Kuntreis Acharon for Section 18

Kuntreis Acharon 18:1 (2)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains the basis for Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling that when the knife is discovered to be blemished after slaughtering, it makes no difference whether the slaughter was an animal or a fowl. Even though the skin of a fowl is soft, we do not assume that the knife became blemished on the cervical spine of its neck, because the Talmud does not differentiate between a fowl and a large animal (see Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah 18).

In this Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe also presents an overview of the various positions regarding a slaughtering knife that is found to be blemished after the slaughter is completed. This overview will help the student of this text understand the issues at hand. The Alter Rebbe begins by quoting the relevant passage in Chulin 10a:

It was stated: One who slaughters an animal with a knife (that had been examined),1 but was afterwards found to be blemished: Rav Huna says, “Even if [after slaughtering, the shochet] broke bones with the knife all day [and thus, one might say that the blemish was caused by the bones,] the slaughter is invalid.” Rav Chisda says, “The slaughter is acceptable.”

Rav Huna’s [opinion] is understood because he follows his previously established approach – During its lifetime, an animal’s status was established as forbidden [and that presumptive status] continues until it becomes known in which manner it was slaughtered (Chulin 9a).

However, what is the reasoning for Rav Chisda’s [ruling]?

Rav Chisda would say to you: A bone certainly blemishes [the knife], but with regard to a hide, it is uncertain whether it will or will not blemish [the knife. The principle is that:] A factor concerning which we are uncertain does not override one about which we are certain.

[The Gemara raises a question:] It has been taught: In all cases of uncertainty with regard to slaughter, the slaughter is invalid. What was the word “all” [intended] to include? Was it not intended to include an instance of this nature?

[The Gemara answers:] No. [The word “all” was intended] to include an instance where there is uncertainty whether the shochet interrupted [the slaughter,] or one in which there is uncertainty whether he pressed the knife against the simanim.

What is the difference between the two?

In one instance, a flaw was found in the animal. In the other, a flaw was found in the knife, not in the animal.

Rashba interprets the Talmud’s question, “What is the difference between the two?” to mean: Since we rule stringently in an instance where there is uncertainty as to whether the shochet interrupted the slaughter or pressed the knife against the simanim, because of the animal’s established status, even though most shochtim slaughter without interrupting or pressing against the simanim, similar stringency should be applied to a knife that was examined before it was used for slaughter, if it was discovered to be blemished after the slaughter is completed. True, one could say that it is likely that a bone will cause a blemish, but it is unlikely that the hide will do so. Nevertheless, it would appear that the animal’s established status should remain unchanged until we are certain that it was slaughtered correctly.

After outlining the arguments, the Talmud (Chulin 10b) concludes that the law follows Rav Huna’s stringency if it is not known that the shochet definitely broke a bone with the knife after slaughtering. However, if he used the knife to break a bone after shechitah, the law follows Rav Chisda’s lenient stance.

The Talmud continues: It is understood that Rav Chisda himself maintains that even if the shochet did not break a bone, we do not say that the knife became blemished from the hide. If so, what caused it to become blemished? It is assumed that it touched the cervical spine.

Rashba explains that Rav Chisda maintains that there are two leniencies that are relevant: a) that it is more likely for the knife to be blemished by the cervical spine than by the hide, and b) that even if the shochet has no specific knowledge of such, we assume that the knife touched the cervical spine. Rashba maintains that neither of these leniencies are accepted, and even if it is known that the knife touched the cervical spine, the slaughter is unacceptable.

Rabbeinu Asher differs with this approach and maintains that it is more likely that the knife will become blemished from striking the cervical spine than from striking the hide. Nevertheless, it is not assumed that the slaughtering knife became blemished from the cervical spine since a shochet rarely strikes the cervical spine powerfully with his knife. Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 18:15) follows Rashba’s approach.

The Alter Rebbe concludes by explaining that Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch – that we rule stringently even when the knife was found to be blemished after slaughtering a fowl – is based on Rashi’s commentary on Chulin 10b. Rashi, like Rabbeinu Asher, maintains that we do not assume that the knife became blemished from touching the cervical spine because the shochet does not strike the cervical spine with enough force to do so. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:2 (3)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe focuses on his ruling in note 3 in the main text concerning the difference of opinion between Rashba2 and Rabbeinu Asher3 regarding the size of a blemish that disqualifies a slaughtering knife. Rabbeinu Asher follows the opinion of Rav Chisda in Chulin 17b. In that source, Rav Chisda maintains that the size of a disqualifying blemish
on a slaughtering knife is derived from the size of a blemish that disqualifies the Altar: the blemish disqualifies the knife if it is large enough that tachgor bo hatziporen, “a fingernail would be caught in it.”

Notwithstanding Rav Chisda’s ruling, Rashba supports his more stringent stance – that a blemish in which a hair could be collected disqualifies a knife – by noting that Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi does not quote Rav Chisda’s ruling in his Halachos, leading to the conclusion that the halachah does not follow this view. Rashba further substantiates his stance, explaining that many of the other Amoraim mentioned in the Talmud’s discussion of this topic suggest other ways of examining a slaughtering knife which would reveal a blemish of even the slightest size, and maintain that even such blemishes would disqualify a knife. Nevertheless, Rashba maintains that the blemish must be large enough to contain something, even a hair. He thus clarifies that the expression “of even the slightest size” should not be taken literally because the Talmud (loc. cit.) states that a disqualifying blemish must be ogeres, which means “collects,” i.e., the blemish must be such that something would collect in it.

The Alter Rebbe equates Rashba’s interpretation of the phrase (Chulin 18a), tachgor bo hatziporen, translated above as “a fingernail would be caught in it,” with that of Rashi, i.e., it means that “a fingernail would be collected in it.” In other words, the blemish would have two spikes with a dip in between them into which the fingernail would sink. This is sufficient to disqualify the knife.

