1
(1) Of not slaughtering –
[The rationale for this practice is that the Rabbis] did not wish to accept [a woman’s] word regarding ritual slaughter because “their minds are fickle.”1 Beis Yosef writes [that although we have not seen women slaughtering, the fact that] we have not seen them slaughter is not proof [that their slaughter is not acceptable. However,] Sifsei Kohen [(Yoreh Deah 1:1)] writes regarding a custom, the fact that [such a practice] has not been [commonly] seen is [accepted as sufficient] proof that it is not practiced, as stated by Rama (Choshen Mishpat 37[:22]).2
In that source, Sifsei Kohen explains [this ruling of Rama, saying that] since [ritual slaughter] is a common practice, if, [indeed],] it were permitted [for women to slaughter], it would be impossible that we never once saw that the practice was to permit [a woman to slaughter]. The laws of ritual slaughter are applicable every day, and it is a common practice [to slaughter animals. Even so] we never saw a woman slaughtering or studying the laws of ritual slaughter so that she could slaughter. Definitely, given such a situation, the fact that [women] were not seen [performing ritual slaughter] serves as proof [that women should not slaughter].
(2) Servants –
The Tur writes [that this refers to] freed servants.3 Sifsei Kohen [(Yoreh Deah 1:2)] explains [that the Tur used the term “freed servants” because he writes, “[It is permitted to allow servants and all other individuals to slaughter as an initial option.” [This cannot apply to ordinary servants because] servants whose characters are not known are presumed to be thieves [and are therefore not qualified to slaughter] (note Sifsei Kohen HaAruch, [sec. 1]). (The knives [used by freed servants for slaughter] must be inspected, as stated below sec. 2:6.)
[An additional proof:] Among [ordinary servants] there are also some who are suspected of [transgressing the prohibition against] eating limbs from live animals. Since the prohibition against eating [limbs] from a live animal applies to [non-Jewish servants], how then can [an animal] be removed from the presumption that it is forbidden because [it was slaughtered by] servants who are suspected of violating this prohibition?
However, when we are familiar with a [particular[ servant and know him to be observant, but do not know whether he knows the laws of ritual slaughter, we follow the principle that, “most of those who perform ritual slaughter are experts.”4 As Rashba states [(Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 1, shaar 1)], womenand servants are included in the general rule that, “most of those who perform ritual slaughter are experts.”
[In his Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Caro mentions “servants”] without stating that [the law applies only to] freed [servants] because he follows his established position that even regarding people at large, it is necessary that the trustworthy character of a shochet be established. The prevailing assumption that all Jews are observant is not sufficient. Instead, [Rav Yosef Caro maintains that] it must be known and recognized that a ritual slaughterer is an observant and trustworthy person, as he writes in his Beis Yosef [(Yoreh Deah 1)],5 citing Rambam [(Hilchos Maachalos Assuros 8:7)] and Mordechai [(Chulin, sec. 614)], who quotes Rabbeinu Chananel. Therefore, it was not necessary for him to mention that requirement here, for it is obvious that servants are not given greater status than other people.
For this reason, every Rabbinic authority who certifies6 a shochet must research and investigate whether [the candidate] is [Torah-]observant, that his conduct is respectable, and that the fear of G‑d is upon him.7 Also, [a shochet] must know how to study and understand the Talmud and Rashi’s commentary on his own, for [only] then will he have the thoughtfulness to be meticulous [in his observance of the mitzvos,] as our Sages declared,8 “An unlearned person is not G‑d-fearing.” There is an opinion in the Talmud (Sotah 22a) that [even if] one has studied the Written Law and the Oral Law, but did not train under Torah scholars, i.e., learning [the motivating rationales for Torah rulings,9] he is considered unlearned. This is the opinion of Rav Amram Gaon, as quoted by Beis Yosef [(Yoreh Deah 1)].10
At present, when there are many who grant certification [to a shochet] without researching and investigating [his knowledge and character], anyone whose heart is touched by the fear of G‑d should not eat meat unless it is slaughtered by a shochet whom he knows to be of moral character and G‑d-fearing,11 [unless] he lives in a city whose communal authorities are G‑d-fearing men who certainly researched and investigated [the characters of the shochtim] thoroughly.12 Alternatively, each person should himself check the shochet’s knife [to ascertain] wheather he is [trained and] sensitive13 [in that regard. The person] should also ask the inhabitants of the city whether [the shochet] frequently becomes intoxicated or conducts himself in other undesirable ways. [Only] afterwards, should he eat [from his slaughter] (Simlah Chadashah, [1:8]).
At the end of sec. 18, Beis Yosef writes in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah:
“For those who reprove, it will be pleasant.”14 They shall warn the people [so that] they are careful regarding the laws of ritual slaughter in [all] its details. Choose a G‑d-fearing shochet, because so many of the Jewish people are dependent upon him with regard to the mitzvos of ritual slaughter and the inspection [of the lungs of slaughtered animals].15 True, our Sages said,3 “most of those who perform ritual slaughter are experts.” [However,] there are places where this [matter is given] inadequate attention and admonishment is lacking. [In such places,] many of those who perform ritual slaughter are not experts. Moreover, we have seen scandalous travesties in certain places because the hearts of many of those who are expert [shochtim] are, [however,] distant from the fear of sin. When a person is not G‑d-fearing, his heart will not be sensitive to [the necessity of] checking the [slaughtering] knife thoroughly because checking [a knife] requires very focused attention. As we see, a person may check [a knife] two or three times and not feel a very slight nick, but afterwards, he will discover it. [The reason for this is that] he [only] focused his attention this last time he inspected [the knife], and an inspection dependent upon touch is contingent on the focus of the heart.16 [In addition,] a person who is not G‑d-fearing may transgress regarding the inspection of the organs [of the animal that are required to be checked] after slaughter,17 and also in other ways.
Similar statements are cited in the name of Rabbeinu Asher, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, [Yoreh Deah,] sec. 18[:17]. To a great extent, a composed mind and the fear of G‑d are necessary in order to [properly] examine a [slaughtering] knife. It is necessary to check [the knife] slowly, with focused attention, without diverting one’s heart to other matters. Therefore, a person should not be appointed to [such a task] unless he is [extremely] G‑d-fearing and in awe of G‑d’s word, not prone to impetuousness nor haste, nor to drunkenness, for those prone to drunkenness are heavy-limbed even when they are not intoxicated. Those [responsible] for appointing [shochtim] must investigate all these matters. They must also check [all potential slaughterers] to see if they possess the required sensitivity [in their hands] as is true of other people of impeccable character (whose characters are not prone to impetuousness nor haste). All those who are thorough in their investigation of shochtim in these matters are worthy of praise (Simlah Chadashah 18:7).
In his responsa [(see responsum 25)], Beis Yaakov rules leniently, [stating] that if [a shochet] is G‑d-fearing, even if a slight nick [in his knife] can be felt after his inspection, it is not of any consequence since he checked to the extent of his capacity, according to his sensitivity. [Tevuos Shor (sec. 18, note 17) objects, stating:]
Heaven forbid to say so! Of what value is it that he is [G‑d-]fearing and a proficient slaughterer?! If he performs that act [of slaughter] properly but lacks the [required] sensitivity [of touch], he is feeding improperly slaughtered animals to the Jewish people.
Instead, the matter is dependent on other people. If they detect [a nick] after his [inspection], he is disqualified. However, if the other people with him say that they do not feel [any blemish] and they are scholars and fit to [judge] this matter, even though one person claims to feel [a blemish], all the others are not required to listen to this person. Nevertheless, if there are several who feel [a blemish in the knife,] obviously, [that shochet] should be disqualified.
(3) Becoming faint –
[“Faint” in this context] refers to tiredness and weakness of the heart; the person cannot [bear] seeing a blow [inflicted] by a sword or knife, even to an animal. [This interpretation is reflected by the use of the word “faint” in the verse,]18 “The maidens will become faint,” [as interpreted by Rashi.19 In the context of ritual slaughter, the word “faint”] refers to the loss of feeling stemming from one’s softness of heart (Simlah Chadashah, [1:2]). [As a result, there is concern that the slaughterer will] interrupt [the slaughter of an animal, thus disqualifying it]20 (Rashi).5
(4) To slaughter as an initial option –
[Although such a person is allowed to slaughter, that license is given] provided that after slaughtering, he will be examined to see whether he is knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter, as the text concludes. We do not suspect that he might forget and eat without such an inspection.
[The rationale is that] even if he forgets and eats [without such an inspection, it] cannot [be said] that he ate forbidden [food], because the majority of those who frequently slaughter are [assumed to be] proficient [in the necessary laws]. The same [rule would apply in an instance] where [the shochet] departs [immediately after slaughtering,] and there is no way to inspect his [knowledgeand proficiency, in which case] we rely on [the assumption that he is one of] the majority [who are proficient] and [the meat] is permitted (Rabbeinu Asher, [Chulin 1:5]).
(5) We presume [that they are knowledgeable] –
True, we follow the logic that while an animal is alive, its established halachic status is that it is forbidden [to be eaten and it remains forbidden] until it is known that it was slaughtered [properly]. In this instance, [it could thus be said that] it is not known whether [the animal] was slaughtered [properly], because it is possible that the shochet was not proficient [in the pertinent laws]. Nevertheless, [that reasoning is not accepted]. Since the majority of those who frequently slaughter are proficient, it is considered as if it is known that the animal was slaughtered [properly] (Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi, [Chulin 3b]).
(6) Whether he will become faint [when slaughtering] –
The reason why becoming faint [disqualifies a shochet] is because [it is feared that he will hesitate and] make an interruption [while slaughtering, thus disqualifying the animal.21 However,] since this person is knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter, he would not give [others the meat] to eat if he interrupted [the slaughter] (Beis Yosef, [Yoreh Deah 1]). Nevertheless, this reasoning alone would not be sufficient for us to allow him to slaughter as an initial preference, were it not for the fact that the majority of those who frequently slaughter are [proficient and knowledgeable in the pertinent laws], as stated in the Shulchan Aruch [of Rav Yosef Caro] above, because we would be concerned that he might have interrupted [the slaughter] without being aware of it. [The rationale is that] feeling faint involves a loss of feeling. [Thus,] it is possible that [the shochet] will [feel] slightly faint and lose feeling [and will not realize that he interrupted his slaughter]. Nevertheless, after the fact, we are not concerned about this, for if he felt faint, [we assume that] he would [no doubt] recognize [that feeling], and would forbid [partaking of the meat from the animal that he slaughtered.]
Rashba [(Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 1, shaar 1; gloss to Chulin 4b)] explains that the reason it is not necessary to ask [the shochet] whether he became faint is that becoming faint is not a common occurrence among mentally sound persons. Therefore, it is not [necessary] to be concerned about it even as an initial preference. The Tur and [Rav Yosef Caro in his] Shulchan Aruch do not accept this premise, as is evident from the fact that to permit the meat [to be eaten] as an initial preference, they had to cite the rationale, “the majority of those who frequently slaughter [are assumed to be proficient],” as further [stated] below [by Rama] in his gloss.22
Rabbeinu Asher [(Chulin 1:6),] differs regarding this point and maintains that, as an initial preference, [when examining a prospective shochet to determine his proficiency in the relevant laws,] it is necessary to ask him whether he is wont to become faint [while slaughtering]. The rationale is that] we are concerned that [despite becoming faint while slaughtering,] he might forget to tell others that [the slaughtered animal] is forbidden because [he interrupted the slaughter] due to his faintness. It is desirable to show concern for [Rabbeinu Asher’s] words in a matter that does not involve a [financial] loss.23
(7) To verify –
I.e., to check whether he is indeed proficient and knowledgeable [in the necessary laws before he slaughters]. Since it is possible to verify his [proficiency and knowledge] before he slaughters, he should not slaughter with the intent that he be checked [only afterwards]. However, if he did slaughter [an animal before having his knowledge of the relevant laws checked], it is not necessary to examine [his proficiency and knowledge] according to this approach. [The rationale is that] after the fact, we rely on [the presumption that] the majority [of shochtim are proficient and knowledgeable in the applicable laws,] even though it was possible to verify [the shochet’s proficiency and knowledge, and that was not done].Fundamentally, [the halachah follows] the first opinion,24 for it is the perspective of the Geonim and the majority of the halachic authorities (Simlah Chadashah).25
Nevertheless, weight should also be given to the second opinion26 and [a shochet] should not be allowed to slaughter as an initial preference while relying on [the possibility of] verifying [his proficiency and knowledge] afterwards, when it is possible to verify [these matters] initially (Bayis Chadash,[Yoreh Deah 1,] Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:3]).
(8) Proficient –
[This refers to] the manner [with which he controls] his hands, that he knows how to maneuver his hands [so that he will slaughter professionally] (Rashi, [Chulin 9a]), and [also] that he will not become faint. [In this way,] others who are not familiar with him can rely on the presumption regarding the majority, i.e., that the majority of those who slaughter on a frequent basis are proficient [in the necessary laws], as stated above [in the main text].
(9) Should not slaughter –
when he is alone, for perhaps he will become faint and not realize it. By contrast, [he is permitted to] slaughter in the presence of a Torah scholar who carefully observes him and sees whether he is conscious [of his actions] (Tevuos Shor [section 1, note 1]).27 [However,] if he does slaughter when he is alone, his slaughter is permitted (Rambam, [Hilchos Shechitah 4:3]), for [after the fact] we are not concerned that he might have become faint without realizing it. [The concern is] only an initial option.
[As mentioned,]28 Rashba maintains that becoming faint is not a common occurrence and we need not be concerned with this matter at all. Rabbeinu Nissim29 also concurs [with this approach. Accordingly,] they maintain that even a shochet who knows that his [knowledge and proficiency] has not yet been established is permitted to slaughter at the outset, even when alone.30 Therefore, in his gloss [to the Gemara,]31 Rashba [cites] Rambam’s ruling (which serves as the source for Rama’s words) [that a person whose knowledge and proficiency of the relevant laws has not yet been established] should not slaughter while alone [and comments], “It is a stringency imposed for those who fear sin. It is proper to give weight to it as an initial preference,” [i.e., only as an initial preference and not as an absolute requirement].
Accordingly, when a person who is a scholar and who has attained [a degree of knowledge that makes him] fit to deliver halachic rulings – in which instance, he need not be certified by others – desires to slaughter alone to begin with, and there is no expert [shochet available] for [the scholar] to [first] slaughter in his presence, Rashba and Rabbeinu Nissim’s rulings carry sufficient halachic weight for [the scholar] to rely on them in a pressing situation. [Therefore, in such a situation he may slaughter alone.]
(10) Three times –
[The three times must be] consecutive. If one slaughters incorrectly once, he must again slaughter [in front of an expert three times] until he establishes his [knowledge of and proficiency in the relevant laws] by slaughtering three times consecutively in an acceptable manner (Simlah Chadashah, [1:6]).
(11) Proficient in the practice [of slaughtering] –
[The literal meaning of Rav Yosef Caro’s words are “skilled with his hands.” This is established by having the person who seeks certification] slaughter in the presence of an expert shochet three times consecutively in an acceptable manner, as stated above.32
It is customary that the three slaughters [used to determine the expertise of a perspective shochet] be [the slaughter of] chickens.33 [This is because] slaughtering [chickens] is difficult due to the concern that [their gullets and windpipes] will become dislodged. Therefore, slaughtering them] requires a greater degree of skill. One of [the three chickens to be slaughtered] should be a rooster, since its slaughter is more difficult than that of a hen because [there is greater] concern that [a rooster’s gullet and windpipe] will become dislodged.34
Although [a shochet] has established his expertise in [the slaughter of] chickens and other fowl, it is customary not to allow him to slaughter smaller fowl and doves alone [without supervision. Such license is granted] only to a shochet who has already slaughtered [such fowl] and demonstrated his skill in doing so in the presence of an expert, (i.e., he slaughtered [such fowl] three consecutive times acceptably, as stated above. Note Simlah Chadashah, [1:11,] which was not exact [in its comments on this law]).35 [This special attention is necessary regarding such fowl] because it is common that [such fowl] are slaughtered invalidly. For this reason, [even] very expert [shochtim] are careful when small fowl are brought to them, [and do] not slaughter [a small fowl] alone but [rather slaughter it] together with another [larger] fowl, in order to avoid the possibility of reciting the blessing [over the slaughter] in vain36 (Yam shel Shlomoh, Bava Kama 9:23. Contemplate that source thoroughly, in contrast to the Simlah Chadashah which did not [deliberate on that source adequately].)
If two small fowl or doves are brought to a shochet, it is not necessary [to slaughter any additional larger fowl]. The concern [over the possibility of the slaughter being invalid] is not so great that the slaughter of both fowl will be invalidated (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:6]). All of this is not [required by] the letter of the law, but is an [additional] stringency. [However,] it is proper to be careful regarding [this stringency] (Pri Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1:8]).
The custom practiced [by some] – that the Torah scholar [a)] takes the chickens that were slaughtered in his presence [in order to determine the proficiency of the shochet who is being trained] and [b)] he also receives a commission and/or fee for the authorization and certification to slaughter that he gives [the apprentice] – is an undesirable practice. As a result of it, much corruption has occurred, [i.e.,] the authorization and certification [to slaughter] has been granted to individuals who are not worthy of this in return for payment [to the scholar for his] livelihood. Therefore, any G‑d-fearing individual should distance himself from [such] unsavory [conduct] and anything that resembles it.37 The scholar should not even benefit from the chicken, but instead should give them to the poor (Maharshal, [Chulin 1:5]; Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:6]).
If the community did not establish a minimal fixed payment [for the scholar to certify others], but [instead] he charges [the shochtim in training] according to his desires, doing so is also considered theft, because the [prospective] shochet is forced to give [the scholar that arbitrary payment]. Otherwise, he will not be allowed to slaughter in his city (Simlah Chadashah, [1:12]).
(12) Nor afterwards –
[An examination is not required after slaughter because it is assumed that the prospective shochet is proficient and knowledgeable. The rationale is that] it is not at all common that a person will slaughter without [having first] received certification (Darchei Moshe, [Yoreh Deah 1:5, 12]).
(13) From time to time –
[There is no absolute requirement regarding the] frequency [with which one should review the laws of ritual slaughter]. Everything is dependent on the individual capacities of the person, whether [or not] he has a good memory (Simlah Chadashah, [1:7]).38
(14) Be fluent in them –
True, with regard to delivering a ruling on other [matters of halachah], it is not necessary for the authority to know all [the relevant laws] by heart.39 [Nevertheless, this does not apply] with regard to ritual slaughter, [since the matter] is entrusted to people at large [– and not merely to Rabbinic authorities –] and many thrust themselves into such positions without continuously focusing [the necessary] attention on reviewing the laws of ritual slaughter. Therefore, many great [halachic authorities] follow the practice of [periodically] checking the shochtim’s [knowledge of the pertinent laws] even though they already were certified (Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:5]).
See sec. 2, [note 19, which notes] which laws of ritual slaughter must be [continuously] reviewed and known by heart.
(15) The laws and customs are entirely the same –
The intent is that according to the law, [a person who inspects the lungs of a slaughtered animal to verify that they are kosher] must be examined to see whether he knows the laws [pertinent to such an] inspection because it is common for there to be a minority [of people in that position] who are not experts, as stated above40 in the name of Rabbeinu Nissim.
For this reason, it is customary for inspectors to receive certification. Accordingly, they are not examined [regarding their knowledge] afterwards. However, according to what was stated in the above source34 in the name of Ramban,41 it is not necessary to receive certification for checking [an animal’s] lungs.
(א) שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁחוֹט.
א שֶׁלֹּא רָצוּ לְהַאֲמִינָם עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה הוֹאִיל וְדַעְתָּן קַלָּה.ב וְהַבֵּית יוֹסֵף ג כָּתַב דְּלֹא רָאִינוּ אֵינוֹ רְאָיָה.ד וְהַשַּׁ”ךְ ה כָּתַב דִּבְמִנְהָג וּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא הָוֵי לֹא רָאִינוּ רְאָיָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב רְמָ”א בְּחֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט סִימָן ל”[ז] ו וּפֵרֵשׁ שָׁם הַשַּׁ”ךְ ז הַטַּעַם דְּכֵיוָן שֶׁהַדָּבָר שְׁכִיחַ אִם הָיָה הַדָּבָר מֻתָּר אִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא הָיִינוּ רוֹאִים פַּעַם אַחַת כֵּן נוֹהֲגִים לְהַתִּיר וְגַם הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה נוֹהֶגֶת בְּכָל יוֹם וּשְׁכִיחַ טוּבָא וְלֹא רָאִינוּ מֵעוֹלָם שֶׁאִשָּׁה שָׁחֲטָה אוֹ שֶׁלָּמְדָה הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה כְּדֵי שֶׁתּוּכַל לִשְׁחוֹט וַדַּאי בִּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא הָוֵי לֹא רָאִינוּ רְאָיָה עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ:
(ב) וַעֲבָדִים.
הַטּוּר כָּתַב וַעֲבָדִים מְשֻׁחְרָרִים. וּפֵרֵשׁ הַשַּׁ”ךְ ח דְּהַיְנוּ מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי לְמִתְנֵי ט אֲפִלּוּ אֵין מַכִּירִין כוּ’ וּסְתָם עֲבָדִים שֶׁאֵין מַכִּירִין אוֹתָם הֵם בְּחֶזְקַת גַּנָּבִים כוּ’ (עַיֵּן שַׁ”ךְ הָאָרֹךְ י) (וּצְרִיכִים בְּדִיקַת סַכִּין כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן ב’ סְעִיף ו’ יא) וְגַם יֵשׁ מֵהֶם חֲשׁוּדִים עַל אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי וּבְהֵמָה בְּחֶזְקַת אִסּוּר אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי עוֹמֶדֶת יב וְאֵיךְ נוֹצִיאָהּ מֵחֶזְקַת אִסּוּר עַל יְדֵי עֲבָדִים הַחֲשׁוּדִים עָלָיו. אֲבָל עֶבֶד שֶׁמַּכִּירִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין יוֹדְעִים אִם יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה אָמְרִינָן בֵּיהּ רֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן יג כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב הָרַשְׁבָּ”א יד דְּנָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים הֵם בִּכְלַל רֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן. וְהַבֵּית יוֹסֵף [שֶׁ]הִשְׁמִיט תֵּבַת מְשֻׁחְרָרִים טו אָזִיל לְטַעְמֵיהּ דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּגַם בִּשְׁאָר בְּנֵי אָדָם בָּעִינָן שֶׁיְּהֵא הַשּׁוֹחֵט נֶאֱמָן וְלֹא דַי בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת שֶׁל כָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶלָּא שֶׁיּוֹדְעִים וּמַכִּירִים בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא אָדָם כָּשֵׁר וְנֶאֱמָן כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב בְּבֵית יוֹסֵף טז בְּשֵׁם [הָ]רַמְבַּ”ם יז וְהַמָּרְדְּכַי יח בְּשֵׁם רַבֵּינוּ חֲנַנְאֵל וּלְכָךְ לֹא הֻצְרַךְ לְהַזְכִּירוֹ הָכָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא דְּלֹא עֲדִיפֵי עֲבָדִים מִשְּׁאָר בְּנֵי אָדָם עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ:
וְלָכֵן [ב] כָּל רַב שֶׁנּוֹתֵן קַבָּלָה לְשׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ לִדְרוֹשׁ וְלַחֲקוֹר עָלָיו אִם הוּא אָדָם כָּשֵׁר וּדְרָכָיו מְתֻקָּנִים וְיִרְאַת ה’ עַל פָּנָיו יט וְגַם שֶׁיִּהְיֶה יוֹדֵעַ לִלְמוֹד וּלְהָבִין בְּעַצְמוֹ בִּגְמָרָא וּבְפֵרוּשׁ רַשִׁ”י שֶׁאָז יֵשׁ לוֹ לֵב לְהִזָּהֵר כ כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ רַזַ”ל כא אֵין בּוּר יְרֵא חֵטְא וְאִיכָּא מַאן דְּאָמַר בִּגְמָרָא כב שֶׁאִם קָרָא וְשָׁנָה וְלֹא שִׁמֵּשׁ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים דְּהַיְנוּ לִמּוּד הַגְּמָרָא כג הֲרֵי זֶה בּוּר וְזֶהוּ דַּעַת רַב עַמְרָם גָּאוֹן הוּבָא בְּבֵית יוֹסֵף.כד
וְעַכְשָׁו שֶׁרַבּוּ נוֹתְנֵי קַבָּלָה בְּלִי דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה כָּל מִי שֶׁנָּגַע יִרְאַת ה’ בְּלִבּוֹ לֹא יֹאכַל בָּשָׂר כִּי אִם מִשְּׁחִיטַת הַשּׁוֹחֵט שֶׁמַּכִּירוֹ שֶׁהוּא אָדָם כָּשֵׁר וִירֵא שָׁמַיִם אוֹ שֶׁהוּא בְּעִיר שֶׁרָאשֶׁיהָ הֵם יִרְאֵי ה’ שֶׁבְּוַדַּאי דָּרְשׁוּ וְחָקְרוּ אַחֲרָיו הֵטֵיב אוֹ שֶׁיִּבְדּוֹק הַסַּכִּין בְּעַצְמוֹ אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ הַרְגָּשָׁה טוֹבָה וְגַם יִשְׁאַל לִבְנֵי עִירוֹ אִם אֵינוֹ רָגִיל בְּשִׁכְרוּת אוֹ שְׁאָר רֹעַ מַעֲלָלִים וְאַחַר יֹאכַל (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה כה).
