Teshuvah - Chapter 6

Halachot 3 and 5 mention a number of these verses.

That man is granted free choice.

On the basis of these verses, many people conclude that, not only does God know what choice man will make (Divine omniscience), He decrees the nature of that choice and controls man’s destiny (Divine decree).

Though the Rambam does not completely resolve this apparent contradiction, by outlining the fundamental principles of faith involved in the issue, he demonstrates how the matter transcends our human comprehension. Accordingly, it should be accepted as a matter of faith and not rationalized according to the principles of intellect (Avodat HaMelech).

Chapter 5, Halachah 4. Similarly, in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, in his Thirteen Principles of Faith listed in the introduction to Chapter 10 of Sanhedrin (principle 11), he emphasizes how reward and punishment are fundamental to the Jewish faith.

“God knows the sinners and according to His wisdom and uprightness, He determines the extent of their punishment” (Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 8). The workings of the scales of Divine judgment cannot be perceived by our limited intellects. However, it is clear that the various punishments administered to different people depend on the nature of their characters, the sins they committed, and the circumstances surrounding them.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1, relates that a person who possesses more merits than sins suffers retribution for those sins in this world so as to enter the world to come without any blemishes on his record.

For example, Arichin 16a relates that the affliction of tzara’at (generally translated as leprosy) comes as retribution for the sins of slander, murder, false oaths, adultery, pride, theft, and miserly behavior. Similarly, Vayikra Rabbah 17:4 states that first God afflicts a sinner’s body. If he does not repent, he takes his soul.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 1:7, states that a person’s loss of possessions can atone for severe sins: “If a person transgressed a sin punishable by death at God’s hand, his ox may die, he may lose his chicken, and his glassware may break…. Thus, his obligation is reduced.”

Bar and Bat Mitzvah, twelve for girls, thirteen for boys.

The first clauses of that verse state: “Fathers shall not die because of their sons, nor shall sons die because of their fathers.” Sanhedrin 27b notes the apparent contradiction between that verse and Exodus 34:7, “He [G‑d] visits the iniquity of the fathers on the children,” and explains that unless a son sins himself, he is not to be punished for his father’s behavior. However, a sinner can bear the cumulative guilt of both his and his ancestor’s transgressions. Nevertheless, this principle applies only after the son reaches majority. While he is a minor, he may still die because of his father’s sins (Sifri). Similarly, Ketubot 8b states when fathers offend God, He vents His wrath on their children. See also Tosafot, Shabbat 25a.

The Rambam’s statement appears to be a quote from a previous source. However, to this writer’s knowledge, this statement in this form is not found in the Talmud or popular Midrashim. This touches on a significant point regarding the Mishneh Torah. In order to allow the text to flow freely, the Rambam did not mention the sources from which he derived his halachot. [Indeed, this became a point of controversy (see the Ra’avad’s comments on the introduction to the Mishneh Torah) and in his later years, the Rambam stated that he regretted that decision.] Subsequently, many Torah scholars have dedicated themselves to finding the sources for the halachot. Often, the task is not overly taxing. However, there are many halachot in which the Rambam appears to be referring to sources and those references cannot be found in the Talmud or Midrashim that we possess. This has led many commentaries to state that the Rambam possessed sources from the Talmudic period which have not been passed on to us. Others maintain that the Rambam took the liberty of interpreting the Biblical verses himself on the basis of knowledge gleaned from other sources.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1, relates that a person with more sins than merits enjoys the benefit of his merits in this world so that he can be given full punishment in the world to come.

The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) gives as examples, “one who removes the yoke [of Torah], one who acts brazen-facedly to the Torah, and one who abrogates the covenant [of circumcision].”

That a person suffers retribution for his sins.

In his commentary to Avot 4:11, the Rambam explains that just as a shield wards off an enemy’s attack, Teshuvah prevents retribution from affecting man. Though Teshuvah totally absolves a person from retribution in the world to come (Iggeret HaTeshuvah, Chapter 2), in this world, it merely serves as a shield, i.e., retribution will come for a person’s sins, but his Teshuvah will protect him.

