SECTION 2 Whether Ritual Slaughter Performed by a Non-Jew or an Apostate is Kosher (1-11)

סימן ב אִם שְׁחִיטַת נָכְרִי וּמוּמָר כְְּשֵׁרָה, וּבוֹ י״א סְעִיפִים

1

[An animal] slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered a neveilah (1) (i.e., an animal that died without being ritually slaughtered). [This applies] even if [the non-Jew] is a minor, (2) and even if he does not worship false deities (e.g., a resident alien) [1] and even when others are observing him. (3)

א

שְׁחִיטַת נָכְרִי נְבֵלָה, (א) אֲפִלּוּ הוּא קָטָן, (ב) וַאֲפִלּוּ אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵד אֱלִילִים הַגָּה: כְּגוֹן גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב (טוּר), וַאֲפִלּוּ אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ. (ג)

(1) Neveilah – However, it is not forbidden to benefit from [the carcass of the animal], because it is not considered a sacrifice to false deities. [The principle that]2 it can be assumed that the intent of non-Jews is [to slaughter an animal] for the sake of [their] false deity is applied only when [the non-Jewish slaughterer] is [an active] non-believer,2 i.e., a priest devoted to a false deity.3 In the present era, even the priests [cannot be said] to be that devoted to their false deities. Instead, they are [merely] carrying out their ancestral traditions.4 [Accordingly, even when an animal was slaughtered by a priest,] permission may be granted to derive benefit [from the slaughtered animal] if there is a significant [financial] loss involved.5 All the above applies when the animal was slaughtered. However, if it was killed [in another way], there is no need at all to be concerned regarding [the non-Jew] intending [to slaughter the animal] for the sake of [his] false deity (Tevuos Shor, sec. 2, note 3).
(2) A minor – [i.e., a child] who is not knowledgeable regarding the worship of false deities6 and [thus] this cannot be his intent.
(3) Him – [Even though observers saw that the non-Jew] slaughtered properly, [the animal he slaughtered] is [deemed] a neveilah according to Scriptural Law, as indicated by the verse,7 “You shall slaughter… and you shall eat….” Our Sages inferred,8 “You may eat what you slaughter.” [Excluded is] what a monkey slaughters;9 the same law applies regarding a non-Jew.8 Since the laws of ritual slaughter do not apply to [a non-Jew, an animal] he slaughters is deemed to be similar to an animal slaughtered by a monkey.
By contrast, the laws of ritual slaughter apply to a deaf-mute, an emotionally- or mentally-challenged person, and a minor, as evidenced by the fact that it is forbidden by Scriptural Law to feed [such individuals] meat from an animal that was not slaughtered according to halachah.10 Therefore, [an animal] slaughtered by such a person is permitted when others observe him [slaughter].11 [i]
(א) נְבֵלָה. אֲבָל אֵינָה אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה מִשּׁוּם תִּקְרֹבֶת עַכּוּ”ם דְּלֹא אָמְרִינָןא סְתָם מַחֲשֶׁבֶת גּוֹיִם לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הוּא מִיןב דְּהַיְנוּ כֹּמֶר הָאָדוּק בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָהג וּבִזְמַן הַזֶּה אַף הַכֹּמָרִים אֵינָם אֲדוּקִים בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה כָּל כָּךְ כִּי מַעֲשֵׂה אֲבוֹתֵיהֶם בִּידֵיהֶםד וְיֵשׁ לְהַתִּיר בַּהֲנָאָה בְּהֶפְסֵד מְרֻבֶּה.ה וְכָל זֶה בִּשְׁחִיטָה אֲבָל בַּהֲרִיגָה אֵין לָחוּשׁ כְּלָל לְמַחֲשֶׁבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָהו (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרז):
(ב) קָטָן. שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּטִיב עֲבוֹדָה זָרָהח וְאֵין מַחֲשַׁבְתּוֹ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה:ט
(ג) אוֹתוֹ. שֶׁשָּׁחַט יָפֶה שְׁחִיטָתוֹ נְבֵלָה מִן הַתּוֹרָהי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַריא וְזָבַחְתָּ וְאָכַלְתָּ וְדָרְשׁוּ חֲכָמִיםיב מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ אַתָּה אוֹכֵל וְלֹא שֶׁזָּבַח הַקּוֹףיג וְהוּא הַדִּין לְנָכְרִייד לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת שְׁחִיטָהטו וּשְׁחִיטָתוֹ כִּשְׁחִיטַת הַקּוֹף. אֲבָל חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן הֵם בְּתוֹרַת שְׁחִיטָהטז שֶׁהֲרֵי אָסוּר לְהַאֲכִילָם נְבֵלוֹת בְּיָדַיִם מִן הַתּוֹרָהיז וּלְפִיכָךְ שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה בַּאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹיח [א]:

Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (SIE)

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2

[Before] one who rebels against Jewish practice and eats neveilos to [satisfy] his appetite (4) [performs ritual slaughter], an [observant] Jew must inspect the [slaughtering] knife [to assure that it is fit for slaughtering] and [only then] give it to him.

[After the knife has been inspected,] it is permitted to eat [the meat of an animal] slaughtered [by such a person] even if he slaughters in private, (5) provided he is known to be knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter. (6) If [an observant Jew] did not inspect the slaughtering knife for him initially, it would be forbidden to eat [the meat of an animal such a person] slaughtered unless [the knife] is examined afterwards. (7)

Initially, he should not be allowed to slaughter, even if an observant Jew is supervising him, (8) without an [observant Jew] inspecting the knife beforehand, relying on the [mere] expectation that [the knife] will be inspected afterwards. (9)

Note – If a person slaughtered and once permitted an animal that was tereifah to be eaten, as long as he did not establish a reputation for doing so, it is permitted to eat [meat from animals] he slaughtered. [v] Nevertheless, [in practice,] the decision [regarding such an instance] depends on the judgment of the Rabbinic authority concerning the shochet. If he already transgressed and there is reason to [suspect that he will continue to transgress regarding this matter], he should be removed [from his position] (Maharik, responsum 33).

ב

מוּמָר אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת לְתֵאָבוֹן, (ד) יִשְׂרָאֵל בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ אֲפִלּוּ יִשְׁחֹט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ, (ה) וְהוּא שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה. (ו) וְאִם לֹא בָּדַק לוֹ סַכִּין תְּחִלָּה, אָסוּר לֶאֱכֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ בַּסּוֹף. (ז)

וְאֵין לִתֵּן לוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחֹט, אֲפִלּוּ כָּשֵׁר עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, (ח) בְּלִי שֶׁיִּבְדֹּק לוֹ כָּשֵׁר אֶת הַסַּכִּין תְּחִלָּה, עַל סְמַךְ שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ בַּסּוֹף. (ט) הַגָּה: מִי שֶׁשָּׁחַט וְהוֹצִיא טְרֵפָה פַּעַם אַחַת מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ, אִם לֹא הֻחְזַק בְּכָךְ, מֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל אַחַר כָּךְ מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ. [ה] מִכָּל מָקוֹם דָּנִין בָּזֶה לְפִי רְאוּת עֵינֵי הַדַּיָּן בָּאָדָם הַשּׁוֹחֵט, אִם כְּבָר נִכְשַׁל וְרַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר, מַעֲבִירִין אוֹתוֹ (מַהֲרִי"ק שֹׁרֶשׁ ל"ג).