וְכָתַב בֵּית יוֹסֵף סוֹף סִימָן י”ח כו בְּשֵׁם הר”ר יוֹנָה כז וְלַמּוֹכִיחִים יִנְעַם כח וְהָעֵד בָּעָם וְיִזָּהֲרוּ בְּתוֹרַת הַשְּׁחִיטָה בְּדִקְדּוּקֶיהָ וְיִבְחֲרוּ לָהֶם שׁוֹחֵט יְרֵא חֵטְא כִּי עַם רָב מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל תְּלוּיִם עָלָיו בְּמִצְוַת הַשְּׁחִיטָה וְהַבְּדִיקָה וְגַם אָמְנָם אָמְרוּ רַזַ”ל כט רֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן יֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת מִבְּלִי מֵשִׂים וְאֵין תּוֹכַחַת מְצוּיָה שָׁם רַבִּים מִן הָעָם הַנִּמְצָאִים אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה בִּלְתִּי מֻמְחִין. וְעוֹד רָאִינוּ בְּמִקְצָתָם שַׁעֲרוּרִיָּה כִּי רַבִּים מִן הַמֻּמְחִים רָחַק לִבָּם מִיִּרְאַת חֵטְא וַאֲשֶׁר אֵינֶנּוּ יָרֵא לִבּוֹ לֹא יָבִין לְדַקְדֵּק בִּבְדִיקַת הַסַּכִּין כִּי צָרִיךְ לְכַוֵּן אֶת לִבּוֹ מְאֹד מְאֹד בִּבְדִיקָתוֹ הֲלֹא תִרְאֶה כִּי יִבְדּוֹק אָדָם פַּעֲמַיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ וְלֹא יַרְגִּישׁ פְּגִימָה דַקָּה וּלְאַחַר כֵּן יִמְצָאֶנָּה כִּי הֵכִין לִבּוֹ בָּאַחֲרוֹנָה וּבְחִינַת חוּשׁ הַמִּשּׁוּשׁ כְּפִי כַּוָּנַת הַלֵּב מִלְּבַד כִּי יִפְשַׁע גֶּבֶר מִבְּלִי יִרְאָה בִּבְדִיקַת הַסִּימָנִים אַחַר שְׁחִיטָה וְיֶתֶר דְּרָכִים עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ. וְכֵן כָּתַב בְּשֵׁם הָרֹא”שׁ ל וְטוּר וְשֻׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ סִימָן י”ח לאֹ דְּהַרְבֵּה צָרִיךְ יִשּׁוּב הַדַּעַת וְיִרְאַת שָׁמַיִם לִבְדִיקַת הַסַּכִּין וְצָרִיךְ לִבְדּוֹק לְאַט וּבְכַוָּנַת הַלֵּב שֶׁלֹּא יִפָּנֶה לִבּוֹ לְדָבָר אַחֵר וְלָכֵן אֵין לְמַנּוֹת עַל זֶה כִּי אִם יִרְאֵי שָׁמַיִם בְּיוֹתֵר וַחֲרֵדִים עַל דְּבַר ה’ וְאֵינָם נִבְהָלִים וְנֶחְפָּזִים בְּדַעְתָּם וְאֵינָם מִשְׁתַּכְּרִים שֶׁהַמִּשְׁתַּכְּרִים אֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת שִׁכְרוּתָם אֵבְרֵיהֶם כְּבֵדִים עֲלֵיהֶם לב וּצְרִיכִים הַמְמֻנִּים לַחֲקוֹר אַחַר כָּל זֶה וְגַם לְבָדְקָם אִם יֵשׁ לָהֶם הַרְגָּשָׁה טוֹבָה כִּשְׁאָר בְּנֵי אָדָם הַשְּׁלֵמִים בְּדַעְתָּם (שֶׁאֵינָם נִבְהָלִים וְנֶחְפָּזִים בְּדַעְתָּם) וְכָל הַמַּרְבֶּה לִבְדּוֹק אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֲטִים בְּעִנְיָנִים כָּאֵלּוּ הֲרֵי זֶה מְשֻׁבָּח (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה סִימָן י”ח סְעִיף ז’).
וּבִתְשׁוּבַת בֵּית יַעֲקֹב לג הֵקִיל בְּאִם שֶׁהוּא יְרֵא שָׁמַיִם אַף שֶׁמַּרְגִּישִׁין פְּגִימָה דַקָּה אַחַר בְּדִיקָתוֹ אֵין בְּכָךְ כְּלוּם כֵּיוָן שֶׁבְּדָקוֹ כְּפִי כֹחוֹ מֵהַרְגָּשָׁתוֹ. וְחָלִילָה לוֹמַר כֵּן כִּי מַה לִּי בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא יָרֵא וּבַעַל מַעֲשֶׂה אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין לוֹ מַחֲשָׁבָה וְהַרְגָּשָׁה טוֹבָה הוּא מַאֲכִיל נְבֵלוֹת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל רַק הַדָּבָר תָּלוּי בִּשְׁאָר בְּנֵי אָדָם אִם יֵשׁ מַרְגִּישִׁין אַחֲרָיו הֲרֵי הוּא פָּסוּל רַק אִם בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁעִמּוֹ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁאֵינָן מַרְגִּישִׁין וְהֵם [ג] חֲכָמִים וּרְאוּיִם לְזֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיִּמָּצֵא אֶחָד אוֹמֵר שֶׁמַּרְגִּישׁ אֵין כֻּלָּם זְקוּקִים לִשְׁמוֹעַ לָזֶה אֲבָל בִּדְאִיכָּא קְצָת מַרְגִּישִׁים פְּשִׁיטָא שֶׁיֵּשׁ לֶאֱסוֹר לד עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹן הַתְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר שָׁם לה ס”ק יז:
(ג) יִתְעַלֵּף.
לְשׁוֹן עֲיֵפוּת וַחֲלִישׁוּת הַלֵּב שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִרְאוֹת מַכַּת חֶרֶב וְסַכִּין אֲפִלּוּ בִּבְהֵמוֹת כְּמוֹ (ו)תִּתְעַלַּפְנָה הַבְּתוּלוֹת לו (רַשִׁ”י לז) וְהוּא עִנְיַן סִלּוּק הַרְגָּשָׁה מֵחֲמַת רַכּוּת לִבּוֹ (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה לח) וְיָבֹא לִידֵי שְׁהִיָּה (רַשִׁ”י לט):
(ד) לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחוֹט.
פֵּרוּשׁ עַל סְמַךְ שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ אַחַר הַשְּׁחִיטָה מ אִם יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה כִּדְמַסִּיק. וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן דִּלְמָא מִשְׁתְּלֵי וְאָכִיל בְּלֹא בְּדִיקָה מִשּׁוּם דְּאַף אִם מִשְׁתְּלֵי וְאָכִיל לָאו אִסּוּרָא קָאָכִיל דְּרֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן וְכֵן אִם יֵלֵךְ לוֹ וְלֹא נוּכַל לְבָדְקוֹ סָמְכִינָן אַרוּבָּא וְשָׁרֵי (רֹא”שׁ מא):
(ה) וּמֻחְזָקִין.
דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּקַיְמָא לָן מב בְּהֵמָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ בְּחֶזְקַת אִסּוּר עוֹמֶדֶת עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ בַּמֶּה נִשְׁחֲטָה וְהָכָא אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בַּמֶּה נִשְׁחֲטָה כִּי שֶׁמָּא לֹא הָיָה הַשּׁוֹחֵט מֻמְחֶה מִכָּל מָקוֹם כֵּיוָן דְּרֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן כְּמַאן דְּאִתְיְדַע לְךָ בַּמֶּה נִשְׁחֲטָה דָּמֵי (רִי”ף מג):
(ו) אִם נִתְעַלֵּף.
דְּטַעְמָא דְעִלּוּפָא מִשּׁוּם שְׁהִיָּה הוּא מד וְכֵיוָן שֶׁזֶּה יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וַדַּאי אִלּוּ שָׁהָה לֹא הָיָה מַאֲכִילוֹ לָנוּ (בֵּית יוֹסֵף מה). וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם מֵהַאי טַעְמָא לְחוֹד לֹא הָיָה מֻתָּר לִתֵּן לוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחוֹט אִי לָאו מִשּׁוּם שֶׁרֹב הָרְגִילִין לִשְׁחוֹט הֵם בְּחֶזְקַת מֻחְזָקִים כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ לְעֵיל מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲוָה חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהֶה וְלֹא אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ שֶׁהָעִלּוּף הוּא עִנְיַן סִלּוּק הַהַרְגָּשָׁה מו וְיָכוֹל לִהְיוֹת שֶׁיִּתְעַלֵּף מְעַט וְלֹא יַרְגִּישׁ. וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם בְּדִיעֲבַד לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן לְהָכִי וְאִם הָיָה מִתְעַלֵּף הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּף וְהָיָה אוֹסְרָהּ. מז
וְהָרַשְׁבָּ”א מח פֵּרֵשׁ הַטַּעַם דְּאֵין צָרִיךְ לְשָׁאֲלוֹ אִם נִתְעַלֵּף מִשּׁוּם דְּהָעִלּוּף הוּא דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָצוּי בְּבֶן דַּעַת לְהָכִי לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן לֵיהּ כְּלָל אֲפִלּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְהַטּוּר וְשֻׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ לֹא סְבִירָא לְהוּ הָכִי מִדְּהֻצְרְכוּ לִתֵּן טַעַם לְהַתִּיר לְכַתְּחִלָּה מִשּׁוּם שֶׁרֹב הָרְגִילִים כוּ’. וּכְדִלְקַמָּן בְּהַגָּ”ה.מט
וְהָרֹא”שׁ נ חוֹלֵק בְּזֶה וּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּצָרִיךְ לְשָׁאֳלוֹ אִם נִתְעַלֵּף לְכַתְּחִלָּה דְּחַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא שָׁכַח לְהוֹדִיעַ לוֹמַר שֶׁהִיא אֲסוּרָה מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּף. וְטוֹב לָחוּשׁ לִדְבָרָיו בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ הֶפְסֵד:
(ז) לְבָרְרוֹ.
דְּהַיְנוּ לְבָדְקוֹ אִם הוּא מֻמְחֶה שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְבָדְקוֹ קֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט עַל דַּעַת שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ. אֲבָל אִם שָׁחַט אֵין צָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ לְפִי סְבָרָא זוֹ דְּסָמְכִינָן אַרוּבָּא בְּדִיעֲבַד אַף עַל גַּב דִּיכוֹלִין לְבָרֵר. נא וְהָעִקָּר כִּסְבָרָא הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁהִיא דַּעַת הַגְּאוֹנִים וְרֹב הַפּוֹסְקִים (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה נב). וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם יֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ גַּם לִסְבָרָא הָאַחֲרוֹנָה שֶׁלֹּא לִתֵּן לוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה [לִשְׁחוֹט] עַל סְמַךְ שֶׁיִּבְדְּקֶנּוּ אַחַר כָּךְ כְּשֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְבָדְקוֹ תְּחִלָּה (בַּ”ח.נג טַ”ז נד):
(ח) בָּקִי.
בְּיָד לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו לְכָךְ (רַשִׁ”י נה) וְשֶׁלֹּא יִתְעַלֵּף דַּאֲחֵרִים שֶׁאֵינָם מַכִּירִים אוֹתוֹ יְכוֹלִין לִסְמוֹךְ אַרוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה שֶׁרֹב הָרְגִילִין לִשְׁחוֹט הֵם בְּחֶזְקַת מֻמְחִין כְּדִלְעֵיל: נו
(ט) לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט.
בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ שֶׁמָּא יִתְעַלֵּף וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן כְּשֶׁשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנֵי חָכָם הַמְדַקְדֵּק עָלָיו וְרוֹאֶה אִם לִבּוֹ עִמּוֹ (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר נז). וְאִם שָׁחַט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה (רַמְבַּ”ם נח) דְּלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן לְעִלּוּפֵי וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ אֶלָּא לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וּלְהָרַשְׁבָּ”א נט דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּהָעִלּוּף אֵינוֹ מָצוּי וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן לֵיהּ כְּלָל וְכֵן כָּתַב הָרַ”ן ס סְבִירָא לְהוּ דַּאֲפִלּוּ הַשּׁוֹחֵט עַצְמוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻחְזָק עֲדַיִן מֻתָּר לוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט בַּתְּחִלָּה אֲפִלּוּ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ. וְלָכֵן כָּתַב הָרַשְׁבָּ”א בְּחִדּוּשָׁיו סא עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתַב הָרַמְבַּ”ם (שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ מְקוֹר דִּבְרֵי רְמָ”א) שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחוֹט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ כִּי חוּמְרָא הִיא שֶׁהֶחְמִיר בְּזֶה לְיִרְאֵי חֵטְא וְנָכוֹן לָחוּשׁ בְּזֶה לְכַתְּחִלָּה עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ.
הִלְכָּךְ מִי שֶׁהוּא חָכָם שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְהוֹרָאָה שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לִטּוֹל קַבָּלָה וְרוֹצֶה לִשְׁחוֹט בְּעַצְמוֹ בַּתְּחִלָּה וְאֵין שָׁם מֻמְחֶה לִשְׁחוֹט לְפָנָיו כְּדַאי הֵם הָרַשְׁבָּ”א וְהָרַ”ן לִסְמוֹךְ עֲלֵיהֶם בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק:
(י) ג’ פְּעָמִים.
רְצֻפִּים וְאִם קִלְקֵל שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פַּעַם אַחַת צָרִיךְ לַחֲזוֹר וְלִשְׁחוֹט עַד שֶׁיִּתְחַזֵּק בְּג’ פְּעָמִים רְצֻפִּים בִּשְׁחִיטוֹת כְּשֵׁרוֹת (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה סב):
(יא) וּבָקִי בְּיָד.
דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט לְפָנָיו ג’ שְׁחִיטוֹת כְּשֵׁרוֹת רְצֻפִּים כְּדִלְעֵיל.סג
וְהַמִּנְהָג שֶׁג’ שְׁחִיטוֹת אֵלּוּ הֵן תַּרְנְגוֹלִים סד שֶׁקָּשָׁה בָּהֶן הַשְּׁחִיטָה מִפְּנֵי חֲשַׁשׁ שְׁמוּטָה וְצָרִיךְ אוּמָנוּת בְּיוֹתֵר סה וְאֶחָד מֵהֶן הוּא תַּרְנְגוֹל סו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה קָשָׁה בּוֹ יוֹתֵר מִבְּתַרְנְגוֹלֶ[ת] מִשּׁוּם חֲשַׁשׁ שְׁמוּטָה.סז
וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֻחְזַק בְּתַרְנְגוֹלִים וּשְׁאָר עוֹפוֹת אֵין נוֹהֲגִים לִתֵּן לוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ עוֹפוֹת הַקְּטַנִּים שֶׁהֵן צִפֳּרִים וְיוֹנִים הַקְּטַנִּים אֶלָּא לְמִי שֶׁשָּׁחַט אוֹתָם וְאִתְמַחִי כְּבָר בָּהֶם סח בִּפְנֵי מֻמְחֶה (דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁשּׁוֹחֵט ג’ שְׁחִיטוֹת כְּשֵׁרוֹת סט כְּדִלְעֵיל. עַיֵּן שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה ע דְּלֹא דָק) לְפִי שֶׁהַנִּבּוּל מָצוּי בָּהֶם.עא וּמִשּׁוּם הָכִי מְדַקְדְּקִים מֻמְחִים גְּדוֹלִים מָתַי שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵיהֶם עוֹף קָטָן אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין אוֹתוֹ לְבַדּוֹ אֶלָּא עִם עוֹף אַחֵר כְּדֵי לְהִסְתַּלֵּק מֵחֲשַׁשׁ בְּרָכָה לְבַטָּלָה (יָם שֶׁל שְׁלֹמֹה פֶּרֶק ט’ דְּבָבָא קַמָּא סִימָן כ”ג.עב עַיֵּן שָׁם הֵטֵיבעג דְּלֹא כְּשִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה עד שֶׁלֹּא עִיֵּן שָׁם). וְאִם מְבִיאִים לְפָנָיו ב’ צִפֳּרִים אוֹ ב’ יוֹנִים קְטַנִּים אֵין צָרִיךְ יוֹתֵר דְּכוּלֵי הַאי לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁיִּתְנַבְּלוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם (שַׁ”ךְ עה). וְזֶה אֵינוֹ מֵעִקַּר הַדִּין אֶלָּא חוּמְרָא בְּעָלְמָא וְנָכוֹן לִזָּהֵר בּוֹ (פְּרִי חָדָשׁ עו).
וּמַה שֶּׁנּוֹהֲגִים שֶׁהַתַּרְנְגוֹלִים שֶׁשּׁוֹחֵט לִפְנֵי הֶחָכָם נוֹטֵל הֶחָכָם בִּשְׂכָרוֹ וְגַם יֵשׁ לוֹ קִצְבָה וְשָׂכָר בְּמַה שֶּׁנּוֹתֵן לוֹ אַחַר כָּךְ רְשׁוּת לִשְׁחוֹט מִנְהָג רָע הוּא וּמֵחֲמַת זֶה בָּאוּ כַּמָּה קִלְקוּלִים שֶׁנּוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת וְהַסְכָּמָה מֵחֲמַת שְׂכַר פַּרְנָסָתָן אֲפִלּוּ לְמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְכָךְ לָכֵן כָּל יְרֵא שָׁמַיִם יִתְרַחֵק מִן הַכִּעוּר וְהַדּוֹמֶה לוֹ עז וְאַל יֵהָנֶה אֲפִלּוּ מִן הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִים אֶלָּא יִתֵּן לַעֲנִיִּים (רְשַׁ”ל עח שַׁ”ךְ עט).
וְאִם לֹא קָצְבוּ לוֹ הַקָּהָל דָּבָר מוּעָט בִּשְׂכָרוֹ אֶלָּא מַעֲלֶה בְּדָמִים כְּפִי רְצוֹנוֹ יֵשׁ בּוֹ גַם כֵּן מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל שֶׁהֲרֵי הַשּׁוֹחֵט מֻכְרָח לִתֵּן לוֹ שֶׁאִם כֵּן לֹא יַנִּיחֵהוּ לִשְׁחוֹט בְּעִירוֹ (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה פ) [ז]:
(יב) וְלֹא בַּסּוֹף.
שֶׁלֹּא שְׁכִיחַ כְּלָל שֶׁשּׁוּם אָדָם יִשְׁחוֹט בְּלֹא קַבָּלָה (דַּרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה פא):
(יג) לִפְרָקִים.
הַפְּרָקִים הֵם הַכֹּל לְפִי מַה שֶּׁהוּא אָדָם אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ זִכָּרוֹן טוֹב (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה פב):
(יד) שְׁגוּרִים בְּפִיו כוּ’.
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁבִּשְׁאָר הוֹרָאוֹת אֵין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֵּדַע הַמּוֹרֶה בְּעַל פֶּה כָּל הוֹרָאוֹת פג בִּשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁהִיא מְסוּרָה לַכֹּל הֶחֱמִירוּ וְרַבִּים מִתְפָּרְצִים וְאֵינָם נוֹתְנִים עַל לֵב תָּמִיד לַחֲזוֹר עַל הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה עַל כֵּן נָהֲגוּ גְּדוֹלִים לַחֲקוֹר אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֲטִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּטְלוּ קַבָּלָה (טַ”ז פד). וְעַיֵּן סְעִיף ב’ פה מָה הֵן הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לַחֲזוֹר עֲלֵיהֶן וְלֵידַע אוֹתָן בְּעַל פֶּה:
(טו) וְדִינָם וּמִנְהָגָם שָׁוֶה.
פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁמִּן הַדִּין הוּא צָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ אִם יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת בְּדִיקָה מִשּׁוּם דְּמִעוּט שֶׁאֵינָם מֻמְחִין שְׁכִיחַ כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב לְעֵיל פו בְּשֵׁם הָרַ”ן.פז וְלָכֵן נָהֲגוּ לִטּוֹל קַבָּלָה וְלָכֵן נָהֲגוּ שֶׁאֵין בּוֹדְקִים עוֹד אוֹתוֹ. אֲבָל לְפִי מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב לְעֵיל פח בְּשֵׁם הָרַמְבַּ”ן פט אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִטּוֹל קַבָּלָה לִבְדִיקוֹת הָרֵיאָה:
Anyone may perform ritual slaughter as an initial and preferred option, even women.
Note: There are authorities who maintain that women should not be allowed to perform ritual slaughter, since they have already accepted the custom of not slaughtering (1). (This is indeed the prevailing custom – that women do not perform ritual slaughter) (Beis Yosef in the name of Sefer HaAgur).
It is permitted to allow servants (2) [i] and all [other] individuals to slaughter as an initial option (4) and it is permitted to eat from such a person’s slaughter. [This applies] even if it is not known whether it has been established that [these individuals are able to] slaughter without becoming faint, (3) [iv] nor are they known to be proficient [in the act of] ritual slaughter and knowledgeable regarding its laws. [The rationale is that] the majority of those who frequently slaughter are assumed to be proficient and we presume [that they are knowledge-able (5) regarding the relevant laws].
When does the above apply? When [the person] is not in our presence, at which time we may eat of his slaughter, for we rely on the presumption [that he is a proficient slaughterer]. However, if he is in our presence [after he completed the slaughter of the animal,] he must be tested to see if he is proficient in slaughter and knows the [relevant] laws. [v] Nevertheless, it is not necessaryto ask him whether he felt faint [when slaughtering]. (6) Note – There are [authorities] who maintain that we may rely on the presumption that [a shochet, i.e., a slaughterer, is proficient and knowledgeable in the relevant laws] only after the fact. However, as an initial and preferred option, one should not rely on the [above] presumption in a place where it is possible to verify (7) [the shochet’s knowledge and proficiency before he begins to slaughter] (Mordechai; Hagahos Asheri; Sefer HaAgur in the name of Or Zarua; Sheil tos [D’Rav Achai Gaon,] Parshas Bahaaloscha).