Rabbi Aharon Halevi4 differs with Rashi and Rashba, ruling even more stringently. He explains that the word tachgor has the same root as the word veyachgeru, which is used in the phrase (II Shmuel 22:46), veyachgeru mimisgerosum ‒ “and they became lame from their fetters.” Thus, Rabbi Aharon Halevi explains that just as a lame person’s gait is never even, so too, the blade of a blemished knife is not straight.5 This interpretation leads to the understanding that the knife is disqualified as long as a person feels a blemish on a knife when passing his fingernail over it, even if the blemish is so small that nothing becomes collected in it.

Rashba6 responds to Rabbi Aharon Halevi’s argument, maintaining that even those Amoraim who would examine a slaughtering knife with something other than a finger, would do so only as a preliminary measure. If they detected something that indicated that the knife was blemished, they would examine it to see if something, even a hair, would collect in the blemish. If it did, they would disqualify the knife. Rashba1 clarifies his stance, and explains that the expression, “of even the slightest size” should not be taken literally because Chulin 17b states that a disqualifying blemish must be ogeres, which is generally understood to mean “collects,” i.e., the blemish must be large enough that something would collect in it.

As a practical matter, the common practice among Ashkenazim is to follow Rav Pappa’s ruling in Chulin 17b, and examine the slaughtering knife on both one’s finger and fingernail. The Alter Rebbe quotes Pri Chadash7 and Tevuos Shor8, who explain the rationale behind this practice: A fingernail can feel even a blemish that is too small for the nail to get caught in. This differs slightly with Rashba’s approach. In resolution, they explain that, in addition to examining the knife with one’s nail, he should examine the knife with the flesh of his finger as well. If his flesh becomes entangled with the blemish, the knife is disqualified.

However, the Alter Rebbe questions the approach of Pri Chadash and Tevuos Shor because it would seem from Chulin, loc. cit., that if the shochet did not examine the knife by running his finger over it in addition to checking it with his fingernail, it is disqualified. However, at present, it is not common practice for shochtim to examine the knife by running the flesh of their finger over it. Moreover, clarification is necessary because the Talmud (Chulin, loc. cit.) states that even though a האסאס, i.e., a “bristle,” on a knife will be felt by a fingernail, it does not disqualify the knife. According to Pri Chadash and Tevuos Shor’s understanding of Rashba’s stance, what is the difference between a blemish that will contain a hair and a האסאס? The Alter Rebbe asks: How will a person differentiate between the two cases, when in both instances, his finger is not actually being “collected” in the space?

The Alter Rebbe resolves these difficulties by explaining that Rashba did not mean that the knife is disqualified by merely feeling a blemish that is large enough for a hair to be collected in it with one’s fingernail. Rather, the intent is that the nail or the flesh must be collected in the blemish. Now, a slight blemish will also collect flesh. For that reason, Rashba maintains that we do not follow Rav Chisda’s opinion that the knife is disqualified only if the blemish is large enough for a nail to be caught on it. Rather Rashba requires that the knife be examined by running the flesh of one’s finger over it. If one’s flesh is not collected in the blemish, then the knife is not disqualified even if the person feels the blemish.

According to this understanding, one might ask: Why is it necessary to examine the knife with a fingernail at all? Seemingly, examining the knife by running one’s finger over it should be sufficient. This question can be answered based on Tosafos’ interpretation of Chulin 17b. Tosafos explains that since the windpipe is firm, it is necessary to examine the knife with something firm. Such an examination will detect a blemish that will tear the windpipe. A firm substance that will serve this function is a fingernail. True, a fingernail might not detect a very slight blemish, however such a blemish would not tear the windpipe.

(This leads to a very significant leniency regarding the slaughter of a fowl. If the shochet only held the windpipe and slit it, and then discovered a blemish on the knife, if the blemish is not sufficient for a fingernail to be caught in it, the slaughter is not disqualified.)

Since a blemish in the knife that would tear the windpipe is larger than one which would tear the gullet – i.e., only a blemish in which a fingernail would be collected would be large enough to tear the windpipe, while even a smaller blemish will tear the gullet – it is necessary to examine the knife by running one’s finger over it as well. However, this applies only as an initial preference. After the fact, an examination with one’s fingernail is sufficient. The rationale is that if the shochet felt anything when examining the knife with his fingernail – even if his fingernail did not become collected in the blemish he detected – he would surely examine it again by running his finger over it. However, if the shochet did not feel anything when examining the knife with his fingernail, any blemish that might exist on the knife would not be large enough for his flesh to be collected in it.

Rabbeinu Asher rules more leniently, and offers a different reason as to why Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi did not mention Rav Chisda’s ruling in his Halachos. Rav Chisda rules that a disqualifying blemish must be large enough for a fingernail to be caught in it. Rabbeinu Asher explains that we require “an examination [of the knife] on the flesh of one’s finger and on one’s fingernail [because such an examination will discover blemishes that] would be karge enough for a fingernail to be caught on. Any blemish that a nail would feel would be that size.” Therefore, it is not necessary to mention Rav Chisda’s ruling. Thus, Rabbeinu Asher rules more leniently than Rashba, and maintains that if a blemish on a knife is not large enough for a fingernail to be caught in, even if a hair would be caught in it, the knife is not disqualified. According to his view, there is no difference between the size of a blemish that would tear the windpipe and one that would tear the gullet. According to this view, it would be sufficient to check the knife with one’s fingernail alone. The reason that, as an initial preference, it is also necessary to check the knife with the flesh of one’s finger is only as a safeguard, to ensure that one checks the knife effectively.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:4 (4)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe cites the passages that serve as the sources for this law:

Mishnah: One may slaughter with any [object that cuts], with the exception of a harvest sickle (used for harvesting grain; its edge has serrated spikes all pointed in one direction on an incline),9 a saw, the teeth (of an animal still attached to its jawbone)…, because they strangle the animal. (They do not cut [its simanim, i.e., its windpipe and gullet. Instead, they] tear [the simanim] because they are serrated.…)10

If one slaughters an animal with a harvest sickle, [which is serrated with its teeth inclined in one direction, by moving the knife] in a forward direction, the School of Shammai invalidates the slaughter, but the School of Hillel deems it kosher. ([If the knife] was moved in a forward direction, the School of Hillel maintains that the serrations do not tear the flesh because they are very bent over. [Thus, the flesh will not be caught in the teeth.])

