Kuntreis Acharon for Section 2

Kuntreis Acharon 2:2 (2)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe focuses on his ruling in note 5 in the main text that even if a person partakes of meat that was not slaughtered according to halachah to fulfill his own desires, we do not suspect that he will slaughter improperly – either by interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife against the simanim (i.e., the gullet and the windpipe), or failing to slit the major portion of the simanim. The point of this Kuntreis Acharon is that we do not suspect that the slaughter was disqualified accidentally because it is an established presumption that a Jew who is mentally capable will slaughter correctly when he has the opportunity and will notice if a disqualifying factor arises.

Seemingly, the assumption at the end of the previous paragraph can be questioned because, when it is possible to verify whether an animal was slaughtered correctly, one is obligated to do so by examining the slaughtered animal to ensure that the major portion of the simanim was slit. In such an instance, we do not rely on the presumption that a mentally capable person will make sure to slaughter correctly, and will note whether a factor that had disqualified the slaughter has arisen. The need for stringency is based on the concept that the halachic status of the animal is that it is forbidden to be eaten until it is known that it was slaughtered in accordance with halachah (see sec. 25:1 and note 2 there). Thus, if it possible to verify that the animal was slaughtered correctly, one must do so and not rely on the assumption that the shochet slaughtered correctly. The same principle applies regarding examining the slaughtering knife used by a person known to have eaten non-kosher meat (see Kuntreis Acharon, note 3).

However, if it is impossible to verify that the animal was slaughtered correctly – e.g., the animal’s head was cut off, and therefore it is impossible to check if the shochet slit the simanim correctly – we rely on the presumption that the person who slaughtered the animal slit the major portion of the simanim as required. We make this assumption even if the slaughterer is known to eat non-kosher meat because we assume he slaughtered the animal carefully, and then checked to see that the major portion of the simanim was slit. The basis for this leniency is the presumption that even such a person will not violate a transgression if it is possible for him to perform the same act in a halachically correct manner without any undue difficulty.

The assumption that the shochet slaughtered properly, without interrupting the process applies even according to the ruling that if one makes even the slightest interruption while slaughtering, the slaughter is disqualified (see sec. 23:2). The rationale for this leniency is that the ruling in sec. 23:2 is merely of Rabbinic origin (see sec. 23, note 3), and we follow the principle: When there is doubt regarding a Rabbinic prohibition, we rule leniently. Moreover, even regarding such a matter, we assume that even though the shochet is a transgressor, he will not slaughter improperly since there is no additional, overtaxing difficulty involved in slaughtering properly.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:2 (3)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling that if an observant Jew did not check the knife of a shochet who is known to eat non-kosher meat, before he slaughtered, then the meat is forbidden unless [the knife] is examined afterwards. The Alter Rebbe notes that this ruling seems to imply that if the knife was checked by a reliable authority before being used to slaughter the animal, it is not necessary to examine the shochet’s knife after he completes ritual slaughter. The rationale is that we assume that the knife retains its previous halachic status (see sec. 18:12). This opinion is not accepted by many later authorities including Turei Zahav (Yoreh Deah 18:7) and Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 18:16), who always require that the knife be examined before and after slaughtering with it. Their logic is that since it is possible to examine the knife and verify its present state, we do not rely on the presumption that its state has not changed. It is only if it is impossible to examine the knife after the slaughter has been completed, that we apply that presumption.

In this Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe notes that if the shochet is known to partake of non-kosher meat, the knife must be examined by someone other than the shochet. The rationale for this stringency is that we do not rely on the assumption that a person who is a transgressor will have inspected his knife. It is possible that in fact he will not check it. Alternatively, it is possible that he will check the knife, find a blemish, and refrain from saying anything even though slaughtering with such a knife would cause others to partake of non-kosher meat. True, we accept the statement of a person who is suspected of partaking of forbidden substances if he testifies for others regarding this prohibition [see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 119:7)]. However, that general rule applies only when such a person actually gives testimony. In this instance, the slaughterer is remaining silent, and we cannot assume his silence means that he examined the knife and found it to be fit for slaughtering. Since he is not careful about his own observance, we cannot assume that he would make a statement in order to prevent others from transgressing.