Free-choice is not only a negative factor. On the contrary, God granted man this potential so that he use it in His service.

In this halachah, the Rambam gives one explanation (a second explanation is offered in Halachah 5) to resolve the difficulty presented by certain Biblical verses that imply that God decrees that man will sin. In the previous halachot, the Rambam had described various levels of retribution. This halachah deals with the most severe levels of retribution, one in which a man is prevented from repenting. In such an instance, God removes man’s potential for free-choice. (A further explanation of the concepts mentioned in this halachah is found in Shemoneh Perakim, Chapter 8.)

. In this instance, the Rambam does not define what constitutes “a great sin.” In contrast to the sins mentioned in Chapter 3 that “hold back Teshuvah,” no arbitrary criteria are mentioned.

At times, the cumulative effect of many lesser sins can have the same effect as a more severe sin. A parallel to this concept exists in Torah law. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:14, relates that if, on the Sabbath, there is no kosher food available for a person who is critically ill, it is preferable to slaughter a kosher animal rather than serve him non-kosher food. Though eating non-kosher food is a much less severe prohibition, the person will transgress it with every morsel he eats. In contrast, the Sabbath laws, though more severe, need only be overlooked once. In Lekach Tov (Chapter 15), Rav Yosef Engel brings a number of examples where כמות, quantity, takes precedence over איכות, level or quality.

“After God waits for the wicked to repent and they fail to do so, He takes the potential for Teshuvah from their heart…. Even if they desire to repent and pray to God, they find themselves incapable of doing so” (Shmot Rabbah 11:1).

However, even when a person’s Teshuvah will be obstructed, he should not despair of establishing a bond with God. King Menasheh committed more severe sins than all the kings who preceded him. Nevertheless, II Chronicles 33:12 relates that, “when he was in affliction, he sought God, his Lord, and humbled himself before the God of his fathers.” Commenting on this verse, the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 11:2 relates that the angels “stopped up the windows of heaven” to prevent his prayers from reaching God. Nevertheless, when God saw that Menasheh’s intent was sincere, He “dug a tunnel under the heavenly throne” to allow him to repent.

God tells the prophet that the spiritual sensitivity of the people will be dulled to the point that they will not appreciate the need for repentance.

This verse describes the chain of events which led to the destruction of the First Temple. Each day, God would send a new prophet to exhort the people to repentance. However, the people would respond with scorn.
Ultimately, God removed the possibility of repentance from them and (loc. cit. 17), “brought upon them the king of the Kasdim who slew their young men with the sword… and had no compassion young men, virgins, old men, or the feeble.”

The association of Teshuvah with the metaphor of healing or remedy was employed in Chapter 1, Halachah 4, quoting Jeremiah 3:22, “I will heal your backsliding.”

I.e., prevent him from responding affirmatively to Moses’ appeal to send forth the people.

As the Torah subsequently relates, he enslaved the people, murdered their children, and embittered their lives.

Pharaoh was punished not only for his previous deeds, but for his refusal to send the Jewish people after “God hardened his heart.” One might ask: How could he be punished for an act that he had no choice but to commit? The question can be resolved on the basis of the halachah (Bava Metzia 42a, Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:15) which obligates a watchman to make restitution for property that was destroyed by factors beyond his control if he was negligent in its care initially (תחילתו בפשיעה סופו באונס). Similarly, though ultimately, Pharaoh was not responsible for his actions — since the ability to choose freely was taken from him — because of his initial wickedness, he was obligated to suffer the consequences of his later deeds as well.

Hence, Moses’ mission appears futile and purposeless.

Egypt was the center of the civilized world of that age. Hence, what happened there became known to all mankind. Any observer could have realized that after the first plagues, Pharaoh should definitely have heeded Moses’ request. His refusal to do so clearly demonstrated that, aside from his stubbornness, God’s hand was also involved. Thus, Pharaoh served as an example to teach all men.

God will “negate his free-choice” (Shemoneh Perakim, loc. cit.).