Gemara: …Rabbi Yochanan says: Even though the School of Hillel deemed [the slaughter] kosher, they deemed it kosher only regarding ritual impurity [i.e., the carcass would not impart the ritual impurity] of a neveilah [i.e. the meat of an animal that was not ritually slaughtered], but the meat is [nonetheless] forbidden to be eaten. (This is a decree, [instituted] lest [permitting an animal slaughtered with such an object] by moving it in a forward direction [lead one to permit an animal slaughtered with such an object] by bringing it back.)11

The Sages taught: A knife in which there are several blemishes is deemed like a saw (for the reason to be explained). One in which there is only one blemish, if it catches [the flesh, the slaughter] is invalid, but if it [merely] entangles [the flesh, the slaughter] is kosher.

What is meant by a blemish that catches [the flesh], and what is meant by a blemish that entangles [the flesh]? Rabbi Eliezer said: A blemish that catches [has a spike] on two sides, while a blemish that entangles [has a spike] on one side. )Rashi: On two sides: Each blemish has two spikes, one on the head and one on the end. Ogeres, [the word translated as “catch,”] is similar to the word agarah, [as in Mishlei 6:8,] agrah ba’katzir ma’achalah ‒”She collects her food in the harvest.” [In this context, the intent is that, when examining the knife, the shochet’s] nail was caught and collected between the two spikes. [When Rabbi Eliezer mentions a knife with a blemish] on one side, [the intent is] that the blemish has only one spike and the second one was smoothed with a sharpener. [The slaughtering] knife would not catch the flesh [of the gullet or windpipe] in it, only entangle it. Mesuchseches, [translated as “entangled,”] shares the same root [as the word sichsasti, as in Yeshayahu 19:2,] vesichsachti Mitzrayim beMitzrayim ‒ “and I will entangle Egyptians against Egyptians.”(

[The Gemara challenges this explanation:] What is the difference between a blemish that catches [the flesh], in which instance, the first spike weakens (the hide and the flesh [of the neck]) and the second spike rips (i.e., strikes the siman and tears it) and one that entangles? [Seemingly, also] in the case of a blemish that entangles, the sharp tip of the knife weakens ([the hide and the flesh of the neck] before it touches the blemish) and the spike rips [the windpipe or the gullet].

([The rationale is] that any spike from the blemish will tear the flesh either when it encounters [the flesh of the siman] and then encounters the spike or when [the flesh] descends from it. Thus, [a blemish will disqualify the slaughter] even if [the shochet] passed the knife only in a forward direction and did not bring it back and thus, the siman did not encounter the first spike, i.e., the first spike was towards the tip of the knife and the second spike that was near the handle had been smoothed with a sharpener. A similar situation would apply if [the shochet] only brought the knife towards him and the spike that was not smoothed was on the side of the handle in which instance, the siman would not strike the spike but rather as [the siman] descended from [the spike, as the knife cut through the siman, the blemished part of the blade] would also tear [the siman].)

The Gemara explains: The reference is to a blemish that stands at the tip of the knife, [which begins the slaughter]. (The spike [will encounter only] the hide and the flesh [of the neck since] they were not slit beforehand. Hence, the spike will not tear the simanim as they descend from it [into the depth of the blemish]).

[The Gemara] objects: Ultimately, when the knife goes in one direction it will weaken [the hide and the flesh] and when it comes back in the other direction, it will tear the simanim.

[The Gemara] responds: [We are speaking about an instance where the shochet] passed [the knife] in a forward direction and did not draw it back.

[“A knife in which there are several blemishes”12 – On this phrase,] Rashi comments: For this reason, initially, a distinction was not made regarding a knife that has several blemishes as to whether the flesh would become caught in it or [merely] entangled in it. Even if all the blemishes are of the type that would cause [the flesh to become] entangled, it is unacceptable. [A knife whose blemishes would cause the flesh to become] entangled is accepted only if there is only one blemish at the tip of the knife. However, if there are many blemishes that entangle the flesh, the spike of the first blemish at the tip of the knife weakens the hide and the flesh [of the neck] and [the spike of] the second blemish tears the simanim as they descend from the spike into the depth of the blemish, even if the person just passed [the knife] in a forward direction and did not bring it back.

True, it has been taught, “One who slaughters an animal with a harvest sickle… the School of Hillel deems it kosher.” ([However, they accept the use of such a utensil only] to a limited degree, [maintaining that an animal slaughtered with such a utensil] does not impart the ritual impurity associated with a neveilah. Here, by contrast, it is taught that [a knife with several blemishes] is governed by the same laws as a saw). An animal slaughtered with such a knife is disqualified. [The distinction between them is that] the spikes of a harvest sickle are very bent over and do not at all tear the simanim when passed over them in a forward direction. However, if a spike is not bent over, it will tear [the simanim] even as it descends [to slit them], because as [the windpipe or gullet] descends toward the knife it [catches on] the blemish [and is torn].