Furthermore, such a person’s statement is not accepted if he is slaughtering with a knife that was not examined beforehand and after he slaughters, he says that the knife he used is acceptable. Instead, it must be examined because it is possible that he will not take the trouble of ensuring that the knife is fit to be used for slaughter.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:2 (4)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe comments on his statement in note 9 in the main text, that it is necessary for a person other than the transgressor who slaughters to check the knife before the slaughter lest the examiner forget to check it afterwards, since we do not rely on an examination performed by the transgressor. The source for this ruling is Rashba (Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 6, shaar 1).

Rabbeinu Nissim offers another explanation why we should not rely on checking the transgressor’s knife after the slaughter: An observer may mistakenly conclude that we rely on the examination performed by the transgressor himself after or before he slaughtered, and then give him animals to slaughter without checking the transgressor’s knife before partaking of the meat.

On this basis, Bach (Yoreh Deah 2) states that the person who examines the knife prior to the slaughter should not do so in private, but instead should check it in the presence of others, lest casual observers assume that one may rely on the transgressor to check the knife in the future. Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 2:8) offers an alternative solution to this problem: When giving the knife to the transgressor who slaughters, the person who checked the knife should say publicly, “I examined this knife.” In this way, the observers will understand that he is not relying on an examination performed by the transgressor.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:2 (5)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rama’s statement that the fact that a shochet allowed an animal that was tereifah to be sold – or gave it to others – under the assumption it was kosher does not invalidate his slaughter in the future, and he may be relied upon to slaughter correctly. The Alter Rebbe notes that Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 2:11) and other authorities object to this leniency, and maintain that the shochet may not be relied upon until he both repents and undergoes the process of penances set forth in Yoreh Deah 119:15 (which is based on Sanhedrin 25a). It is evident from the ruling of Rashba (Vol. 1, responsum 20), that this stringency applies even if the shochet claims to have given to others – or permitted the sale of – the incorrectly slaughtered animal’s meat unknowingly. The rationale for this strict stance is that part of a shochet’s responsibility is to check the slaughtered animal carefully to ensure that it was slaughtered correctly. If the shochet failed to fulfill this obligation, he is considered to have transgressed willfully.

The later authorities debate whether the shochet’s expression of regret and sorrow at having permitted meat from the improperly slaughtered animal to be eaten is sufficient to prevent him from being disqualified as a slaughterer. All authorities agree that the shochet must accept divrei chaveiros, i.e., agree to conduct himself in a more halachically conscious manner than people at large and promise to be careful not to allow such an error to happen again. Some of these authorities maintain that there is a difference between a shochet who immediately expresses regret and one who does so only after some time has passed. These authorities maintain that in the latter instance, there is concern that the shochet is expressing regret only in an effort to maintain his position.

All authorities agree that if the local Rabbinic authorities disqualify the shochet, he may not regain his former status as one who is permitted to slaughter unless he goes to a place where he is not known1 and, if, when slaughtering a costly animal for himself, he disqualifies it as tereifah.2 Alternatively, the shochet can prove his honesty by returning a lost object that is very valuable to its owner. This shows that he is no longer motivated by the desire for unearned financial gain [Sanhedrin 25a; see also Yoreh Deah, loc. cit.; see also the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Choshen Mishpat 34:34)].

These laws apply to a shochet who slaughters animals for himself and sells their meat to others, as well as to one who is appointed as a communal shochet [Rama (Choshen Mishpat 34:33-34)].

The Alter Rebbe notes that Sanhedrin, loc. cit., and the authorities who cite that source do not mention the shochet expressing regret and undergoing penances. However, there are authorities (e.g., Maharit, Yoreh Deah, responsum 15) who rule that in certain instances the shochet’s expression of sincere regret for his transgression together with his resolution to conduct himself in a more careful manner may be considered sufficient to reinstate the person to his former status as a slaughterer. The Alter Rebbe notes that Maharit seems to rule in a manner that is inconsistent with Sanhedrin 25a, and explains that there is a significant difference between the two cases: Sanhedrin, loc. cit., is addressing an instance in which the shochet willfully sold non-kosher meat as kosher, i.e., he was obviously motivated by a desire for money. Therefore, until he shows that he has overcome that desire, he is not permitted to slaughter and his former status is not restored. Maharit, by contrast, is ruling regarding a shochet who acted negligently. Since he is known to be a sincere and G‑d-fearing person, the fact that he immediately expresses regret for his actions and resolves, in the presence of three scholars, never to repeat them, is sufficient to permit him to regain his former status as a reliable shochet.

