Sechirut - Chapter 9

To begin work at sunrise.

To work until after sunset.

This applies even if he paid them higher wages than normal [Bava Metzia 83a; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 331:1)]. Instead, as the Rambam states at the conclusion of the halachah, the local custom must be followed.
This applies if the employer did not make a stipulation when hiring the workers. If, however, the employer made a stipulation that the workers must work these extra hours and they agreed, they must honor their commitment (Kessef Mishneh).

Desert or side-dishes to accompany their meals.

Instead of negotiating a set wage.

We do not, however, calculate the average wage in the city. For example, if some workers are paid 19, some 17 and some 12, he is paid 15 and 1/2 and not 16 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 331:5).

For each worker.

Even though the accepted wage for this type of work is three.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 332:1) state that if the accepted wage for such work was four zuz, the agent would be entitled to complete reimbursement from the employer. As evident from Halachah 9, the Rambam might also accept such a ruling (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 332:2).

I.e., he told them that he was only an agent and would not be making the actual payments to them. From Chapter 11, Halachah 4, it appears that as long as the agent does not explicitly say that the employer is responsible for the workers’ wages, the agent is held personally responsible.

I.e., if the ordinary wage paid for such work is three, he may pay them three. If the ordinary wage is four, he must pay them four. The rationale is that since the agent deviated from the employer’s instructions, he concluded his agency. Hence, we consider it as if the workers performed work for the employer without any prior contractual agreement. In such an instance, they are to be paid according to local custom.

For unless stipulated otherwise, we assume that they accepted the lower wage. Even though the agent agreed to pay them four, since he told them that the employer was responsible for their wages, they should have checked with the employer before beginning their work (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 332:3).

But no financial claim.

Their complaints are justified because there are places in that city where people are hired for four zuz. Therefore, if he had not promised them that wage, they would have looked until they found someone willing to pay it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 332:4).

That they may be paid the lower wage.

Bava Metzia 76a, the source for this halachah, defines this as referring, not only to a situation where it is obvious that they had not invested extra effort in their work, but also to a situation where it is impossible to determine whether their work was worth four - e.g., they were hired to dig a trench around a field and before their work was evaluated, the trench became filled with water. Even in such an instance, the employer is not obligated to pay more than the lower amount.
The rationale for the ruling is the principle: “A person who desires to expropriate money from a colleague must substantiate his claim.” The workers desire to expropriate the extra zuz from the employer. Unless they can prove that their work is worth the extra amount, the matter is left to the employer’s will.

This applies whether the agent accepted the responsibility for paying them or told them that the employer was responsible [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:2).

For it was unnecessary for the agent to minimize the owner’s generosity. To such a situation is applied the adage (Proverbs 3:27): “Do not withhold good from its rightful owner.”

I.e., since their statements cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of the employer's statements, it is as if they are working without a contract. If the workers in that place are usually paid four zuz, they should receive four. If there is no standard wage, we evaluate their work and pay them accordingly (Maggid Mishneh).

There is room to say that the workers are entitled to four, because their statement implied that they expected to receive more than what the agent promised them. On the other hand, it is possible to say that their statement indicated an acceptance of the agent’s words. Since this question is left unresolved by Bava Metzia, loc. cit., the workers are not able to claim the extra money from the employer.

I.e., they do not come to work.

He does not provide them with work.

The workers have complaints against the employer because he did not provide them with the work he promised, thus causing them to lose other opportunities. Similarly, the employer has complaints against the workers, for they have prevented him from having necessary work performed. Neither, however, has a financial claim against the other. The rationale is that in most instances, causing someone to lose profit is not considered to have caused him a loss.
The Ramban and the Rashba maintain that if the workers could have found other employment originally, but cannot find employment after the employer terminates the agreement, the employer is obligated to pay them as he pays a worker who does not actually perform labor. For he caused them an actual loss. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:2). The Shulchan Aruch (see also the Maggid Mishneh) continues, stating that if the workers could hire themselves out for less, they are obligated to do so, but the original employer is required to make up the difference.

Once the workers reach the place of employment, the employer is under obligation to them.

The difficulty is considered to be caused by factors beyond his control, and he is not held responsible.

He was willing to take the risk and he must bear its consequences.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 333) and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 333:6 emphasize that the employer is obligated in such an instance even if the workers could not have found other employment.