[The Talmud continues:] Rava says: There are three types [of blemishes] in a knife. [If a blemish] catches, one may not slaughter [with it], and if he slaughtered, his slaughter is invalid. [If a blemish] entangles, one may not slaughter [with it as an initial preference], but if he slaughtered [with it], his slaughter is kosher [after the fact]. (I.e., as [the Talmud] explained, [the blemish was] on the tip of the knife and the shochet passed the knife only forward but did not bring it back. Even so, as an initial preference, he should not slaughter [with such a knife, as a safeguard] lest he [not only] passes it forward [but also] brings it back.) If the blade [of the knife] rises and falls (i.e., the knife had been blemished in a major way, but the spikes were smoothed with a sharpener, leaving a dip in the edge of the blade), one may slaughter with it as an initial preference.4

The above reflects the Talmud according to Rashi’s commentary. To summarize: Rashi maintains that a knife that causes the flesh to become entangled is one that had two spikes, but then one of them was smoothed with a sharpener. The remaining spike would tear the windpipe or the gullet both when the simanim first encounter the spike and when they descend from it. Therefore, slaughtering with such a knife is permitted only when the blemish is found on the tip of the knife and the shochet slit the simanim with only a forward motion, without drawing it back again. In this way, the blemish would not come in contact with the simanim until after the slaughter is completed. Alternatively, such a knife is acceptable when the blemish is on the end of the knife and the shochet made the slit by bringing the knife back, but did not pass it forward at all. Rama rules in this manner (see subsection 4).

Rambam, however, quotes the Talmud in his Hilchos Shechitah 1:15-16, but understands it differently than Rashi does. According to the understanding of Rabbeinu Nissim and Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch, Rambam maintains that a knife that causes the flesh to become entangled is one that is similar to Rashi’s interpretation of a harvest sickle, i.e., its spike is very bent over. Therefore, the knife’s spike is not felt when the shochet passes it over the animal’s flesh in a forward motion; the spike is felt only when he draws the knife back. The Alter Rebbe explains that Rambam is referring to a spike that is located towards the tip of the knife and is bent over towards the handle. Thus, Rambam understands the Talmud’s words, “that stands at the tip of the knife,” to mean that the spike is located towards the tip of the knife. This is in contrast to Rashi, who maintains that the spike is located adjacent to the tip of the knife. The same laws apply if the spike is located towards the end of the knife, i.e., towards the handle and is bent over towards the tip, for in this instance, the spike will not be felt if the shochet draws the knife in a backwards motion. The Alter Rebbe notes that Rambam permits slaughtering with such a knife in the above manner onlywhen there is only one spike. If the knife has more than one such spike, Rambam forbids slaughtering with it. The rationale is that if there are many spikes in the knife, there is concern that the shochet drew back his hand slightly and moved the knife in a backward motion without being aware of it. Rav Yosef Caro rules in this manner in subsection 5, below.

The Alter Rebbe then explains that Rabbeinu Asher (responsum 24) maintains that Rambam is theoretically correct in saying that if the shochet did not feel the blemish when examining the knife in the forward direction, we can assume that if he only moved the knife in the forward direction while slaughtering, the spike would not have torn the simanim. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, Rabbeinu Asher agrees with Rashi’s view. He maintains that it is very unlikely that a spike will be bent over to the extent that it will not be felt by the person checking the knife as his finger passes over it. Rabbeinu Asher explains that, true, according to Rambam, not only is it possible for a knife to have such a spike, but if such a spike passes over the simanim, it will not tear them. Nevertheless, as a practical measure, Rabbeinu Asher favors Rashi’s view.

The Alter Rebbe expands on this, and explains that according to Rabbeinu Asher, any blemish that would be felt when a person passes his finger over the knife from its handle to its tip will also be felt – albeit only if the person pays very careful attention – when he passes his finger over it from its tip to its handle. Therefore, Rabbeinu Asher rules that, after the fact, if a knife was examined only by passing one’s finger in one direction, it is acceptable. By contrast, Rambam and Rav Yosef Caro maintain that even after the fact, the slaughter is permitted only if the knife was examined by running one’s finger over the blade in both directions.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:11 (5)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe discusses the practice of examining the blade of the slaughtering knife between the slaughter of several animals when slaughtering numerous animals or fowl. He emphasizes that since a basic examination was made after the slaughter of each animal, if the knife is found to be blemished on its side when it is examined thoroughly after the final slaughter, only the last animal or fowl slaughtered is forbidden; the rationale for that prohibition is that we do not accept the possibility that the knife was blemished by the cervical spine after the slaughter was completed.

The Alter Rebbe explains that this ruling applies even if it is known that the knife touched the cervical spine when slaughtering the last animal or fowl, as maintained by Rama (see subsection 1, above). The rationale for this stringency is that we assume that the knife became blemished before or while it was being moved back-and-forth over the neck of the last animal or fowl to be slaughtered.

True, it is not known whether the knife was blemished at the outset – on the animal’s hide – or at the end – on its cervical spine. Nevertheless, since there is no greater likelihood that it was blemished at the beginning of the slaughtering process than at the end, we do not say that the halachic status of the knife, which was presumed to have been unblemished, may have been impaired, while the status of the animals, which were permitted – because they were presumed to have been slaughtered correctly – remained the same.

The rational is that in this instance, the presumption that the animal was slaughtered correctly is balanced against the fact that a disqualifying factor was found on the knife. Accordingly, since the halachic status of an animal is that its meat is forbidden until it is known that it was slaughtered correctly, we rule stringently and forbid the animal, since a Scriptural prohibition is involved. Even so, the above does not apply to the animals or fowl slaughtered before the last one. The fact that the knife was discovered to be blemished after the last animal was slaughtered does not reflect upon the animals or fowl that were slaughtered initially – even if the knife did not touch the cervical spine of the last animal or fowl. The rationale is that it is possible that the knife became blemished only on the hide of the last animal or fowl slaughtered. Because there are two equally-weighted possibilities involved, only the meat from that animal or fowl is forbidden.

