Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter 3

The proof-text stated above explicitly states that the owner is liable when his animals pasture “in another’s field.” This is understood as excluding the public domain.
In Chapter l, Halachah 8, the Rambam explains the rationale for this exclusion: “It is the habit of an animal to go and eat as it proceeds” - i.e., if a person leaves produce in the public domain, he should take it for granted that it will be eaten by the animals passing through.

Our translation is loose. The Hebrew b’zol literally means “as they are cheap.” Rashi (Bava Kama 20a) states that he should pay 2/3 of the market price of the fodder. The reason for this reduction is that the owner is being forced to pay against his will.
Based on his interpretation of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:2), the Shiltei Gibborim interpret b’zol as meaning “when they are cheap” - i.e., if they cost less than the substance eaten by the animal.

Here also we have used a loose translation, because as mentioned in the Maggid Mishnel1, the Kessef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh, there are several different interpretations of the Hebrew term emir.

I.e., although the chestnuts or the sesame seeds are more valuable than the simple fodder, the owner is required to pay only the market price for the fodder, for that is what he would have fed his animal.

The commentaries explain that this damage is considered a derivative of goring.

There are two dimensions to the damage: the place from which the produce was taken, and the place where it was destroyed. One is not liable for produce taken from the public domain, but one is liable for produce eaten in a private domain. Hence the doubt mentioned by the Rambam. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391 :12.

Because of the doubt, money cannot be exacted from its owner.

Since the money is now in possession of the person whose property was damaged, it can also not be exacted from him. See the notes to Chapter 1, Halachah 11.

Belonging to another person.

I.e., he does not pay the full price of the food. The rationale is, as in the previous halachah, that the food was eaten in the public domain.

The fact that it was taken away from the place from which it was originally taken is not significant, provided that it is eaten in a domain belonging to that owner.

A type of bean usually eaten by cows.

Despite the fact that this is not the animal’s ordinary food, since it ate it, the owner is liable for the damages. If, however, an animal eats food that it would never eat - e.g., a cow ate meat - the owner must pay only half the damages [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:3)].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:6) interpret this as referring to raw meat alone.

I.e., even small sheep; certainly this applies with regard to large sheep.

Eating small cocks, however, is not considered a deviation. See Ketubot 41b.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) clarifies that this refers only to living animals. Once an animal has died, however, it is natural for a dog or cat to eat from its corpse regardless of its size.

This is considered a derivative of goring. Hence the payment must be exacted from the body of the animal that caused the damage [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:4)].

For the marketplace is considered to be part of the public domain.

For this is also the ordinary practice of an animal in the public domain.

The area on the side of the marketplace is considered to be a private domain, and considered like the private property of the person whose property was damaged (Tosafot, Bava Kama 21a).

Therefore, it is considered to be an ordinary instance of an animal’s eating produce in the public domain.

And placed its forelegs on the other animal. By doing so, it is considered to have left the public domain and entered the domain of the person whose produce was damaged.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 391:11) differ and maintain that this ruling applies only when it is impossible for the animal to eat the produce without jumping on the other animal.

Since the animal entered the private domain by accident, its owner is not held responsible for the damage it caused.

Even if the owner did not know that the animal was about to give birth, and thus the damage can be considered to have come about by forces beyond his control. Since the animal’s entry into the private domain came as a result of negligence, the owner is held liable. See Chapter 2, Halachah 15.

I.e., this is also considered negligence on the owner’s part. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 394:1) consider this to be accidental, and free the owner of responsibility.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 394:2) state that this law applies when the owner is aware that the animal entered the garden and departed.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.) state that if the owner locked the animal in a stall in an ordinary manner, and the animal managed to escape and return to the garden, the owner is not liable, because he did everything necessary to prevent this from happening.

His animal has free rein within his own courtyard; it can be assumed that it will walk freely and trod on anything placed there. The potter brought his wares there at his own risk.

The pottery is considered to be a pit dug in someone’s private property, because the potter should have taken the necessary precautions to ensure that the owner’s animal would not be damaged.

For the owner knew of the pottery and should have taken care that his animal not be damaged.

For it can be assumed that his animal will eat any produce left in his courtyard.

For he created an obstacle in another person’s domain.

Since the’ owner gave the person permission to place his produce there, he must take responsibility for his animal.

Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 393:1, 398:5), who maintain that if the owner of the courtyard gave the person permission to bring his wares in, he becomes liable for them. He does not have to make an explicit statement accepting responsibility.

I.e., the owner of the courtyard should take responsibility for making sure that his animal does not overeat (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 393:4).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 393:5 explains that this incident teaches that even when the owner of the produce does not know that the owner of the courtyard has left, under certain circumstances, he should take responsibility for the animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard.

It is common for a woman to roll up her sleeves and bare her arms when she is kneading dough. Out of concern for modesty, the owners of the house left the room (Bava Kama 48a).

These laws are basically a restatement of those of the previous halachah. The new insight stated by the Rambam comes in the following paragraph.

Note the Lechem Mishneh [and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 6:3)], which indicate that the watchman is liable and not the owner of the field.
See, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 393:7, which states that this is speaking about an instance in which the owner himself guards his fields.