Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter 8

I.e., the owner of the ox consecrated it to serve as a burned offering or a sin offering, or (if it was blemished) to donate its value to the Temple, but he did not bring it to the Temple as yet.

One can infer that since the ox that is consecrated no longer belongs to a colleague, the laws that follow in the verse do not apply.

See Hilchot Me’ilah, which describes these laws.

For they are all considered to be “consecrated unto God.”

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashini, which describes when a consecrated animal is p1aced into this category.
See Chapter 12, Ha1achah 21, from which it is evident that the 1iab1ity applies on1y when a disqualified animal was a1ready redeemed. If it has not been redeemed, the owner is not liable.

Although it is forbidden to work with, or shear these anima1s, they are still considered the private property of their owners and are thus “an ox belonging to a co11eague.”

Since the meat of a peace offering is eaten by the owners, the anima1 is still considered to be their personal property, despite the fact that it is consecrated. Therefore, payment for the damages can be expropriated from the meat.
See the commentary of the Lechem Mishneh, who questions the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ru1ing in Hilchot Geneivah 2:1.

Those that may be eaten outside the Temple Courtyard.

Hilchot Me’ilah 2:1.

Forty loaves of bread are offered together with the thanksgiving offering. These are, however, considered to be a separate entity and are not on 1ien to the person whose property was damaged.

I.e., as befits sacrifices of lesser sanctitv.

I.e., one might think that the person whose property was damaged might be entitled to expropriate the amount of the loss from the body of the ox. Nevertheless, since the ox was acquired by its present owner after the damage took place, he is not held responsible.

Bava Kama 44b derives this concept from the exegesis of Exodus 21:29. If, however, the previous owner retakes possession of the ox, he is liable for the damages even though he declared it ownerless [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 406:3)]. With regard to the sale of the ox, see Halachah 6. (See also Halachah 8 and notes.)

The Ra’avad differs with the rationale stated by the Rambam, and objects because the gentiles seize animals in lieu of payment for the damage that they cause. The Ra’avad maintains that by speaking of “a colleague’s ox,” the Torah excludes one belonging to a gentile. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 406:1) quote the Rambam’ s ruling.

See Hilchot Melachim 10:12, which states:
[The following rules apply when] there is [a dispute] between a Jew and an idolater: If the Jew will fare better according to their laws, they are judged according to their laws.... If the Jew will fare better according to our laws, they are judged according to Torah law.... It appears to me that this approach is not followed with regard to a resident alien. He is always judged according to their laws.
See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 4:3), which echoes and expands upon this principle.

It would appear that the intent of the word mitzvot, meaning “commandments,” is the seven universal laws commanded to Noach and his descendants. One of them is the law obligating societies to set up a system of civil law. See Bava Kama 38a.

For the damages that an ox that is tam causes are collected from its body. Thus, it is as if the ox is on lien for the damages it caused.

This implies that the sale is not nullified. The purchaser may plow with the ox directly after the purchase. Moreover, he cannot return it to the original owner because of the claim against it.

I.e., why the purchaser is at all responsible for the damage the ox caused previously.

Implied is that in essence the person whose property was damaged should be allowed to collect his due from the ox without redeeming it. Our Sages, however, did not allow this, because a person who knew that the ox was consecrated, but did not know that it had gored, might see it being given to the person whose property was damaged and think that an animal that was consecrated can lose its sacred status without being redeemed. Instead, they required that the. person whose property was damaged redeem the ox for a minimal fee and then collect his due from it (Maggid Mishneh).
The Chatam Sofer (Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 165) notes that there appears to be a contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 4. From Halachah 4, it appears that the person can. consecrate the ox and thus totally nullify the lien of the person whose property was damaged. From this halachah, by contrast, it appears that the lien remains.
In resolution, the Chatam Sofer makes a distinction between the sanctification of the value of the ox (as in this halachah), in which instance the lien remains, and the sanctification of the body of the ox (as in Halachah 4), in which instance the lien is nullified.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 407:2) state that if the slaughter causes the value of the ox to depreciate, the owner must reimburse the person whose property was damaged for the loss.