True, if no inspection at all was made between the slaughter of several animals, and a blemish was found on the blade, all the animals or fowl slaughtered beforehand are forbidden. However, in this situation, the blade was checked before and after each animal or fowl was slaughtered. Since there are authorities who rule according to Rav Yeimar – who holds that the slaughters of the previous animals or fowl are not disqualified – with regard to a blemish found on the side of a knife, one may rely on these rulings with regard to all the animals or fowl slaughtered before the last one. The last animal or fowl is, however, definitely forbidden.

The difference between the ruling regarding the last animal or fowl slaughtered and the previous ones can be explained as follows: In both instances, there is an equal possibility that the knife was blemished by the hide – in which case, the slaughter would be disqualified – or by the cervical spine – in which case, the slaughter would be acceptable. Accordingly, regarding the animals or fowl slaughtered before the last one, the doubt is considered equally balanced and the status of the knife was unknown. As such, since the animal or fowl was not known to have any disqualifying factors beforehand, we assume the shochet slaughtered the animal in an acceptable manner and therefore, rule leniently.

By contrast, the fact that after the slaughter of the last animal or fowl, the knife was discovered to be blemished forces us to consider the possibility that the knife was blemished before the slaughter of that animal or fowl.

The above also explains the reason for the common practice of not checking the knife on all three sides between slaughters, mentioned by K’nesses HaGedolah. Nevertheless, as an initial and preferred option, unless there is a pressing situation, one should not rule leniently and instead, should follow the ruling of Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 18:16), which requires inspecting the knife on all three sides between every animal that is slaughtered. For this reason, shochtim have adopted the practice of making a basic inspection of the blade of the knife before and after each animal slaughtered, and only inspecting all three sides of the knife before slaughtering the first animal of a group and after completing the slaughter of all the animals. The rationale is that after slaughtering the last animal, there is ample time to thoroughly check the knife, and it is not a pressing situation.

Moreover, even in a pressing situation, when inspecting the knife between each animal or fowl slaughtered, although the accepted practice is to inspect only the blade, and not to inspect the knife on all three sides, nevertheless, the inspection of the blade must be carried out in a careful and patient manner. If it is done hastily, one is likely to miss a small blemish. It is particularly necessary to emphasize this point on the day preceding Yom Kippur, when many people bring the chickens used for kaparos to be slaughtered.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:11 (6)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe clarifies that if, when slaughtering a group of animals or fowl, the shochet does not examine his knife at all in between slaughters, none of the animals or fowl he slaughtered should be taken to be eaten until the knife has been examined after slaughtering the last of the animals. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to examine the knife between the slaughter of one animal or fowl and the next out of concern that the slaughtered animals or fowl will be taken and eaten before the shochet has completed slaughtering all the animals intended to be slaughtered and examined the knife. The rationale for this leniency is that even were that to happen, we would assume that unless the knife has been found to be blemished, it retains its previous halachic status. Thus, we would not assume that the people ate forbidden meat.

Similarly, we are not concerned that the shochet will forget to examine the knife after slaughtering. True, we are somewhat concerned regarding this possibility, and therefore require the knife to be examined before slaughtering with it, as stated in subsection 3 (note 4), above. In the instance at hand, however, since the knife was examined before the shochet began slaughtering, we presume that it retains its halachic status; we are not concerned that perhaps it touched the cervical spine of one of the animals slaughtered previously and became blemished, as will be explained in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 7). Therefore, even if the shochet forgot to check the knife after slaughtering, a person who partakes of meat from this animal is not considered to have eaten forbidden food (see Rashba, Chulin 10a-b; see also Terumas HaDeshen, responsum 184). Nevertheless, one should examine the animals or fowl after slaughtering each one to avoid bringing about this questionable situation and having to disqualify the slaughter of many animals if a slaughtering knife was checked and discovered to be blemished (see Rashba, loc. cit.; see also Tevuos Shor, sec. 18, note 23).

Kuntreis Acharon 18:12 (7)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe explains that the slaughtered animals are permitted because we are not concerned that the knife may have touched the cervical spine of one of their necks and then became blemished or that it became blemished because the shochet slaughtered a group of many animals. The rationale is that we do not suspect that the animal’s hide or the cervical spine of its neck blemished the knife unless we see an actual blemish on the knife. True, the animal is presumed to be forbidden until we know that it was slaughtered according to halachah. Nevertheless, since it is uncommon for a knife to be blemished by an animal’s hide or the cervical spine, the situation is comparable to that described in sec. 1.13 Just as in that situation, the number of shochtim who are not experts is not significant and therefore is not taken into consideration, similarly, in the present instance, the likelihood of the knife being blemished by the animal’s hide or the cervical spine of its neck is minimal, and is therefore not taken into consideration. This is the view of Rabbeinu Asher (Chulin 1:15).

Rashba (Chulin 10a) and Rabbeinu Nissim (Chulin 3b) disagree with this stance, and maintain that it is not entirely uncommon for an animal’s hide to blemish a slaughtering knife. Nevertheless, after the fact, if the knife is lost, they rule that the animals slaughtered are deemed permitted because just as the presumed status of the animal is that it is forbidden, the presumed status of a knife is that it is unblemished. Hence, we assume that a knife that was used by an expert to slaughter an animal was examined before he used it and, accordingly, retains its status as being unblemished. We therefore assume the animal was slaughtered correctly, unless a disqualifying blemish is found on the knife, as mentioned in the note 5 of the Kuntreis Acharon. In this instance, however, although the knife was lost, since it was not known to have been blemished, we assume that its state remained unchanged and the animal was slaughtered in an appropriate manner.