The Alter Rebbe [based on Rashba (Vol. 1, responsum 594)], however, clarifies that Maharit’s lenient ruling applies only in an instance where the shochet was not cavalier in his examination of the slaughtering knife. If, however, the shochet slaughtered incorrectly due to a lighthearted attitude when examining the knife before slaughtering, and then subsequently sold the meat from the invalidly slaughtered animal as permissible meat, he is considered to have willfully violated a prohibition. In such an instance, an expression of regret in the presence of three scholars is not sufficient to permit the shochet’s original status to be restored. The rationale for this stringent stance is that we suspect the person may be expressing regret solely to be reinstated in his position.

If the shochet did not express his regret immediately, Hagahos Asheri (Chulin 7:16) adds another condition before permitting a shochet who sells his meat to be reinstated to his former position: The shochet must also be subjected to having his misconduct announced publicly.

In this Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe also mentions an instance where a shochet repented after allowing the meat of a tereifah animal to be sold as kosher meat, but then committed a similar offense. In such an instance, depending on the situation, there are various opinions as to whether the shochet’s expression of regret is taken into consideration and he may be reinstated to his position. However, it is generally accepted that if this occurs three times, a chazakah (i.e., an accepted presumption) is established regarding this person’s carelessness, and he is not to be reinstated (Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 119:28).

Kuntreis Acharon 2:3 (6)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe focuses on his statement in note 10 in the main text – that a person who partakes of forbidden meat because of his appetite is suspect to take a false oath regarding meat that he slaughtered because by partaking of the forbidden meat, he violated the oath to observe the mitzvos taken by the Jewish people at Mount Sinai. There are authorities (e.g., Rashi, Shevuos 46b, et al.) who maintain that a person who violated an oath regarding his future conduct because he could not overcome his desires is not suspect to take a false oath about something that had happened in the past. According to this logic, one could argue that since this person violated the oath taken by our forefathers at Mount Sinai only because he could not overcome his desires, an oath he takes regarding an animal that he slaughtered or a knife with which he slaughtered should be accepted.

Nevertheless, this stance is not accepted and such a person’s oath regarding his slaughter is not accepted. The rationale is that this person is known to transgress and rebel against Jewish Law regarding this prohibition. Accordingly, with regard to this prohibition, his statement is not accepted, even if it is made under oath.

The Alter Rebbe then explains that the same concept applies to financial matters, i.e., a person who is suspected of violating prohibitions regarding financial matters is also suspected of taking a false oath regarding such matters (Bava Metzia 6a; see also the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Choshen Mishpat 92:3). The rationale is that since the person is willing to violate Jewish Law for financial gain, we suspect that he will also take a false oath for financial gain.

Building on this concept, the Alter Rebbe explains why Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah 4:14) rules that if a person willfully violates Jewish practice regarding one mitzvah as an act of rebellion, his statements regarding any mitzvah are not accepted (see subsection 6 below; see also the Alter Rebbe’s note 13 to this section). Thus, as the Alter Rebbe explains, such a person is not trusted to examine a slaughtering knife. Furthermore, even after the fact, if he takes an oath that he examined the knife carefully, his statement is not accepted because we suspect him of lying regarding any matter of mitzvah observance. This is similar to our stance regarding a person who transgresses for financial gain — we suspect such a person of taking a false oath regarding such matters. True, we are not certain that he is lying, however, we suspect that he might be.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:4 (7)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in subsection 4, that when a Jew who rebels against Jewish practice has two knives – one which is suitable for slaughtering and one which is not – says that he slaughtered with the acceptable knife, we accept his statement. As the Alter Rebbe explains, even though the person has another knife which is not acceptable, we assume that he would not slaughter with the unacceptable knife. Instead, we presume that the person would not violate a prohibition if he can easily accomplish the task at hand in a permitted manner. Nevertheless, even in this instance, we rely on his word only if a reliable individual checks the knife within an hour or two after the slaughter, thus, making it unlikely that he would have the opportunity to obtain another knife. Rashba rules more stringently and requires that the reliable person be present when the slaughterer completes slaughtering.