(4) To [satisfy] his appetite – i.e., to fulfill his desire [to eat meat] when he cannot find kosher meat or when he does not find it available as inexpensively as meat that is from a neveilah or a tereifah (Sanhedrin 27[a]). [Such a person is judged more leniently than] one who shows [absolutely] no concern for ritual slaughter. [In that instance, we are stringent and forbid his slaughter, as will be discussed] in the note to subsection 5 below.
(5) In private – There is no concern that he will not be careful to slaughter properly, [i.e., he must be careful not to interrupt the slaughter nor press the knife against the animal’s organs. The rationale is] that it is assumed that he will not forgo something that is permitted and eat something forbidden since he has the possibility of slaughtering in the proper manner. This is an accepted presumption regarding even the sinners of Israel, [i.e., Jews who do not observe the Torah’s commandments] – that when they have the choice of something forbidden or something permitted, they will not forsake what is permitted and partake of the forbidden. [A Jew is presumed to conduct himself in this manner] unless it is known that he did not act accordingly, but rather showed no concern for [the Torah’s] prohibitions (Rambam, [Hilchos Shechitah 4:15,] Tevuos Shor, [section 2, note 7]).
Even if [the shochet] will not eat [from the meat of the animal] he slaughtered,12 nevertheless, [we assume that] he will show concern not to feed others forbidden food, just as he would not eat [something forbidden himself. Doing so would constitute a violation] of the prohibition against placing a stumbling block in front of the blind13 [and it is assumed that] he will not violate this prohibition if he has the possibility of not violating it (Tosafos, [Chulin 3b]; Rabbeinu Asher, [Chulin 1:7]).
Nevertheless, [we are concerned] that the shochet will not take the trouble14 to examine the slaughtering knife and fix it if it is blemished (Rabbeinu Asher, [loc. cit.]) even if he will partake of [the animal’s meat]. For this reason, [it is necessary that a knowledgeable and observant person first] inspect the knife and give it to him ([Chulin 3a]).[ii]
(6) The laws of ritual slaughter – The principle that the majority of those involved with ritual slaughter are knowledgeable and proficient [in the pertinent laws]15 is not applied regarding those who rebel against Jewish Law. [The rationale is that] there are grounds for concern that anyone who partakes of meat from a neveilah because of his appetite and does not trouble himself [to find kosher meat] is not proficient and knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter, and slaughters [purely] out of desire [to eat meat] (Rashba, [Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 1, shaar 1]).
It is necessary to examine [such a person’s] proficiency [in the pertinent laws] before he slaughters. He should not be allowed to slaughter, relying on the fact that he will be examined after slaughtering, because it is possible that [the inspectors] will forget and not examine him, and forbidden food will be eaten. [The rationale for the above stringency is that] even after the fact, it is forbidden to partake [of meat slaughtered by such a person] if, [before he slaughtered,] it was not known that he is an expert [in the laws of ritual slaughter] (Sifsei Kohen [Yoreh Deah 2:6]).
(7) Afterwards – The word of [the slaughterer] is then accepted if he says that he slaughtered with the particular knife [he showed the inspectors]. We do not suspect that he slaughtered with a blemished knife and then came across this [unblemished] knife after the slaughter.
[This ruling only applies during] the first hour or two [after he slaughtered, in which instance], he did not have the opportunity to go and find another [knife] in the marketplace. However, if he had the opportunity of a day or two [to find another knife before the inspection], we do not rely on his statement [regarding which knife he had used] in such a situation.
This is the logical conclusion. However, in actual practice, one should rule stringently even within [only] an hour or two [after the slaughter]. Nevertheless, if [inspectors] come [directly after the person] completed slaughtering or he had already slaughtered two or three animals and he was still slaughtering (a fourth and fifth [animal]), since he is still slaughtering and his knife is in his hand, it is assumed that he certainly slaughtered all [the animals] with [the knife that is presently in his hand] (Rashba, [Chulin 4b]; Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 2:7]).[iii]
(8) Supervising him – [This law applies even when the supervisor] sees that [the shochet] slaughtered in the proper manner, for the possibility exists that he slaughtered with a blemished knife (Chu lin 3b). [This situation] does not resemble [one described in the Talmud16 regarding] Samaritans. [In that case, in the time] before [the Sages] decreed that they should be considered as non-Jews [entirely], if a Jew would supervise [their slaughter] – or even if he merely frequently entered and departed [while they were slaughtering] – it was permitted to partake [of the meat of the animals] they slaughtered without inspecting the knife they [used. The rationale is that] a Samaritan would fear that the Jew might inspect his knife, because he knew that a Jewwould not rely on him since he was separated from the congregation of Israel [due to] his faith, for he does not believe in the Oral Law.17 However, a Jew who rebels against the Torah will not be afraid, because he thinks that [no one] will inspect [his knife] because he considers himself as a Jew [in a full sense] (Tosafos, [Chulin 3b]).
(9) Afterwards – We are concerned that [the inspectors] will forget to check [the knife] afterwards and forbidden [meat] will be eaten. [Even if the Jew who rebels says that he checked his knife, it is of no consequence,] for an inspection performed by one who rebels is of no value, and knives in general are not assumed to have been checked.[iv]
(ד) לְתֵאָבוֹן. פֵּרוּשׁ לְמַלֹּאת תַּאֲוָתוֹיט כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹצֵא בָּשָׂר כָּשֵׁרכ אוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹצֵא בְּזוֹל כָּל כָּךְ כְּמוֹ נְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת (סַנְהֶדְרִין כ”זכא). לְאַפּוּקֵי מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בִּשְׁחִיטָה דִּלְקַמָּן סְעִיף ה’ בְּהַגָּ”ה:כב
(ה) לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ. וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא לֹא יִזָּהֵר לִשְׁחוֹט יָפֶה שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁהֶה וְיִדְרוֹס [מִשּׁוּם] דְּלֹא שָׁבִיק הֶתֵּרָא וְאָכַל אִסּוּרָאכג כֵּיוָן שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט יָפֶהכד שֶׁזּוֹ חֲזָקָה הִיא אֲפִלּוּ בְּפוֹשְׁעֵיכה יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ אִסּוּר וְהֶתֵּר לְפָנָיו שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַנִּיחַ אֶת הַהֶתֵּר וְאוֹכֵל אֶת הָאִסּוּר עַד שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁיָּצָא מֵחֲזָקָה זוֹ וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ כְּלָל בְּאִסּוּרִין (רַמְבַּ”םכו תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרכז). וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא יֹאכַל הוּא מִשְּׁחִיטָה זוֹ מִכָּל מָקוֹם חוֹשֵׁשׁ הוּא שֶׁלֹּא לְהַאֲכִיל אִסּוּרִים כְּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לֶאֱכוֹל שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲבוֹר עַל וְלִפְנֵי עִוֵּר וְגוֹ’כח כְּשֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲבוֹר (תּוֹסְפוֹתכט וְרֹא”שׁל). אֶלָּא דְּמִטְרַח לֹא טָרַחלא לִבְדּוֹק הַסַּכִּין וּלְתַקְּנָהּ אִם הִיא פְּגוּמָה (רֹא”שׁלב) אֲפִלּוּ אִם יֹאכַל מִמֶּנָּה מִשּׁוּם הָכִי בּוֹדֵק הַסַּכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ (גְּמָרָאלג) [ב]:
(ו) הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה. דִּבְמוּמָר לֹא אָמְרִינָן רֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן דְּכָל שֶׁאוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת לְתֵאָבוֹן וְאֵינוֹ טוֹרֵחַ יֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא אֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה וּלְתַאֲבָה הוּא שׁוֹחֵט (רַשְׁבָּ”אלד). וְצָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ תְּחִלָּה קֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה אִם הוּא מֻמְחֶה וְאֵין לִתֵּן לוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט עַל סְמַךְ שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ אַחַר שְׁחִיטָה דִּלְמָא מִשְׁתְּלֵי וְלֹא יִבְדְּקֶנּוּ וְקָאָכִיל אִסּוּרָאלה דַּאֲפִלּוּ בְּדִיעֲבַד אָסוּר שְׁחִיטָתוֹ אִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם הוּא מֻמְחֶה (שַׁ”ךְלו):
(ז) בַּסּוֹף. וְאָז הוּא נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר שֶׁבְּסַכִּין זוֹ שָׁחַט וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה שָׁחַט וּלְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה נִזְדַּמְּנָה לוֹ זוֹ. וְדַוְקָא בְּשָׁעָה אוֹ שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לוֹ פְּנַאי לָלֶכֶת לְדַרְכּוֹ וְלִמְצוֹא אַחֶרֶת בַּשּׁוּק אֲבָל כְּשֶׁהָיָה לוֹ פְּנַאי יוֹם אוֹ יוֹמַיִם אֵין סוֹמְכִין עָלָיו בְּזֶה כָּךְ הַדַּעַת נוֹתֶנֶת אֲבָל לְדִינָא יֵשׁ לְהַחֲמִיר אֲפִלּוּ בְּשָׁעָה אוֹ בִּ[שְׁתַּיִם]. אֲבָל אִם בָּאנוּ בִּגְמַר שְׁחִיטָה אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה לְפָנָיו ב’ אוֹ ג’ בְּהֵמוֹת שְׁחוּטוֹת וַעֲדַיִן הוּא שׁוֹחֵט וְהוֹלֵךְ (רְבִיעִית וַחֲמִישִׁית) כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּא מִתְעַסֵּק עֲדַיִן בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְסַכִּינוֹ בְּיָדוֹ אָמְרִינָן בְּוַדַּאי בְּזוֹ שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ שָׁחַט הַכֹּל (רַשְׁבָּ”אלז שַׁ”ךְלח) [ג]:
(ח) עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו. וְרוֹאֶה שֶׁשּׁוֹחֵט יָפֶה דְּדִלְמָא בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה קָשָׁחִיט (גְּמָרָאלט). וְלֹא דָמֵי לְכוּתִים קֹדֶם שֶׁגָּזְרוּ עֲלֵיהֶם לִהְיוֹת כְּנָכְרִים דִּבְיִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָסמ הָיָה מֻתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ בְּלִי שֶׁיִּבְדּוֹק לוֹ סַכִּין מִשּׁוּם דְּהַכּוּתִי מִרְתַּת מֵהַיִּשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁמָּא יִבְדּוֹק הַסַּכִּין אַחֲרָיו לְפִי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהַיִּשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יִסְמוֹךְ עָלָיו הוֹאִיל וְהוּא נִבְדָּל מֵעֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל בֶּאֱמוּנָתוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַאֲמִין בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל פֶּהמא אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר לֹא מִרְתַּת כִּי הוּא סָבוּר שֶׁלֹּא יִבְדְּקוּ אַחֲרָיומב לְפִי שֶׁמַּחֲזִיק עַצְמוֹ כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל (תּוֹסְפוֹתמג):
(ט) בַּסּוֹף. דְּחַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁכַּח לִבְדּוֹק בַּסּוֹף וְקָאָכִיל אִסּוּרָאמד שֶׁבְּדִיקַת הַמּוּמָר אֵינָהּ כְּלוּםמה וּסְתָם סַכִּינִים אֵינָם בְּדוּקִיםמו [ד]:
3