And therefore the recipient of the present may work with the animal.

For the lien on the body of the ox possessed by the person whose property was damaged has now been firmly established. He thus becomes a partner in the ownership of the ox, and the original owner cannot carry out a sale without informing him.

I.e., if the obligation were incumbent on the person whose ox caused the damage himself or on his property, those who had a prior claim would be entitled to take the ox as payment. In this instance, the obligation is associated with the body of the ox itself, and therefore the person whose property was damaged is entitled to the ox for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.

The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 407:4). The Tur and the Ramah differ and state that if the owner of the ox had already designated the ox as payment for a specific debt that existed before the damage took place, that creditor has a right to the ox.

According to Talmudic law, an earlier debt takes precedence over a later one with regard to landed property. With regard to movable property, by contrast, whichever creditor takes control of an asset first is entitled to it.

This explains the fundamental difference between damage caused by a tam and a mu’ad. When a tam causes damage, its own body is on lien for the damage; the damage is not considered to be a debt owed by the owner of the ox. When, in contrast, a mu’ad causes damage, the opposite is true. The person whose property was damaged has no claim to the ox itself; his claim is borne by all the holdings of its owner.

These laws, though applicable to damage caused by an ox that is mu’ad, apply to all other cases of damage for which a person is held responsible.

Bava Kama 7b explains that movable property is considered to be easier to sell after it has been expropriated than landed property. Therefore, it is considered to be “choicer” and should be given priority.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 419:1 writes that the person who caused the damages has the prerogative of giving the person whose property he damaged movable property or landed property, whichever he desires. The Siftei Cohen 419:2 differs and states that according to the Rambam, the Beit Yosef and others, if the person who caused the damages possesses movable property, he must pay in movable property, regardless of whether or not he desires.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam literally means “bran.”
As long as the person pays for the damage with movable property, the quality of the movable property with which he pays is of no consequence. The Hagahot Maimoniot state that according to the Rambam and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, even if the person who caused the damage possesses cash, he may pay the person whose property he damaged with movable property of inferior quality.
Although there is debate concerning this concept among the commentaries, it is accepted as binding by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 419:1).

During the lifetime of the person who caused the damage, the choicest property in his holdings is expropriated. After his death, however, the status of the obligation changes, and the property of least value is expropriated (Gittin 48b).
This law applies regardless of the age of the heirs, even if they are past majority (Maggid Mishneh; Siftei Cohen 419:7). See, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 419:5.

In his gloss on Hilchot Ishut 16:7, the Maggid Mishneh explains that ·this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period: In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property thus rose in importance, and a creditor would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.

Thus, although it is post-Talmudic in origin, it should be adhered to because of its universal acceptance. See, however, Hilchot lshut 16:8.

When an ox that is mu’ad kills a human being, the ox should be executed, and its owner is obligated to pay an atonement fine, as explained in Chapter 10. The Ra’avad explains that if a person admits that either he or his property caused damage, he is obligated for financial payment and for an atonement fine. His ox is not, however, executed because of his statements.

Who are disqualified from serving as witnesses, because they are suspected of pasturing their flocks in fields belonging to other people, for this is equivalent to stealing (Hilchot Edut 10:4).

Who are not acceptable witnesses (Hilchot Edut 9:2,4,7).

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 35:14) writes that although this is the legal standard, it has already become customary to accept witnesses whose testimony would ordinarily be disqualified, if there is no way of finding witnesses who are acceptable. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 35:30, which states that the Ramah’s leniency does not apply with regard to damages.

In this as in many other instances, the Rambam emphasizes that circumstantial evidence - no matter how indisputable - is not sufficient. According to Torah law, a claim can be established only through the testimony of witnesses. (See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:4; Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:1, 24:1.)