In the event that a reliable individual checks the knife immediately following the slaughter and it would be impossible for the transgressor to obtain another knife, the remaining question would be whether he checked the knife he had before the slaughter. The Alter Rebbe suggests that there is a relevant difference of opinion between Rabbeinu Asher and Rashba as to whether checking the knife is itself considered a bothersome matter or that applies only to fixing a blemished knife. According to Rabbeinu Asher, checking the knife is not in itself considered bothersome. Hence, we assume that given the opportunity, the transgressor would have used the acceptable knife. Therefore, he does not need to make any statement about the knife’s status. However, Rashba is of the opinion that even checking the knife is bothersome. Thus, the transgressor would still need to state that “I slaughtered with this acceptable knife.”

Kuntreis Acharon 2:5 (8)

Rav Yosef Caro uses the term mumar lehachis, which we have translated as, “A person who rebels [against Jewish observance] with the intent of angering [his Creator].” In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe discusses the definition of this term, beginning with the explanation in Chulin 4a, which states that a mumar lehachis refers to a person who foregoes kosher food and partakes of forbidden food even though he has no greater desire for it, and does so only to anger and rebel against his Creator.3 Rambam presents another explanation, ruling that a person may be considered a mumar lehachis even if he transgresses without specifically intending to rebel against his Creator. Instead, he transgresses a specific commandment because heresy overcame him and he does not believe in this mitzvah, i.e., he does not believe that the mitzvah is of Divine origin.4 Since the person does not distinguish between what is forbidden and what is permitted, he is considered one who rebels against the entire Torah.

This same rule applies if a person is careful regarding the mitzvah of ritual slaughter, and observes it in all its details, but violates another commandment. It makes no difference if he transgresses a prohibition or fails to fulfill a specific mitzvah, not out of laziness, but because he either desires to rebel against his Creator or because he does not believe in that mitzvah (Tevuos Shor, sec. 2, note 17). Even if the person transgresses a prohibition only once, but did so as an act of rebellion, he is considered a mumar lehachis (Horiyos 11a).

However, this categorization does not apply to a person who foregoes food that is permitted and partakes of food that is forbidden not because he is overcome by his desire for what is forbidden, nor as an act of rebellion. Instead, he knows and believes that his actions constitute a transgression. It is just that he is not careful about the observance of this mitzvah because he became accustomed to violating it when he did have a strong desire for the forbidden food. Since this became his habit, he now views the forbidden food as permitted. Thus, he does not transgress out of desire; he merely has no fear of Heaven or sin and therefore it does not occur to him to be careful about transgressing. Such a person is not considered a nonbeliever. Rather, he is considered one who rebels regarding a particular mitzvah or mitzvos. As such, he is permitted to slaughter, unless ritual slaughter is one of the mitzvos that he disregards.

All this applies to transgressions that are explicitly mentioned in the Torah. However, if they are not explicitly mentioned there, but are only mentioned in the Oral Law, a transgressor is not considered a mumar lehachis with regard to ritual slaughter. This rule applies even if he violates matters stated in the Oral Law because he denies that they are mitzvos, and it applies even if the person denies the entire Oral Law. Animals such a person slaughters are acceptable provided he is known to slaughter in accordance with all the requirements of the Torah, including those of the Oral Law. True, one who denies the Oral Law is considered a nonbeliever and should be treated very strictly. Nevertheless, as long as he accepts the entire Written Torah and is careful to observe all the details of the laws of ritual slaughter, his slaughter is acceptable, provided there is someone overseeing him (see subsection 9 below).