All of the above applies to other people who are not knowledgeable and informed [regarding] whether or not a shochet is proficient [in the relevant laws] (8). However, a shochet himself – even if he knows the laws of ritual slaughter and is proficient [in them] – should not perform ritual slaughter (9) until he slaughters three times (10) in the presence of a scholar who is an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter [vi] so that [the expert] will [be able to] verify that this person is experienced and robust [and thus] will not faint (Tur, citing Rambam). Therefore, it has become customary that a person not slaughter unless he receives certification [by slaughtering] in the presence of a scholar (Sefer HaAgur, citing Hilchos Eretz Yisrael). A scholar will not give [a person] certification unless he knows that [the person] is familiar with the laws of ritual slaughter and is proficient in the practice [of slaughtering]. (11)
Therefore, it is customary, as an initial and preferred option, to rely on all people who come to slaughter; we do not examine them, neither before [slaughter], nor afterwards. (12) [The rationale is that it is assumed that] all those who present themselves as shochtim already received certification from a scholar ([this is based on Rama’s] own logic). [v] In certain places, it is customary to employ a further stringency – that a person who is certified receives a document from the scholar as proof that he has been certified.
Every shochet, even after having been certified, should see to it to review the laws of ritual slaughter from time to time (13) so that he will be fluent in them, (14) having them readily on his lips and in his heart so that he does not forget them (Rav Yaakov HaLevi in the name of Maharash).
The same laws that apply regarding the laws of ritual slaughter and a person who comes to slaughter apply to the laws of examining a lung [to make sure the animal is not tereifah] and to those who make such an examination. The laws and customs are entirely the same (15) in this regard ([this is based on Rama’s] own logic).
The Jewish court should research and investigate [the Rabbinic authorities] who make such examinations and the shochtim to see that they are knowledgeable, proficient, and of upright moral standing (Mahariv, responsum 50), for very severe prohibitions and stumbling blocks are created when ritual slaughter and the examination [of the lungs] are given over to anyone [without distinction].
[The following laws apply] if a shochet and/or examiner was tested and it was discovered that he was not knowledgeable: If, in the past, he was certified [as a shochet and/or examiner, the animals] that he slaughtered [or examined] previously are not deemed tereifos retroactively, for it is said that his lack of knowledge occurred now (Chidushei Agudah). However, if he was never certified, everything that he ever slaughtered is [deemed] tereifah and all the utensils in which [the meat from the animals] he slaughtered were cooked must be kashered (Rashba, Vol. 1, responsum 218).
אהַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין לְכַתְּחִלָּה, אֲפִלּוּ נָשִׁים. הַגָּה: יֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁאֵין לְהַנִּיחַ נָשִׁים לִשְׁחֹט, שֶׁכְּבָרנָהֲגוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁחֹט (א) (וְכֵן הַמִּנְהָגשֶׁאֵין הַנָּשִׁים שׁוֹחֲטוֹת) (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם הָאָגוּר). וַעֲבָדִים (ב) [א] וְכָלאָדָם, אֲפִלּוּ אֵין מַכִּירִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁמֻּחְזָק לִשְׁחֹט שֶׁלֹּא יִתְעַלֵּף, (ג) וְגַם אֵין יוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא מֻמְחֶה [ד] וְיוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, מֻתָּר לִתֵּן לוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחֹט, (ד) וּמֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, שֶׁרֹב הָרְגִילִין לִשְׁחֹט הֵם בְּחֶזְקַת מֻמְחִיןוּמֻחְזָקִין. (ה) בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ לְפָנֵינוּ, אָז מֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ וְסוֹמְכִים עַל הַחֲזָקָה. אֲבָל אִם הוּא לְפָנֵינוּ, צָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ אִם הוּא לְפָנֵינוּ, צָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ אִם הוּא מֻמְחֶה וְיוֹדֵעַ [ה] הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל אֵין צָרִיךְ לְשָׁאֲלוֹ אִם נִתְעַלֵּף. (ו) הַגָּה: וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁאֵין לִסְמֹךְ עַל הַחֲזָקָה אֶלָּא בְּדִיעֲבַד, אֲבָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה אֵין לִסְמֹךְ עַל חֲזָקָה בְּמָקוֹם דִּיכוֹלִין לְבָרְרוֹ (ז) (מָרְדְּכַי וְהַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִי וְאָגוּר בְּשֵׁם אוֹר זָרוּעַ וּשְׁאִלְתּוֹת פָּרָשַׁת בְּהַעֲלֹתְךָ).וְכָל זֶה מַיְרִי בַּאֲחֵרִים, שֶׁאֵינָן בְּקִיאִין וְיוֹדְעִין אִם זֶה הַשּׁוֹחֵט בָּקִי (ח) אוֹ לֹא, אֲבָל הַשּׁוֹחֵט עַצְמוֹ לֹא יִשְׁחֹט, (ט) אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וּמֻמְחֶה, עַד שֶׁשָּׁחַט ג׳ פְּעָמִים (י) בִּפְנֵי חָכָם וּמֻמְחֶה בְּהִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, [ו] שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא רָגִיל וְזָרִיז שֶׁלֹּא יִתְעַלֵּף (טוּר בְּשֵׁם הָרַמְבַּ״ם). וְלָכֵן נוֹהֲגִין שֶׁאֵין אָדָם שׁוֹחֵט אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נָטַל קַבָּלָה לִפְנֵי חָכָם (אָגוּר בְּשֵׁם הִלְכוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל). וְאֵין הֶחָכָם נוֹתֵן לוֹ קַבָּלָה עַד שֶׁיֵּדַע בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וּבָקִי בַּיָּד. (יא) וְלָכֵן נוֹהֲגִין שֶׁכָּל הַבָּאִין לִשְׁחֹט סוֹמְכִין עֲלֵיהֶם לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְלֹא בָּדְקִינָן אוֹתָם לֹא בַּתְּחִלָּהוְלֹא בַּסּוֹף, (יב) דְּכָל הַמְּצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה כְּבָר נָטְלוּ קַבָּלָה לִפְנֵי חָכָם (דִּבְרֵי עַצְמוֹ). וּבִקְצָת מְקוֹמוֹת נוֹהֲגִין לְהַחֲמִיר עוֹד, דְּהַמְקַבֵּל נוֹטֵל כְּתָב מִן הֶחָכָם לִרְאָיָה שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ קַבָּלָה. וְכָל שׁוֹחֵט, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּטַל קַבָּלָה, יִרְאֶה שֶׁיַּחֲזֹר לִפְרָקִים (יג) הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה,שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שְׁגוּרִים בְּפִיו (יד) וּבְלִבּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁכָּחֵם (מהר״ר יַעֲקֹב הַלֵּוִי בְּשֵׁם מהר״ש). וּכְמוֹ שֶׁהַדִּין בְּהִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וּבְמִי שֶׁבָּא לִשְׁחֹט, כָּךְ הוּא הַדִּין בְּהִלְכוֹת בְּדִיקוֹת הָרֵאָה וּבְמִי שֶׁבָּא לִבְדֹּק, וְדִינָם וּמִנְהָגָם שָׁוֶה (טו) בְּכָל זֶה (דִּבְרֵי עַצְמוֹ). וְיֵשׁ לְבֵית דִּין לַחְקֹר וְלִדְרֹשׁ אַחַר הַבּוֹדְקִים וְהַשּׁוֹחֲטִים, וְלִרְאוֹת שֶׁיִּהְיוּ בְּקִיאִים וּמֻמְחִים וּכְשֵׁרִים (מהרי״ו סִימָן נ׳). כִּי גָּדוֹל אִסּוּר הַמַּכְשֵׁלָה בִּשְׁחִיטוֹת וּבְדִיקוֹת הַמְּסוּרִים לַכֹּל. וְאִם בָּדְקוּ אֵיזֶה שׁוֹחֵט וּבוֹדֵק וְנִמְצָא שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵע, אִם נָטַל פַּעַם אַחַת קַבָּלָה, אֵין מַטְרִיפִין לְמַפְרֵעַ מַה שֶּׁשָּׁחַט, דְּאָמְרִינָן הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּאִתְרַע (חִדּוּשֵׁי אֲגֻדָּה). אֲבָל אִם לֹא נָטַל קַבָּלָה מֵעוֹלָם, כָּל מַה שֶּׁשָּׁחַט טְרֵפָה, גַּם כָּל הַכֵּלִים שֶׁבִּשְּׁלוּ בָּהֶן מַה שֶּׁשָּׁחַט צְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר (רשב״א סִימָן רי״ח).
2
(16) All the detailed laws –
E.g., [what the ruling would be] if one interrupted [the slaughter] or concealed the knife [within the folds of the neck] while slitting the lesser portion of the simanim, [as will be explained] below in sec. 23:4-5 and sec. 24:11, or the like. [The rationale is that] Torah scholars also are in doubt regarding certain matters concerning the laws of ritual slaughter. Therefore, if [a prospective shochet] said, “If such a law would be presented to me, I would be in doubt and I would consult [an authority,” he is not disqualified] (Beis Yosef, [Yoreh Deah 1,] in the name of Mordechai, [Chulin, sec. 574,] and Hagahos Maimonios, [Hilchos Shechitah ch. 4, note 1]).
(17) One who knows [the laws] –
[The shochet] must, however, be [sufficiently] knowledgeable to know to pay attention to any [abnormal] change [that occurred during] the slaughter, and to inquire concerning the doubt [that arose] (Mordechai, [Chulin, sec. 574]). In other words, he must know the fundamental laws pertaining to ritual slaughter (Rambam, [Hilchos Shechitah 4:6]), as [reflected by Rama’s statements in his] gloss.42
[This is derived] from [the teaching of] Rav Yehudah,43 “Whenever a shochet does not know the laws of ritual slaughter, it is forbidden to partake of [meat from the animals] he slaughtered. These are the [fundamental] laws [that disqualify a ritually slaughtered animal]: Interrupting [the slaughter]…,” as mentioned above.44 Hagahos Asheri writes:
Since [Rav Yehudah] only mentions interrupting [the slaughter and the other four fundamental laws,] it is evident that even if a [prospective shochet] only knows these [laws – i.e., the laws about which questions] commonly arise, no further [knowledge] is required.45 [The rationale is that] if doubt arises concerning [other less known points], he will know to ask. If [the shochet] will not find [anyone] to ask, he will conduct himself stringently, for the [principle] – that one should conduct himself stringently when a doubt arises regarding a Scriptural prohibition46 – is known by even an unlearned person.
However, the [prospective] shochet must also know that there is an unresolved question in the Talmud47 [regarding] whether [repeated minimal] interruptions are added together [and therefore, disqualify the slaughter, for such a question] frequently presents itself to a shochet. [A prospective shochet] must also know [the laws regarding] checking a knife on his flesh and nails so that he will not slaughter with a blemished knife.
Rama adds [that a shochet must also know how to] check the simanim after slaughter. This includes the required measure of how much of the signs must be slit for the slaughter [to be acceptable,] as [explained] below, sec. 21.48
Rambam includes all the above by stating the five factors [that disqualify meat from a ritually slaughtered animal], interrupting [the slaughter], and the like, which are the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter. Note his statements in Hilchos Shechitah 4:1-2, 6. [The Alter Rebbe interprets Rambam as implying that] since [a prospective shochet] knows the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter, he will know the order of ritual slaughter, [i.e.,] how one slaughters [as an initial preference]. All the other laws of ritual slaughter are only explanations of the laws that apply if [the shochet] deviated from the [prescribed] order of ritual slaughter. If a deviation occurred, [the shochet] will certainly ask regarding the doubt that arose. However, if he does not know the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter mentioned in [Rama’s] note, he will not know what to ask at all. Therefore, saying, “Concerning such a matter, I would be in doubt and I would ask [an authority],” is only effective with regard to the particular details of the laws, but not with regard to the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter mentioned in [Rama’s] note.
(18) Something that should be forbidden is permitted –
[A person who makes such an error] is deemed to be one who does not know [the laws of ritual slaughter]. Even after the fact, it is forbidden to partake [of the meat from an animal that] he slaughtered49 because we are concerned that maybe a [prohibition] could have arisen, but he was unaware of [the law], and he permitted [the animal slaughtered] (Perishah, [Yoreh Deah 1:14); this is also evident from the wording of the Tur, [Yoreh Deah 1].
[The above applies] even with regard to [questions] that do not frequently arise for a shochet, for example, [making] an interruption or concealing [the knife] when slitting the lesser portion of the simanim, or the like. For with regard to questions that frequently arise, even if [the prospective shochet] says, “I do not know,” he is disqualified, as explained [in note 17,] above.
(19) At the beginning of sec. 23… –
These [fundamental laws include disqualifying a ritually slaughtered animal] because of interrupting [the slaughter], pressing [the knife], concealing [the knife under the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter], diverting [the knife from the place of slaughter], and ripping [the windpipe or the gullet from their place before slitting them], as explained in that source, and in sec. 24.
(20) A [slaughtering] knife –
[The required inspection] will be explained in sec. 18.
(21) Should be examined –
However, if [the shochet] is present and he was examined [regarding his knowledge of the pertinent laws] and he was found to be knowledgeable [regarding these laws], the simanim need not be examined. [The rationale is that] since [the shochet] is knowledgeable [regarding the necessary laws], he certainly checked the simanim. Similarly, if he is not present and it is impossible to examine the simanim, e.g., the animal’s head was [already] severed, we rely on [the presumption that] the majority of those who slaughter are proficient and that he certainly examined the simanim (Darchei Moshe, [Yoreh Deah 1:16], Rabbeinu Asher,50 and Rabbeinu Nissim [in his gloss to the Halachos of Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi, Chulin 1a.)].
(22) At all –
From this phrase, it can be inferred that there is never a need to examine [a shochet’s proficiency and knowledge] even if a long time has passed since he was certified [as a ritual shochet.] To [emphasize] this point, Rama repeated this concept [here, although] he already stated it in subsection 1 [above], thus [clarifying] that it is never customary to examine a [shochet after he has been certified,] even after a lengthy period of time [has passed since his certification]. There is no suspicion that he forgot what he studied. (This is also apparent from [Rama’s statements in his] Darchei Moshe, [Yoreh Deah 1:11,] in the name of Piskei Maharia, [sec. 177]. See the ruling of Maharia in that source and the support he cites from ch. Ein Maamidim, [Avodah Zarah 39a]).51
The rationale for this matter is not that the status of a person who has established himself [as a proficient and knowledgeable shochet] is presumed [to be unchanged for all time]. Firstly, that status is likely to change in and of itself, [for] if [the shochet] does not review his studies he will forget [the pertinent laws.52 Therefore, his slaughter of an animal] does not remove [the slaughtered animal] from the presumption that it would be forbidden.53
Moreover, [following] the majority has greater [halachic weight] than [following an established halachic] presumption.54 [Nevertheless,] we do not rely on the fact that the majority of those who slaughter are proficient [in the necessary laws] when [the shochet] is present, and it is possible to clarify [his proficiency].55 How, then, can we rely on the fact that [the shochet’s certification] has established [his proficiency] when there are grounds to be concerned about forgetfulness?
Instead, the reason [for relying on a shochet’s certification after much time has passed since he was certified] is that there is no concern for forgetfulness at all, for it is very unlikely that [a shochet] will forget the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter that frequently arise since he is continually involved with ritual slaughter. [The reason] it is necessary to check a [shochet’s proficiency] initially instead of relying on the fact that most of those involved with ritual slaughter are proficient [in the pertinent laws] is that the minority who are not proficient are significant in number, as stated above in the name of Rabbeinu Nissim.56
A similar perspective can be inferred from Rama’s statement equating checking an [animal’s] lung with examining a shochet, as stated above.57 However, after [a prospective shochet] was examined and it was discovered that he is among the majority [of those involved in ritual slaughter] who are proficient [and knowledgeable in the necessary laws], there is no longer a need for concern [that he might] forget [these laws. The rationale is that] forgetfulness [about matters that occur frequently] is not common among those [regularly] involved in ritual slaughter.
[However, there are different rules] if [a shochet] left this profession [and did not involve himself in it] for a prolonged period to the extent that there is concern that he forgot the fundamental laws of ritual slaughter. Since it is common that [a person] will forget matters over the course of such a lengthy period of time, there are grounds for concern, and he must be examined [again]58 as if he is coming to slaughter for the first time. [The rationale is that in this instance] we do not rely [on the assumption] that the majority involved in ritual slaughter are proficient [in the necessary laws], for that assumption is not relied upon when it is possible to clarify the matter, as [Rama states] above in [his] note to subsection 1.59
(טז) חִלּוּקֵי הַדִּינִים.
כְּגוֹן שְׁהִיָּה וַחֲלָדָה בְּמִעוּט סִימָנִים צ דִּלְקַמָּן סִימָן כ”ג סְעִיף ד’ ה’ וְסִימָן כ”ד סְעִיף י”א וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָהֶם דְּהָא חֲכָמִים נַמִי מְסַפְּקָא לְהוּ כַּמָּה מִלֵּי בְּהִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה צא הִלְכָּךְ אִם אוֹמֵר אִלּוּ בָּא דִּין זֶה לְפָנַי הָיִיתִי מִסְתַּפֵּק וְשׁוֹאֵל צב כוּ’ (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם הַמָּרְדְּכַי וְהַגָּהוֹת מַיְמוֹנִיּוֹת):
(יז) יוֹדֵעַ כו’.
אַךְ שֶׁיֵּדַע לָתֵת לֵב בְּשִׁנּוּי שְׁחִיטָה וְלִשְׁאוֹל עַל סְפֵקָם (מָרְדְּכַי צג). דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ עִקָּרֵ[י] הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה (רַמְבַּ”ם צד) כְּדִלְקַמָּן בְּהַגָּ”ה. דְּמִדְּקָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה כָּל טַבָּח שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה שְׁהִיָּה כוּ’ כְּדִלְעֵיל צה כֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַזְכִּיר אֶלָּא שְׁהִיָּה כוּ’ מַשְׁמַע דַּאֲפִלּוּ אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֶלָּא אֵלּוּ שֶׁרְגִילִים לָבוֹא לְיָדוֹ אֵין צָרִיךְ יוֹתֵר צו שֶׁהֲרֵי אִם יִסְתַּפֵּק בָּהֶם יוֹדֵעַ לִשְׁאוֹל וְאִם לֹא יִמְצָא לִשְׁאוֹל מִשּׁוּם אָדָם יַחֲמִיר דִּבְזֶה בָּקִי אֲפִלּוּ עַם הָאָרֶץ דְּסָפֵק דְּאוֹרַיְתָא לְחוּמְרָא. צז אַךְ צָרִיךְ לֵידַע הָא דִּמְסַפְּקָא לָן בִּגְמָרָא צח אִי שְׁהִיּוֹת מִצְטָרְפוֹת צט וְסָלְקָא בְּתֵיקוּ ק דִּרְגִילוֹת לָבֹא לִידֵי הַשּׁוֹחֵט קא וְגַם צָרִיךְ לֵידַע בְּדִיקוֹת הַסַּכִּין אַבִּשְׂרָא וְאַטּוּפְרָא קב שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחוֹט בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹן הַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִ”י. קג וְהָרְמָ”א הוֹסִיף בְּדִיקַת הַסִּימָנִים לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה, וְנִכְלָל בְּזֶה שִׁעוּר הַשְּׁחִיטָה דִּלְקַמָּן סִימָן כ”[א]. קד
וְהָרַמְבַּ”ם כָּלַל כָּל אֵלּוּ בְּמַה שֶּׁכָּתַב ה’ דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֵם שְׁהִיָּה כוּ’ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָהֶם שֶׁהֵם עִקַּר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה עַיֵּן שָׁם בְּפֶרֶק ד’ הֲלָכוֹת א’ ב’ ו’ שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ עִקָּרֵי הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה יוֹדֵעַ סֵדֶר הַשְּׁחִיטָה כֵּיצַד שׁוֹחֲטִין וְכָל שְׁאָר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה אֵינָם אֶלָּא לְבָאֵר מִשְׁפַּט הַשִּׁנּוּיִם אִם שִׁנָּה מִסֵּדֶר הַשְּׁחִיטָה וְאִם יֶאֱרַע לוֹ אֵיזֶה שִׁנּוּי יִשְׁאַל עַל סְפֵקוֹ בְּוַדַּאי אֲבָל אִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ עִקָּרֵי הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה דִּלְקַמָּן בְּהַגָּ”ה אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לִשְׁאוֹל כְּלָל וְהִלְכָּךְ לֹא מְהַנֵּי מַה שֶּׁאוֹמֵר עַל דָּבָר זֶה הָיִיתִי מִסְתַּפֵּק וְשׁוֹאֵל אֶלָּא בְּחִלּוּקֵי הַדִּינִים אֲבָל לֹא בְּעִקַּר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה דִּלְקַמָּן בְּהַגָּ”ה:
(יח) הָאָסוּר מֻתָּר כוּ’.
אָז מִקְרֵי אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ וַאֲפִלּוּ בְּדִיעֲבַד אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ קה דְּחַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא בָּא לְיָדוֹ אֵיזֶה סָפֵק קו וְהוּא אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ וְהִתִּירוֹ (פְּרִישָׁה קז וְכֵן מַשְׁמַע מִלְּשׁוֹן הַטּוּר קח). וְהַיְנוּ אֲפִלּוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָגִיל לָבוֹא לִידֵי הַשּׁוֹחֵט כְּגוֹן שְׁהִיָּה וַחֲלָדָה בְּמִעוּט סִימָנִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָהֶם דִּבְדָבָר הָרָגִיל לָבֹא אֲפִלּוּ אָמַר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ לֹא מְהַנֵּי כְּדִלְעֵיל: קט
(יט) רֵישׁ סִימָן כ”ג כו’.
שֶׁהֵן שְׁהִיָּה דְּרָסָה חֲלָדָה הַגְרָמָה וְעִקּוּר שֶׁנִּתְבָּאֵר שָׁם וּבְסִימָן כ”ד: קי
(כ) הַסַּכִּין.
שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּסִימָן י”ח: קיא
(כא) בָּדְקִינָן כוּ’.
אֲבָל אִי אִיתָא קַמָּן וּבְדָקוּהוּ וְנִמְצָא מֻמְחֶה אֵין צָרִיךְ לִבְדּוֹק הַסִּימָנִים דְּכֵיוָן שֶׁהוּא מֻמְחֶה בְּוַדַּאי בָּדַק בַּסִּימָנִים וְכֵן אִי לֵיתָא קַמָּן וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִבְדּוֹק בַּסִּימָנִים כְּגוֹן שֶׁנֶּחְתַּךְ הָרֹאשׁ סָמְכִינָן אַרֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן וּבְוַדַּאי בָּדַק בַּסִּימָנִים (דַּרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה קיב הָרֹא”שׁ קיג וְרַ”ן קיד):
(כב) כְּלָל וְכוּ’.
מִלָּשׁוֹן זֶה מַשְׁמַע דְּאֵין צָרִיךְ לִבְדּוֹק אַחֲרָיו לְעוֹלָם אֲפִלּוּ יֵשׁ זְמַן רַב שֶׁנָּטַל קַבָּלָה. וּמִשּׁוּם הָכִי כָּפַל רְמָ”א דָּבָר זֶה שֶׁכְּבָר כְּתָבוֹ בִּסְעִיף א’ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינָן דְּאֵין נוֹהֲגִים לִבְדּוֹק אַחֲרָיו כְּלָל בְּשׁוּם אֹפֶן בָּעוֹלָם אֲפִלּוּ אַחַר זְמַן מְרֻבֶּה וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן דִּלְמָא שָׁכַח לִמּוּדוֹ (וְכֵן מַשְׁמַע בְּהֶדְיָא בְּדַרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה קטו בְּשֵׁם פִּסְקֵי מהרי”א קטז עַיֵּן שָׁם בְּמהרי”א וּבִרְאָיָתוֹ מִפֶּרֶק אֵין [מַעֲמִידִין] קיז).
