 1:1; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:13, with regard to the nature of this prohibition.

By incurring ritual impurity.

The commentaries question: Since he was in the cemetery at the time he took the vow, seemingly, his violation of the prohibition does not involve a deed. Generally, when a transgression does not involve a deed, lashes are not given. Why then is he liable? Among the resolutions offered is that failing to depart is also considered a deed (Tosafot, Nazir 17a).

See Halachah 18.