The Alter Rebbe maintains that the same laws apply to all those mentioned in Sanhedrin 99b-100a, who are categorized as nonbelievers and of whom it is said that they will not receive a portion in the World to Come. Included in this category is one who derides a Torah scholar, one who derides other people in the presence of a Torah scholar without being embarrassed because of his presence, and one who refers to his teacher by his first name, etc. Despite the fact that such individuals are considered nonbelievers, they are not disqualified as shochtim.

(Parenthetically, the Alter Rebbe explains that, according to Rambam, the Sages would term people who violate a transgression that is not regarded seriously by people at large as nonbelievers in an effort to impress upon them the seriousness of the transgression.) However, according to law, they are not deemed mumarim, apostates, at all, and there is no need to inspect their slaughtering knives.

Based on Sanhedrin 99b-100a, the Alter Rebbe then states that the leniency – that it is not necessary to check a slaughterer’s knife – does not apply to Torah scholars who are knowledgeable of the Sages’ statements regarding these individuals, and nevertheless frequently violate one of these prohibitions for the sake of their own benefit. The Alter Rebbe considers such Torah scholars as rebelling with regard to that particular prohibition. Thus, according to Rambam, their knives must be checked (see ShaalosVeTeshuvos HaMaharil, responsum 194).

He also mentions that common people who violate transgressions because they are unaware of the prohibition involved may serve as ritual slaughterers. It is not even necessary to examine their slaughtering knives (Simlah Chadashah 2:17). However, this leniency does not apply to a Torah scholar who was aware of the prohibition involved, or even to a common person who was informed about the prohibition, yet continues to transgress.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:5 (9)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), the Alter Rebbe explains that a person is considered to serve false deities even if he did so once intentionally only once, in private (Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 2:17). Such an act causes the person to be considered as rebelling against the entire Torah. Therefore, he is considered a non-Jew regarding all matters except marriage (Yevamos 47b; Tur and Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 44:9). This categorization applies even if he intentionally transgressed not for the sake of rebelling but merely willingly [served the] false deity, as long as he did not transgress because of danger to his life.

The Alter Rebbe then posits that all those who were forced to accept other faiths (e.g., the Marranos) who could have departed their countries and fled, but chose to convert rather than lose their financial resources, are considered as rebelling against the Torah. This stringent ruling applies even if these people continued to observe the mitzvos privately. The rationale is that there is no difference between one who serves false deities out of desire, and one who does so as an act of rebellion against his Creator. However, this does not apply if the individual did not have the opportunity to flee, and was simply forced to serve false deities. In such an instance, if the person continues to observe mitzvos in private, we may rely on him regarding ritual slaughter.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:5 (10)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe defines the term “in public” used in the main text as meaning – performed in the presence of ten Jews or in a way that the matter would become public knowledge if the transgressor knew that this is what would happen. This ruling applies even if one did not desecrate the Shabbos with the intent of angering G‑d, but merely violated a Scriptural Shabbos prohibition intentionally to satisfy his own desires (Simlah Chadashah, 2:16). In such an instance, even if we see that the person is very careful regarding the mitzvah of ritual slaughter, he is nonetheless considered as a non-Jew with regard to the entire Torah including the mitzvah of ritual slaughter, with the exception of the laws of marriage (Yevamos 47b; Tur and Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 44:9).

The above applies even if the person intentionally desecrated the Shabbos in public only once. Nevertheless, that designation only applies with regard to the future. Therefore, if a Jew ritually slaughters an animal on Shabbos, meat from that animal is permitted. However, from that point onward, his slaughter is unacceptable (Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 2:17). It should be noted that Yom Kippur is considered like Shabbos in regard to all of the above. (Simlah Chadashah, 2:16).

Kuntreis Acharon 2:5 (11)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 11), the Alter Rebbe cites Tevuos Shor (sec. 2, subsections 23 and 25), which explain that to be placed in this category he need not rebel against the entire Torah. Even if he rebels against the majority of the Torah’s laws he is disqualified as a shochet.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:5 (12)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 12), the Alter Rebbe explains that such a person is disqualified as a shochet based on the interpretation of Devarim 12:21 in Chulin 31a. Devarim 12:21 states, “You shall slaughter… and you shall eat.” Chulin 31a interprets this as meaning “What you slaughter, you shall eat.” That quote is also interpreted as implying that when a person does not eat kosher meat, he is not given the option of slaughtering.