The king of the Amorites whose territory lay in the path of the Jews on their way to Eretz Yisrael. Though the Jews offered to pass through his land without engaging him in war, he refused and challenged them in battle. His armies were utterly defeated and he was slain (Numbers, Chapter 21).

It would have been unfair to punish Sichon for not allowing the Jews to pass through his land, since that decision was made because, “God… hardened his spirit….” However, prior to that instance, Sichon had committed many other sins and as retribution for his wickedness, God prevented him from accepting the Jews’ offer (Shemoneh Perakim, loc. cit.).

Torat Kohanim, commenting on Leviticus, 18:3, relates that the Canaanites’ behavior was more depraved than any other idolatrous nation.

The preceding verse relates: There was no city which accepted a peaceful settlement with the children of Israel except the Chivites who lived in Gibeon. All the rest, they conquered in battle.” Based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Shivi’it 6:1, Hilchot Melachim 6:5 relates: Joshua sent three letters [to the Canaanites] before entering the [promised] land: At first, he sent them: “Whoever desires to flee, should flee.” Afterwards, he sent a second [message]: “Whoever desires to accept a peaceful settlement, should make peace.” Then, he sent again: “Whoever desires war, should do battle.” The command to destroy the Canaanites only applied to those who did not accept a peaceful settlement. Hence, after seeing all the miracles which accompanied the Jews, it would have been logical for the Canaanites to accept Joshua’s offer of peace.

Hoshea 4:17 describes the Israelites of that age with the statement: “Ephraim is joined to idols, let him go.” Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.) interprets the verse: Because “Ephraim is joined to idols,” he willingly established a bond with idol worship, it is fit to “let him go,” to abandon him to his love for them and remove his potential for repentance.

Elijah made this statement in his confrontation with the prophets of Ba’al at Mount Carmel. Rav Saadia Gaon interprets this verse as a request for God to turn the hearts of the people back to Him. Nevertheless, the Rambam views it as an explanation of how it was possible for Israel to continue serving Ba’al.

They had free will and used that potential to commit severe transgressions which warranted harsh punishment.

There are two complementary points brought out by this halachah:
Firstly, it further develops the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, showing how the awareness that, at times, God will prevent people from repenting has motivated the righteous to entreat Him to help them continue on the path of truth. Frequently (see Berachot 4a), out of their humility, our spiritual giants would consider themselves as sinners and worry that God would remove His influence from them. A second explanation can be given on the basis of the Zohar, Vol. I, 59a, which interprets the verse within the context of the seeming contradiction between free will and Divine determination. The Zohar asks: How could David make such a request? It has been taught everything is in the hand of God except righteousness and sin. It explains that David was not asking God to take the choice away from him, but rather to show him the path which will enable him to proceed, on his own initiative, to true service of God.

Shmot Rabbah 19:2 infers a similar concept, explaining that the verse represents David’s request that the evil inclination not be able to sway him from the path of Torah.

This verse is part of “A Psalm by David, after Nathan the prophet came to him after he had been intimate with Batshevah.” After that event, David thought God had closed off the doors to Teshuvah for him. Nevertheless, he persevered in prayer, hoping that ultimately, he would be given the opportunity to repent.

In which the righteous appear to ask God to direct their behavior. They are not requesting that He take away their free will and remove the possibility of committing evil. On the contrary, their request is that God continue to allow them that choice instead of punishing them by decreeing that they never repent.

The question posed by this verse resembles those mentioned in the previous halachah. The verse appears to imply that God will place people on the path of truth, and thus, put them in a position where they are not able to choose evil. Accordingly, the Rambam explains the verse’s intention.

The choice whether to heed the prophet’s words or not remains theirs. Similarly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Makkot 2:6 interprets this verse to mean that God shows sinners a path of Teshuvah.

Positive behavior creates a self-reinforcing pattern. The more good one does, the more one desires to do. Hilchot De’ot 1:7 elaborates on the process in which the repetition of good deeds encourages good character traits.

Shabbat 104a, Yoma 38b, Menachot 29b

Rashi (Menachot, ibid.) states: “One who comes to purify himself, needs assistance because of the evil inclination, therefore, help is granted to him.”