When a Jew who rebels against Jewish practice because of his appetite [18] slaughters [an animal and says] – even if he swears – that he slaughtered with an acceptable knife, his statement is not accepted. (10)

ג

מוּמָר לְתֵאָבוֹן שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אֲפִלּוּ נִשְׁבַּע שֶׁשָּׁחַט בְּסַכִּין יָפָה, אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. (י)

(10) His word is not accepted – [When a Jew rebels against a particular element of Jewish practice, even if he does so out of desire,] he is considered suspect to take a false oath regarding that particular matter. [The rationale is that, by transgressing, he already violated the prohibition of taking a false oath] for he is bound by the oath [to keep the commandments that our ancestors took] at Mount Sinai19 [and he does not heed that oath] (Beis Yosef, [Yoreh Deah 2,] in the name of Rashba).[vi]
(י) אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. דְּחָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה הוּא לְגַבֵּי אוֹתוֹ דָבָר שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא מֻשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי (בֵּית יוֹסֵףמז בְּשֵׁם הָרַשְׁבָּ”אמח) [ו]:
4

[The following law applies] when a Jew who rebels against Jewish practice because of his appetite slaughters in private: If he has in his possession [two knives,] a knife that is acceptable and one that is not acceptable, and he says that he slaughtered with the acceptable knife, (11) his word is accepted. [vii]

Even if meat is found in his possession, should there be an expert slaughterer in the city, his word is accepted if he says, “The expert slaughtered [the animal from which this meat was taken] for me.” (12)

ד

מוּמָר לְתֵאָבוֹן שֶׁשָּׁחַט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ, וְיֵשׁ עִמּוֹ סַכִּין יָפָה וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ יָפָה, וְאוֹמֵר שֶׁבְּיָפָה שָׁחַט, (יא) נֶאֱמָן. [ז] וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם נִמְצָא בָּשָׂר בְּיָדוֹ, אִם יֵשׁ מֻמְחִין בָּעִיר, נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר: מֻמְחֶה שָׁחַט לִי. (יב)

