Shabbat - Chapter 15

In both these instances, there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition against moving the articles. As mentioned in the notes on the following halachah, Rashi and the Rashba state that this leniency applies only with regard to articles the person does not require in the domain in which he is standing. If he needs them, the Rabbis decreed that they may not be moved, lest the person forget and bring the articles into the domain where he is standing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1) appears to favor the view of these authorities.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s decision, noting that Eruvin 99a would appear to hold a person liable in such a situation. The difficulty with the Rambam’s statements is compounded by the fact that the passage cited above associates the law in question with the following decision, “A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.” Since the Rambam holds one liable in the latter instance (see Chapter 12, Halachah 14), it would seem that he would hold one- liable with regard to the law under discussion. The Ra’avad’s arguments are so powerful that the Maggid Mishneh suggests amending the text of the Mishneh Torah accordingly.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1527) notes the Ra’avad’s question, and states that he checked all the ancient manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah available to him, and they all state that the person is not liable. Therefore, he explains that a person is not liable for. transfering an article unless he is standing in one of the domains involved in the transfer. This concept is derived from. the transfer of the articles in the construction of the Sanctuary. ln this instance, the people were not standing in a domain other than those involved in the transfer. Based on this foundation, he offers an interpretation—albeit a slightly strained one—for the passage in Eruvin.

This and the following law refer to situations where the key is located in the domain where the door is located.

The Maggid Misfmeh mentions the possibility of placing the key in the door as a forbidden transfer. ln the present day, almost every keyhole would be considered to be a makom patur.

I.e., we are not worried that perhaps the animal will withdraw its neck and the person will carry the food outside the stall. Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 17, Halachah 29.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, in their commentary on Eruvin 99a, the source for these halachot, Rashi and the Rashba maintain that if the person requires the vessels, the above restrictions apply even if the vessels are not attractive. The Maggid Mishneh states that although the Rambam’s ruling appears most appropriate within the context of the Talmudic passage, in practice the more stringent ruling should be followed. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch also rules accordingly.

This relects a significant leniency. We are requiring the person to drink while bent over. Even so, the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to forbid the person from drinking, lest he forget, stand upright, and thus bring the drinking vessel- into the other domain.

The prohibition against transferring an article from a carmelit is Rabbinic in nature. Hence, even if the person were to forget and transfer the drinking vessels · to his domain, he would not violate Torah law. Accordingly, there is no need to prohibit him from drinking as a further safeguard.
This represents the opinion of Ravvah (Eruvin 99a) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1). Significantly, however, the Talmud also records the opinion of Abbaye, who differs and maintains that since the forbidden labor of transferring articles is a matter that may be taken lightly, the Sages instituted safeguards with regard to Rabbinic decrees as well.

As long as he takes the water from the air, there is no difficulty. If he takes the water from ten handbreadths or more above the ground, he has taken it from a makom patur. If he takes it from less than ten handbreadths, he has moved an article less than four cubits in the public domain.

Based on the principle of l’vud, since the pipe is within three handbreadths of a private domain, it is considered to be an extension of that domain.
From the Rambam›s wording, it appears that if the roof is less than thirteen handbreadths above the ground, the principle of l’vud does not apply. This is so because the principle of l’vud cannot cause a space that is part of the public domain to be considered an extension of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).

In this instance, the pipe would be considered to be a carmelit. Transferring from a carmelit to a public domain is forbidden.

In this instance, the drainpipe is considered to be a private domain in its own right.

Note the distinction between this ruling and Chapter 13, Halachah 4, which describes removing water that is at rest.

I.e., to place articles upon it, transferring them from the building. Note, however, the restrictions mentioned in Halachah 7.

The space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is a makom patur. Hence, one may transfer articles to and from it (Chapter 14, Halachah 12).

This applies even if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and directly below an open window. Since it is low enough to be used by the passersby in the public domain, it is considered to be a carmelit.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, these restrictions apply even when the two projections are not directly above each other.

As the Rambam explains, the difficulty is that people from different properties cannot both use a third property which adjoins them—for example (Hilchot Eruvin 3:16), a wall that is four handbreadths wide that separates between two different properties. In particular, there are two conceptions of the Rambam’s statements:
a) that of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:2), which explains that the two projections extend from two windows belonging to two different individuals who have not made an eruv. Since these individuals are forbidden to transfer articles from one projection to the other by Rabbinical decree, certain restrictions were also placed on using the projections themselves.
b) that of the Ritba, who explains that we are speaking of a wall that possesses only a single window. Nevertheless, the lower projection may be used by the passersby in the public domain. (Although the public domain extends only to ten handbreadths, the people in the public domain have the right to use projections and holes in the wall that are above that height.) When there is only one projection, they refrain from using it, because it will be used by the inhabitants of the house. When, however, there are two projections, the passersby feel free to use the lower one. This in turn causes there to be certain restrictions with regard to the use of both projections on the Sabbath. See the diagram on the opposite page.
Although the Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that the Ritba’s interpretation is more appropriate to the wording chosen by the Rambam, our notes will follow the approach of the Shulchan Aruch, for it is accepted by the subsequent halachic authorities. lt also must be noted that Rashi’s version of the text of Eruvin 98b differs from that of the Rambam. Accordingly, he and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities have a different conception of these rulings.