וְטַעְמָא דְמִלְּתָא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאוֹקֵי גַבְרָא אַחֶזְקָתֵהּ חֲדָא דְּהִיא חֲזָקָה הָעֲשׂוּיָה [לְהִשְׁתַּנּוֹת] מֵעַצְמָהּ אִם לֹא יַחֲזוֹר עַל לִמּוּדוֹ יִשָּׁכַח מֵאֵלָיו וְאֵינָהּ מוֹצִיאוֹ מֵחֶזְקַת אִסּוּר קיח וְעוֹד דְּהָא רוּבָּא עָדִיף מֵחֲזָקָה קיט וַאֲנַן לֹא סָמְכִינָן אַרֹב מְצוּיִן אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן הֵיכָא דְּאִיתָא קַמָּן וְאֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר קכ וְהֵיכָא סָמְכִינָן אַחֲזָקָה כְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לָחוּשׁ לְשִׁכְחָה. קכא אֶלָּא הַיְנוּ טַעְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן לְשִׁכְחָה כְּלָל מִשּׁוּם [דְּמִלְּתָא] דְּלֹא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא שֶׁיִּשְׁכַּח עִקַּר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה קכב הָרְגִילִין לָבוֹא מֵאַחַר שֶׁהוּא עוֹסֵק תָּדִיר בִּשְׁחִיטָה דְּהָא דְּמַצְרְכִינָן בְּדִיקָה בַּתְּחִלָּה וְלֹא סָמְכִינָן אַרֹב מְצוּיִן אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן הוּא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִעוּט שֶׁאֵינָן מֻמְחִים שְׁכִיחַ כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב לְעֵיל קכג בְּשֵׁם הָרַ”ן וְכֵן כָּתַב רְמָ”א מִדְּהִשְׁוָה דִּין בְּדִיקַת הָרֵיאָה לִשְׁחִיטָה כְּדִלְעֵיל. קכד אֲבָל אַחַר שֶׁנִּבְדַּק וְנִמְצָא שֶׁהוּא מִן הָרֹב שֶׁהֵן מֻמְחִין תּוּ לֵיכָא לְמֵיחַשׁ לְמִדֵּי דְּשִׁכְחָה מִלְּתָא דְּלֹא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא בְּמִי שֶׁהוּא עוֹסֵק בִּשְׁחִיטָה.
אֲבָל אִם הִנִּיחַ וְעָזַב עֵסֶק הַשְּׁחִיטָה זְמַן רַב בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא שָׁכַח עִקָּרֵי הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה כֵּיוָן שֶׁמִּלְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא הִיא שֶׁיִּשְׁכַּח בִּזְמַן רַב כָּזֶה חַיְשִׁינָן וְצָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ קכה כְּאִלּוּ בָּא לִשְׁחוֹט בַּתְּחִלָּה דְּלֹא סָמְכִינָן אַרֹב מְצוּיִן אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן דְּלֹא מוֹקְמִינָן אַחֶזְקָתֵיהּ הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר כְּדִלְעֵיל סְעִיף א' בְּהַגָּ"ה: קכו
[A prospective shochet] need not know all the detailed laws [viii] [that apply to ritual slaughter]. (16) Instead, if he says, “Concerning such a matter, I would be in doubt and I would consult [an authority],” it is still befitting to deem him as one who knows [the laws]. (17) [He is disqualified] only if he states that something that should be forbidden is permitted. (18) [ix] – Note: He is tested concerning the laws of ritual slaughter that will be explained below at the beginning of sec. 23, (19) the laws concerning checking a [slaughtering] knife, (20) and the laws concerning checking simanim [i.e., the gullet and the windpipe] after the slaughter [of the animal] as will be explained below [in] sec. 25 (Hagahos Asheri and Hagahos Maimonios, ch. 4).
If [a person whose proficiency and knowledge is unknown] slaughtered [an animal] and he is [currently] not present so that he can be tested, even so, the simanim [of the slaughtered animal] should be examined (21) to see whether their major portion was slit, for whatever can possibly be checked should be checked (Rabbeinu Nissim in the name of Halachos Gedolos; [this is based on Rama’s] interpretation of Rabbeinu Asher’s conception; see below sec. 25:13).
All the above applies in places where it is not customary [for a shochet] to receive certification. However, in places where it is customary [for a shochet] to receive certification, e.g., the Ashkenazic community and those who follow their practices, it is not customary to check a shochet’s slaughter [of an animal] at all, (22) as explained47 ([this is based on Rama’s] own logic).
באֵין צָרִיךְ [ח] שֶׁיֵּדַע כָּל חִלּוּקֵי הַדִּינִים, (טז) אֶלָּא אִם אוֹמֵר: עַל דָּבָר זֶה הָיִיתִי מִסְתַּפֵּק וְשׁוֹאֵל, קָרֵינָןבֵּהּ שַׁפִּיר יוֹדֵעַ, (יז) עַד שֶׁאוֹמֵר עַל הָאָסוּר [ט] מֻתָּר. (יח) הַגָּה: וּבוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ בְּדִינֵי הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֲרוּ לְקַמָּן רֵישׁ סִימָן כ״ג, (יט) וּבְדִיןבְּדִיקַת הַסַּכִּין, (כ) וּבְדִין בְּדִיקַת הַסִּימָנִים לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר לְקַמָּן סִימָן כ״ה (הַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִי וְהַגָּהוֹת מַיְמוֹנִי פֶּרֶק ד׳ מֵהִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה). וְאִם שָׁחַט וְלֵיתֵהּ קַמָּן לְמִבְדְּקֵהּ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם יִבְדְּקוּ בַּסִּימָנִים אִם נִשְׁחֲטוּ רֻבָּן, דְּכָל מַה דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְמִבְדַּק בָּדְקִינָן (כא) (הָרַ״ן בְּשֵׁם בַּעַל הֲלָכוֹת וְדִבְרֵי עַצְמוֹ לְדַעַת הָרא״ש עַיֵּן לְקַמָּן סכ״ה סי״ג). וְכָל זֶה בִּמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁלֹּא נָהֲגוּ לִטֹּל קַבָּלָה, אֲבָל בִּמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁנּוֹהֲגִין לִטֹּל קַבָּלָה, כְּגוֹן בְּנֵי אַשְׁכְּנַז וְהַנִּמְשָכִים אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אֵין נוֹהֲגִין לִבְדֹּק אַחֲרָיו כְּלָל, (כב) וּכְמוֹ שֶׁנִּתְבָּאֵר (דִּבְרֵי עַצְמוֹ).ֹ
Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (SIE)
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3
(23) His slaughter is invalid –
[The status of the slaughtered animal] resembles that of one that is safek neveilah, [i.e., one about which a doubt exists as to whether it was slaughtered properly] (Rambam, [Hilchos Shechitah 4:1]).60 Nevertheless, [the animal is not definitely placed in that category. The reason is that classifying an animal as] a safek neveilah involves a state of doubt that was brought about because a questionable factor arose, and it is not known whether or not that factor disqualifies [the slaughter].61 In this instance, however, [the animal is not definitively placed in that category] because [we have] no [definite knowledge that such] a questionable factor arose. Instead, we are [merely] concerned [about the possibility] that [the shochet] interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs when slaughtering], and was not aware of doing so, as will be explained62 (Kesef Mishneh, [Hilchos Shechitah, loc. cit.]).
Even if the shochet does not know about the prohibition against [slaughtering with] a blemished knife, Rambam, [Hilchos Shechitah 4:1-2,]63 explains [that the slaughtered animal] is not definitely considered to have died without having been ritually slaughtered. Instead its [status is merely] close to that of [an animal] concerning which there is doubt as to whether it died without being slaughtered.
Nevertheless, Mishmeres HaBayis writes that…. {the continuation of the Alter Rebbe’s text is not extant.}64
(24) Properly –
The intent is that [the shochet] made this statement after he was taught the laws of ritual slaughter (Bayis Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1]; Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:8]). Alternatively, [the shochet] says, “I am certain that I did everything [in the manner] which you are asking of me” (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:12]).
The reason for [disqualifying the slaughter] is that since [the prospective shochet] did not know the laws of ritual slaughter at the time he slaughtered [the animal], it is possible that he interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs when slaughtering] without noticing ([Chulin 9a]). Thus, he will not be sensitive to such an occurrence if it were to happen. [The rationale is that we follow the principle65] that when a person [is not cognizant of] a matter and does not know what is expected of him, he will act without paying attention to [that concern], and he will not remember [what he did]. Therefore, [the shochet’s] word is not accepted if he says that he did not interrupt [the slaughter] or press [the knife against the animal’s organs] (Rashba, [Chulin 9a]; Rabbeinu Asher, [Chulin 1:13]).
(25) The laws of ritual slaughter –
Certainly, if [a person who studied the laws of ritual slaughter] interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs,] he would [inform others of its non-kosher status and] not let [the others] eat [the animal’s meat] (Beis Yosef, [Yoreh Deah 1]).
According to this [conception], the same law would apply if the person remained silent and did not say anything. Since he knows the laws of ritual slaughter, if he interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs,] he would certainly not remain silent and [enable the animal’s meat to be] eaten. [Instead, he would] admit that he interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs] (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:13;] this also appears to be] the approach of [Rav Yosef Caro in his] Shulchan Aruch [Yoreh Deah 1:1].66
According to the approach of Rabbeinu Asher mentioned above66 – that we are concerned that perhaps [the shochet interrupted the slaughter or pressed the knife against the animal’s organs and thus disqualified the slaughter, but] forgot to inform [others] – in this instance, when a person frequently becomes faint, [the animals he slaughtered] are forbidden, even after the fact, if he is not present to be asked [about the matter]. It is desirable to give weight to [Rabbeinu Asher’s] words and rule stringently [since] a Scriptural [prohibition is involved] (Tevuos Shor, sec. 1, note 39).67 Nevertheless, if [the shochet] left [the slaughtered animal] in a place where people do not usually leave the carcasses of animals that were not slaughtered properly, we need not be stringent. See subsection 4 below.68
(26) Until the end –
However, if [the observer did not watch the entire slaughter, but] only saw that [the shochet] slit [either the gullet or the windpipe] properly, and then departed without watching further, we do not say that since [the shochet] slaughtered one of [these organs] properly, [it can be assumed that] he also slaughtered the other [one] properly. Instead, it is possible that [the first organ] just happened [to be slaughtered] properly and perhaps, he interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s other organ while slitting it] (Chulin 12a).
(27) The laws of ritual slaughter –
The concern is – as is the concern regarding a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged person, or a minor [who slaughters], as [stated] below [in] subsection 5 – that perhaps [the shochet] interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs] without the proper attention being paid to this by the person supervising him.
[In his] Shulchan Aruch, [however, Rav Yosef Caro does not rule in this manner because he] maintains that such [a mentally sound adult] does not resemble a deaf-mute, an mentally- or emotionally-challenged person, or a minor. [The difference is that] in general, the actions [of the latter individuals] are disordered, and they are always likely to impair [ritual slaughter]. For this reason, we are concerned about [having them slaughter.] By contrast, the actions of a mentally sound adult are generally proper even though he does not know the laws of ritual slaughter (Rashba, [Chulin 2a]).
When [the degree of knowledge possessed by a shochet is not known, i.e.,] it is not known whether or not he knows the laws of ritual slaughter, all authorities agree that he is permitted to slaughter while others are observing him (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:15]). The intent is that it is not necessary to check [the person’s knowledge] at all since he was observed to have slaughtered correctly. We are not concerned that perhaps he interrupted [the slaughter] or pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs] without the knowledge of the person supervising him because most of the people who perform ritual slaughter are proficient [in the necessary laws]. Even though [this shochet] was not certified, that is not of consequence since an expert is overseeing him, as [explained] above.69
(כג) שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
וַהֲרֵי זוֹ קְרוֹבָה לִסְפֵק נְבֵלָה (רַמְבַּ”ם קכז) לְפִי שֶׁסְּפֵק נְבֵלָה קכח הוּא כְּשֶׁנּוֹלַד בָּהּ דְּבַר מָה וְאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִים אִם הַדָּבָר הַהוּא פּוֹסֵל בָּהּ אִם לָאו קכט אֲבָל כַּאן לֹא נוֹלַד בָּהּ דָּבָר קל אֶלָּא שֶׁאָנוּ חוֹשְׁשִׁין דִּלְמָא שָׁהָה אוֹ דָרַס וְלֹא יָדַע כְּדִלְקַמָּן קלא (כֶּסֶף מִשְׁנֶה קלב). וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִסּוּר פְּגִימַת הַסַּכִּין מְבֹאָר בְּרַמְבַּ”ם קלג דְּאֵינָהּ נְבֵלָה בְּוַדַּאי אֶלָּא קְרוֹבָה לִסְפֵק נְבֵלָה.
אֲבָל בְּמִשְׁמֶרֶת הַבַּיִת כָּתַב קלד (חָסֵר):
(כד) יָפֶה כוּ’.
פֵּרוּשׁ לְאַחַר שֶׁלִּמְּדוּהוּ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה אוֹמֵר כָּךְ (בַּ”ח קלה טַ”ז קלו) אוֹ שֶׁאוֹמֵר בָּרִי לִי שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי כָּל מַה שֶּׁאַתֶּם שׁוֹאֲלִים לִי (שַׁ”ךְ קלז). וְטַעְמָא דְמִלְּתָא דְּכֵיוָן דְּבִשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה לֹא יָדַע הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה זִמְנִין דְּשָׁהָה וְדָרַס וְלֹא יָדַע (גְּמָרָא קלח) פֵּרוּשׁ וְאֵינוֹ מַרְגִּישׁ אִם נִזְדַּמְּנוּ לוֹ דְּכָל מִלְּתָא דְּלָא רַמְיָא עֲלֵיהּ דֶּאֱינָשׁ עָבִיד וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ קלט וְלֹא מִדְכַּר כְּלָל הִלְכָּךְ לֹא מְהֵימַן לוֹמַר לֹא שָׁהִיתִי וְלֹא דָרַסְתִּי (רַשְׁבָּ”א בְּחִדּוּשָׁיו קמ רֹא”שׁ קמא):
(כה) הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה כוּ’.
דְּוַדַּאי אִלּוּ שָׁהָה וְדָרַס לֹא הָיָה מַאֲכִילָהּ לָנוּ (בֵּית יוֹסֵף קמב). וּלְפִי זֶה הוּא הַדִּין אִי קמג שָׁתַק וְאֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר כְּלוּם דְּמֵאַחַר שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וַדַּאי אִלּוּ שָׁהָה אוֹ דָרַס לֹא הָיָה שׁוֹתֵק וְלֹא הָיָה מַאֲכִילָהּ לָנוּ וְהָיָה אוֹמֵר שֶׁשָּׁהָה וְדָרַס (שַׁ”ךְ. קמד וְכֵן דַּעַת הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ קמה).
וּלְפִי דַּעַת הָרֹא”שׁ דִּלְעֵיל קמו דְּחַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא שָׁכַח לְהוֹדִיעַ הָכָא בְּרָגִיל לְהִתְעַלֵּף אָסוּר אֲפִלּוּ בְּדִיעֲבַד אִי לֵיתֵיהּ קַמָּן דְּנִשַׁיְּלֵיהּ. וְטוֹב לָחוּשׁ לִדְבָרָיו וּלְהַחֲמִיר בְּשֶׁל תּוֹרָה (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר קמז). וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם אִם הִנִּיחָהּ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ אֵין לָנוּ לְהַחֲמִיר עַיֵּן סְעִיף ד’: קמח
(כו) סוֹפָהּ.
אֲבָל אִם לֹא רָאָה אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁחַט סִימָן אֶחָד יָפֶה וְהָלַךְ לוֹ וְלֹא רָאָהוּ עוֹד לֹא אָמְרִינָן מִדְּהַאי שָׁחַט שַׁפִּיר אִידָךְ נַמִי שָׁחַט שַׁפִּיר אֶלָּא הַאי אִתְרְמוּיֵי אִתְרְמֵי לֵיהּ אִידָךְ שֶׁמָּא שָׁהָה שֶׁמָּא דָרַס (גְּמָרָא קמט):
(כז) הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה.
חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהֶה וְיִדְרוֹס וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּהַאי דְּעוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו כִּי הֵיכִי דְּחַיְשִׁינָן בְּחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן דִּלְקַמָּן סְעִיף ה’. קנ וְהַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּלֹא דָמֵי לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן דְּרֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם מְקֻלְקָלִים וּמוּעָדִים לְקַלְקֵל תָּמִיד מִשּׁוּם הָכִי חַיְשִׁינָן בְּהוּ לְהָכִי קנא מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּגָדוֹל בֶּן דַּעַת שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה רֹב מַעֲשָׂיו מְתֻקָּנִים הֵם קנב (רַשְׁבָּ”א בְּחִדּוּשָׁיו קנג).
אֲבָל מִן הַסְּתָם שֶׁאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה אִם לָאו לְכוּלֵי עָלְמָא מֻתָּר לִשְׁחוֹט כְּשֶׁאֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבָּיו (שַׁ”ךְ קנד). פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁאָז אֵין צָרִיךְ לְבָדְקוֹ כְּלָל כֵּיוָן שֶׁרָאָה שֶׁשָּׁחַט יָפֶה וְלֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא שָׁהָה וְדָרַס וְלָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְהוּ דְּעוֹמְדִין עַל גַּבָּיו כֵּיוָן דְּרֹב מְצוּיִן אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא נָטַל קַבָּלָה אֵין בְּכָךְ כְּלוּם כֵּיוָן שֶׁמֻּמְחֶה עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו כְּדִלְעֵיל: קנה
When it is known that a person is not knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter – even though he slaughtered [an animal] in our presence four or five times in a proper and befitting manner – [if] afterwards he slaughters in private, [the animal he] slaughtered is invalid. (23) Even if he is asked, “Did you do this and this?”, and it is apparent from his answer that he slaughtered in a proper manner, he should not be relied upon. [This law applies] even if he said, “I am certain that I slaughtered properly.” (24) Note: When a person is [known] to feel faint and we know that it has not been established that he will not [feel faint while slaughtering, if] he slaughters [an animal] and says, “I am certain that I did not faint,” his word is accepted, since he knows the laws of ritual slaughter (25) (Rambam as understood by Beis Yosef ).
When there is a person who is known not to be knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter, it is possible to allow him to slaughter if another person stands [and observes] him, provided [the observer] watches [the shochet] from the beginning of the slaughter until the end. (26) – Note: There are authorities who rule stringently and, as an initial preference, forbid allowing such a person to slaughter since he is not knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter (27) (Beis Yosef in the name of Hagahos Asheri, citing Or Zerua and Mordechai). This is [the accepted] custom.
גמִי שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, אֲפִלּוּ שָׁחַט לְפָנֵינוּ ד׳ אוֹ ה׳ פְּעָמִים שְׁחִיטָה הֲגוּנָה וּרְאוּיָה, וְשָׁחַט אַחַר כָּךְ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. (כג) אֲפִלּוּ שָׁאֲלוּ לוֹ: עָשִׂיתָ כָּךְ וְכָךְ, וּמִתּוֹךְ תְּשׁוּבָתוּ נִרְאֶה שֶׁשָּׁחַט כָּרָאוּי, אֵין לִסְמֹךְ עָלָיו, וַאֲפִלּוּ אָמַר: בָּרִי לִי שֶׁשָּׁחַטְתִּי יָפֶה. (כד) הַגָּה: וּמִי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהִתְעַלֵּף, וְאָנוּ יוֹדְעִים שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻחְזָק, וְשָׁחַט וְאָמַר: בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְעַלַּפְתִּי, נֶאֱמָן, מֵאַחַר שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה (כה) (בֵּית יוֹסֵף לְדַעַת הָרַמְבַּ״ם). מִי שֶׁיּוֹדְעִים בּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, יְכוֹלִים לִתֵּן לוֹ לִשְׁחֹט אִם אַחֵר עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיִּרְאֶה אוֹתוֹ מִתְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה עַד סוֹפָהּ. (כו) הַגָּה: וְיֵשׁ מַחְמִירִין וְאוֹסְרִין לִתֵּן לוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחֹט, מֵאַחַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה (כז) (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם הַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִי בְּשֵׁם אוֹר זָרוּעַ וּבְמָרְדְּכַי), וְהָכִי נָהוּג.
4
(28) Goat-kids or chickens –
The intent is that [the person] recognized [the goat-kids or chickens] as his own because he is familiar with their appearance (i.e., tevias ayin), or he recognized them via a distinguishing mark (i.e., a siman). [In such an instance, the goats or chickens] are not [forbidden because of the prohibition against partaking of] meat that one lost sight of (i.e., basar shenisalem min ha’hayin), as will be mentioned below, in sec. 63;70 consult that source (Turei Zahav [1:10]).
Based on the latter opinion in that source, [sec. 63:]2, which maintains – and this is our custom, as Rama states there – [it can be concluded] that the prohibition against meat that one lost sight of does not apply.71 [In such circumstances, when a person] finds slaughtered goat-kids or chickens that are not his, [the meat from these animals is] permitted when the majority of the population of that city is Jewish and the majority of the slaughterers are Jewish, as stated below in that source.
(29) Stolen –
Even though [the thief] is suspected of stealing, he is not suspected of [partaking of] meat that was not ritually slaughtered. [It can be assumed that] he slaughtered [the animals or chickens appropriately] or gave them to another person to slaughter if he does not know how to slaughter or does not want to trouble himself to examine the slaughtering knife. See sec. 2:6 (Sifsei Kohen, [2:18]).
(30) Located there –
Even if the majority of the people in the city and in the marketplace are non-Jews, but the majority [of those] who frequent the place where [the slaughtered animal or chickens] were found are Jewish, it is assumed [that the animal or chickens were taken by] a Jew. [The opposite is also true.] If the majority of people who frequent [the place where the meat was found] are non-Jews, even if the majority of the people in the city and in the marketplace are Jewish, [the animal or chickens] are forbidden. [The rationale is that the ruling regarding whether the meat is permitted] is entirely dependent on [the majority of those] who frequent the place where [the animal or chickens] were discovered.
If there is an equal number of Jews and non-Jews who frequent the place where [the animal or chickens] were discovered, [the ruling] depends on the majority of those who frequent the [entire] marketplace. If an equal number [of Jews and non-Jews frequent] the marketplace, [the ruling] depends on the majority of the city’s population. If the population of the city is equally divided [between Jews and non-Jews, the animal or chickens] are forbidden. This is the ruling of Sifsei Kohen [(Yoreh Deah 1:17)].
Tevuos Shor sec. 63, [note 2] explains that when Sifsei Kohen states that [the number of Jews and non-Jews who frequent the location] are equal, his intent is that it appears that they are equal.72 If one does not know whether more [Jews or non-Jews] frequent the place where [the animal or chickens] were found, [he should try to determine the makeup of the people who frequent the marketplace]. If, [after investigating the issue,] it became clear that the majority of those who generally frequent the marketplace are Jews, it is assumed that this [same] situation also exists in the place [where the animal or chickens was found]. If it is not clear who constitutes the majority [of those] who frequent the marketplace, [the ruling] depends on the majority of the city’s residents. However, if we know that the place where [the animal or chickens] werefound is equally frequented by Jews and non-Jews, [the animal or chickens] is forbidden. It is of no consequence who constitutes the majority of the city’s population or the marketplace as a whole. Everything depends on the majority [of those] frequenting the place where [the animal or chickens] were found, as Sifsei Kohen rules.
Sifsei Kohen73 [also] states that a similar law applies if there is a majority of non-Jews who frequent that place but the majority of slaughterers in the city are Jewish, [in which instance, the meat] is permitted.