(11) He slaughtered with the acceptable knife – The intent is that he says, “I slaughtered with this [knife]” and we see that [the knife] is acceptable (Rashba, [Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 1, shaar 1]).
(12) Slaughtered [the animal…] for me – [The rationale is that we assume the person] will not forgo the permitted option of bringing [the animal] to the expert slaughterer in his city and instead, partake of forbidden [meat]. We suspect him only of being unwilling to make an effort [to follow Jewish Law] when the undertaking is of a significant nature, [for example,] checking a slaughtering-knife.20 However, something that requires minimal effort, e.g., walking [the animal to the shochet,] is not considered an effort significant enough to motivate the person to eat forbidden food [to avoid] it. This is [reflected in] the ruling of the Talmud21 that chametz belonging to transgressors is permitted after Pesach. True, these individuals do not [necessarily] obliterate their chametz before Pesach and chametz that belonged to a Jew and remained in his possession over Pesach is forbidden. Nevertheless, [it is assumed] that these individuals exchanged their chametz with chametz belonging to a non-Jew, [and chametz owned by a non-Jew over Pesach] is permitted after Pesach. [It is assumed that even such individuals] will not forgo permitted [food] and eat something forbidden because of the [minimal] effort it takes to go to the non-Jews [and exchange their chametz].22
Nevertheless, there is a distinction [between that instance and the case at hand.] There are many non-Jews available with whom one may exchange [chametz. By contrast,] only one, two, or three expert slaughterers may be found in a city, and there is room to suspect that [a transgressor] will not trouble himself extensively to search until he finds them if, [initially, when] he goes to their homes, he does not find them there. For that reason, it is necessary [to take a further measure and] require [the transgressor] to say, “The expert slaughtered [the animal] for me.” This further measure [supports the argument that the meat is permitted,] for [the transgressor] will be afraid to lie lest the expert be asked [to corroborate his statement.]
Although it was stated above23 that a Jew who rebels against Torah Law will not be afraid [to lie] because he thinks that his statement will not be checked, this instance is different. Since [the person] is being asked where he obtained this meat and he must say that an expert slaughtered [the animal] for him, he sees that his statements are being verified and that his [word alone] is not accepted regarding ritual slaughter. [Hence, he will be afraid to lie in this instance.]
Turei Zahav [(Yoreh Deah 2:7)] and Sifsei Kohen [(Yoreh Deah 2:15)] state that [the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch] applies only when [the person] specifically identifies the expert slaughterer [by name], as stated below in sec. 119,24 (regarding a person who sent an agent to purchase cheese. [In that source, it is stated that] if an agent who is suspected of [using] cheese [from a non-Jew] states, “I purchased it from so-and-so, the reputable person,” his word is accepted. [However, the agent must specify the name of the reputable person.]
[In this section,] the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not mention [the need to specify] the identity of the expert slaughterer for the following reason – which is indeed valid: [Regarding cheese,] if the identity of the reputable person was not specified, [the principal would remain in doubt as to whether the cheese was acceptable because the agent] could always justify himself saying, “Although you do not consider the person I bought [the cheese] from [to be] reputable, I do,” as Rashi states (Bechoros 36b).
That [rationale] does not apply [regarding ritual slaughter] because there is no suspicion that someone who was not an expert slaughtered for him, since most of the people who slaughter are experts. [True, there are grounds for suspicion that] perhaps [the transgressor] slaughtered [the animal] himself. [However, that suspicion is obviated by the fact that] he said that a [certified] expert slaughtered it for him. He would be afraid [to lie when making such a statement] because it is possible that the experts would be asked because [generally] there are only a few such experts in the city. Even if there are many [certified expert slaughterers, the presumption that he would be afraid to lie would be rejected] only according to the approach of Rabbeinu Asher [Bechoros 5:10,] who maintains that he could justify himself, but not according to the approach of Rambam [Hilchos Bechoros 2:19] or the Shulchan Aruch, as stated below in sec. 314:8.25See [the comments of] Sifsei Kohen there [314:8]).26
[Nevertheless, simply employing] the rationale that [the transgressor] would be afraid [to be caught in a lie] is also not sufficient to be relied upon, were it not for [the additional rationale] that [even a transgressor] would not forgo kosher meat and eat non-kosher meat [despite the fact that eating kosher meat would mean] troubling himself to take [the animal to the shochet. The rationale that a person] is afraid to lie lest others be asked and his statements investigated and discrepancies [be discovered] is accepted only when [the concerns being clarified] involve Rabbinic Law and not Scriptural Law, as will be stated below in sec. 119,27 unless there is also another rationale that supports a lenient ruling, as will be stated in sec. 86 below.28 [The rationale is that] in matters involving Scriptural Law, we take into consideration a further concern – that perhaps [the person] will not have in mind the possibility that his [statements] will be investigated because he takes it for granted that his word will be believed. This is not true in an instance when a Jew regularly enters and departs [the premises], as will be explained below in subsection 9,29 for in that situation, the person will be afraid lest he be seen [performing an action that] renders his slaughter invalid, and he will be caught and considered as a thief.
When there are established Jewish shochtim in a city, any meat found in the possession of such a transgressor is permitted even if he does not say [that he purchased it from an expert slaughterer]. The rationale is that it is assumed he bought the meat from a Jewish shochet, [since we operate under the assumption that] he will not forgo [eating] permitted meat merely because of the difficulty of taking [the animal to a certified shochet] since the [identity of the] shochtim is established and there is no concern that perhaps he could not find [the certified shochtim] and he would not trouble himself to search for them (Rashba, [Vol. 1,] responsum 430, Mishmeres HaBayis [Bayis 1, Shaar 1, p. 5b]; Tevuos Shor, sec. 2, note 14).