The Alter Rebbe supports this ruling with an example from a somewhat parallel situation:14 Once it is established that a mikveh contains the required quantity of water, after the fact, it is not necessary to measure the depth of the water before each immersion even though the status of the person immersing in the mikveh has been established to be ritually impure (see sec. 201).15

Kuntreis Acharon 18:13 (8)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s statement in his Shulchan Aruch, that if a knife was misplaced after it was used to slaughter, and was then found and discovered to be blemished, we do not disqualify the animals slaughtered with it. Instead, we assume that the knife was used to break bones after the slaughter was completed, and it was then that it became blemished. The Alter Rebbe notes that Rabbeinu Asher issued a similar ruling in K’lal 20, subsection 15. This ruling is based on the difference of opinion between Rav Chisda and Rav Huna in Chulin 10a:

One who slaughters an animal with a knife (that had been examined),16 but was afterwards found to be blemished: Rav Huna says, “Even if [after slaughtering, the shochet] broke bones with the knife all day [and thus, one might say that the blemish was caused by the bones,] the slaughter is invalid.” Rav Chisda says, “The slaughter is acceptable.”

With his approach, Rav Huna is implying that we should assume that the knife was damaged by the animal’s hide while the animal was being slaughtered. According to Rabbeinu Asher’s understanding of the Talmudic passage, we follow this stringent approach if we are certain that the shochet did not break bones with the knife before examining it. In that instance, we can be certain that the knife was blemished while slaughtering. True, it is more likely that the knife was blemished by the cervical spine of the animal’s neck than by its hide, in which case the slaughter would be valid. However, since the possibility exists that the knife was blemished by the hide, the animal’s meat is forbidden.

Nevertheless, we follow Rav Chisda’s more lenient approach if the knife was misplaced and then discovered afterwards. In such an instance it is possible that the knife was used in a way that might blemish it, e.g., to break bones, before it was found and checked. Hence, since it is unlikely that the knife was blemished by the animal’s hide, we assume that it was blemished afterwards when being used in this manner. This is the argument Rabbeinu Asher presents in his responsum.

The implication is that we follow Rav Chisda‘s more lenient approach not only if we are certain that the knife was used in a manner that might blemish it before it was examined, but even if such a possibility merely exists. The rationale for this practice is that it is more likely that the knife was damaged by the cervical spine of an animal’s neck than by its hide. Therefore, if there is an additional factor that increases the likelihood that the knife was not damaged by the hide, the slaughter is not disqualified. This reasoning follows the approach of Rabbeinu Asher who maintains that it is more probable that a knife became blemished from the cervical spine – if it struck it forcefully – than by the hide.

Rashba, in his gloss to Chulin 10b, maintains that we should follow Rav Chisda’s lenient approach only when it is certain that the knife was used to break bones before being examined. Otherwise, we should follow the stringency of Rav Huna’s approach because according to Rashba, there is no greater likelihood that the knife was damaged by the cervical spine of the animal’s neck than by its hide.

In subsection 15 of his Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Caro ruled according to Rashba’s approach. Nevertheless, that does not represent a contradiction to his ruling here, which follows Rabbeinu Asher’s view, because there is a significant difference between the situations presented. In the instance presented here, the knife was misplaced before being examined. Since it was already damaged when it was found, even Rashba would agree that in this instance, the possibility exists that while it was missing, the knife was used to crack bones or in some other way that would blemish it. Therefore, we assume that the knife retained its original status until it was misplaced, and only afterwards was it blemished. By contrast, in subsection 15, Rav Yosef Caro presents an instance where the knife remained in the shochet’s possession after he finished slaughtering. In that instance, since it was in the shochet’s possession and it is not known that anything that disqualified the knife occurred to it – even if it fell, but it is not known that it fell on its blade – if a blemish was discovered, it is assumed that the blemish occurred while slaughtering the animal. Hence, the meat of that animal is not permitted.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:15 (*)

In a Kuntreis Acharon marked with an asterisk, the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in the main text, that even if one used a slaughtering knife as a hatchet to break the cervical spine of an animal’s neck, and then found that the knife was blemished, we do not assume that using the knife in this manner is what caused the blemish. In his Beis Yosef, Rav Yosef Caro explains that he based this ruling on the understanding of Rabbeinu Nissim, who he interprets as maintaining that the cervical spine of an animal’s neck is softer than other bones.

Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 18:26) and Turei Zahav (Yoreh Deah 18:12) disagree with this interpretation, and understand Rabbeinu Nissim’s ruling differently. Like Rav Yosef Caro, these authorities maintain that Rabbeinu Nissim rules that when the shochet broke the cervical spine, we should not follow the more lenient opinion of Rav Chisda in Chulin 10a (see the Kuntreis Acharon, note 8, where Rav Chisda’s opinion is discussed in depth). As such, we do not consider the possibility that the blemish on the knife was caused by being drawn back and forth over the cervical spine of the animal’s neck during the slaughter.17 However, these authorities maintain that although a knife being drawn back and forth over the cervical spine will not blemish it, if one uses the knife like a hatchet to break bones, there is no difference between the cervical spine and other bones and doing so will blemish the knife. Thus, both Sifsei Kohen and Turei Zahav maintain that if the shochet used the knife in this manner, and the knife was then found to be blemished, the blemish can be attributed to this use of the knife, even if it was used only to break the cervical spine of the animal’s neck.