Note that Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 353:11 explain that this refers to articles that were kept inside the house. Articles that were left on the projection before the Sabbath may be moved on it. See Hilchot Eruvin 3:18-19.

This applies even if the lower projection is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:4; Mishnah Berurah 353:12).

Note the Mishnah Berurah 353:12, which cites opinions that allow the people whose window opens up to the lower projection to use it when it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths.

There are no restrictions whatsoever, for neither projection is a domain in its own right.

This is permitted, because the projection is considered to be an extension of the window, like a hole in the wall of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the lower projection is a domain in its own right, it includes the space above it until the heavens, and the entire wall is considered as a part of it. In this instance, since the upper projection is not considered to be a domain in its own right, it is divided into portions. The portion directly opposite the window is considered an extension of the window as in the previous note, but the portion on either side is considered part of the lower projection.

If the projection extends over a carmelit and is ten handbreadths high, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 353:3).

Bringing the articles from the public domain to the home constitutes a forbidden activity. Hence, our Sages instituted this safeguard.
Note the Rashba, who states that if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah states that on a roof or balcony on which a person stands comfortably, all articles may be carried.

Our translation follows the version of the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. Many early printings and manuscripts of the text state “one is permitted.... “From the context, the latter version appears more appropriate.
One is forbidden to transfer from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain. Nevertheless, since the public domain extends for only ten handbreadths above the ground, the transfer is not being made through a public domain, but rather through a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:1).

See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-4, which explains that although according to the Torah itself, one may transfer from one private domain to another, our Sages forbade this unless an eruv was constructed.

These articles are not breakable. Nevertheless, since the houses are on the same level, it is not difficult to throw from one to the other. Accordingly, our Sages did not feel the need for a safeguard, lest the article fall and the person descend to the public domain and bring them into his home, a private domain.

Even if the articles fall, they will break. Hence, there is no need to worry that the person may bring them home.

A cistern that is ten handbreadths deep is considered as a private domain. Were the sand piled around the cistem to be ten handbreadths high, the enclosure would be considered a private domain. Eruvin 99b teaches us a new concept, that the sum of ten handbreadths can be reached by combining the two together.
Hence, there is no difficulty in drawing water from the enclosure to the house, since one is transferring from one private domain to another. Needless to say, it is forbidden to transfer from such an enclosure to the public domain.

Since there is no room for a person to pass comfortably between the sand pile and the wall of the house, the space between them is not considered as part of the public domain, but rather as a carmelit (compare to Chapter 14, Halachah 6). Therefore, the space above it is also considered as a carmelit. Thus, one would be transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a carmelit. In this instance (in contrast to Chapter 14, Halachah 14), our Sages allowed such a transfer.

When there is room for people to pass between the cistem and the house in a normal manner, the space between them is considered as part ofthe public domain. Therefore, a person who draws water through the opening to his home would be considered to be transferring from a private domain—the cistern—through a public domain—the area above the space between the sand pile and the home—to one’s home—a private domain. See Chapter 13, Halachah 16.

Here, the importance of the height of ten handbreadths is not significant because it creates a private domain, but because, as explained in the following note, this will cause the bucket to be more than ten handbreadths above the ground as it passes over the sand pile.

1. e., as the bucket is transferred from the enclosure to the home, it passes above the public domain. In this instance, since the sand pile is ten handbreadths high, there is no difficulty, because the space ten handbreadths above the public domain is a makom patur.

Since the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high, it constitutes a private domain. Thus, when water is poured from the house, the water will pass from a private domain through a mekom petur—the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain—to another private domain. This is permitted.

This is a Rabbinic decree, instituted for the reason to be explained. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 354:3 states that this restriction applies even if the garbage heap is located in a carmelit.

Eruvin 99b cites an example where the Sages considered such a possibility.

1. e., we suspect that without looking, the person will follow his usual habit and pour water onto the place where the garbage heap was located previously without noticing that it had been removed.