([Moreover, there is room for leniency] even in a city that is primarily populated by non-Jews, when it is not customary for the non-Jews to slaughter in their homes at all, but rather to purchase [meat] from butchers, [i.e., the non-Jews] sell all the animals set aside for [slaughter and for use as] food to the butchers, and they do not slaughter them themselves, as long as the majority of the slaughterers in the butcher shops [in that city] are Jewish. [The ruling] depends on the majority of the butchers, who [in this instance] are Jewish. We assume that [after the lost or stolen animals] were found, they were taken to one [of the Jewish butchers] who slaughtered them. [Therefore, the meat is permitted] even though [the slaughtered animals] were found in a place where the majority [of those] who frequent [that place] are non-Jews and the majority of the [population of the] city {are non-Jews, since the majority of the people who frequent that place as well as the majority of the population} do not slaughter themselves at all; only the slaughterers [do the slaughtering. Hence, the situation] resembles [the law that applies when] the majority of the slaughterers [are Jewish], as mentioned above.(
Nevertheless, [the fact that] the majority of butchers [are Jewish] is significant specifically with regard to animals but not to fowl, because it is customary to slaughter [fowl] at home. This concludes [Sifsei Kohen’s] words. Similar statements are found in Beis Yosef [Yoreh Deah 1]. By contrast, Tevuos Shor [sec. 1, note 41] understands Beis Yosef [as forbidding a person’s lost animal that he found slaughtered even when the majority of the butchers are Jewish, if the majority of the city’s residents are non-Jews.]
(31) Are Jewish –
This [ruling] applies specifically when [the animals or chickens] were stolen.74 If, however, they were lost, we do not suspect that they were [first] stolen [and subsequently lost]. Instead, we assume that they escaped from [the owner’s] house and they were found by a Jew who thought that the owner had despaired [of finding them] (Mordechai, [Orach Chayim, sec. 594]). [We assume that] afterwards [the finder] changed his mind [and decided] to return them, or they fell from [his hand].75
When [the animals or chickens] were stolen, it is only necessary that the majority of the thieves in the city are Jewish [for them to be permitted] even when the majority of the people who frequent the place where they were found are not Jewish, and even if the majority of the residents of the city are not Jewish. Sifsei Kohen76 rules in this manner.
The intent of Rama’s words, “and also…,” [which might lead to the impression that the majority of those who frequent the place must also be Jewish,] is that in such a situation, [the meat or chickens] are permitted whether they were stolen or lost. Even if that was not [Rama’s] intent, fundamentally, [the halachah follows the view] of Sifsei Kohen, since Pri Chadash [1:19] and Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 43,] also rule in this manner.
If, however, the majority of the thieves in the city are non-Jews, [the animals or chickens] are forbidden, even if most of the slaughterers in the city are Jewish.31 [The rationale is that] we do not assume that one of the slaughterers stole them, for they do not have an established reputation as thieves. Nor can it be assumed that the thief sold [the animalsor chickens] to [a Jewish slaughterer] because he would be afraid to sell [them] in his city.81
(32) Permitted –
[This ruling is based on the principle that] most of those who frequently slaughter are assumed to be proficient [in the necessary laws]. Nevertheless, whenever possible, as an initial preference, one should examine the simanim [of the slaughtered animal] to see that it was slaughtered in a proper manner, as stated in [Rama’s] note to subsection 2 above (Darchei Moshe, Yoreh Deah [1:15]; Simlah Chadashah [1:25]).
Simlah Chadashah [1:27,] writes that in the present era, [when it is customary] to appoint specific people [to oversee] ritual slaughter,77 [when a slaughtered animal or fowl is discovered,] an investigation should be conducted among the shochtim, for perhaps it will be clarified that they did not slaughter it. If it is impossible to clarify [the identity of the shochet], we should be stringent when [the animal or fowl] was stolen, even if most of the thieves are Jewish. There are grounds for concern that [the thief] was afraid to go to [a Jewish] shochet lest his [theft] be revealed publicly.
[Although it is customary] to permit [an animal or fowl] that was lost, nevertheless, may blessings rest upon one who conducts himself stringently even regarding [an animal or fowl] that was lost because all these matters involve Scriptural [prohibitions] and it is easy to [unknowingly] transgress and violate the prohibition against eating [meat from] an animal that was not slaughtered correctly.
(33) At home –
[The slaughtered animal’s meat is permitted] if found on a road (Bava Metzia 24[b]) for it is not common for a person to cast the carcass of an improperly slaughtered animal in the dung heap of a house, nor in the marketplace, nor on a road, but rather in the dung heap in the marketplace [(Chulin 12a)]. Therefore, [the animal’s or fowl’s meat is permitted] in these instances, although there is a negatively implicating factor – that [the animals or fowl] were found slaughtered and cast away. This [would appear to] substantiate [the assertion] that they were disqualified during their slaughter, and for that reason they were cast away – for it is not so common for people to destroy a stolen object and not return it.78 Nevertheless, [we permit the animals or fowl, for] we assume that the latter alternative took place and not that they were cast away because they were slaughtered improperly. [The rationale is that] it is not common practice for a person to cast away the carcass of an animal [anywhere] but in a dung heap in the marketplace.
[Thus,] if there is no indication [that the animal was slaughtered improperly], we do not suspect that the animal was slaughtered invalidly, for there is a prevailing assumption that an intellectually sound person would not let an invalidly slaughtered [animal] be taken from under his hand, against his will, as stated in [the Kuntreis Acharon, note 2, to] sec. 2, below ([see] Tevuos Shor, sec. 1, note 7). [Consequently,] in places where it is common to cast the carcasses of unslaughtered or improperly slaughtered animals in other places besides dung heaps, [the meat of an animal that was cast away] is forbidden (Tevuos Shor, note 44).
(34) In the market place –
[This ruling applies] even if [the dung heap] is not three handbreadths high79 (Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:11]; Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:21].
(כח) גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו.
פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁמַּכִּירֵם בִּטְבִיעוּת עַיִן אוֹ בְּסִימָן שֶׁהֵם שֶׁלּוֹ דְּאֵין בָּהֶם מִשּׁוּם בָּשָׂר שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִן הָעַיִן דִּלְקַמָּן סִימָן ס"ג קנו עַיֵּן שָׁם (טַ"ז קנז). וְלִסְבָרָא הָאַחֲרוֹנָה דִּלְקַמָּן שָׁם סְעִיף ב' קנח וְכֵן מִנְהָגֵנוּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב רְמָ"א שָׁם קנט דְּלֵית לָן, אִסּוּר בָּשָׂר שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִן הָעַיִן אַף הַמּוֹצֵא גְּדָיִים וְתַרְנְגוֹלִים שְׁחוּטִים שֶׁאֵינָן שֶׁלּוֹ קס מֻתָּרִים אִם רֹב הָעִיר יִשְׂרָאֵל וְרֹב טַבָּחִים יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּדִלְקַמָּן שָׁם: קסא
(כט) שֶׁנִּגְנְבוּ.
שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָשׁוּד עַל הַגְּנֵבָה אֵינוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַנְּבֵלָה קסב וְשׁוֹחֵט אוֹ נוֹתֵן לְאַחֵר לִשְׁחוֹט אִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לִשְׁחוֹט אוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לִטְרוֹחַ בִּבְדִיקַת הַסַּכִּין עַיֵּן סִימָן ב' סְעִיף ו' קסג (שַׁ"ךְ שָׁם קסד):
(ל) מְצוּיִים.
אֲפִלּוּ רֹב הָעִיר וְהַשּׁוּק נָכְרִים אֶלָּא שֶׁבְּמָקוֹם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בּוֹ רֹב יִשְׂרָאֵל מְצוּיִים בּוֹ בְּמָקוֹם זֶה תְּלִינָן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. קסה וְכֵן אִם רֹב נָכְרִים מְצוּיִים בּוֹ אֲפִלּוּ רֹב הָעִיר וְהַשּׁוּק יִשְׂרָאֵל אָסוּר דְּהַכֹּל תָּלוּי בִּמְצוּיִים בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בּוֹ. וְאִם יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנָכְרִים מְצוּיִים שָׁוִים בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בּוֹ אָזְלִינָן בָּתַר רֹב הַשּׁוּק וְאִם שָׁוִים בַּשּׁוּק אָזְלִינָן בָּתַר רֹב הָעִיר וְאִם שָׁוִים בָּעִיר אָסוּר. כֵּן כָּתַב הַשַּׁ"ךְ. קסו
וּפֵרֵשׁ הַתְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר סִימָן ס"ג קסז דְּהַאי מְצוּיִין שָׁוִין הַיְנוּ שָׁוִין לְמַרְאִית הָעַיִן וְאִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מִי מָצוּי יוֹתֵר בִּמְקוֹם הַמְּצִיאָה אָז אִם נִתְבָּרֵר לָנוּ שֶׁבִּכְלַל הַשּׁוּק מְצוּיִים רֹב יִשְׂרָאֵל אָמְרִינָן מִסְתָּמָא גַּם כַּאן הוּא כֵּן. וְכֵן אִם לֹא נִתְבָּרֵר בַּשּׁוּק מִי הֵם רֹב הַמְּצוּיִים שָׁם אָזְלִינָן בָּתַר רֹב הָעִיר. אֲבָל אִם יָדוּעַ לָנוּ שֶׁבִּמְקוֹם הַמְּצִיאָה יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנָכְרִים מְצוּיִים שָׁוִים אָסוּר וְלֹא מְהַנֵּי רֹב הָעִיר וְהַשּׁוּק דְּהַכֹּל תָּלוּי בְּרֹב מְצוּיִין בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בּוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב הַשַּׁ"ךְ [י].
וְכָתַב הַשַּׁ"ךְ קסח דְּהוּא הַדִּין אִם רֹב נָכְרִים מְצוּיִים שָׁם אֶלָּא שֶׁרֹב הַטַּבָּחִים שֶׁבָּעִיר הֵם יִשְׂרָאֵל מֻתָּר (וַאֲפִלּוּ בְּעִיר שֶׁרֻבָּהּ נָכְרִים אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ הַנָּכְרִים לִשְׁחוֹט כְּלָל בְּבָתֵּיהֶם אֶלָּא לִקַּח מִמְּקוֹלִין וְכָל בַּהֲמוֹתֵיהֶן הָעוֹמְדִים לַאֲכִילָה הֵם מוֹכְרִין לִמְקוֹלִין וְאֵינָם שׁוֹחֲטִים בְּעַצְמָן וּבִמְקוֹלִין הֵם רֹב טַבָּחִים יִשְׂרָאֵל אָזְלִינָן בָּתַר רֹב הַטַּבָּחִים שֶׁהֵם יִשְׂרָאֵל וּתְלִינָן שֶׁאֶחָד מֵהֶם מְצָאָן וּשְׁחָטָן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁמְּצוּיִין רֹב נָכְרִים וְגַם רֹב הָעִיר [נָכְרִים כֵּיוָן שֶׁרֹב הַמְּצוּיִין שָׁם וְרֹב הָעִיר קסט] אֵינָן שׁוֹחֲטִין כְּלָל בְּעַצְמָן אֶלָּא הַטַּבָּחִים לְבַדָּן וְדָמֵי לְרֹב טַבָּחִים דִּלְעֵיל קע).
וּמִיהוּ דַּוְקָא בִּבְהֵמוֹת מְהַנֵּי רֹב טַבָּחִים וְלֹא בְּעוֹפוֹת שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לְשָׁחֲטָן בַּבַּיִת עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ. וְכֵן הוּא בְּבֵית יוֹסֵף קעא דְּלֹא כִּתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר קעב בְּשֵׁם הַבֵּית יוֹסֵף:
(לא) יִשְׂרְאֵלִים.
אַנִּגְנְבוּ דַוְקָא קָאֵי. קעג אֲבָל בְּנֶאֶבְדוּ לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא נִגְנְבוּ אֶלָּא תְּלִינָן שֶׁבָּרְחוּ מִבֵּיתוֹ וּמְצָאָם יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהָיָה סָבוּר שֶׁנִּתְיָאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים (מָרְדְּכַי קעד) וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְלַךְ לְהַחֲזִירָם קעה אוֹ שֶׁנָּפְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ. קעו
וּבְנִגְנְבוּ לֹא בָּעִינָן אֶלָּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה רֹב גַּנָּבֵי הָעִיר יִשְׂרְאֵלִים וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רֹב יִשְׂרָאֵל מְצוּיִים בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ וַאֲפִלּוּ רֹב הָעִיר נָכְרִים כֵּן כָּתַב הַשַּׁ"ךְ. קעז וּמַה שֶּׁכָּתַב רְמָ"א וְגַם קעח כוּ' רוֹצֶה לוֹמַר דְּאָז מֻתָּר בֵּין בְּנִגְנְבוּ בֵּין בְּנֶאֶבְדוּ. וְאַף אִם לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְזֶה קעט הָעִקָּר בְּזֶה כְּהַשַּׁ"ךְ שֶׁכֵּן פָּסַק הַפְּרִי חָדָשׁ קפ וּתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר. קפא
אֲבָל אִם רֹב גַּנָּבֵי הָעִיר נָכְרִים אַף שֶׁרֹב טַבָּחֵי הָעִיר יִשְׂרָאֵל אָסוּר קפב דְּלֹא תְּלִינָן שֶׁאֶחָד מֵהַטַּבָּחִים גְּנָבָם כֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵינָן מֻחְזָקִים בְּגַנָּבִים וְגַם אֵין לִתְלוֹת שֶׁהַגַּנָּב מְכָרָם לָהֶם כִּי הוּא מִתְיָרֵא לִמְכּוֹר בְּעִירוֹ:
(לב) מֻתָּרִים.
דְּרֹב מְצוּיִים אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מֻמְחִין הֵן. וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם הֵיכָא דְאֶפְשָׁר יִבְדּוֹק בַּסִּימָנִים לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִרְאוֹת אִם נִשְׁחֲטוּ כָּרָאוּי כְּדִלְעֵיל סְעִיף ב' בְּהַגָּ"ה (דַּרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה קפג שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה קפד).
וְכָתַב הַשִּׂמְלָה [חֲדָשָׁה] קפה דְּעַכְשָׁו שֶׁמְּמַנִּים אֲנָשִׁים יְדוּעִים עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה יֵשׁ לַחֲקוֹר אֵצֶל הַשּׁוֹחֲטִים שֶׁמָּא יִתְבָּרֵר שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחֲטוּ עַל יָדָם וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהִתְבָּרֵר יֵשׁ לְהַחֲמִיר בְּנִגְנָב אֲפִלּוּ בְּרֹב גַּנָּבֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל דְּיֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁנִּתְיָרֵא לֵילֵךְ לְהַשּׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא תִגָּלֶה רָעָתוֹ בַּקָּהָל וּלְהַתִּיר בְּנֶאֱבָד וְהַמַּחְמִיר גַּם בְּנֶאֱבָד תָּבֹא עָלָיו בְּרָכָה דְּכָל עִנְיָנִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה וּבְקַל יוּכַל לְהַכְשִׁיל בְּאִסּוּר נְבֵלוֹת עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ:
(לג) שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
בֵּין שֶׁמְּצָאָן בַּדֶּרֶךְ (גְּמָרָא בָּבָא מְצִיעָא כ"ד) שֶׁאֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בָּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת וְלֹא בַּשּׁוּק וְלֹא בַּדֶּרֶךְ אֶלָּא בָּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק (גְּמָרָא קפו). וְהִלְכָּךְ אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא הָכָא רֵעוּתָא שֶׁמְּצָאָן שְׁחוּטִים וּמֻשְׁלָכִים וְזוֹ הוֹכָחָה שֶׁנִּתְנַבְּלוּ בִּשְׁחִיטָתָן וּמִפְּנֵי כָּךְ הִשְׁלִיכָן שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין דֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם כָּל כָּךְ לְאַבֵּד וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיר הַגְּנֵבָה קפז אֲפִלּוּ הָכִי תְּלִינָן בְּהָכִי וְלֹא שֶׁהִשְׁלִיכָן בְּכַוָּנָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּתְנַבְּלוּ כֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ אֶלָּא בָּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק. קפח אֲבָל בְּלֹא הוֹכָחָה לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן כְּלָל שֶׁמָּא נִתְנַבְּלוּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה קפט דַּחֲזָקָה עַל בֶּן דַּעַת שֶׁאֵין קִלְקוּלֵי שְׁחִיטָה יוֹצְאִים מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ בְּמִקְרֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְצוֹנוֹ כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן ב' קצ (וּבִתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר קצא). וּבִמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁרְגִילִין לְהַטִּיל נְבֵלוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בָּאַשְׁפָּה אָסוּר (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר קצב) [יא]:
[The following rules apply] if [a person’s] goat-kids or chickens (28) were lost or stolen (29) and he finds them slaughtered in the proper manner: [Should he find them] in a place where the majority of the people located there (30) are Jewish – note: and also, the majority of the thieves in the city are Jewish (31) – they are permitted. (32) [This ruling applies] whether he found them in the marketplace or in a dung heap of a home. (33) However, if he found them in a dung heap in the marketplace, (34) they are forbidden.
דאִם אָבְדוּ גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו (כח) אוֹ שֶׁנִּגְנְבוּ, (כט) וּמְצָאָם שְׁחוּטִים כָּרָאוּי, בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁרֹב יִשְׂרָאֵל מְצוּיִים, (ל) הַגָּה: וְגַם רֹב גַּנָּבֵי הָעִיר יִשְׂרְאֵלִים, (לא) מֻתָּרִים, (לב) בֵּין שֶׁמְּצָאָם בַּשּׁוּק בֵּין שֶׁמְּצָאָם בָּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, (לג) אֲבָל אִם מְצָאָם בָּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק, (לד) אֲסוּרִים.
5
(35) Speaks –
[Such a person is governed by] the same laws as a mentally- or emotionally- challenged person,80 because [his disability is so severe that] he lacks the capacity [to make proper, rational decisions].81
(36) What is given –
[This does not necessarily refer to a person] who purposely casts away [objects of value.] Even when a person does not [display that degree of mental or emotional incapacity], but – as a result of his mental or emotional incapacity – merely does not know how to keep [his property safe], for example, due to his incapacity, he places [things] in a place where [they] will [eventually] be lost, [he is placed in this category] (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 45]).
[By mentioning] these four instances, [the authorities] are not saying that these are the only [defining signs of intellectual or emotional incapacity]. Instead, whoever performs any action in an irrational and bizarre manner is placed in this category (Beis Yosef, [Yoreh Deah 1], citing Rambam, [Hilchos Eidus 9:9]).
In Choshen Mishpat, sec. 35, Beis Yosef derived from Rambam’s words [(loc. cit.)] that [a person] is not categorized as mentally- or emotionally-challenged if he carries out any of the above actions only once. Instead, it must be his common practice [to act in this manner]. Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 46, differs and] derives from the statements of Tosafos [(Chagigah 3b), that even if a person performs such an action only] once, he is placed in the above category since he acted in an irrational manner [that one time].82 If [the person] does not act in such a manner again, [it does not indicate that he was not mentally- or-emotionally-challenged when he performed the irrational act. Rather,] it can be said that [after acting irrationally, the person] became healthy and regained his mental and emotional capacity, if we know that the reason he no longer acts in this manner is indeed because of his [newfound] mental and emotional stability.
[In] Darchei Moshe, [Rama writes], “Note all the laws concerning a mentally- or emotionally-challenged person [outlined] in Choshen Mishpat, sec. 35.” [From these words,] it appears that he maintains that even the extremely foolish and deranged, whose minds are in a state of disquiet and frenzy, can be considered to be mentally- or emotionally-challenged with regard to ritual slaughter, as is true regarding testimony [in court], as explained in Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit. (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 50]). See Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit., regarding all the laws applying to mentally- or emotionally-challenged individuals.
(37) An [uncontrolled,] irrational manner –
The intent is that it is clearly known that there is no rational reason for such conduct other than this person’s intellectual or emotional incapacity. Even if there is room to say that his conduct could be attributed to an uncommon factor, for example, a person sleeps in a cemetery, [and such] behavior could be attributed to his desire to [have] an impure spirit rest upon him, we do not attribute [his behavior to that] factor ([Chagigah 3b;] Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 47]). However, if the person performs all the [unsound] actions [mentioned by Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch], but does not do so in an uncontrolled, irrational manner, he is not considered to be mentally- or emotionally-challenged ([Chagigah, loc. cit.]).
(38) Even if there are others supervising them –
[The rationale for disqualifying such persons even when they are supervised is that] it is likely that they will invalidate [the slaughter] since the majority of their actions are impaired because they lack intellectual maturity and responsibility.83 [Therefore,] we are concerned that they will invalidate the ritual slaughter by interrupting [it] or pressing [the knife against the animal’s neck] without the supervisors realizing this (Rashi [Chulin 2b]; Rashba, [Chulin 2a]).84
(39) Provided others are supervising them –
[I.e., the supervisors] saw that [the individual in question] slaughtered properly from the beginning [of the process] until the end, as stated in subsection 3 above.85 [The rationale is that] after the fact, we do not suspect that the supervisors did not take notice [of all the factors involved.]
(40) To dogs –
[I.e., the person] is [only] slaughtering [the animal in a halachically accepted manner] to train himself [in that craft] (Rashba, [Chulin 2a]). The reason [for the prohibition] is concern that an observer will see that [these individuals] are being allowed to perform ritual slaughter and [as a result] will err and say that the slaughter performed by such individuals is kosher, and they will partake of [such meat] (Tosafos, [Chulin 2a]). The same law and logic apply with regard to a mentally competent adult who does not know the laws of ritual slaughter,[and] who [nevertheless] slaughters without an expert supervising him.
[However,] if an expert is supervising [the slaughterer], it is permitted to allow even a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, or a minor to slaughter if [the owner of the animal] desires to feed the meat to dogs. [In such an instance,] there is no concern that one might eat from [an animal] slaughtered by such an individual because [such a slaughter] is acceptable after the fact when [an expert] supervises [the entire process] (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:26]).
For this reason, it is permissible to allow an expert [shochet] who has yet to establish that he can slaughter without becoming faint to slaughter [animals] to feed to dogs even though an expert is not supervising him. [The rationale is that an animal that such a person] slaughters is [permitted] after the fact, as stated above.86
When it is necessary that a person who is not an expert [shochet] slaughter animals to feed [the meat to] dogs or non-Jews, he should stab them to death or pull out their gullets and windpipes so that it will be evident to everyone that [the animal] was killed without being ritually slaughtered. He should not slaughter, even using a blemished knife or invalidate the slaughter in another way that is not [clearly] evident to [an observer], lest a mishap occur and there be those who partake of [the animal’s meat.] (However, [if a person seeking to hone his skills at ritual slaughter] is able to slaughter [animals] in a [halachically acceptable] manner by [having] an expert [supervise him], he should not needlessly kill animals [merely for practice]), as will be mentioned below, in sec. 23[:23]. Consult that source (Tevuos Shor [sec. 1, note 33]).
(41) As an initial preference –
According to the understanding of Rama – [see] his note at the end of [sec. 1:]3 – this applies when [the minor] is knowledgeable regarding the laws of ritual slaughter (Pri Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1:28]). After the fact, [the animal that a minor has] slaughtered is [deemed halachically acceptable] when others supervise him [and testify that he slaughtered in a valid manner], even if he does not know the laws of ritual slaughter and is not trained [in this craft]. This is the understanding of [Rav Yosef Caro in his] Shulchan Aruch, based on the approach of Rabbeinu Asher [Chulin 1:4] and Rabbeinu Nissim [Sukkah 20b].
(42) The laws of ritual slaughter –
[As Rama notes, this law applies even if the minor is] proficient in the craft of ritual slaughter (Hagahos Asheri, [Chulin 1:4]; Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:27]). [The rationale is that] since the minor is not intellectually mature, he is considered likely to impair [the slaughter] at all times. The majority of his actions will be impaired even though he knows how to perform [ritual slaughter]. Therefore, the blood of [an undomesticated animal or fowl] slaughtered by such a minor is exempt from [the mitzvah of] covering its blood because it is [deemed as] certainly having been slaughtered improperly, as will be stated in sec. 28.87
Even if [the minor] says that he slaughtered [the animal] in an appropriate manner, [his word is not believed,] because a minor’s word is not accepted as valid (Rabbeinu Nissim, [Sukkah 20b]; Maharshal, [Yam shel Shlomoh, Chulin 1:3]; Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 61,] in the name of Or Zerua). Even though [the minor] has the ability to slaughter in the proper manner because he knows the craft [of ritual slaughter], nevertheless, since ritual slaughter is a Scriptural requirement, his word [that he slaughtered correctly] is not accepted. It is specifically women and servants whose word is accepted even regarding a Scriptural requirement,88 provided they have the capacity [to fulfill the requirement]. However, a minor’s word is not accepted except regarding Rabbinical matters that do not have a basis in Scriptural Law, [as will be explained] at the end of sec. 127.89
Nevertheless, it is common practice to send [an animal or fowl] with a boy or girl below the age of majority [to bring to] a shochet. There is no concern that they will slaughter [the animal or fowl] themselves, because the presumption is that they are observant. Thus, we operate under the assumption that [the minor] will not [cause the animal or fowl to] be disqualified [for consumption,] and [thereby] cause [others to violate a prohibition when they partake of the meat] (Mishmeres HaBayis, [Bayis 1, Shaar 1]).