Numerous authorities including Rabbeinu Asher (Chulin 1:15),18 and Rashi differ with Rabbeinu Nissim’s fundamental premise (which is shared by Rashba), and maintain that even if the shochet moved the knife back and forth over the cervical spine of the animal’s neck, if a nick is found in the bone, any blemish that is found in the knife is attributed to it. The rationale behind this stance is as follows: The knife was discovered to be blemished after slaughtering with it. We assume that the knife was unblemished before being used, since no blemish was found when it was checked following its previous use. Therefore, we assume that it was blemished while slaughtering, either on the animal’s hide or on its cervical spine. If, upon checking the cervical spine, that bone is found to be nicked, we can safely assume that the knife was blemished after the slaughter was completed. The rationale is that, if the cervical spine is nicked, it is more probable that the knife was blemished from contact with it than with the hide. In such an instance, we rule leniently and permit the meat.

As mentioned, Rabbeinu Nissim and Rashba do not accept this approach, because they maintain that a) the cervical spine of an animal’s neck is no more likely to damage a knife than the hide and b) an animal is presumed to be forbidden until it is known to have been slaughtered properly. Thus, Rabbeinu Nissim and Rashba maintain that since the knife was discovered to be blemished after slaughtering the animal, there is no reason to assume that the animal was slaughtered properly.

The difference between the two approaches is reflected in the statement in Chulin 10b, “There, the flaw [arose] regarding the animal. [Hence, the slaughter is invalid]. Here, the flaw [arose regarding] the knife but not regarding the animal. [Hence, the slaughter is valid.]” Rabbeinu Asher applies that argument to this instance, but Rabbeinu Nissim and Rashba do not.

The Alter Rebbe concludes this note with practical advice regarding how to resolve questions of this nature. If the shochet used the knife like a hatchet to break the cervical spine of the animal’s neck, and afterwards the knife was discovered to be blemished, he should find an unblemished portion of the blade and use it like a hatchet to break another portion of the cervical spine of the animal’s neck. If this creates a blemish, then the blade of the knife is soft, and it was probably blemished by breaking the cervical spine of the animal’s neck. Hence, the Alter Rebbe maintains that in this instance, the shochet may rely on Sifsei Kohen and Turei Zahav and permit the animal. Moreover, if a substantial loss is involved, even if a blemish was discovered on the knife and the shochet forcefully slit the cervical spine of the animal’s neck with the knife when he was moving it back and forth to slit the simanim, he should forcefully move it back and forth it in a similar fashion over the cervical spine of the animal’s neck. If this blemishes the knife, the person may rely on Rashi’s and Rabbeinu Asher’s opinion and permit the slaughter.

Kuntreis Acharon 18:17 (9)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch, that a shochet who does not show his knife to a scholar should be placed under a ban of ostracism. Rashi (Chulin 18a) maintains that the reason behind this halachah is, “[the shochet’s] uncontrolled conduct, his brazenness [towards the scholar], for the law is that ‘[an affront] to a scholar’s honor [deserves] ostracism.’”

Rabbeinu Nissim, in his gloss to Chulin 5a agrees with Rashi’s reasoning. However, Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 1:26) and others maintain that the shochet is threatened with a ban of ostracism for a different reason – to discourage him from relying on his own examination of his knife. Furthermore, if a shochet is ostracized for examining his own knife, his punishment will serve as a deterrent for others. Hence, this practice serves as a safeguard, ensuring that no shochet will come to slaughter with a blemished knife.19

Rambam explains that a person is placed under a ban of ostracism for an affront to a scholar’s honor only if he denigrates the scholar verbally in a manner that belittles the scholar. However, failure to show a scholar the appropriate honor does not warrant a ban of ostracism. Furthermore, shochtim are not required to show their slaughtering knife to a scholar as a sign of respect. Rather, this practice is required as a safeguard, to ensure that the knife is inspected properly before slaughtering. We do not permit the shochet to examine his own knife for blemishes because we are concerned that he will fail to show the appropriate care and concern when doing so.

True, Chulin 17b states that the requirement to show a slaughtering knife to the local scholar is a way of showing the scholar proper respect. However, that does not contradict Rambam’s approach, because this show of respect is not the primary reason for requiring shochtim to have their knives checked by a local scholar. Rather, the practice developed because those who slaughter animals for others or to sell to the public (i.e., professional shochtim) were not permitted to inspect their own knives. Instead, that inspection had to be performed by an independent, outside party who is knowledgeable, G‑d-fearing, and proficient in this craft. As a gesture of honor to the leading local scholar, it was ordained that he, and not other scholars, be the one who performs these inspections. However, this requirement applies only to those who slaughter for others or slaughter intending to sell the meat to others. If a person slaughters solely for his own consumption and he knows the laws of ritual slaughter, he is permitted to do so without first showing his knife to the local scholar. The Alter Rebbe concludes that at present, when it is no longer the practice for the local scholar to inspect slaughtering knives, one must be very careful to make sure that the local shochtim are individuals who are renowned for their fear of G‑d. Alternatively – and this is a proper practice which has been adopted in many places – a G‑d-fearing person should be appointed over the shochtim to inspect their knives before they slaughter (Simlah Chadashah 18:20).

Kuntreis Acharon 18:18 (10)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe discusses the interrelated issues of how shochtim are paid and who should be responsible for inspecting the animals that have been slaughtered to determine whether or not they are kosher. The Alter Rebbe begins by explaining that although Rama notes that some communities appoint independent slaughterers and inspectors to check the animals that have been slaughtered, according to the letter of the law, it is permitted for every person with an established reputation for piety to slaughter animals, inspect these animals, and then sell their meat to others (see sec. 65, below).20

True, the shochet would lose money each time he would find an animal to be tereifah, and thus there is reason to suspect that he might be overly lenient in his rulings. Nevertheless, since he is not receiving a wage for slaughtering animals that are found to be kosher, people are less likely to suspect him of ruling leniently in this matter.