[The above leniency applies only] when it is known that kosher [meat] was selling as cheaply that day as non-kosher [meat]. If that was not the case, even if [such a person] states that he purchased kosher [meat], his word is not accepted (Rabbeinu Yerucham, [nasiv 15, os 32]; Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 2:14]). Moreover, it has to occur frequently in the city that kosher [meat] is as inexpensive as non-kosher [meat. Otherwise,] if that is not common, even though they were [the same price] on that day, it is possible that [the transgressor] did not know that and relied on the fact that most of the time, [kosher meat] is more expensive. [Therefore,] he followed his usual practice and went to [a seller of] non-kosher [meat] – [either] a butcher store owned by non-Jews or a Jewishly-owned non-kosher butcher store.30 [The transgressor’s] word is not accepted even if he says, “I purchased [the meat] from the Jewish slaughterer, so-and-so.” [The rationale is that] in matters involving Scriptural Law we do not rely on the assumption [that a person] will be afraid [to lie unless it is coupled with other factors which support leniency]31 (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 2, note 15]).32
(יא) שֶׁבְּיָפָה שָׁחַט. פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁאוֹמֵר בָּזוֹ שָׁחַטְתִּי וְאָנוּ רוֹאִין שֶׁהִיא יָפָה (רַשְׁבָּ”אמט):
(יב) שָׁחַט לִי. דְּלֹא שָׁבִיק הֶתֵּרָא לְהוֹלִיךְ לְמֻמְחֶה שֶׁבָּעִיר וְאָכַל אִסּוּרָא. וְלֹא אָמְרִינָן דְּמִטְרַח לֹא טָרַח אֶלָּא בִּבְדִיקַת סַכִּין שֶׁהִיא טִרְחָא רַבָּהנ אֲבָל טִרְחָא זוּטָא כְּטֹרַח הַהֲלִיכָה לֹא מִקְרֵי טֹרַח לוֹ בְּזֶה לְמֵיכַל אִסּוּרָא בִּשְׁבִיל זֶה כִּדְאָמְרִינָן בִּגְמָרָאנא גַּבֵּי חֲמֵצָן שֶׁל עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵרָה לְאַחַר הַפֶּסַח מֻתָּר שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן מְבַעֲרִין חֲמֵצָן לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסֶח וְחָמֵץ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁעָבַר עָלָיו הַפֶּסַח אָסוּרנב מִכָּל מָקוֹם מַחֲלִיפִין הֵם חֲמֵצָן בְּחָמֵץ שֶׁל נָכְרִים שֶׁמֻּתָּר לְאַחַר הַפֶּסַחנג וְלֹא שָׁבִיק הֶתֵּרָא וְאָכַל אִסּוּרָא בִּשְׁבִיל טֹרַח הַהֲלִיכָה אֶל הַנָּכְרִים. אֶלָּא שֶׁיֵּשׁ הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין נָכְרִים שֶׁמְּצוּיִים הַרְבֵּה לְהַחֲלִיף עִמָּהֶם וּבֵין מֻמְחִין לִשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁבָּעִיר שֶׁאֵינָן אֶלָּא אֶחָד אוֹ ב’ וְג’ וְיֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא לֹא יִטְרַח הַרְבֵּה לַחֲזוֹר אַחֲרֵיהֶם עַד שֶׁיִּמְצָאֵם אִם יֵלֵךְ אֶצְלָם וְלֹא יִמְצָאֵם בְּבֵיתָם מִשּׁוּם הָכִי בָּעֵי הָכָא שֶׁיֹּאמַר מֻמְחֶה שָׁחַט לִי דְּאִיכָּא עוֹד חֲדָא לְמַעַלְיוּתָא דְּמִרְתַּת לְשַׁקֵּר שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁאֲלוּ אֶת הַמֻּמְחֶה.נד
וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמְרִינָן לְעֵילנה דְּמוּמָר לֹא מִרְתַּת דְּסָבוּר שֶׁלֹּא יִבְדְּקוּ אַחֲרָיו. שַׁאֲנֵי הָכָא שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִים אוֹתוֹ מֵאַיִן לוֹ בָּשָׂר זֶה וְהוּא צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר מֻמְחֶה שָׁחַט לִי אִם כֵּן רוֹאֶה הוּא שֶׁבּוֹדְקִין אַחֲרָיו וְאֵין מַאֲמִינִים לוֹ עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה. וְכָתַב הַטַּ”זנו וְהַשַּׁ”ךְנז דְּהַיְנוּ דַוְקָא כְּשֶׁאוֹמֵר מֻמְחֶה פְּלוֹנִי שָׁחַט לִי כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן קי”טנח (גַּבֵּי הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ לִקְנוֹת גְּבִינָה וְאָמַר הַשָּׁלִיחַ לָקַחְתִּי מִמִּי שֶׁהוּא מֻמְחֶה וְנֶאֱמָן עַל הַגְּבִינוֹת דְּבָעִינָן שֶׁיֹּאמַר לָקַחְתִּי מִמֻּמְחֶה פְּלוֹנִי אִם הַשָּׁלִיחַ הוּא חָשׁוּד עַל הַגְּבִינוֹת. וְהַטּוּר וְשֻׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ שֶׁלֹּא הִזְכִּירוּ כַּאן מֻמְחֶה פְּלוֹנִי טַעְמָם וְנִמּוּקָם עִמָּם דְּהָכָא לֹא דָמֵי דְּהָתָם דְּאִי לֹא אָמַר פְּלוֹנִי אֶלָּא מֻמְחֶה סְתָם מָצִי לְאִשְׁתַּמּוּטֵי וְלוֹמַר אִי לְדִידָךְ לֹא מְהֵימַן מִי שֶׁקָּנִיתִי מִמֶּנּוּ לְדִידִי מְהֵימָן כִּדְפֵרֵשׁ רַשִׁ”י בִּבְכוֹרוֹת (דַּף ל”ו ע”בנט) מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן הָכָא דְּלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁשָּׁחַט לוֹ מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה דְּהָא רֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן אֶלָּא שֶׁמָּא שָׁחַט בְּעַצְמוֹס וְכֵיוָן שֶׁאָמַר מֻמְחֶה שָׁחַט לִי מִרְתַּת שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁאֲלוּ אֶת [הַ]מֻּמְחִין שֶׁהֵם יְחִידִים בָּעִיר. וְאַף אִם הֵם רַבִּים לֹא מָצִי לְאִשְׁתַּמּוּטֵי אֶלָּא לְפִי דַעַת הָרֹא”שׁסא וְלִא לְפִי דַעַת הָרַמְבַּ”םסב וְשֻׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ דִּלְקַמָּן סִימָן שׁי”ד סְעִיף ח’. עַיֵּן שָׁם בְּשַׁ”ךְסג).
וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם אַהַאי טַעְמָא דְּמִרְתַּת לְחוֹד לֹא הָוֵי סָמְכִינָן אִי לֹא מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא שָׁבִיק הֶתֵּרָא וְאָכַל אִסּוּרָא בִּשְׁבִיל טֹרַח הַהֲלִיכָה. דְּלֹא סָמְכִינָן אַהַאי טַעְמָא דְּמִרְתַּת לְשַׁקֵּר פֶּן יִשְׁאֲלוּ וְיִדְרְשׁוּ אַחֲרָיו מֵאֲחֵרִים וְיַכְחִישׁוּהוּ אֶלָּא בִּדְרַבָּנָן וְלֹא בִּדְאוֹרַיְתָא כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן קי”טסד אֶלָּא בִּדְאִיכָּא נַמִי טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא לְהָקֵל כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן פ”ו.סה מִשּׁוּם דְּבִדְאוֹרַיְתָא חַיְשִׁינָן חֲשָׁשָׁא יְתֵרָה דִּלְמָא לֹא אַסִּיק אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ שֶׁיִּשְׁאֲלוּ וְיִדְרְשׁוּ אַחֲרָיו כִּי נִדְמֶה לוֹ שֶׁיַּאֲמִינוּ לוֹ מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס דִּלְקַמָּן סְעִיף ט’סו דְּמִרְתַּת פֶּן יִרְאוּהוּ מְקַלְקֵל שְׁחִיטָתוֹ וְיִהְיֶה נִתְפָּס כְּגַנָּב.
וְעִיר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּה טַבָּחֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל קְבוּעִים בָּשָׂר הַנִּמְצָא בְּיַד מוּמָר זֶה מֻתָּר אֲפִלּוּ בְּלֹא אֲמִירָתוֹ שֶׁחֶזְקָתוֹ שֶׁלָּקַח מִטַּבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא שָׁבִיק הֶתֵּרָא בִּשְׁבִיל טֹרַח הַהֲלִיכָה לְבַדָּהּ מֵאַחַר שֶׁהַטַּבָּחִים קְבוּעִים וְאֵין לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא לֹא מְצָאָם וְלֹא טָרַח לַחֲזוֹר אַחֲרֵיהֶם (רַשְׁבָּ”אסז סִימָן ת”ל. מִשְׁמֶרֶת הַבַּיִת.סח תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרסט).
וְהוּא שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁהָיוּ הַכְּשֵׁרוֹת בְּאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בְּזוֹל כְּמוֹ הַטְּרֵפוֹת שֶׁאִם לֹא כֵן אַף בַּאֲמִירָתוֹ אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר שֶׁלָּקַח מֵהַכְּשֵׁרוֹת (רַבֵּנוּ יְרוּחָםע שַׁ”ךְעא). וְגַם צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת הַדָּבָר מָצוּי בָּעִיר לִהְיוֹת הַכְּשֵׁרוֹת בְּזוֹל כְּמוֹ הַטְּרֵפוֹת שֶׁאִם אֵין זֶה דָּבָר מָצוּי אַף שֶׁהָיָה בּוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ יוֹם שֶׁמָּא לֹא יָדַע הוּא וְסָמַךְ אַרֹב פְּעָמִים שֶׁהֵן בְּיֹקֶר וְהָלַךְ כְּפַעַם בְּפַעַם אֶל הַטְּרֵפוֹת לִקְנוֹת מִמְּקוֹלִין שֶׁל נָכְרִים אוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם מְקוֹלִין מְיֻחָדוֹת לִטְרֵפוֹתעב וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן אֲפִלּוּ בַּאֲמִירָתוֹ וַאֲפִלּוּ אוֹמֵר מִטַּבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל פְּלוֹנִי לָקַחְתִּי דְּבִדְאוֹרַיְתָא לֹא סָמְכִינָן אַהַאי טַעְמָא דְּמִרְתַּת (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרעג):
5