The Rambam (based on Eruvin 16b) interprets this as referring to a situation in which the w’all around the courtyard has been broken where the conduit passes, but there are portions of the wall remaining on both sides of the conduit. Note, however, the objections of the Ra’avad who interprets this Talmudic passage as referring to a situation where the conduit passes below the wall of the courtyard.

Almost all commentaries interpret the word “high” as meaning “deep.”

Since the water conduit passes through the courtyard on both sides, and it is of sufficient size to constitute a domain of its own, it is considered to be a carmelit unless the partitions are constructed. Since there is a portion of the wall remaining on either side of the conduit, the courtyard is still considered as a private domain. Nevertheless, the conduit itself is considered as a separate domain and unless a partition is constructed it is forbidden to carry to and from it.

Even were the conduit to pass beneath the wall of the courtyard, since that wall was not erected for the sake of the water, it is not of consequence. Instead, a separate partition must be erected for the sake of the conduit itself (Rashi, Eruvin 87a).

The laws concerning the construction of a partition of this nature are described in Halachah 13.

It is not large enough to be considered to be a domain in its own right. Hence, it is considered as part of the courtyard and we are permitted to draw water from it on Sabbath.

ln this halachah as well, most commentaries maintain that the Rambam is referring to a water conduit that passes through a place where a portion of the wall of the courtyard has been taken down. As mentioned above, the Ra’avad interprets Eruvin 12b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore objects to the Rambam’s ruling.
Significantly, the Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the second clause of the halachah appears to indicate that the conduit breaks through the wall entirely, and it therefore offers a different interpretation of the Rambam’s words.

Since the conduit is not deep enough to constitute a domain of its own, it would normally be considered part of the domain through which it passes. (See Chapter 14, Halachah 24.) Nevertheless, since this conduit is so wide, it is no longer considered part of the private domain.

I.e., does the conduit nullify the courtyard’s distinction as a private domain? Significantly, this question is asked in this halachah and not in the previous one. In the previous halachah, although the conduit itself was considered a separate domain, since the opening was less than ten handbreadths, it is considered as an entrance and the enclosure is not nullified. This halachah, however, mentions an opening of more than ten cubits, an aperture which ordinarily nullifies an enclosure.

Several explanations have been offered for the Rambam’s ruling. Among them: the small portion of the wall which remains juts out over the water. Therefore, the opening to the courtyard is less than ten cubits (Rabbenu Y onason, commenting on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The portions of the wall which remain on either side are considered like poles. As stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, it is permitted to carry in a courtyard with poles on either edges of the entrance to the fourth side (an ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt). See also the Or Sameach.

For the reasons mentioned above, the wall of the courtyard is an acceptable divider, and thus the courtyard as a whole is still considered to be a private domain. Nevertheless, since the wall was not made for the purpose of distinguishing the water that is outside the courtyard from that which is within the courtyard, a separate partition is required for that purpose (ibid.)

When there are no portions jutting out over the water (according to the first interpretation in note 49) or when the entire wall is destroyed (according to the second), the courtyard is considered as enclosed on three sides alone and it 1s forbidden to carry within.

For the entire intent of this partition is to make a distinct separation between the water in the courtyard and the water in the public domain outside of it. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishneh (Eruvin 8:6). See also Hilchot Eruvin 3:21-22 where the Rambam mentions a similar requirement.]

Generally, a partition must descend within three handbreadths of the ground.

For, as mentioned above, the courtyard is a private domain, and carrying within it is permitted. Furthermore, even the water conduit is considered as a private domain according to the T orah itself and its designation as a carmelit is Rabbinic in origin.

In contrast to the conduit mentioned in the previous halachot, this conduit does not pass through the courtyards, but merely by their side. Hence, it cannot be considered as part of the courtyard itself.

I.e., ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide.

The conduit is considered to be a carmelit; the windows, the holes adjacent to a carmelit.

Since the opening is more than three handbreadths away, it is no longer considered to be a hole adjacent to the carmelit, but rather a separate entity. Hence, it is forbidden to transfer from the carmelit to it.

I.e., the projections cause the courtyard to be considered as extending beyond its wall, into the space of the conduit. Therefore, taking water from the conduit would be considered as moving an article within a single private domain.

ln his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains that just as it is customary to erect balconies over the public domain, it is also customary to erect balconies over bodies of water.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:l) states that the aperture must be four handbreadths states that the aperture must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths.

Since the body of water is considered to be a carmelit. It is forbidden to transfer from a carmelit to a private domain.

The partition need not reach the water itself. Because of the principle gud acheit mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends into the water, even though it actually ends above its surface. This leniency is granted, because the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
Thus it is considered as if the hole extends into the water itself. Accordingly, we are allowed to draw water through it, because the portion of the body of water beneath it is considered to be an extension of the private domain [the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid)].