I.e., the employer does not have to pay the worker a full wage, because the worker is not actually performing labor. He must, however, compensate the worker for the time he promised to employ him.
If the worker can find work at a lower wage, he is obligated to accept it, and the original employer is obligated to pay the difference between the two figures (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., when do we say that the worker is not obligated to the employer and the employer is not obligated to the worker?

I.e., the Jews have no binding commitment to any being other than God. Hence, any worker may terminate the contracts at will.
In his responsa (182), the Maharik states that this law applies even when the worker has been paid an advance by the employer and does not have the money to return the advance. Rav Yosef Karo quotes this ruling in his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:3).

I.e., if he performed half the work for which he was hired, he is paid half of his wage, even if the price of labor increased. The Tur and the Ramah add that this law applies only when the worker does not quit because he could earn more money.
If the price of labor decreased, it would appear that the Rambam would not require that the worker be paid more than the appropriate percentage of his original wage. This is also the opinion of the Siftei Cohen 333:19. Sefer Me’irat Einayim, however, differs and requires that the worker be given the advantage of the fluctuation in the price of labor.

The term “worker” refers to a person hired to work for a particular amount of time. The term “contractor” refers to a person hired to perform a particular task (Maggid Mishneh).

The contractor is paid the amount originally agreed upon minus the amount necessary to complete the task.

And was raised afterwards, so that the workers hired afterwards will be paid proportionately more.

Thus, the workers hired afterwards will be paid proportionately less.

A sela is worth four dinarim.

Which is worth two dinarim. Similarly, if the price of work doubled, the contractor is not paid anything at all. He is not held responsible if the price of labor increases beyond that measure and is never required to pay from his own resources.

And receiving the eight dinarim.

Thus, according to the Rambam the owner profits, for he is not required to pay the entire amount to which he originally committed himself. The Rambam maintains that although a contractor has the right to quit in the middle of the day, he is always given the lower hand and the employer benefits. The Ra’avad differs with this approach and maintains that the contractor should be paid only two dinarim, for that is the present value of his work (Siftei Cohen 333:22).

And if they leave it there, it will spoil.

In which instances if the flutes were not brought on time, there is no point in bringing them later.

In such an instance, the employer must compensate the worker for the work he did even though he did not finish the entire task [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 333:5)].

In which case the worker is not held responsible, for he has no alternative but to care for his own concerns.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that this ruling applies only when originally it would have been possible for the employer to have found other workers at that wage. For otherwise, the workers will not have caused the employer a loss. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:5) quotes this ruling.

We allow him to speak less than truthfully so that he will not suffer a loss.

I.e., the second workers can be hired to complete the task for the entire amount promised to the original workers. Hence, the original workers will not receive anything for their efforts.

E. g., tools that had been entrusted to him for safekeeping.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that if the workers have left their property in the employer’s possession, he may use it to hire other workers even when their failure to work would not cause him an immediate loss. The Ramah quotes this ruling (Choshen Mishpat 333:1).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 333:26 interprets this as meaning “a sum an employer would pay so that his work would not be lost.” Hence, in every place and every situation, a different sum applies.

Note the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 333:6), who quotes a difference of opinion between the Rabbis whether the employer is entitled to sue the workers if he was not able to hire workers and hence suffered a loss.

That the employer has the right to deceive the original workers or hire other workers on their account.

But no financial claim.

Even though he may desire to work for his employer, he is unable to do so because he is obligated to perform the king's service.

The fact that the worker was taken is considered a factor beyond the employer’s control; he is not liable for paying the worker for the remainder of the day.
With regard to an animal that was requisitioned by a king for his service while it was being rented, the Rambam rules (Chapter 5, Halachah 1) that the renter of an animal must pay the entire rental fee. For we say that it was the renter’s misfortune that caused the animal to be taken. Similarly, one might say that the employer should be required to pay the worker his entire wage, for it is the employer’s misfortune that the worker was called to the king’s service.
The Lechem Mishneh distinguishes between the two laws as follows: With regard to the animal, had the renter not taken it out to work, it would not have been seen and taken by the king. Therefore, the renter is responsible. With regard to the worker, by contrast, whether or not he went out to work, he would have been called to the king’s service. Therefore, it is considered to be a factor beyond the employer’s control.
The Rambam LeAm offers a different distinction. An animal has no fortune of its own; its fate is dependent on the person in possession of it at the moment. Since the renter was in possession of the animal at the time it was taken, we attribute its being taken to his misfortune. Every person, by contrast, has a fortune of his own. No man is totally dependent on another. Thus, we say that it is the worker’s own misfortune that he lost a portion of his work day.