A person who rebels [against Jewish observance] with the intent of angering [his Creator], [viii] even [if he rebels only] with regard to one practice, or who rebels by worshipping false deities [ix] or desecrating the Shabbos in public, [x] or he rebels against the entire Torah [xi] – even [if it is] with the exception of these two [commandments] – is governed by the same laws as a non-Jew (Rabbeinu Yerucham). Note: A person who shows no concern for ritual slaughter and eats animals that were not ritually slaughtered without desire even though he does not do so with the intent of angering [his Creator] is governed by the same laws as one who rebels with the intent of angering [his Creator]; [xii] (this is the conclusion of Beis Yosef based on the ruling of Rabbeinu Asher).

ה

מוּמָר לְהַכְעִיס, [ח] אֲפִלּוּ לְדָבָר אֶחָד, אוֹ שֶׁהוּא מוּמָר לַעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים [ט] אוֹ לְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא, [י] אוֹ שֶׁהוּא מוּמָר לְכָל הַתּוֹרָה [יא] אֲפִלּוּ חוּץ מִשְׁתַּיִם אֵלּוּ, דִּינוֹ כְּנָכְרִי (רַבֵּנוּ יְרוּחָם). הַגָּה: וּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְאוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת בְּלֹא תֵּאָבוֹן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה לְהַכְעִיס, דִּינוֹ כְּמוּמָר לְהַכְעִיס [יב] (כָּךְ הֶעֱלָה הַבֵּית יוֹסֵף מִדִּבְרֵי הָרא"ש).

6

[When a Jew] rebels [and his rebellion involves the violation of] one of the other prohibitions, it is not necessary to examine the knife [with which he slaughters]. According to Rambam, it is necessary [to examine the knife]. (13) [This ruling applies] specifically regarding a person who rebels regarding a transgression. (14) However, [when] one is disqualified as a witness because he transgressed a Scriptural Commandment, even Rambam [would agree] that it is not necessary to examine his [slaughtering] knife.

Note: Nevertheless, if he is disqualified as a witness because he ate [the meat of] animals that were not ritually slaughtered, even though he is not considered as one who rebels regarding this [mitzvah], since he is suspected [of eating] meat [from animals] that were not ritually slaughtered, [with regard to ritual slaughter] he is governed by the laws that apply to one who rebels (15) regarding this [mitzvah] ([this follows] the reasoning of Beis Yosef regarding [the opinion of] Rambam).

ו

מוּמָר לְאַחַת מִשְּׁאָר עֲבֵרוֹת, אֵין צָרִיךְ לִבְדֹּק לוֹ סַכִּין, וּלְהָרַמְבַּ"ם צָרִיךְ. (יג) וְדַוְקָא בְּמוּמָר לַעֲבֵרָה, (יד) אֲבָל מִי שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת בַּעֲבֵרָה מֵעֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁל תּוֹרָה, אֵין צָרִיךְ לִבְדֹּק לוֹ סַכִּין אֲפִלּוּ לְהָרַמְבַּ"ם. הַגָּה: מִיהוּ אִם הוּא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת מִשּׁוּם שֶׁאָכַל נְבֵלוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוּמָר לְכָךְ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּא חָשׁוּד לֶאֱכֹל נְבֵלוֹת, דִּינוֹ כְּמוּמָר לְכָךְ (טו) (סְבָרַת בֵּית יוֹסֵף לְהָרַמְבַּ"ם).