The partition need not reach the balcony. Because of the principle gud asikcmechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends to the balcony, even though it actually ends below it (ibid.). See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1).

Eruvin 88a explains that the leniency of pouring into the body of water has an added dimension of severity. The current of the water will cause the water that has been poured to flow beyond the periphery of the aperture and into the portion of the body of water that is a carmelit. Nevertheless, since the person does not perform this transfer himself, there is no restriction.

Since the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, the construction of such a partition is sufficient (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam›s wording is intended to negate an opinion mentioned in Eruvin 88a, which states that even if a courtyard is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, if its total area is 16 square handbreadths (e.g., it is is eight cubits by two), the restrictions mentioned in this halachah do not apply. Significantly, the Rashba accepts the more lenient view and, in this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:1) follows his ruling.

Pouring the water into the courtyard does not violate a Torah prohibition, because the courtyard itself is an extension of the home. Although the water flows into the public domain, this is due to the forces of gravity and inertia. Thus, the person’s pouring of the water is considered as merely a cause; it is not considered as if he poured the water into the public domain directly. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade pouring the water in this manner.

A seah is approximately 8.25 liters according to Shiurei Torah and 14.4 liters according to the Chazon Ish. The Sages chose this measure because they considered this to be the average quantity of water used by a person every day (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 8:9).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which differs and mentions a covering of boards, which most likely is flat.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (op. cit.), the Rambam explains that the covering will cause the pit to be separated from the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:1 and the Be’ur Halachah, which explain that because of its dome-like cover, people will not walk over it easily. Hence, since its opening faces the private domain, it is considered to be a hole adjacent to the private domain or a makom patur.)
Note the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 357) who explains that the reason for the cover is to prevent people’s suspicions from being aroused.

Since this prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin, as long as a distinction is made, one is allowed to pour as much water as he desires. We do not suspect that a person will err and come to pour water directly into the public domain.
It must be emphasized that if a person pours water at the border of the public domain and it flows into that domain as a result of his force, he is liable and it is as if he poured it in the public domain itself (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:2).

Thus, according to the Rambam, there are two difficulties with pouring water into such a courtyard: that the person himself may err and pour the water into the public domain, and that the onlookers in the public domain might develop a misconception and think that the person is pouring the water into the public domain.

In the summer, water that is poured in the courtyard will attract attention and it will be much more apparent that it is being poured there so that it will flow into the public domain.

According to the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.), the above restrictions apply only in a public domain. If the courtyard is located adjacent to a carmelit, there are no restrictions. The Ramah, however, differs, and maintains that in both instances there is a Rabbinic prohibition. (See the notes on the following halachot.)

Eruvin 8:10 records a difference of opinion regarding this matter between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya›akov and the other Sages. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya›akov maintains that as long as the drain runs below the ground in a space that is four cubits by four cubits, the person is not liable, for it is possible for the water to be absorbed in such an area. The Sages, by contrast, maintain that this is forbidden, since the water ultimately flows into the public domain, because of the person›s power (Rambam›s Commentary on the Mishnah).

It must be emphasized that these restrictions apply only when \lltimately the water emerges above ground in the public domain. There is no difficulty using our household toilets and drains when the water flows into sewage pipes or septic tanks.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:3) follows Rabbenu Asher and others, who accept Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov’s ruling. This leniency applies only when the drainage pipe is made of a substance that absorbs water. If not, even these authorities agree that it is forbidden to pour directly into the drain.

At this time of year, a person’s courtyard will be filled with mud regardless. Therefore, he is not suspected of desiring to pour water into the public domain and no restriction are imposed (Eruvin 88b)

Transferring articles into a carmelit is forbidden only according to Rabbinic decree. The prohibition against causing water to flow into another domain because of one’s power is also a Rabbinic decree instituted as a safeguard. Hence, we follow the principle that a Rabbinic decree should not be instituted as a safeguard to protect the observance of a Rabbinic decree. This opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch 357:3. The Ramah, however, differs, and states that the leniency applies only in a carmelit—like a sea or a desert—that is clearly distinct from · a public domain. Within a carmelit in a town or city, we must observe the same restrictions that apply in a public domain.

Note. the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah 355;14, which allows seamen to dispose of other refuse by similar means.

When the protrusion is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is considered

Eruvin 98a explains that this refers to a scroll of sacred writings.

The Turei Zahav 326:2 mention two distinctions between this instance and a situation when rain descends upon a person in the public domain: a) when bathing, one is likely to be covered with greater quantity of water, b) there is no way one can protect oneself from a sudden rain.