Tosafot Yom Tov (Avot 5:18) states that only after a person considers repentance does God assist him in this matter. This is consonant with the concept of free-choice mentioned in this chapter. However, other Rabbis explain that even before a person considers the concept of Teshuvah, there are Divine forces arousing him to that decision.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam is adding a further point to the explanation given in Chapter 5, Halachah 5. The Turei Even objects, explaining that here the question is of a different nature. In Chapter 5, the Rambam spoke about God’s knowledge. As explained above, knowledge and free-choice are not necessarily contradictory concepts. However, in this halachah, the Rambam deals with the question of Divine decree. Once God states a prophecy, that prophecy will surely be fulfilled and, hence, it seemingly contradicts the concept of free will.

This prophecy was included in the covenant between God and Abraham established by halving the sacrifices (bris bein habetarim).

This prophecy was conveyed to Moses shortly before his death.

In Shemoneh Perakim, the Rambam elaborates slightly more, asking, “Does the fact that God included the laws requiring the punishment of stoning in the Torah mean that a person who commits a sin requiring that punishment does not exercise free will?”

Explaining that ultimately, there would be people who sin.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s explanation and offers a different explanation: No one would say that Moses’ statement (Deuteronomy 31:29): “I know that after I die, you will become corrupt and turn away from the path that I have prescribed for you,” removed the Jewish people’s potential for free choice. Instead, the intent is that Moses, as the leader of the people, knew their tendencies and was able to predict that they would not withstand the challenges presented them. Surely, God can possess similar knowledge.

This statement is obviously not a decree that any specific person will be cursed with poverty. Rather, it relates the general pattern of worldly affairs, explaining that there will always be poor people among the Jewish community. Similarly, in the statement quoted above, God was informing Moses that the wicked would continue to exist.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s statements: These are lengthy and underdeveloped words…. I would almost call them childish…. There are two possible explanations regarding the Egyptians: a) … The Egyptians were wicked and deserving of punishment. If they had listened to Moses originally and sent forth the Jews, they would not have suffered or drowned in the sea. However, it was Pharaoh’s arrogance and scorning of God… which caused [his punishment]. b) The Creator had stated, “they will enslave them.” However, the Egyptians [overstepped that decree,] forcing them to do backbreaking work, slaughtering them, and drowning them, as implied by [Zechariah 1:15]: “I was slightly angered, but they helped [forward] the evil.” The first resolution proposed by the Ra’avad resembles the Rambam’s own statements in Halachah 3 and does not acknowledge the unique difficulty which the Rambam addresses himself to here, that seemingly it was a Divine decree that made the Egyptians enslave the Jews. The second resolution, also mentioned by the Rambam, Genesis, 15:14, is based on the Shmot Rabbah 30:15, which offers a comparison to a king who ordered his son to work for a certain master, but promised him he would be treated fairly. Instead, the master was overbearing and made the prince suffer greatly. When the king was ultimately reconciled with his son, he ordered the execution of the cruel master. Support for the Rambam’s explanation can be brought from Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:4. There, the Rambam explains that, in contrast to prophecies of Divine favor, prophecies concerning retribution may remain unfulfilled. Hence, in this instance, there was no definite Divine decree forcing the Egyptians to oppress the Jews. On the contrary, the Divine decree was itself subject to change. Therefore, every one of the Egyptians who made the decision to cause difficulty to the Jews must accept full responsibility for his deed.

Though the above explanation clarifies the question of God’s decree, still God surely knew which individuals would bring His decree to fulfillment. Thus, to answer this question, the Rambam refers to his previous explanation (Chapter 5, Halachah 5) that God’s knowledge is not bound by the same rules as human knowledge. In one of his responsa (159), the Rambam writes: “Anyone who pays no attention to our words [on the question of free-choice] in the commentary to the tractate of Avot (Shemoneh Perakim) and in Sefer HaMadah which are built on eternal foundations, and searches to contradict these statements based on a statement of the Aggadah, Midrash, or that of one of the Geonim… is committing suicide, as it were.”