(13) Is necessary [to examine the knife] – [This is an] absolutely binding requirement. If [such a person slaughtered an animal] without having his slaughtering knife checked either beforehand or afterwards, [animals] that he slaughters are forbidden (Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah [2:18]). “[The rationale is that] since we see that he violates one of the Torah’s prohibitions for the sake of his desire, we are concerned that [possibly] he has cast off the yoke [of the commandments] to the extent33 that he will not observe any of the mitzvos as required by law” (Rabbeinu Asher, [Chulin 1:7]).
It appears from [Rabbeinu Asher’s] words that this is the accepted practice (Bayis Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 2]; Maharshal, [Yam shel Shlomoh, Chulin 1:6] also rules in this manner; this is also the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch [of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 2:]7, and that of Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 2:18], and Turei Zahav [Yoreh Deah 2:9]).[xiii]
(14) Transgression – [The implication is that he] habitually and frequently transgresses. However, [greater leniency applies regarding] one who is disqualified as a witness, i.e., one who transgressed a prohibition only once. Although he is disqualified as a witness regarding financial matters, his word is accepted regarding prohibitions [provided] he is not suspect [of violating them regularly], i.e., he violated [the prohibition] only once.
[Greater stringency is shown regarding] testimony involving financial matters. The difference [stems from the admonition,]34 “Do not join hands with a wicked person to be a malicious witness,” and anyone who violates a transgression even once is considered wicked.35 However, with regard to prohibitions, a wicked person is disqualified only with regard to a matter that he is suspected of [violating regularly] (Rambam, Hilchos Eidus 11[:7]; Rashba, ([Vol. 1,] responsum 430).
(15) He is governed by the laws that apply to one who rebels – All authorities [accept this ruling] (Tevuos Shor [sec. 2, note 6]). It is necessary to examine [the transgressor’s slaughtering] knife even if [the transgressor] will not eat [from the animal] he slaughters. [The rationale is that a transgressor] will not be more concerned [about the proper observance] of others than [he is regarding] his own [observance. Therefore,] we are concerned that he will not examine the knife carefully.
The principle that [the statement of] a person who is suspect [of transgressing] regarding the matter [about which he is testifying] is accepted with regard to other people, stated below in sec. 119,36 applies only regarding testimony that he delivers. However, we do not say that he will trouble himself for the sake of others more than he would for his own sake. On the contrary, there are people who are suspect of feeding forbidden food to others, even though they will not eat it themselves, as stated in subsection 2 there.37 (See K’nesses HaGedolah. See also Tevuos Shor, [loc. cit.]. This [ruling] does not follow the ruling of Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 2:20]).
(יג) צָרִיךְ. אֲפִלּוּ לְעִכּוּב דְּהֵיכָא שֶׁלֹּא בָדְקוּ לוֹ הַסַּכִּין לֹא בַּתְּחִלָּה וְלֹא בַּסּוֹף שְׁחִיטָתוֹ אֲסוּרָה (שַׁ”ךְעד) דְּכֵיוָן דַּחֲזִינָן שֶׁלְּתַאֲוָתוֹ הוּא עוֹבֵר עַל אַחַת מִן הָעֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה חַיְשִׁינָן דְּפָקַר (טְפֵי)עה שֶׁלֹּא לְקַיֵּם שׁוּם מִצְוָה כְּהִלְכָתָהּ עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹן הָרֹא”שׁ.עו וְנִרְאֶה מִדְּבָרָיו דְּהָכִי נָקְטִינָן (בַּ”ח.עז וְכֵן פֵּרֵשׁ רְשַׁ”ל.עח וְכֵן דַּעַת הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ לְקַמָּן סְעִיף ז’עט וְהַשַּׁ”ךְפ וְהַטַּ”זפא שָׁם) [יג]:
(יד) לַעֲבֵרָה. הַיְנוּ שֶׁהוּא מוּעָד וְרָגִיל לַעֲבוֹר.פב אֲבָל מִי שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת הַיְנוּ שֶׁלֹּא עָבַר אֶלָּא פַּעַם אַחַת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּפְסַל לְעֵדוּת מָמוֹן נֶאֱמָן הוּא בְּאִסּוּרִין בְּדָבָר שֶׁלֹּא נֶחְשַׁד עָלָיו דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁלֹּא עָבַר עָלָיו אֶלָּא פַּעַם אַחַת. דְּשַׁאֲנִי עֵדוּת מָמוֹן דִּכְתִיבפג אַל תָּשֶׁת יָדְךָ עִם רָשָׁע לִהְיוֹת עֵד חָמָס וְכָל מִי שֶׁעָבַר עֲבֵרָה אֲפִלּוּ פַּעַם אַחַת נִקְרָא רָשָׁעפד אֲבָל בְּאִסּוּרִין אֵין הָרָשָׁע פָּסוּל אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר שֶׁנֶּחְשַׁד עָלָיו (רַמְבַּ”ם פֶּרֶק י”א מֵהִלְכוֹת עֵדוּת.פה רַשְׁבָּ”אפו סִימָן ת”ל):
(טו) דִּינוֹ כְּמוּמָר. לְכוּלֵי עָלְמָא (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרפז). וְצָרִיךְ לִבְדּוֹק לוֹ סַכִּין אֲפִלּוּ לֹא יֹאכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָה ז[וֹ] לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ עַל אֲחֵרִים יוֹתֵר מִמֶּנּוּ וְחַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁלֹּא יִבְדּוֹק הַסַּכִּין יָפֶה.פח וְלֹא אָמְרוּ הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר נֶאֱמָן בְּשֶׁל אֲחֵרִים כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן קי”טפט אֶלָּא לְהָעִידצ אֲבָל לֹא דְּאָמְרִינָן שֶׁיִּטְרַח לַאֲחֵרִים יוֹתֵר מִלְּעַצְמוֹ. דְּאַדְּרַבָּה יֵשׁ חֲשׁוּדִים לְהַאֲכִיל אִסּוּר לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לֶאֱכוֹל בְּעַצְמָן כְּדִלְקַמָּן שָׁם סְעִיף ב’צא (עַיֵּן כְּנֶסֶת הַגְּדוֹלָהצב וּתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרצג דְּלֹא כְּשַׁ”ךְצד):
7

One who rebels against [the mitzvah of] circumcision is governed by the laws applying to one who rebels regarding one transgression. (16) If the only [reason] he is uncircumcised is because his brothers died as a result of circumcision, (17) he is considered like other observant Jews.

ז

מוּמָר לַעֲרֵלוּת, דִּינוֹ כְּמוּמָר לַעֲבֵרָה אַחַת. (טז) וְאִם אֵינוֹ עָרֵל אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמֵּתוּ אֶחָיו מֵחֲמַת מִילָה, (יז) הֲרֵי הוּא כִּשְׁאָר יִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר.