For its drying up is considered to be a matter beyond the employer’s control, and he is not held responsible.

Hence, since they did not make an explicit stipulation otherwise, they must suffer the consequences.

The commentaries question why this instance is any different from the one mentioned in the previous clause. Since the workers know the pattern of the river, what difference does it make if it dries up naturally or because it was dammed up by the local residents?
Based on the authentic manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah (and this is also evident from Bava Metzia 77a), the previous clause is interpreted as referring to local workers who know the river's pattern, and this clause as referring to workers who come from another place and who are unaware of its way. When workers know the pattern of the river, they must bear the consequences of the vicissitudes of fate as the owner does. When, however, they do not know the pattern of the river, it is the owner's responsibility to inform them. If he fails to do so, he must bear the consequences alone.

The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that they need not actually be paid for a full day’s work, for they did not work the entire day. Instead, for the portion of the day that they did not work, they should be paid as “an idle worker.” (See the notes on Halachah 4.) This interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 334:1).

Of the possibility of the river drying up.

For the workers did not have to perform the labor, and the rain came as a factor beyond the employer’s control.

And thus all the worker has to do is direct the flow of the water through the irrigation channels.

For they did perform some work. It is only that because of the river’s rising, it was easier.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that if the river rises to the extent that no work at all is necessary, the workers need not be paid. There is no difference between the river rising and rain descending. Perhaps this is alluded to by the Rambam’s words, “From heaven, they were granted help” - i.e., although they were granted help in accomplishing their work, they still had to work themselves.

I.e., the sharecropper is being given a larger share in consideration of the additional effort he undertakes. The owner of the land is prepared to pay this extra amount in the expectation that the additional water will produce a better crop.

Thus, as long as the objective is accomplished, the sharecropper receives the extra portion of the harvest. The rationale is that the owner must pay the worker regardless of whether or not the crops produce a good yield. Hence, the worker is paid only according to his labor. A sharecropper, by contrast, is paid according to the ultimate yield of the field. Therefore, he is considered to be a partner and receives the benefit of the good fortune visited upon the field (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 334:11).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that this law applies only when the employer specified the type of work for which he was hiring the worker at the outset. Since he told him he was being hired for one type of work, he cannot be compelled to perform a more difficult task at the same wage. If, however, the employer made no specification at the outset, he can change the worker’s tasks at will.

See Halachah 4 and notes.

For remaining idle is not considered to be an advantage for such a person.

Rav Kapach states that the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state “fruit,” rather than cabbage or prunes (as stated in Bava Kama 117b, the source for this halachah), because according to the Rambam’s medical research, these species are not beneficial for a sick person to eat.

Although the fruit may be worth more than the wage, the worker may desire the money. (See Halachah 10.) He deserves his entire wage because he fulfilled the mission with which he was charged. The fact that by the time he returned, the fruit was no longer necessary is not his responsibility.

For the worker fulfilled everything demanded of him.

E. g., if there are some workers who would perform these tasks for three zuz, that is all the owner of the field is required to pay. If the person who hired the worker paid more, he must bear the loss himself.

To clear them from a field.

This law applies even when the straw was worth the same amount as the worker's wage. The Maggid Mishneh derives from this law the concept that an employer must pay his workers in cash. He may not tell him: “Here is movable property. Sell it and take payment.”

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 336:2) clarify that this law applies only when the worker took possession of the straw through a formal kinyan, e.g., meshichah (pulling the article after him) or hagba’ah (lifting it up).

The owner may, however, deduct from the worker’s wage, payment for the time it takes to collect the lost object.

In which case, the employer’s words could be interpreted as meaning: “Perform any task for me, including collecting lost objects.”

In which instance, collecting a lost object is definitely not included in the task for which he was hired.

For he hired himself out to collect lost objects - and this wallet falls into that category - on behalf of the employer.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 270:3) state that this law applies even when the person is hired without specific instructions, and afterwards the employer instructs him to collect ownerless objects.
Kin’ at Eliyahu notes that the worker has the right to quit working for the employer when he sees the wallet and then take the wallet for himself. This, however, is not considered as ethical behavior.