This is Raavad’s conception. In practice, Raavad would make an agreement with the shochtim, committing to pay them a fixed fee for the year. Afterwards, he would make an arrangement with them that they would receive the colons from the kosher animals in exchange for the money that is due them. It appears that Raavad’s intent was that if a yearly wage was not established, and the shochtim would take the colons from the animals found to be kosher as payment for slaughtering, there would be room to suspect that the shochtim would rule leniently when examining the animals they slaughtered. However, since Raavad first established a wage for the entire year, the shochtim would be receiving their payment in whatever form for slaughtering both the animals that are found to be kosher and those found to be tereifah. Afterwards, by agreeing to accept the colons, the shochtim are not receiving their salary solely for slaughtering animals that are found to be kosher. Rather, they are accepting the colons in exchange for the money that is due them.

For this same reason, it is permissible for a shochet to purchase the right to slaughter all the animals of the city, in return for receiving a predetermined amount from the butchers for every animal found to be kosher that he slaughters. In such an instance, the amount earned by selling the slaughtered animals is not considered a wage. The rationale is that although the shochet is losing money each time an animal is found not to be kosher, he is considered like a butcher who slaughters intending to sell the meat to others. In such an instance, it is permitted for the butcher to check the animals he slaughters himself and determine whether or not they are permitted, provided he has established a reputation for pious behavior. This applies even though he loses money each time an animal is found to be tereifah. Although according to the letter of the law, there is no difficulty with this practice, it does appear inappropriate and a meticulous person should distance himself from such conduct.

The above represents Rivash’s opinion, which Rav Yosef Caro cited in his Beis Yosef. On the basis of Rivash’s statements, Turei Zahav (Yoreh Deah 18:15) questions why a butcher is permitted to slaughter his own animals, inspect them, and sell their meat to others, but is not permitted to inspect his own firstborn animals for disqualifying blemishes. Indeed, Negayim 2:5 clearly states that a person is permitted to inspect only firstborn animals owned by others for disqualifying blemishes, but is not permitted to inspect his own firstborn animals. The rationale given for this stringency is that a person is suspected of being overly lenient when ruling about his own animals.21 Seemingly, similar concepts should apply regarding a shochet’s ruling about the permissibility of an animal he slaughtered.

Turei Zahav resolves this question, explaining that the established halachic status of a firstborn animal is that it is forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Therefore, if the animal’s owner were to find a blemish disqualifying the animal’s special status, and permitting it to be used, it would be problematic. We are concerned that he will rule leniently and claim that he found a disqualifying blemish when, in fact, the imperfection he found would not disqualify the firstborn animal.

By contrast, when it comes to checking the lungs or other organs of an animal that was slaughtered, there is room for leniency. Although an animal is forbidden to be eaten while it is alive, that halachic status is counterbalanced by the fact that most animals are healthy and do not have disqualifying flaws in their inner organs. Since there is a general principle that most shochtim are experts, once an animal is slaughtered, it is assumed to have been slaughtered according to halachah. Thus, the presumed status of the animal is that it is kosher and, unless it is known that there is a difficulty regarding its organs, an inspection of those organs simply verifies the presumed status. It should be noted, however, that the Alter Rebbe emphasizes that according to Turei Zahav, a scholar may not rule regarding his own property if its current halachic status is that it is assumed to be forbidden, and issuing a ruling permitting the object will financially benefit the scholar.22 This includes instances where questions arise regarding whether the animal was slaughtered correctly.

Rivash and other authorities, however, do not accept the distinction Turei Zahav makes between checking the animals one has slaughtered and ruling that they are kosher, and ruling regarding the disqualification of a firstborn animal due to a blemish. Rivash maintains that ruling regarding a blemish in a firstborn animal is entirely different than checking the animals which one slaughtered and ruling whether or not they are kosher. The latter situation closely resembles the trust which the Torah has given a person regarding his own home. In that instance, every person’s word is accepted regarding separating terumah and the tithes, slaughtering animals, and the like (see Kuntreis Acharon (note 15) to sec. 1). The Sages did not impose any restrictions regarding this because if they had, no one would accept hospitality from another person (Talmud Yerushalmi, Demai 4:5). This concept can be expanded to include a shochet who knows the relevant laws, i.e., such a shochet may issue a halachic ruling concerning his own animals that he has slaughtered. The rationale for this leniency is that according to Scriptural Law, even the word of a single witness is accepted with regard to prohibitions. Rambam23 rules that this applies even if the witness derives some benefit from issuing a lenient ruling. That instance is not drastically different from a person serving others meat from animals he slaughtered, after he himself inspected the animals to ensure that they were kosher, in which instance, his word is relied upon.

By contrast, ruling regarding a blemish in a firstborn animal is a much more severe and restricted matter. In the Talmudic era, even Rabbinic authorities who mastered the laws concerning this matter were not permitted to issue rulings regarding it unless they received authorization from the Nasi, the head of the Rabbinic Academy. Similarly, in the present age, a person is not permitted to rule regarding a blemish on his own firstborn animal.

Accordingly, no comparison can be made between ruling regarding a blemish on a firstborn animal and ruling regarding ordinary questions of ritual slaughter, even if the person issuing the ruling will benefit from it. For that reason, Rivash permits the shochtim to receive a wage for slaughtering and inspecting animals.

However, there are grounds for a person who receives his wages only from animals that he slaughters that are shown to be permitted to be looked down upon by people at large. Indeed, if the shochet has not established a reputation for pious observance, there may well be reason to suspect him of ruling leniently for his own benefit. However, there is no question that a shochet’s word can be unequivocally accepted regarding animals he slaughters for his own personal use.