(16) One – He is not considered as one who rebels against the entire Torah. [This applies] even though [the transgression is very severe]; one who abrogates the covenant of our patriarch Avraham does not have a share in the World to Come.38 (Note Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 119[:12].)
(17) Because of circumcision – Tosafos39 interprets this as applying [in an instance when the person’s brothers] were circumcised when they were [either] past maturity or [even] on the eighth day [of their lives], but it was noticeable that [their bodies] had absorbed their blood. If that is not the case, we say that perhaps [their bodies] had not absorbed their blood and therefore, they [were susceptible to bleed to] death40 (Turei Zahav [Yoreh Deah 2:10]). [Since the person should have been circumcised, if he is not,] he is considered to have rebelled [against the mitzvah of] circumcision and it is necessary to examine his [slaughtering] knife according to Rambam.41 [The rationale is that] since every day, [this person] violates a prohibition punishable by kareis, he is considered as one who rebels and is accustomed [to rebelling].
The same law applies to [a father] who does not circumcise his son so as not to cause him pain – he is considered as a rebel regarding one matter ([Simlah Chadashah, 2:23, explaining his intent in] Tevuos Shor).
(טז) אַחַת. וְלֹא כְּמוּמָר לְכָל הַתּוֹרָה כֻלָּהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַמֵּפִיר בְּרִיתוֹ שֶׁל אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּאצה (עַיֵּן פְּרִי חָדָשׁ סִימָן קי”טצו):
(יז) מֵחֲמַת מִילָה. פֵּרְשׁוּ הַתּוֹסְפוֹתצז שֶׁנִּמּוֹלוּ כְּשֶׁהֵם גְּדוֹלִים אוֹ בְּיוֹם ח’ וְרָאוּ שֶׁנִּבְלַע בָּהֶן דָּמָן דְּאִם לֹא כֵן אָמְרִינָן שֶׁמָּא עֲדַיִן לֹא נִבְלַע בָּהֶן דָּמָן וּלְכָךְ מֵתוּ (טַ”זצח) וְהָוֵי לֵיהּ מוּמָר לַעֲרֵלוּת וְצָרִיךְ לִבְדּוֹק לוֹ סַכִּין לְהָרַמְבַּ”ם.צט דְּכֵיוָן שֶׁבְּכָל יוֹם עוֹבֵר בְּאִסּוּר כָּרֵתק הָוֵי לֵיהּ כְּמוּמָר וְרָגִיל בְּכָךְ.קא וְהוּא הַדִּין אִם אֵינוֹ מָל אֶת בְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לְצַעֲרוֹ הָוֵי לֵיהּ מוּמָר לְדָבָר אֶחָד (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹרקב):
8

In the present age, a kusi1 is considered as one who worships false deities.

ח

כּוּתִי, [יד] הָאִידְנָא דִּינוֹ כְּנָכְרִי.

9

Ritual slaughter performed by Sadducees and Baitusees [xv] (i.e., those who follow the teachings of Tzadok and Baitus, the disciples of Antigonus of Socho, who left [Jewish practice and adopted] an undesirable way of life; they do not believe in the Oral Law) is not acceptable. [The only exception is if] they slaughtered while others supervised them and examined their [slaughtering] knife. (18)

Note: One who hands over [Jews or Jewish property to non-Jews] is governed by the same laws as an apostate, (19) and ritual slaughter that he performs is unacceptable (Hagahos Alfasi). There are [authorities who rule that] it is acceptable (20) (Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah 119, citing Rashba). See sec. 119, below.

ט

צְדוֹקִי וּבַיְתּוּסִי [טו] (הֵם הַנִּמְשָׁכִים אַחַר צָדוֹק וּבַיְתּוּס, מִתַּלְמִידֵי אַנְטִיגְנוֹס אִישׁ סוֹכוֹ שֶׁיָּצְאוּ לְתַרְבּוּת רָעָה, וְאֵינָם מַאֲמִינִים בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל פֶּה), שְׁחִיטָתָן אֲסוּרָה, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן שָׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם וְגַם בָּדְקוּ לָהֶם סַכִּין. (יח) הַגָּה: מָסוּר דִּינוֹ כְּמוּמָר, (יט) וּשְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה (הַגָּהוֹת אַלְפָסִי). וְיֵשׁ מַכְשִׁירִין (כ) (בֵּית יוֹסֵף סִימָן קי"ט בְּשֵׁם רַשְׁבָּ"א). וְעַיֵּן לְקַמַּן סִימָן קי"ט.

(18) [Slaughtering] knife – [Because of the supervision and the examination of the knife, the meat of the animal] may be permitted under all circumstances, even if the Sadducee is not an expert [slaughterer]. This is also the intent of [Rav Yosef Caro in his] Shulchan Aruch in requiring the supervisor [to oversee the slaughter] and not merely frequently enter and depart [while the Sadducee is slaughtering], as stated earlier in the name of Beis Yosef. [A Sadducee who is] an expert slaughterer, however, need not have his knife examined, neither at the beginning, nor at the end.
(19) an apostate 43
(20) There are authorities who rule it is acceptable. 43
(יח) סַכִּין. הַיְנוּ כְּדֵי לְהַתִּיר בְּכָל עִנְיָן אִף אַם הַצְּדוֹקִי אֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה. שֶׁכֵּן הוּא גַם כֵּן כַּוָּנַת הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ בְּמַה שֶּׁהִצְרִיךְ עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו וְלֹא סַגֵּי בְּיוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב לְעֵילקג בְּשֵׁם הַבֵּית יוֹסֵף.קד אֲבָל בְּמֻמְחֶה לֹא בָעֵי בְּדִיקַת סַכִּין לֹא בַּתְּחִלָּה וְלֹא בַּסּוֹף:קה
(יט) כְּמוּמָר. קו
(כ) וְיֵשׁ מַכְשִׁירִין.
10

If a person whose [slaughter] is unacceptable began the slaughter [of an animal] and one whose [slaughter] is acceptable completed [the slaughter], or one who is acceptable began [the slaughter] and one who is unacceptable completed [it, the slaughter] is unacceptable.

When does the above apply? When the unacceptable person began [by performing an act of slaughter that would cause the animal to be considered] to have died without ritual slaughter, e.g., [he slit] the gullet or the majority of the windpipe. However, if the unacceptable person began by slitting up to half the windpipe and an acceptable person completed [the slaughter, it is] acceptable.

י

הִתְחִיל פָּסוּל לִשְׁחֹט וְגָמַר הַכָּשֵׁר, אוֹ שֶׁהִתְחִיל הַכָּשֵׁר וְגָמַר הַפָּסוּל, פְּסוּלָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, שֶׁהִתְחִיל הַפָּסוּל בְּדָבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ נְבֵלָה, כְּגוֹן בַּוֵּשֶׁט אוֹ בְּרֹב הַקָּנֶה, אֲבָל אִם הִתְחִיל הַפָּסוּל בַּחֲצִי קָנֶה וְגָמַר הַכָּשֵׁר, כְּשֵׁרָה.

11

If a Jew [who is acceptable as a shochet] and one who is not acceptable were both holding the [slaughtering] knife and slaughtering, [the slaughter] is unacceptable. Needless to say, [this applies when they slaughter an animal together,] each one holding a [separate] knife.

(Slaughter performed by a monkey is unacceptable (Or Zerua; this [ruling is found] in the Tosefta, at the beginning of Chulin).

יא

הָיוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל וּפָסוּל אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, פְּסוּלָה. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם כָּל אֶחָד סַכִּינוֹ בְּיָדוֹ. (שְׁחִיטַת קוֹף פְּסוּלָה) (אוֹר זָרוּעַ וְהוּא בְּתוֹסֶפְתָּא רֵישׁ חֻלִּין).