([The principle that] the majority of [a minor’s] actions are impaired only applies to matters that [the minor] performed himself, and was entrusted to perform. However, when [a minor] was not entrusted to perform [an action himself], but rather [was entrusted] to bring [an object] to another person to perform the act, it can be assumed that he will not perform [the act] himself, thereby disqualifying [the object] and causing [others to violate a prohibition. The rationale is that] we operate under the presumption that [the minor] is observant. Similarly, there is no concern that perhaps he brought [the animal or fowl] to a non-Jew or another person who is disqualified from slaughtering to slaughter, and [that person] slaughtered it. [Rather,] it is assumed that [a minor] will not cause [others to violate a prohibition], since we operate under the presumption that [the minor] is observant.
If, however, a minor has an established reputation for evil conduct, [an animal or fowl] should not be sent with him [for ritual slaughter] lest he slaughter it himself so that he could take the payment designated for the shochet for himself. [When sending an animal or fowl with an observant minor to be slaughtered, the minor] must also be capable of mature thought and know to be vigilant. If that is not the case, there is room for concern that a non-Jew will take the money designated for the shochet from the minor, and slaughter [the animal or fowl] for him, or [that] another disqualifying [factor will arise] (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 62]).
It is also customary to send a precocious male or female minor who is capable of mature thought and knows to be careful to buy meat from a [kosher] butcher shop, despite the fact that most of the butchers [in the city] are non-Jews. There is no concern that [the minor] will purchase [the meat] from a [butcher who is a] non-Jew because it is assumed that he will not do something that brings about a prohibition.
The statement that a minor’s word is not accepted applies only regarding his testimony concerning actions performed by others or by himself when there are grounds to say that the action was not performed or that it was performed in an invalid manner. [Furthermore, the] matter [in question must be one] that it is highly likely [that the minor] will perform unsatisfactorily, and that most of his actions in this regard are impaired, e.g., ritual slaughter, as mentioned [at the beginning of this note]. When it is necessary to rely on [the minor’s] word that the action was performed or that he performed it in a valid manner without impairing it – these are the situations about which it is said that we do not rely on a minor’s word. However, in the present situation [– when a minor is sent to purchase meat –] we are not relying on his word or his testimony, but rather on the prevailing assumption that he will not perform an action that disqualifies a matter and that causes [others to sin]. The minor’s statements are not the determining factor in such an instance. [Thus, the principle] that a minor’s word is not accepted does not apply, because the acceptance of his word is not relevant here at all. (Pri Megadim90).
[Regarding] the practice of sending a minor to ask a Rabbinic authority regarding whether a matter is forbidden or permitted – we rely on the statements of the minor. The reason is that [the minor] is afraid to tell an untruth because [he realizes] the Rabbinic authority is aware [of how he ruled, and] it is possible that he will be asked (Beis Hillel [120:2]).
[It should be noted that] it is specifically a minor who has an established reputation for observance whose word we rely on in situations where he is afraid to tell an untruth. [Furthermore, we rely on such a minor’s word] even [in instances] regarding a Scriptural [command]. However, it is only regarding Rabbinic prohibitions that we rely on the word of a non-Jew or a Jew who is suspected [of transgressing] in a situation where [the rationale to accept his word is that] he would be afraid to lie lest inquiries be made and his statements be contradicted, as Rama states in [Yoreh Deah] 119:19.91
Therefore, when one sends [an animal or fowl] with a non-Jew to be slaughtered, the shochet must write [the sender a note] that he slaughtered [the animal or fowl] for him. We do not rely on the fact that the non-Jew [or a Jew who is suspect of transgressing] will be afraid to lie. It is not sufficient [for the shochet] to write merely the word “kosher” [on the note] because there are non-Jews who can forge this word.
Also, the sender must recognize the fowl he sent as a result of his familiarity with its appearance (i.e., tevias ayin) or via a distinguishing mark (i.e., a siman). Were that not the case, there are grounds to suspect that the non-Jew exchanged the fowl that the shochet slaughtered with another fowl that he slaughtered himself. If [the sender] does not have a clear means of recognizing [the fowl], it is forbidden [to partake of the fowl].
(The fact that the shochet made a sign [on the fowl] is not sufficient, unless he does so in a manner similar to that which will be explained in sec. 118.92 Shochtim have the custom of cutting off a claw of the fowl [as a distinguishing sign]. This is not sufficient because a non-Jew is capable of doing the same on another fowl.) May blessings rest upon one who is stringent and does not send [a fowl] to a shochet via a non-Jew even though he recognizes his fowl because of its appearance, lest he not fully recognize it [and err] (Turei Zahav, ([Yoreh Deah 1:15]).
(43) To be careful –
[This is necessary because] ritual slaughter requires a settled mind and the fear of G‑d. Support [for the concept that until] the age of eighteen, [a person might lack these qualities can be derived from the conduct of King] Yoshiyahu who returned all payment [he had expropriated from litigants] when delivering judgments before he reached the age of eighteen93 (Maharshal, [Yam Shel Shlomo, Chulin 1:1]). Even though according to [the letter of] the law, there is no need [to prevent a younger man from slaughtering], nevertheless, the Rabbis saw the need for a safeguard and applied a stringency (Shiltei Gibborim, [Chulin 1:1]).94
Nevertheless, [there is no hard and fast rule regarding the matter. Instead,] everything is dependent on [the level of maturity of] the youth [involved]. At times, there will be a youth who is learned in the Torah and ardently G‑d-fearing. It is common to grant [such a youth] permission [to slaughter] and certify him as proficient from the age of thirteen and onward (Maharshal, [loc. cit.]; Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:16]).
(לו) שֶׁנּוֹתְנִים.
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַשְׁלִיךְ בְּיָדוֹ לְאִבּוּד אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לִשְׁמוֹר מִפְּנֵי שְׁטוּתוֹ כְּגוֹן שֶׁמַּנִּיחוֹ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁיִּפּוֹל לְאִבּוּד וְקָעָבִיד דֶּרֶךְ שְׁטוּת (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר קצח). וְהַנֵּי ד' דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ לָאו דַּוְקָא אֶלָּא הוּא הַדִּין לְעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר מִן הַדְּבָרִים דֶּרֶךְ טֵרוּף וְשִׁבּוּשׁ הַדַּעַת בִּכְלַל שׁוֹטִים יֵחָשֵׁב (בֵּית יוֹסֵף קצט בְּשֵׁם הָרַמְבַּ"ם ר).
וּבְחֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט סִימָן ל"ה לָמַד הַבֵּית יוֹסֵף רא מִדִּבְרֵי הָרַמְבַּ"ם רב דְּלֹא מִקְרֵי שׁוֹטֶה בְּפַעַם אַחַת שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה אַחַת מֵאֵלּוּ אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ בְּכָךְ. וְהַתְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רג לָמַד מִדִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹסְפוֹת רד דִּבְפַעַם אַחַת מִקְרֵי שׁוֹטֶה כֵּיוָן דְּקָעָבִיד דֶּרֶךְ שְׁטוּת וּמַה שֶּׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה עוֹד כֵּן יֵשׁ לוֹמַר שֶׁהִבְרִיא וְנִתְפַּקַּח אִם יָדַעְנוּ שֶׁמְּנִיעוּתוֹ מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת עוֹד כֵּן הוּא מֵחֲמַת פִּקְחוּת.
[וְכָתַב רה] בְּדַרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה רו עַיֵּן בְּחֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט סִימָן ל"ה כָּל דִּינֵי שׁוֹטֶה עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ מַשְׁמַע דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁאַף הַפְּתָאִים בְּיוֹתֵר וְהַמִּשְׁתַּגְּעִים בְּיוֹתֵר וְהַמְבֹהָלִים וְנֶחְפָּזִים בְּדַעְתָּם בִּכְלַל שׁוֹטִים הֵם לְעִנְיַן שְׁחִיטָה כְּמוֹ לְעִנְיַן עֵדוּת כִּמְבֹאָר בְּחֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט שָׁם רז (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רח). וְעַיֵּן שָׁם רט בְּחֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט כָּל דִּינֵי שׁוֹטֶה:
(לז) דֶּרֶךְ שְׁטוּת.
פֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁנּוֹדַע בְּבֵרוּר שֶׁאֵין סִבָּה לַעֲשִׂיָּה זוֹ כִּי אִם מֵחֲמַת שְׁטוּתוֹ וַאֲפִלּוּ אִיכָּא לְמִתְלֵי בְּמִלְּתָא דְּלֹא שְׁכִיחָא כְּגוֹן הַלָּן בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת דְּאִיכָּא לְמִתְלֵי שֶׁמִּתְכַּוֵּן כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּשְׁרֶה עָלָיו רוּחַ הַטֻּמְאָה לֹא תְּלִינָן (גְּמָרָא. רי תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר ריא). וְאִי לֹא עָבִיד דֶּרֶךְ שְׁטוּת אֲפִלּוּ עָבִיד כּוּלְהוּ לֹא מַחְזְקִינָן לֵיהּ בְּשׁוֹטֶה (גְּמָרָא ריב):
(לח) אֲפִלּוּ אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם.
לְפִי שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁמּוּעָדִים לְקַלְקֵל ריג מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם דַּעַת וְרֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם מְקֻלְקָלִים ריד חַיְשִׁינָן שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ שְׁחִיטָתָן בִּשְׁהִיָּה אוֹ דְרָסָה וְלָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְהוּ דְּעוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם רטו (רַשִׁ"י וְרַשְׁבָּ"א):
(לט) אִם אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם.
וְרָאוּ שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ יָפֶה מִתְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה וְעַד סוֹפָהּ כְּדִלְעֵיל סְעִיף ג' רטז דִּבְדִיעֲבַד לֹא חַיְשִׁינָן דִּלְמָא לָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְהוּ דְּעוֹמְדִין עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם:
(מ) לִכְלָבִים.
וְשׁוֹחֲטִין כְּדֵי לְהִתְלַמֵּד (רַשְׁבָּ"א ריז). וְטַעְמָא מִשּׁוּם חֲשַׁשׁ הָרוֹאִים שֶׁמּוֹסְרִים לָהֶם לִשְׁחוֹט שֶׁלֹּא יִטְעוּ לוֹמַר שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה הִיא וְאָתוּ לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ (תּוֹסְפוֹת ריח). וְהוּא הַדִּין וְהוּא הַטַּעַם בְּגָדוֹל בֶּן דַּעַת שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וְאֵין מֻמְחֶה עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו. ריט וּכְשֶׁמֻּמְחֶה עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו מֻתָּר לִמְסוֹר אֲפִלּוּ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן אִם רוֹצִים לְהַאֲכִיל לִכְלָבִים דְּלֵיכָא לְמֵיחַשׁ דִּלְמָא אָתוּ לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִיא כְּשֵׁרָה בְּדִיעֲבַד בְּעוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו (שַׁ"ךְ רכ). וּמֵהַאי טַעְמָא מֻתָּר לִמְסוֹר לִשְׁחוֹט לְהַאֲכִיל לִכְלָבִים לְמֻמְחֶה שֶׁיּוֹדְעִים בּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻחְזָק לִשְׁחוֹט שֶׁלֹּא יִתְעַלֵּף אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מֻמְחֶה עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו כֵּיוָן שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה בְּדִיעֲבַד כְּדִלְעֵיל. רכא וּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה וְצָרִיךְ לוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט לְהַאֲכִיל לִכְלָבִים אוֹ לְנָכְרִים יִנְחוֹר אוֹ יְעַקֵּר הַסִּימָנִים כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא נִרְאֶה לַכֹּל שֶׁנְּבֵלָה הִיא וְלֹא יִשְׁחוֹט אֲפִלּוּ בְּסַכִּין פָּגוּם אוֹ שְׁאָר פְּסוּלֵי שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָן נִכָּרִים לַכֹּל מִשּׁוּם חֲשַׁשׁ תַּקָּלָה שֶׁלֹּא יָבֹאוּ לֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנָּה. [אַךְ אִם אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט בְּכַשְׁרוּת עַל יְדֵי מֻמְחֶה אֵין לוֹ לְנַבֵּל בַּעַל חַי בְּיָדַיִם שֶׁלֹּא לְצֹרֶךְ] כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב לְקַמָּן סוֹף סִימָן כ"ג רכב עַיֵּן שָׁם (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רכג):
(מא) לְכַתְּחִלָּה.
וְהוּא שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה לְפִי דַעַת רְמָ"א סוֹף סְעִיף ג' בְּהַגָּ"ה (פְּרִי חָדָשׁ רכד). וּבְדִיעֲבַד שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה בַּאֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִין עַל גַּבָּיו אֲפִלּוּ אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה וְאֵין יוֹדֵעַ לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו. כֵּן דַּעַת הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ עַל פִּי שִׁטַת הָרֹא"שׁ רכה וְרַ"ן רכו [יב]:
(מב) הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה.
וְיוֹדֵעַ לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו (הַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִ"י. רכז שַׁ"ךְ רכח) שֶׁמִּתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶּן דַּעַת הוּא מוּעָד לְקַלְקֵל תָּמִיד וְרֹב מַעֲשָׂיו מְקֻלְקָלִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ וּלְכָךְ שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּטוּרָה מִכִּסּוּי הַדָּם מִשּׁוּם שֶׁהִיא נְבֵלָה וַדָּאִית כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן כ"ח. רכט
וְאַף שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁשָּׁחַט כָּרָאוּי אֵין נֶאֱמָנוּת לְקָטָן (רַ"ן רל רְשַׁ"ל רלא וּתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רלב בְּשֵׁם אוֹר זָרוּעַ רלג). וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט כָּרָאוּי שֶׁהֲרֵי יוֹדֵעַ לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו מִכָּל מָקוֹם כֵּיוָן שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָה הִיא מִדְּאוֹרַיְתָא אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן דְּדַוְקָא נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים מְהֵימְנִי בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּיָדָם אֲפִלּוּ בִּדְאוֹרַיְתָא רלד אֲבָל הַקָּטָן אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן כִּי אִם בְּדִבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם סְמַךְ מִן הַתּוֹרָה רלה כְּדִלְקַמָּן סוֹף סִימָן קכ"ז. רלו
וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם הַמִּנְהָג פָּשׁוּט לִשְׁלוֹחַ עַל יְדֵי קָטָן אוֹ קְטַנָּה לִשְׁחוֹט וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּעַצְמָם לְפִי שֶׁהֵם בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת מִן הַסְּתָם וַחֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵינָן עֲשׂוּיִן לְקַלְקֵל וּלְהַכְשִׁיל (מִשְׁמֶרֶת הַבַּיִת רלז). (וְלֹא אָמְרוּ שֶׁרֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם מְקֻלְקָלִים אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר שֶׁהֵם עוֹשִׂים בּוֹ וְנִמְסַר בִּידֵיהֶם לַעֲשׂוֹת אֲבָל כְּשֶׁאֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶם לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶלָּא לְהוֹלִיךְ לְאַחֵר שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה חֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין מֵעַצְמָן כְּדֵי לְקַלְקֵל וּלְהַכְשִׁיל לְפִי שֶׁהֵם בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת מִן הַסְּתָם. וְכֵן אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁים שֶׁמָּא מָסְרוּ לְנָכְרִי אוֹ לִשְׁאָר הַפְּסוּלִים לִשְׁחוֹט וְשָׁחַט לָהֶם לְפִי שֶׁחֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵינָן עֲשׂוּיִן לְהַכְשִׁיל הוֹאִיל וְהֵם בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת רלח).
אֲבָל קָטָן הַמֻּחְזָק בְּרֹעַ מַעֲלָלִים אֵין לִשְׁלוֹחַ עַל יָדוֹ שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁחוֹט בְּעַצְמוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקַּח לוֹ שְׂכַר הַשְּׁחִיטָה שֶׁשּׁוֹלְחִין עַל יָדוֹ וְגַם צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה בַּר דַּעַת וְיוֹדֵעַ לִזָּהֵר שֶׁאִם לֹא כֵן יֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁנָּכְרִי יִקַּח מִיָּדוֹ שְׂכַר הַשְּׁחִיטָה וְיִשְׁחוֹט לוֹ אוֹ שְׁאָר קִלְקוּלִים (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רלט). וְכֵן נוֹהֲגִים לִשְׁלוֹחַ קָטָן אוֹ קְטַנָּה הַחֲרִיפִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶם דַּעַת לְהִזָּהֵר לִקְנוֹת בָּשָׂר מֵהַמְּקוֹלִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרֹב הַטַּבָּחִים נָכְרִים וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא יִקְחוּ מִן הַנָּכְרִי דַּחֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵינָן עֲשׂוּיִן לְקַלְקֵל. רמ
וְלֹא אָמְרוּ שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱמָנוּת לְקָטָן אֶלָּא לְהָעִיד עַל מַה שֶּׁנַּעֲשָׂה עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ עַל עַצְמוֹ כְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹמַר שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה אוֹ שֶׁעָשָׂה וְקִלְקֵל בְּדָבָר שֶׁהוּא מוּעָד לְקַלְקֵל וְרֹב מַעֲשָׂיו בְּזֶה מְקֻלְקָלִים כִּשְׁחִיטָה דִּלְעֵיל אֶלָּא שֶׁבָּאתָ לִסְמוֹךְ עַל דְּבָרָיו שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה אוֹ שֶׁעָשָׂה כְּהֹגֶן וְלֹא קִלְקֵל בְּזֶה אָמְרוּ שֶׁאֵין הַקָּטָן נֶאֱמָן בְּדִבּוּרוֹ אֲבָל בְּכַאן אֵין אָנוּ סוֹמְכִים עַל דִּבּוּרוֹ וְעֵדוּתוֹ אֶלָּא חֲזָקָה הִיא שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָשׂוּי לַעֲשׂוֹת מַעֲשֶׂה לְקַלְקֵל וּלְהַכְשִׁיל וְלֹא מֵחֲמַת אֲמִירַת הַקָּטָן וּבְזֶה לֹא אָמְרוּ שֶׁאֵין הַקָּטָן נֶאֱמָן דְּהָא לֹא שַׁיָּךְ הָכָא נֶאֱמָנוּת כְּלָל (עַיֵּן פ"מ רמא).
וּמַה שֶּׁנּוֹהֲגִים לִשְׁלוֹחַ קָטָן לִשְׁאוֹל אִסּוּר וְהֶתֵּר מֵחָכָם הַמּוֹרֶה וְסוֹמְכִים עַל אֲמִירַת הַקָּטָן הַיְנוּ מִשּׁוּם דְּמִרְתַּת לְשַׁקֵּר כֵּיוָן שֶׁחָכָם הַמּוֹרֶה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁאֲלוּ אוֹתוֹ (בֵּית הִלֵּל רמב).
וְדַוְקָא בְּקָטָן שֶׁהוּא בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת סָמְכִינָן אַהָא דְּמִרְתַּת לְשַׁקֵּר אֲפִלּוּ בִּדְאוֹרַיְתָא אֲבָל בְּנָכְרִי אוֹ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל חָשׁוּד לֹא סָמְכִינָן אַהָא דְּמִרְתַּת לְשַׁקֵּר פֶּן יִשְׁאֲלוּ אַחֲרָיו מֵאֲחֵרִים וְיַכְחִישׁוּהוּ כִּי אִם בְּאִסּוּר דְּרַבָּנָן כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב רְמָ"א סִימָן קי"ט סְעִיף י"ט. רמג הִלְכָּךְ הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ עַל יְדֵי נָכְרִי לִשְׁחוֹט צָרִיךְ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִכְתּוֹב לוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט לוֹ וְלֹא סָמְכִינָן אַהָא דְּמִרְתַּת הַנָּכְרִי לְשַׁקֵּר. וְלֹא דַי שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב תֵּבַת כָּשֵׁר לְבָד לְפִי שֶׁמְּצוּיִים נָכְרִים שֶׁיְּכוֹלִים לְזַיֵּף וְלִכְתּוֹב תֵּבָה זוֹ. וְגַם צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּכִּיר הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ אֶת הָעוֹף שֶׁלּוֹ בִּטְבִיעוּת עַיִן אוֹ בְּסִימָן שֶׁאִם לֹא כֵן יֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא הֶחֱלִיף הַנָּכְרִי אֶת הָעוֹף שֶׁשָּׁחַט הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּעוֹף אַחֵר שֶׁשָּׁחַט בְּעַצְמוֹ וְאִם אֵין לוֹ בּוֹ הֶכֵּר יָפֶה אָסוּר רמד (וְלֹא מְהַנֵּי מַה שֶּׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט עוֹשֶׂה בּוֹ סִימָן עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּסִימָן קי"ח רמה אֲבָל לֹא כְּמוֹ שֶׁנּוֹהֲגִים לַחְתּוֹךְ אֵיזֶה אֶצְבַּע בָּעוֹף שֶׁהֲרֵי גַּם הַנָּכְרִי יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן בְּעוֹף אַחֵר). וְהַמַּחְמִיר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁלוֹחַ עַל יְדֵי נָכְרִי לִשְׁחוֹט אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּכִּיר הָעוֹף שֶׁלּוֹ בִּטְבִיעוּת עַיִן תָּבֹא עָלָיו בְּרָכָה דְּשֶׁמָּא לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ הֶכֵּר יָפֶה (טַ"ז רמו):
(מג) לִזָּהֵר.
מֵאַחַר שֶׁצָּרִיךְ יִשּׁוּב הַדַּעַת וְיִרְאַת ה' בִּשְׁחִיטָה. רמז וּסְמַךְ לְי"ח שָׁנָה מִיֹּאשִׁיָּהוּ שֶׁכָּל דִּין שֶׁדָּן עַד בֶּן י"ח שָׁנָה הֶחֱזִיר לִבְעָלָיו רמח (רְשַׁ"ל רמט). וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמִדִּינָא אֵין לָחוּשׁ לְזֶה מִכָּל מָקוֹם בִּקְעָה מָצְאוּ וְגָדְרוּ בָּהּ גָּדֵר (שִׁלְטֵי גִבּוֹרִים רנ). וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם הַכֹּל לְפִי מַה שֶּׁהוּא נַעַר כִּי לִפְעָמִים יִמָּצֵא הַנַּעַר בַּעַל תּוֹרָה וְחָרֵד בְּיִרְאַת ה' רְגִילִין לְהַרְשׁוֹת אוֹתוֹ וּלְהַחֲזִיקוֹ בְּמֻמְחֶה מִי"ג שָׁנָה וְאֵילַךְ (רְשַׁ"ל רנא טַ"ז רנב):
[None of the following individuals:] a) a deaf-mute, i.e., a person who neither hears or speaks, (35) b) an mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, i.e., one who goes out alone at night, rips his garments, sleeps in a cemetery, or loses what is given (36) to him, even [if he does only] one of the above acts, but does so in an [uncontrolled,] irrational manner, (37) and c) a minor who does not know how to train his hands to slaughter, should be allowed to slaughter as initial preference, even if there are others supervising them. (38)
If [such individuals] did slaughter, the slaughter they [performed] is valid, provided others are supervising them. (39) [However,] as an initial preference, they should not be given [animals] to slaughter when others are not supervising them even if [the owner of the animals] wishes to feed [the meat] to dogs. (40)
If a minor knows how to train his hands, he may slaughter, [even] as an initial preference, (41) provided others are supervising him; it is permitted to partake [of the meat from the animals] he slaughtered. Note: However, if [a minor] slaughters without supervision, his slaughter is invalid even if he knows the laws of ritual slaughter (42) (Hagahos Asheri, [Chulin 1:1]; Rashba in [his] Toras HaBayis; Or Zerua). In this context a boy is categorized as a minor until he becomes bar mitzvah, i.e., he attains the age of thirteen years and a day (Beis Yosef, citing Itur; Or Zerua citing Rabbeinu Yoel).