Rama’s ruling follows the opinion of Rabbeinu Asher (Chulin 1:7), who cites Rabbeinu Yitzchak (see Tosafos, Chulin 3b). This differs from the opinion of Rabbeinu Nissim (Chulin 1a) who maintains that as long as a person does not eat meat from animals that were not ritually slaughtered with the intent to anger G‑d, he is permitted to perform ritual slaughter even if he himself does not always eat properly slaughtered animals. However, the halachah follows Rabbeinu Asher’s view.

Based on Tosafos’ decision in Chulin 3b, Tevuos Shor (sec. 2, note 16) questions whether a person who does not trouble himself at all to obtain kosher meat, i.e., he does not go to a certified shochet to have him slaughter an animal, is permitted to slaughter for others. The Alter Rebbe maintains that such a person is permitted to slaughter for others because one is not disqualified from slaughtering unless, if given the choice of kosher or non-kosher food, he would at times choose the non-kosher food.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:6 (13)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 13), the Alter Rebbe explains Rambam’s stringent ruling that a shochet who is known to transgress one particular mitzvah due to his desires, must have his slaughtering knife examined by someone else. The Alter Rebbe begins by noting that this stringent ruling applies even though a person who rebels regarding one particular mitzvah is not considered to be rebelling against the entire Torah (Chulin 5a). Nevertheless, the stringency is required, for the ruling under discussion does not disqualify the person from slaughtering; it merely requires him to have his slaughtering knife examined before slaughtering. This is necessary because although we do not suspect that such a person will neglect to examine his knife before slaughtering altogether, there are grounds to suspect that he will examine it in a cavalier manner.

Kuntreis Acharon 2:8 (14)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 14), the Alter Rebbe discusses the Kusim in detail, explaining that these were the people Sancherev settled in Shomron (Samaria). Hence, they are often referred to as Samaritans. When the Sages refer to Samaritans, they are referring to the descendants of these people.5 The Alter Rebbe explains that shortly after being resettled in Samaria, the Kusim converted and carefully followed the laws of the Torah. However, during the era of the second Beis HaMikdash, the degree of their observance degenerated and they denied much of the Oral Law. Nevertheless, even then, they continued to practice all the laws of ritual slaughter according to halachah. Indeed, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintained that, with regard to the laws that they did observe, the Samaritans were more careful in their observance than were Jews (Chulin 4a). Accordingly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintained that it was permitted to partake of meat from animals slaughtered by Samaritans.

However, the majority opinion in Chulin, loc. cit., maintains that since the laws of ritual slaughter are not specifically stated in the Torah, but are rather part of the Oral Law (see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah, the preface to sec. 1), the Samaritans could not be trusted to observe them precisely. Therefore, even though the Samaritans practiced those laws, Jews could not rely on them to slaughter correctly. Moreover, even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it was possible to rely on the Samaritans only when they themselves partook of the meat from the animals they slaughtered. However, if they slaughtered solely for others, they could not be relied on to slaughter correctly because they did not observe the charge (Vayikra 19:14), “Do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind,” which should be broadly interpreted, meaning (see Bava Metzia 5b, et al.) that one should not cause another person to transgress.

Later in the Talmudic era, the Sages discovered that the Samaritans were worshipping a false deity on Mount Gerizim (Chulin, loc. cit.). At that point, the Sages ruled that Samaritans should be considered non-Jews regarding all matters. Accordingly, even if a Jew supervises a Samaritan while he slaughters, and sees that he slaughtered an animal properly, halachically it is considered as if the animal was not ritually slaughtered (Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 2:2).

Kuntreis Acharon 2:9 (15)

In the manuscript of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, there is a reference to note 15 of the Kuntreis Acharon. However, no such note is extant. In note 8 of the Kuntreis Acharon to this section, the Alter Rebbe wrote, “as [will be explained] below,” even though the topic at hand never seems to be discussed. Rabbi Sholom DovBer Levine suggests that perhaps the comment in note 8 was referring to the discussion in the non-extant note 15 of the Kuntreis Acharon.