There are those who conduct themselves stringently and do not certify [a shochet] who is less than 18 years-old (Mordechai, citing Hilchos Eretz Yisrael; the recently published Hagahos Alfasi). At that age, [the youth] is a mature thinker and knows how to be vigilant. (43)
החֵרֵשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר, (לה) וְשׁוֹטֶה, דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁהוּא יוֹצֵא יְחִידִי בַּלַּיְלָה, אוֹ מְקָרֵעַ כְּסוּתוֹ, אוֹ לָן בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת, אוֹ מְאַבֵּד מַה שֶּׁנּוֹתְנִים (לו) לוֹ, אֲפִלּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵאֵלּוּ, אִם עוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָם דֶּרֶךְ שְׁטוּת, (לז) וְקָטָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו לִשְׁחֹט, אֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶם לִשְׁחֹט לְכַתְּחִלָּה, אֲפִלּוּ אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם. (לח) וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ, שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה אִם אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם. (לט) וְאֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶם לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁחֹט כְּשֶׁאֵין אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבֵּיהֶם, אֲפִלּוּ אִם רוֹצִים לְהַאֲכִיל לִכְלָבִים. (מ) וְאִם הַקָּטָן יוֹדֵעַ לְאַמֵּן יָדָיו, אִם אֲחֵרִים עוֹמְדִים עַל גַּבָּיו, שׁוֹחֵט לְכַתְּחִלָּה (מא) וּמֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ. הַגָּה: אֲבָל אִם שָׁחַט בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה (מב) (הַגָּהוֹת אֲשֵׁרִי רֵישׁ פֶּרֶק קַמָּא וְרַשְׁבָּ״א בְּתוֹרַת הַבַּיִת וְאוֹר זָרוּעַ). וּמִקְרֵי קָטָן לְעִנְיָן זֶה עַד שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה בַּר מִצְוָה, דְּהַיְנוּ בֶּן י״ג שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם עִטּוּר וְאוֹר זָרוּעַ בְּשֵׁם רַבֵּנוּ יוֹאֵל). וְיֵשׁ מַחְמִירִין שֶׁלֹּא לִתֵּן קַבָּלָה לְמִי שֶׁהוּא פָּחוֹת מִבֶּן י״ח שָׁנָה (מָרְדְּכַי בְּשֵׁם הִלְכוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהַגָּהוֹת אַלְפָסִי הַחֲדָשִׁים), דְּאָז גַּבְרָא בַּר דַּעַת הוּא וְיוֹדֵעַ לִזָּהֵר. (מג)
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(44) The blessing –
[The rationale is that,] as an initial preference, all the blessings should be heard [by the person reciting them], as explained in Orach Chayim 206[:5].95
(45) Kosher –
[The rationale is that,] after the fact, [even the recitation of] the blessing is not a disqualifying factor, as will be stated below in sec. 1996 (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:29]). [Indeed,] even if the fact that [the blessing was not recited] were to be a disqualifying factor, [the deaf person] would have fulfilled his obligation [for reciting the blessing] after the fact, even though he did not hear the blessing [he recited], as stated in Orach Chayim, loc. cit.
(מד) הַבְּרָכָה.
וְכָל הַבְּרָכוֹת צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּשְׁמִיעַ לְאָזְנָיו לְכַתְּחִלָּה כְּמוֹ שֶׁנִּתְבָּאֵר בְּאֹרַח חַיִּים סִימָן ר"ו: רנג
A person who is deaf – he speaks but does not hear – should not perform ritual slaughter because he does not hear [his recitation of] the blessing. (44) [However,] if he does slaughter, even if he slaughters alone, [the animal or fowl] he slaughtered is permitted. (45)
וחֵרֵשׁ הַמְדַבֵּר וְאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ לֹא יִשְׁחֹט, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ הַבְּרָכָה. (מד) וְאִם שָׁחַט, אֲפִלּוּ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. (מה)
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(46) Recites the blessing –
[The person reciting the blessing] must intend to fulfill the requirement [of reciting the blessing on behalf of the mute shochet], and [the mute shochet] must intend to fulfill his obligation [to recite the blessing when hearing the blessing recited by the other shochet on his behalf].97
[This law applies] specifically when the person [who recites the blessing] also slaughters and is reciting the blessing for himself [as well]. However, if he [himself] is not [involved in] slaughtering, he may not recite the blessing to fulfill the obligation of the mute [shochet. The rationale is that] the blessing recited [before performing] ritual slaughter does not resemble the blessing recited [before performing] mitzvos that are obligations [incumbent on every person]. Instead, [it resembles] blessings recited [before] receiving satisfaction, in which instance a person who does not receive satisfaction may not recite the blessing to fulfill the obligation of one who [will be] deriving satisfaction, since [the person has the option] not to receive satisfaction and not to recite the blessing, as explained in Orach Chayim 167[:23].98 Similarly, in this instance, the person may [choose] not to eat [meat] and not to slaughter (Or Zerua, [Vol. 1, sec. 367]; Bach, [Yoreh Deah 1]; Sifsei Kohen [Yoreh Deah 1:32]; Pri Chadash [Yoreh Deah 1:33]).
(מו) מְבָרֵךְ.
וּמְכַוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא[וֹ] יְדֵי חוֹבָה וְהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּן לָצֵאת רנז וְדַוְקָא שֶׁהָאַחֵר שׁוֹחֵט גַּם כֵּן וּמְבָרֵךְ לְעַצְמוֹ אֲבָל אִם אֵינוֹ שׁוֹחֵט אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבָרֵךְ לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הָאִלֵּם לְפִי שֶׁבִּרְכַּת הַשְּׁחִיטָה אֵינָהּ דּוֹמָה לְבִרְכוֹת הַמִּצְווֹת שֶׁהֵן חוֹבָה רנח אֶלָּא לְבִרְכוֹת הַנֶּהֱנִין שֶׁמִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֶהֱנֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבָרֵךְ לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנֶּהֱנֶה מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא לִתְהֲנֵי וְלָא לִבְרוֹךְ כְּמוֹ שֶׁנִּתְבָּאֵר בְּאֹרַח חַיִּים סִימָן קס”ז רנט וְהָכָא נַמִי לָא לֵיכוֹל וְלָא לִשְׁחוֹט (אוֹר זָרוּעַ רס בַּ”ח רסא שַׁ”ךְ רסב פְּרִי חָדָשׁ רסג):
A person who is mute, but is capable of hearing, may slaughter if he is proficient [in the necessary laws], [xiii] even as an initial preference, provided another person recites the blessing. (46)
זהַשּׁוֹמֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר, אִם הוּא מֻמְחֶה, [יג] שׁוֹחֵט אֲפִלּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, אִם אַחֵר מְבָרֵךְ. (מו)
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(47) Of Lot –
I.e., the person performs actions without being aware of what he is doing99 (Rambam, [Hilchos Mechirah 29:18]; the Shulchan Aruch [of Rav Yosef Caro], Choshen Mishpat 235[:22]).
(48) Press –
[This is likely to happen] because [an intoxicated person’s] hands feel heavy. It is fitting to follow [this stringency]. Although the halachah is that an intoxicated person is considered to be mentally capable in all regards,100 that applies to matters that are dependent upon his intellectual capacity. However, in matters that are dependent on [his control of the agility of] his limbs, he certainly is not like an ordinary person (Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:18]).
If [a ritual slaughterer] frequently becomes intoxicated, he should be removed from his position until he accepts – on the pain of a ban of excommunication and [other] penalties – not to become intoxicated (Beis Hillel [1:10]). [The rationale is that people] who frequently become intoxicated are heavy-handed even when they are not intoxicated, and they lack the sensitivity to feel a slight blemish [on the slaughtering knife] (Simlah Chadashah 18[:7]).101
Similarly, an extremely elderly person is [often] heavy-handed. Nevertheless, every person should be judged individually (Simlah Chadashah, [1:36]).
Any person whose hands tremble – whether because of weakness or because his hands are heavy due to his nature – [should not slaughter. The rationale is that] by and large, [the animals] he slaughters [will be disqualified] because he presses the knife [against the animals’ organs] (Beis Lechem Yehudah, [sec. 1, note 23]).
(מז) שֶׁל לוֹט.
דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מַהוּ עוֹשֶׂה (רַמְבַּ”ם. רסד שֻׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ חֹשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט סִימָן רל”ה רסה):
(מח) דְּרָסָה.
עַל יְדֵי שֶׁיָּדָיו כְּבֵדוֹת. וְכֵן רָאוּי לִנְהוֹג. דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּקַיְמָא לָן רסו דְּשִׁכּוֹר הוּא כְּפִקֵּחַ לְכָל דְּבָרָיו הַיְנוּ בְּמִדֵּי דְּתָלוּי בְּדַעַת הָאָדָם אֲבָל לֹא בְּזֶה שֶׁתָּלוּי בִּכְבֵדוּת אֵבָרָיו דְּוַדַּאי אֵינוֹ כְּפִקֵּחַ (טַ”ז רסז). וְאִם רָגִיל לְהִשְׁתַּכֵּר יֵשׁ לְהַעֲבִירוֹ עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בַּחֲרָמוֹת וְעֹנָשִׁים שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתַּכֵּר (בֵּית הִלֵּל רסח) שֶׁהַמִּשְׁתַּכְּרִים אַף שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת שִׁכְרוּתָם יְדֵיהֶם כְּבֵדִים וְאֵינָם יְכוֹלִים לְהַרְגִּישׁ גַּם כֵּן פְּגִימָה דַקָּה (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה סִימָן י”ח רסט).
וְכֵן זָקֵן מֻפְלָג יָדָיו כְּבֵדוֹת. וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם הַכֹּל לְפִי מַה שֶּׁהוּא אָדָם (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה רע).
וְכָל מִי שֶׁיָּדָיו רוֹתְתוֹת בֵּין מֵחֲמַת חֲלִישָׁתוֹ בֵּין מֵחֲמַת טִבְעוֹ שֶׁיָּדָיו כְּבֵדוֹת שְׁחִיטָתוֹ רֻבָּן דְּרָסוֹת (בֵּית לֶחֶם יְהוּדָה רעא):
When an intoxicated person reaches a state of intoxication similar to that of Lot, (47) he is governed by the laws applying to a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual. If his intoxication did not reach that stage, he may slaughter, [even] as an initial preference. Note: There are authorities who maintain that an intoxicated person should not slaughter because it is common that he will press (48) [the knife against the organs of the fowl or animal] (Hagahos Maimonios, Hilchos Shechitah, ch. 3, in the name of Sefer Mitzvos Gadol; Halachos Gedolos; Kolbo, in the name of Sefer HaTerumah; Sefer Yereim, sec. 137).
חשִׁכּוֹר שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְשִׁכְרוּתוֹ שֶׁל לוֹט, (מז) דִּינוֹ כְּשׁוֹטֶה. וְאִם לֹא הִגִּיעַ לְשִׁכְרוּתוֹ שֶׁל לוֹט, שׁוֹחֵט לְכַתְּחִלָּה. הַגָּה: וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁשִּׁכּוֹר לֹא יִשְׁחֹט, שֶׁרָגִיל לָבוֹא לִידֵי דְּרָסָה (מח) (הַגָּהוֹת מַיְמוֹנִי בְּשֵׁם סְמַ״ג פֶּרֶק ג׳ מֵהִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה ובה״ג וְכָל בּוֹ בְּשֵׁם סֵפֶר הַתְּרוּמָה וְסֵפֶר יְרֵאִים סִימָן קל״ז).
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(49) As an initial preference –
Rashba102 [maintains that the reason for this ruling is that a blind person] might unknowingly interrupt [the slaughter] or press [the knife against the animals’ organs]. Rashi [maintains that the reason is that] he might not slit the greater portion of the simanim, [i.e., the gullet and the windpipe], as [will be explained] in sec. 11.103
(50) Him –
Riaz wrote that [a blind person] should not slaughter as an initial option even if others observe him ([as cited by] Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:35]). It is desirable to give weight to his words unless it is a pressing situation (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 67]).
(51) The slaughter is acceptable –
provided afterwards, [the animal’s] simanim are examined [by a sighted person to ascertain] that their major portion was slit.104
If the blind person checked [the simanim] himself, [by] feeling [the gullet and windpipe] with his hands, we may rely on his words in a situation where it is impossible [for a sighted person] to check afterwards, for example, the [animal’s] head was cut off.105 However, if it is possible [for a sighted person] to examine the animal, we do not rely on [the blind person’s checking of the simanim] with his hands. According to Rashi,106 this is the reason why [a blind person] is forbidden to slaughter as an initial option. (See [the notes to the Tur (Yoreh Deah 1),] by K’nesses HaGedolah, [note 51].
(מט) לְכַתְּחִלָּה.
לְהָרַשְׁבָּ”א רעב שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהֶה וְיִדְרוֹס וְלֹא יַרְגִּישׁ וּלְרַשִׁ”י רעג שֶׁמָּא לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט רֹב הַסִּימָנִים כְּדִלְקַמָּן סִימָן י”א: עדר
(נ) אוֹתוֹ.
וְרִיאַ”ז ערה כָּתַב דַּאֲפִלּוּ אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט לְכַתְּחִלָּה (שַׁ”ךְ רעו). וְטוֹב לָחוּשׁ לִדְבָרָ[יו] שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רעז):
(נא) שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
וּבִלְבָד שֶׁיִּבְדְּקוּ אַחֲרָיו בַּסִּימָנִים אִם נִשְׁחֲטוּ רֻבָּן. רעח וְאִם הַסּוּמָא עַצְמוֹ בָּדַק בְּמִשְׁמוּשׁ יָדָיו יֵשׁ לִסְמוֹךְ עָלָיו אִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לִבְדּוֹק אַחֲרָיו כְּגוֹן שֶׁנֶּחְתַּךְ הָרֹאשׁ רעט אֲבָל כְּשֶׁאֶפְשָׁר [לִבְדּוֹק] לֹא סָמְכִינָן אַמִּשְׁמוּשׁ יָדָיו וּמֵהַאי טַעְמָא אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט לְכַתְּחִלָּה לְרַשִׁ”י רפ (עַיֵּן כְּנֶסֶת הַגְּדוֹלָה רפא):
A blind person should not slaughter as an initial preference (49) unless others are observing him. (50) If he does slaughter, the slaughter is acceptable. (51)
טסוּמָא לֹא יִשְׁחֹט לְכַתְּחִלָּה, (מט) אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ. (נ) וְאִם שָׁחַט, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. (נא)
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(52) Recite the blessing –
[A person may not recite a blessing] until he covers his private parts, as it is written,107 “He shall see no [nakedness] among you.” Moreover, even if another person is also slaughtering108 and he turns his face away from [the naked person’s] private parts109 and recites the blessing [for ritual slaughter], as an initial preference, he may not fulfill the obligation [of reciting the blessing on behalf of the one who is naked], because it is forbidden for [a naked person] to hear [a blessing] with the intent of thereby fulfilling his obligation. [The rationale is that] listening to [a blessing] is equivalent to pronouncing it;110 thus, it is as if he is reciting it himself [while naked].111
True, a naked person may think about the Torah’s words, as stated in Orach Chayim, sec. 75[:10,] and a person who listens to a blessing is merely thinking about it. Nevertheless, since [the person] desires to fulfill his obligation by listening, [based on the principle] that listening to [a blessing] is equivalent to pronouncing it, it is as if he is reciting it himself. Therefore, it is [as if the naked person is reciting the blessing himself, and this is] forbidden (Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:37]; Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:19]; see [also] Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 69]).
The same law applies if the person is clothed, but is not wearing a belt and [thus,] his heart is able to see his private parts (Simlah Chadashah, [1:38]).112
(נב) לְבָרֵךְ.
עַד שֶׁיְּכַסֶּה עֶרְוָתוֹ רפב דִּכְתִיב רפג וְלֹא יִרְאֶה בְךָ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר. וְגַם אִם אַחֵר שׁוֹחֵט גַּם כֵּן וּמְהַפֵּךְ פָּנָיו מִכְּנֶגֶד עֶרְוָתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה רפד וּמְבָרֵךְ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ יְדֵי חוֹבָה לְכַתְּחִלָּה לְפִי שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹ לִשְׁמוֹעַ וּלְהִתְכַּוֵּן לָצֵאת יְדֵי חוֹבָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁשּׁוֹמֵעַ כְּעוֹנֶה רפה וַהֲרֵי זֶה כְּמוֹצִיא מִפִּיו. רפו וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶעָרוֹם מֻתָּר לְהַרְהֵר בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב בְּאֹרַח חַיִּים סִימָן ע”ה רפז וְהַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא מְהַרְהֵר רפח מִכָּל מָקוֹם כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּן לָצֵאת יְדֵי חוֹבָה בִּשְׁמִיעָה זוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁשּׁוֹמֵעַ כְּעוֹנֶה הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמוֹצִיא מִפִּיו וְאָסוּר (שַׁ”ךְ. רפט טַ”ז. רצ עַיֵּן תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר רצא).
וְהוּא הַדִּין אִם הוּא לָבוּשׁ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ חָגוּר וְלִבּוֹ רוֹאֶה אֶת הָעֶרְוָה (שִׂמְלָה חֲדָשָׁה רצב):
A person who is naked should not slaughter as an initial preference because he may not recite the blessing. (52)
יעָרֹם לֹא יִשְׁחֹט לְכַתְּחִלָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבָרֵךְ. (נב)
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(53) Is forbidden –
[The rationale for this ruling is that] it is appropriate to compare [such a shochet] to an apostate with regard to the violation of that specific transgression, [as will be discussed] below, in sec. 2:6.113 “Since [the shochet] violated the ban of ostracism in order to slaughter, [he is placed in this category] even though he is not [actually] suspected of eating prohibited food, [i.e., meat from an animal that was not ritually slaughtered]. Nevertheless, the matter is reprehensible, and it is befitting to penalize him and not to eat from [an animal] he slaughters,” (Responsa of Rabbeinu Asher, [K’lal 7, subsection 1]).
From the wording [Rabbeinu Asher] used, it is evident that according to the letter of the law, there is no prohibition [against eating that meat]; it is merely a penalty,114 for in truth, [the shochet] is not considered an apostate regarding that transgression, because a ban of ostracism is regarded much less severely by people than the prohibition against eating [meat from] an animal that was not ritually slaughtered [in the correct manner. Therefore,] even though [the shochet] is suspected of violating a ban of ostracism, he is not suspected of [eating meat from] an animal that was not ritually slaughtered. Accordingly, leniency may be granted in the case of significant [financial] loss (Pri Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1:38]).115
If [a shochet] unknowingly violated this [ban and slaughtered an animal] because he was not aware of the ban, [the meat of the animal] should not be forbidden at all, because a person is not considered as an apostate with regard to [the violation of] a [specific transgression] unless he willfully transgresses (Turei Zahav, Yoreh Deah 1:20). According to the ruling of Pri Chadash– that this [ban] is merely a penalty – even if the shochet acted willfully, but he slaughtered for people who were unaware of the ban, [the people for whom he slaughtered] should not be penalized.116
If the community specifically declared invalid the slaughter of [all animals slaughtered by] any shochet other than one specific shochet, all authorities agree that [any animal slaughtered by another shochet] is forbidden according to law, even if the community did not establish a ban of ostracism. [The rationale is that] a community has the authority to forbid something that is permitted in order to establish a safeguard117 (Rabbeinu Asher, loc. cit.). However, if [the community’s leaders] did not explicitly make such a statement, their actions do not imply that the slaughter [of animals by other shochtim] is invalid, only that a transgressor will be punished as is the law regarding one who violates a communal ordinance or a ban of ostracism. There is no implication that the meat is forbidden (Pri Chadash, [loc. cit.]; Tevuos Shor, [sec. 2, note 39]).
(54) As was the situation originally –
[This law applies] even though [the withdrawal of the ban] is very objectionable and there are [grounds for] punishment when a community takes a stance and agrees regarding a matter concerning a mitzvah, to establish a safeguard and precaution regarding the commandments of G‑d, and then reverses its stance and negates [the ordinance that was previously adopted,] either because of brotherly love and a desire for peace or because of quarrels and envy between people (Piskei Maharai, [sec. 177]; Darchei Moshe, [Yoreh Deah 1:11]).
(נג) אֲסוּרָה.
כִּי רָאוּי לְדַמּוֹתוֹ לְמוּמָר לְאוֹתוֹ דָבָר דִּלְקַמָּן סִימָן ב’ רצג כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבַר עַל הַחֵרֶם כְּדֵי לִשְׁחוֹט וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חָשׁוּד לֶאֱכוֹל דְּבַר אִסּוּר מִכָּל מָקוֹם מְכֹעָר הַדָּבָר וְרָאוּי לְקָנְסוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכְלוּ מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹן הָרֹא”שׁ בִּתְשׁוּבָה. רצד וּמְבֹאָר מִלְּשׁוֹנוֹ דְּמִדִּינָא לֵיכָּא אִסּוּרָא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם קְנָסָא רצה דְּלֹא הָוֵי בֶּאֱמֶת כְּמוּמָר לְאוֹתוֹ דָבָר מִשּׁוּם דְּחֵרֶם קִיל לֶאֱינָשֵׁי טוּבָא לְגַבֵּי נְבֵלָה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָשׁוּד לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַחֵרֶם אֵינוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַנְּבֵלָה רצו וּלְפִיכָךְ בְּהֶפְסֵד מְרֻבֶּה יֵשׁ לְהַתִּיר (פְּרִי חָדָשׁ רצז). וְאִם שָׁגַג בַּדָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא יָדַע מֵהַחֵרֶם אֵין לֶאֱסוֹר כְּלָל דְּלֹא הָוֵי כְּמוּמָר לְאוֹתוֹ דָבָר אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁעוֹבֵר בְּמֵזִיד (טַ”ז רחצ). וּלְפִי מַה שֶּׁכָּתַב הַפְּרִי חָדָשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ אֶלָּא קְנָס אֲפִלּוּ אִם הַשּׁוֹחֵט הוּא מֵזִיד אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁחַט אֵצֶל אֲחֵרִים שֶׁלֹּא יָדְעוּ מֵהַחֵרֶם אֵין לְקָנְסָם כְּלָל. רצט
וְאִם הַקָּהָל פָּסְלוּ בְּפֵרוּשׁ ש שְׁחִיטַת כָּל הַשּׁוֹחֲטִים זוּלָתִי טַבָּח הַיָּדוּעַ אָסוּר לְכוּלֵי עָלְמָא שא מִדִּינָא וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא הִטִּילוּ חֵרֶם כִּי יֵשׁ רְשׁוּת בְּיַד הַצִּבּוּר לֶאֱסוֹר אֶת הַמֻּתָּר לְמִגְדַּר מִלְּתָא שב (רֹא”שׁ שָׁם). אֲבָל אִם לֹא פֵרְשׁוּ כֵּן בְּפֵרוּשׁ אֵין בְּמַשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵיהֶם שֶׁתְּהֵא הַשְּׁחִיטָה נִפְסֶלֶת רַק שֶׁהָעוֹבֵר עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ כְּדִין עוֹבֵר עַל תַּקָּנַת הַקָּהָל אוֹ עוֹבֵר עַל הַחֵרֶם וְלֹא לֶאֱסוֹר הַבָּשָׂר (פְּרִי חָדָשׁ שג וּתְבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר דש):
(נד) כְּמוֹ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה.
אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְאֹד מְכֹעָר הַדָּבָר וְיֵשׁ עֹנֶשׁ בְּדָבָר שֶׁרַבִּים נִמְנִים וּמַסְכִּימִים לִדְבַר מִצְוָה לַעֲשׂוֹת גֶּדֶר וּסְיָג לְמִצְוַת ה’ וְחוֹזְרִים וּמְבַטְּלִים עַל יְדֵי אַהֲבָה וְשָׁלוֹם אוֹ עַל יְדֵי תִּגָּר וְקִנְאַת אִישׁ מֵרֵעֵהוּ (פִּסְקֵי מהרא”י שה דַּרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה שו):
If a conditional ban of ostracism was established by a community [forbidding] anyone other than a designated shochet from slaughtering, if another person slaughtered [an animal], there are authorities who maintain that [the animal he slaughtered] is forbidden. (53) Note –If that ordinance is revoked, all shochtim are presumed to be acceptable as was the original situation, [prior to the appointing of a designated shochet] (54) (Piskei Maharai, sec. 177).
יאאִם הִטִּילוּ הַקָּהָל חֵרֶם שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁחֹט אֶלָּא טַבָּח יָדוּעַ, וְשָׁחַט אַחֵר, יֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ אֲסוּרָה. (נג) הַגָּה: וְאִם נִתְבַּטְּלָה הַתַּקָּנָה, כָּל הַשּׁוֹחֲטִים בְּחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּת כְּמוֹ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה (נד) (פִּסְקֵי מהרא״י סִימָן קע״ז).
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(55) His word is not accepted –
[This ruling applies] even if the witnesses did not see that [the shochet] slaughtered [the animal] in a proper manner. [In such an instance,] based on the principle of migo,118 [there are grounds to argue that the shochet’s word should be accepted. The rationale is that] if he desired [to lie], he could have [told a more convincing lie and] said that his slaughter [of the animal] was invalidated because he interrupted [the slaughter, that his knife] was blemished, or the like. Nevertheless, [his word is not accepted. The rationale is that] since he said, “I did not slaughter it,” he is contradicting the testimony of the witnesses who saw that he slaughtered [the animal] and [we follow the principle that the argument of] migo is not accepted when it contradicts [the testimony of] witnesses.119
[This ruling applies] specifically in an instance when [after making that statement the shochet] was asked if [his intent was that] he slaughtered [the animal] in an invalid manner, and he reiterated his [original] statement, saying that he did not slaughter [this animal] at all. However, if all [the shochet] said was, “I did not slaughter it,” and he is no longer present to be asked [to clarify his statement], his words can be understood to mean that he interrupted [the process] or that he pressed [the knife against the animal’s organs while slaughtering. These actions would disqualify the slaughter from being classified as halachically acceptable, and] whenever a slaughter is disqualified, it is not called slaughter [i.e. shechitah] at all. How much more so is [the shochet’s] word accepted if he himself explains his [initial] statements in this manner (Tevuos Shor, [sec. 1, note 73,] according to Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 1:39]; Pri Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1:39,] in the name of Rashba, [Vol. 3, responsum 253]).
(נה) אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.
וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא רָאוּ הָעֵדִים שֶׁשָּׁחַט כְּהֹגֶן דְּאִית לֵיהּ מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֵי אָמַר נִתְקַלְקְלָה הַשְּׁחִיטָה עַל יְדֵי שְׁהִיָּה אוֹ פְּגִימָה וּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא מִכָּל מָקוֹם כֵּיוָן שֶׁמַּה שֶּׁאוֹמֵר לֹא שָׁחַטְתִּי הוּא מֻכְחָשׁ מֵעֵדִים שֶׁרָאוּ שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ וּמִגּוֹ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים לֹא אָמְרִינָן. שז
וְדַוְקָא כְּשֶׁעוֹמֵד בְּדִבּוּרוֹ כְּשֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתוֹ אִם לֹא שְׁחָטָהּ בְּקִלְקוּל וְאוֹמֵר שֶׁלֹּא שְׁחָטָהּ כְּלָל אֲבָל אִם לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא לֹא שְׁחַטְתִּיהָ וְלֵיתֵיהּ קַמָּן דְּנִשַׁיְּלֵיהּ יֵשׁ לְתָרֵץ (ל)דְּבָרָיו וְלוֹמַר שֶׁשָּׁהָה אוֹ דָרַס שֶׁכָּל שֶׁנִּפְסְלָה הַשְּׁחִיטָה אֵינָהּ קְרוּיָה שְׁחִיטָה כְּלָל. וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן אִם הוּא עַצְמוֹ מְתָרֵץ כֵּן דְּבָרָיו דְּנֶאֱמָן (תְּבוּאוֹת שׁוֹר שח לְדַעַת הַשַּׁ”ךְ שט וּפְרִי חָדָשׁ שי בְּשֵׁם הָרַשְׁבָּ”א שיא):
If a person slaughters an animal for a non-Jew in the presence of witnesses and, when another Jew comes to purchase [some meat] from [this animal, the shochet] says, “Do not purchase [meat] from [that animal] because I did not slaughter it,” his word is not accepted. (55) Nevertheless, [the meat of the animal] is forbidden to him for he has deemed it as a piece of prohibited [meat] for himself. [xiv] (See sec. 127 concerning the law that applies regarding the acceptance of the word of one witness with regard to prohibitions.)
יבהַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים בְּהֵמָה לְנָכְרִי, וּכְשֶׁבָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל לִקְנוֹת מִמֶּנָּה, אָמַר: לֹא תִּקְנֶה מִמֶּנָּה כִּי לֹא שְׁחַטְתִּיהָ, אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. (נה) וּמִיהוּ לְדִידֵיהּ אֲסִירָא, דְּהָא שָׁוְיָא אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָא דְאִסּוּרָא. [יד] הַגָּה: וְעַיֵּן לְקַמָּן סִימָן קכ״ז בְּדִין עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִסּוּרִין.
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(56) His word is accepted –
[This ruling applies] specifically in an instance where the sheep belongs to [the shochet] and he made a sign on it [indicating that it was] tereifah so that [potential] buyers would not press him and demand [that he sell it to them].
Alternatively, [this ruling applies when] the [slaughtered] sheep belongs to a non-Jew and [the shochet made a sign on the slaughtered sheep indicating that it was tereifah and also said that it was tereifah, so that potential Jewish buyers would not buy this meat from the non-Jew.120 [The shochet] desired to purchase from the remaining meat, and [therefore] told the non-Jew that he erred in disqualifying the meat, so that he would not desecrate G‑d’s name in the eyes of the non-Jew [by causing him to think that a Jew is partaking of non-kosher meat] (K’nesses HaGedolah, [Yoreh Deah sec. 1, note 83 to Beis Yosef]).
If, however, [the animal] belonged to [another] Jew, this is not an acceptable justification, since were [the justification to be true, the shochet] did not act in an appropriate manner121 – he caused another Jew aggravation and also a [financial] loss, for [if not for the shochet’s actions] other [Jewish] purchasers would have paid a higher price [for the meat]. Such [conduct] is not befitting for an observant Jew. Therefore, his word is not accepted because a justification is only effective when it is befitting and appropriate. This is the ruling of Maharshal, [Yam shel Shlomoh, Chulin 1:8].
Turei Zahav, [Yoreh Deah 1:22,] rules that one should not follow the lenient ruling of the Shulchan Aruch [of Rav Yosef Caro] here since Rama [questioned this ruling] in his Darchei Moshe [Yoreh Deah 127:2] and left the matter unresolved based on the ruling in sec. 185[:4. In that source, Rav Yosef Caro] rules that [if a woman conducted herself in a manner that created] an assumption in her neighborhood that she was a nidah, e.g., she wore clothing that she usually wears while in the nidah state, and then said that she was ritually pure, the justification stated there [(ibid.:3)] – that she conducted herself in this manner because she was ashamed [to engage in intimacy when her husband’s] mother or sister [were staying with them] or because of forces beyond her control, [e.g.,] she did not have the energy – is not effective. Although such justification is effective in an instance where she told her husband, “I am impure,” it is [only effective when she makes a verbal statement. However, it is] not effective when she performed an action, wearing clothing that she usually wears while in the nidah state.
[The rationale is that when a woman does not want to engage in intimacy with her husband] because of shame or forces beyond her control, it could happen that she would tell [her husband, “I am impure for you” as an excuse]. However, to go so far as to conduct herself in such a manner – [i.e.] to wear clothing that she usually wears while in the nidah state – is not something she would [ordinarily] do.122 Similarly, in the instance at hand, [going so far as to] make a sign on the sheep’s head [indicating] that it is tereifah is [an act that precludes the shochet’s] [subsequent] justification [for this action] from being accepted.
Bach, [Yoreh Deah 185,] and Sifsei Kohen, [Yoreh Deah 185:5,] differentiate [between these two instances,] explaining that in [sec. 185], it would have been sufficient for the woman to tell her husband that she was ritually impure; [that would have been sufficient to cause him to refrain from intimacy.] Why was it necessary for her to wear clothing that she usually wears while in the nidah state? In the instance described here, by contrast, there was no alternative.
To explain: [Since] the sheep belonged to the non-Jewish butcher, it would not be sufficient to tell the non-Jew that [the animal] was tereifah. [We cannot rely on the non-Jew to prevent Jews from purchasing its meat,] because we do not depend on the non-Jew's word. [Therefore, a shochet] must make a sign [on the animal] so that anyone who comes to purchase [meat from the non-Jewish butcher] will recognize and know that it is tereifah. That was the prevailing custom – that the shochet would make a sign on the head of an animal which is tereifah and depart. [Hence, the only way the shochet could substantiate his claim was to make such a mark.]
If, however, the sheep belonged to [the shochet], that rationale would not be relevant because he could tell anyone who wants to purchase meat from that animal that it is tereifah. True, he would customarily always make a sign [on an animal which is tereifah. However,] that should not have been done on a kosher [animal. Since he could have prevented Jews from purchasing the animal in another way, his claim is weakened and we do not accept it.] (See Pri Chadash, [Yoreh Deah 1:40]).
[This explanation] does not follow [the reasoning] explained above in the name of Maharshal. (See Sifsei Kohen, loc. cit., who states that Rama also rules in this manner in a responsum.123 This does not follow the [reasoning of] Turei Zahav.)
(נו) נֶאֱמָן.
וְדַוְקָא כְּשֶׁהַכֶּבֶשׂ שֶׁלּוֹ וְעָשָׂה בּוֹ סִימָן טְרֵפָה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִקְפְּצוּ עָלָיו הַקּוֹנִים וְיִפְצְרוּ בּוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהַכֶּבֶשׂ שֶׁל נָכְרִי וְאַחַר שֶׁנִּשְׁאַר לוֹ לִקַּח מִמֶּנּוּ בָּשָׂר אוֹמֵר לְהַנָּכְרִי טָעִיתִי בְּמַה שֶּׁהִטְרַפְתִּיו כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה חִלּוּל ה’ בְּעֵינֵי הַנָּכְרִי (כְּנֶסֶת הַגְּדוֹלָה שיב). אֲבָל אִם הוּא שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵין זוֹ אֲמַתְלָא טוֹבָה כִּי עַל כָּל פָּנִים לֹא טוֹב עָשָׂה בְּעַמּוֹ לִגְרוֹם צַעַר וְגַם הֶפְסֵד לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ הַקּוֹנִים מַעֲלִים לוֹ בְּדָמִים וַאֲמַתְלָא כָּזֹאת אֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לְבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל הִלְכָּךְ לֹא מְהֵימַן שֶׁאֵין אֲמַתְלָא מוֹעֶלֶת אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁהִיא הֲגוּנָה וּרְאוּיָה כֵּן כָּתַב רְשַׁ”ל. שיג
וְהַטַּ”ז שיד כָּתַב שֶׁאֵין לְהָקֵל [כִּ]פְסַק הַשֻּׁלְחָן עָרוּךְ בְּכַאן מֵאַחַר שֶׁרְמָ”א בְּדַרְכֵי מֹשֶׁה שטו הִנִּיחוֹ בְּצָרִיךְ עִיּוּן מֵהָא דִלְקַמָּן סִימָן קפ”ה שטז דְּאִם הֻחְזְקָה נִדָּה בִּשְׁכֵנוֹתֶיהָ כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּבְשָׁה בִּגְדֵי נִדּוֹתָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרָה טְהוֹרָה אֲנִי לֹא מְהַנֵּי אֲמַתְלָא הַמְבֹאֶרֶת שָׁם שיז דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁעָשְׂתָה כֵּן מֵחֲמַת בּוּשַׁת אִמּוֹ אוֹ אֲחוֹתוֹ אוֹ מִשּׁוּם אֹנֶס שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בָּהּ כֹּחַ אַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲמַתְלָא זוֹ מְהַנֵּי בְּאוֹמֶרֶת לְבַעְלָהּ טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ לֹא מְהַנֵּי בְּלוֹבֶשֶׁת בִּגְדֵי נִדָּה דְּמִשּׁוּם בֹּשֶׁת אוֹ אֹנֶס מִקְרֵי וְאָמְרָה אֲבָל לַעֲשׂוֹת מַעֲשֶׂה כּוּלֵי הַאי לִלְבּוֹשׁ בִּגְדֵי נִדָּה אֵינָהּ לוֹבֶשֶׁת שיח וְהָכָא נַמִי בְּמַעֲשֶׂה זֶה שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּרֹאשׁ הַכֶּבֶשׂ שֶׁהוּא טְרֵפָה לֹא מְהַנֵּי אֲמַתְלָא.
וְהַבַּ”ח שָׁם שיט וְהַשַּׁ”ךְ שָׁם שכ תֵּרְצוּ דְּשַׁאֲנֵי הָתָם דְּדַי הָיָה לָהּ שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ טְמֵאָה אֲנִי וְלָמָה הָיָה לָהּ לִלְבּוֹשׁ בִּגְדֵי נִדָּה אֲבָל הָכָא לֹא הָיָה אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ בְּעִנְיָן אַחֵר. פֵּרוּשׁ דְּהַכֶּבֶשׂ הָיָה שֶׁל קַצָּב נָכְרִי דְּלֹא סַגֵּי בַּאֲמִירָתוֹ לַנָּכְרִי שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה [דְּאֵין נֶאֱמָנוּת לְנָכְרִי] וְצָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת בּוֹ סִימָן שֶׁיַּכִּירוּ וְיֵדְעוּ כָּל בָּאֵי לִקְנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה וְכָךְ הָיָה מִנְהָגָם שֶׁהָיָה עוֹשֶׂה הַשּׁוֹחֵט סִימָן בְּרֹאשׁ הַבְּהֵמָה וְהוֹלֵךְ לוֹ אֲבָל אִם הַכֶּבֶשׂ שֶׁלּוֹ לֹא שַׁיָּךְ הַאי טַעְמָא כִּי כָּל הַבָּא לִקְנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ יֹאמַר לוֹ שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה וְאַף שֶׁמִּנְהָגוֹ תָּמִיד לַעֲשׂוֹת סִימָן לֹא הָוֵי לֵיהּ לְמֶעֱבַד הָכִי בִּכְשֵׁרָה (עַיֵּן פְּרִי חָדָשׁ שכא) דְּלֹא כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב לְעֵיל בְּשֵׁם רְשַׁ”ל שכב (וְעַיֵּן שַׁ”ךְ שָׁם שֶׁכֵּן דַּעַת רְמָ”א בִּתְשׁוּבָה שכג דְּלֹא כְּטַ”ז שכד):
[The following rule applies when] a shochet made a sign on the head of a slaughtered sheep indicating that it was tereifah and he also said that it was tereifah, but afterwards, he [retracted his statement and] said it was kosher. [If the shochet explains that] he made his [original] statement only so that no one would buy [the slaughtered sheep] and it would remain for him, so that he could take meat from it, his word is accepted (56) since he gave a rationale for his [original] statement [and action].
יגטַבָּח שֶׁעָשָׂה סִימָן בְּרֹאשׁ הַכֶּבֶשׂ הַשָּׁחוּט שֶׁיְּהֵא נִרְאֶה שֶׁהוּא טְרֵפָה, וְגַם הָיָה אוֹמֵר שֶׁהוּא טְרֵפָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמַר שֶׁכָּשֵׁר הָיָה וְלֹא אָמַר כֵּן אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִקְחוּ אוֹתוֹ וְיִשָּׁאֵר לוֹ לִקַּח מִמֶּנּוּ בָּשָׂר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנָּתַן אֲמַתְלָא לִדְבָרָיו נֶאֱמָן. (נו)
14
(57) From this time onward –
It is not relevant to say that [the witness’ testimony caused meat slaughtered by this person] to be deemed as forbidden for the witness [forever], from this time onward. [Such a statement is relevant] only with regard to wine used as a libation for forbidden deities and the like [– i.e., a person testified that wine was poured to be used as a libation for a false deity, in which instance,] the witness is forbidden to partake of wine [poured by this person forever, for, in that instance,] if [it is true that] that wine was used as a libation for a false deity, as the witness stated, [the status of the person who poured the wine] can never be rectified [i.e., although the general rule is that testimony from two witnesses is necessary to disqualify a person, and if the person repents he can regain his original status, in the instance of one who serves false deities, the testimony of one witness suffices, and the person may never regain his original status]. As stated [in] sec. 127124 below, [even if others contradict him, that witness may never partake of wine poured or merely touched by this person, because his statement caused that person] to be deemed [an idolater] in relation to him.
In the instance at hand, however, such reasoning is not relevant. Even if the testimony of the witness was true, [i.e., the shochet did not slaughter the animal correctly], it is not definite [that any slaughter from that shochet] should be disqualified forever. If he repents as required of him, his status [will be] restored. Thus, the witness’ testimony did not cause [the shochet’s meat] to be deemed forbidden for [the witness in the future] at all, since the [permissibility of the slaughter] is dependent on the intent of the shochet, [i.e.,] whether [he decides] to act in an undesirable or desirable manner from this point onward. [The rationale for this leniency is that since only one witness testified that the shochet did not slaughter correctly, and it is possible that the shochet repented, the witness is permitted to partake of meat from animals this shochet slaughters in the future.] This is the wording of Maharik, [responsum 33].
Pri Chadash [(Yoreh Deah 1:42)] disputes this [ruling]. Similarly, Mishneh L’Melech, [in his gloss to Hilchos Ma’achalos Assuros 1:26,] questions [Marharik’s logic, asking] why do we not say that [the witness’ statements cause the shochet’s future slaughter] to be deemed forbidden for him? After all, had two witnesses come forward and given such testimony, it would not have been permitted to eat [meat from animals] slaughtered by [this person] afterwards. Similarly, with regard to himself, [a person’s testimony] is equivalent to that of two witnesses. [Therefore,] it is appropriate to say that, for himself, [the witness] rendered [meat fromanimals] slaughtered by [this person] as forbidden from this time onward unless [it is known that] he repented as required of him.
(58) [The shochet’s reputation for observance] –
[I.e.,] if this shochet had transgressed once before, even if [only] one witness had testified regarding [that transgression], he should be removed from his position since there is a basis for suspicion (Maharik, [responsum 33]; Maharshal, [Yam shel Shlomoh, Chulin 1:9]).
[Generally, when a person has transgressed and only one person witnessed the transgression, that witness should not testify; indeed, in certain instances, he is subjected to punitive measures should he testify.125 Nevertheless, in the instance at hand,] at the very least, the witness should not be punished even though his word is not accepted, since his intent was to prevent [the community] from transgressing.126 (On the contrary, it is a mitzvah for him to testify, [because his word can have consequences] for all those who regard his words as trustworthy, as if they were delivered by two [witnesses, and] would heed his testimony, as stated in Kiddushin 66[a]( (Maharik, [loc. cit.,] in the name of Sefer Mitzvos Gadol, [negative commandment 213]).
(נז) וּלְהַבָּא.
דְּלֹא שַׁיָּךְ לְמֵימַר דְּשָׁוֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְאִסּוּרָא בְּמִכַּאן וּלְהַבָּא דְּדַוְקָא גַּבֵּי יֵין נֶסֶךְ וּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא דְּאִם נִתְנַסֵּךְ הַיַּיִן כְּדִבְרֵי הָעֵד שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה אָמְרִינָן לְקַמָּן סִימָן קכ”ז שכה דְּשָׁוֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְאִסּוּרָא אֲבָל הָכָא לֹא שַׁיָּךְ לוֹמַר הָכִי דְּהָא אֲפִלּוּ אִם יִהְיֶה כְּדִבְרֵי הָעֵד מִכָּל מָקוֹם אֵינוֹ מֻחְלָט לִפָסוּל עוֹלָמִית בִּשְׁבִיל כָּךְ שֶׁאִם יַעֲשֶׂה תְּשׁוּבָה הַמֻּטֶּלֶת עָלָיו חוֹזֵר לְכַשְׁרוּתוֹ וְנִמְצָא דְּלֹא שָׁוֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְאִסּוּרָא כְּלָל בְּעֵדוּתוֹ כֵּיוָן שֶׁהַדָּבָר תָּלוּי בְּמַחֲשֶׁבֶת הַשּׁוֹחֵט אִם לְהָרַע אִם לְהֵיטִיב בְּמִכַּאן וּלְהַבָּא עַד כַּאן לְשׁוֹן מַהֲרִי”ק. שכו
וְהַפְּרִי חָדָשׁ שכז חָלַק עָלָיו. וְכֵן מִשְׁנֶה לְמֶלֶךְ שכח תָּמַהּ עָלָיו דְּלָמָּה לֹא נֵימָא דְּשָׁוֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְאִסּוּרָא דְּסוֹף סוֹף אִלּוּ אָתוּ ב’ עֵדִים וְהֵעִידוּ כָּךְ לֹא הָיִינוּ יְכוֹלִים לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ עוֹד הָכָא נַמִי לְגַבֵּי דִידֵיהּ כְּב’ עֵדִים דָּמוּ וְשַׁפִּיר שַׁוְיָה [אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ] חֲתִיכָה דְאִסּוּרָא שֶׁלֹּא לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ מִכַּאן וּלְהַבָּא עַד שֶׁיָּשׁוּב כְּדִינוֹ [טז]:
(נח) אָדָם.
שֶׁאִם אוֹתוֹ שׁוֹחֵט נִכְשַׁל כְּבָר פַּעַם אַחַת אֲפִלּוּ עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד יֵשׁ לְהַעֲבִירוֹ כֵּיוָן שֶׁיֵּשׁ רַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר (מַהֲרִי”ק שכט רְשַׁ”ל של).
וְעַל כָּל פָּנִים אֵין לְהַעֲנִישׁ הָעֵד אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן כֵּיוָן שֶׁמִּתְכַּוֵּן לְאַפְרוּשֵׁי מֵאִסּוּרָא (וְאַדְּרַבָּה מִצְוָה עָלָיו שֶׁיָּעִיד דְּכָל מִי דִּמְהֵימַן לֵיהּ כְּבֵי תְּרֵי יִשְׁמַע אֵלָיו כִּדְאִיתָא בְּקִדּוּשִׁין דַּף ס"ו) (מַהֲרִי"ק שָׁם בְּשֵׁם סְמַ"ג שלא):
When a single witness testifies that a shochet did not slaughter [an animal] correctly, and the shochet disputes his statement, [the meat is acceptable, because] the disputed testimony of a single witness is of no consequence. [xv] Moreover, even the witness himself may partake [of meat from animals this shochet slaughters] from this time onward. (57)
Nevertheless, everything is dependent on [the shochet’s reputation for observance]. (58)
ידשׁוֹחֵט שֶׁהֵעִיד עָלָיו עֵד אֶחָד שֶׁשָּׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא כַּהֹגֶן, וְהוּא מַכְחִישׁוֹ, עֵד אֶחָד בְּהַכְחָשָׁה לָאו כְּלוּם, [טו] וְהָעֵד עַצְמוֹ מֻתָּר לֶאֱכֹל מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא. (נז) וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם, הַכֹּל לְפִי מַה שֶּׁהוּא אָדָם. (נח)
