Sanhedrin veha’Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 18

The person is not absolved from punishment by an earthly court because he will later receive kerait, because if he repents he will not suffer those punishments (Makkot a, b).

For if the transgression is punishable by execution, even if the person is not executed, he does not receive lashes for it. Indeed, even if he does not receive a warning that the prohibition is punishable by execution, but rather that it is punishable by lashes, he does not receive lashes (ibid.).

In contrast to Karait, the soul of a person who violates such a prohibition is not “cut off” in the afterlife [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 9:6)].

Produce from which terumah and the tithes were not separated.

The heap offering taken from crops which must be eaten when both the terumah and the person partaking of it are ritually pure.

A mixture of wool and linen in the same garment.

For, in this context, speech is not considered a deed.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 7.

Makkot 13b derives the above concepts from the fact that the punishment of lashing is followed directly by the prohibition (Deuteronomy 25:4): “Do not muzzle an ox while threshing.” Just as muzzling an ox is a prohibition that involves a deed, so, too, all other prohibitions punishable by lashes must involve a deed.

In this instance, a explicit prooftext teaches us to make the exception. Exodus 20:7 states: “God will not absolve anyone who swears by His Name in vain.” Sh’vuot 21a interprets the verse as implying that God will not absolve such a transgression on His own. Nevertheless, if an earthly court punishes a transgressor, this sin may be absolved.

In this instance, lashes are given because the person’s words have an effect comparable to deed. Through his statements, the sanctity of the offering is transferred from one animal to another (Temurah 3b).

Temurah, loc. cit., explains that the obligation for lashes is derived from Deuteronomy 28:58-59 which states: “If you will not be careful... to fear the glorious and awesome name God... God will render awesome blows upon you.” Through exegesis, the latter phrase is interpreted as referring to lashes. If a person does not fear God’s name - as evidenced by his using it to curse a colleague - he is punished by lashes.
The enumeration of the transgressions that do not involve deed and yet are punishable by lashes is quoted from Sh’vuot 21a. On that passage, Tosafot notes that lying witnesses and a person who spreads a malicious report about his virgin wife are also punished by lashes.

As mentioned above, this applies even if the transgressor received a warning that the transgression is punishable by lashes.

As mentioned by Makkot 4b and Ketubot 32b, whenever an act is punishable by both a financial obligation and lashes, the person is held obligated financially and is not lashed.

After stating that prohibition, Deuteronomy 22:6 continues: “You shall certainly send forth the mother.” This is interpreted, not only as advice to be applied before taking the chicks, but also a means to correct and atone for one’s conduct (Rashi, Makkot 17a).

After stating that prohibition, Leviticus 19:9 continues: “Leave them for the poor and the stranger.” This also is not merely advice to be fulfilled at the outset, but a means of compensating and atoning for transgression.

The wording is slightly misleading. The intent is that one is no longer able to fulfill the positive commandment, e.g., the mother bird died, or the grain from the corners was consumed. As long as it is possible to perform that commandment, the person is not lashed even if he shows no inclination of performing that commandment. For the possibility always exists that he will change his mind.

This term is defined in the following halachah.

Lashes are not administered, however, when a prohibition is understood from a positive commandment, but is not mentioned explicitly, e.g., marriage between a High Priest and a non-virgin. He is commanded to marry a virgin (Leviticus 21:13). Hence we assume he should not marry a non-virgin (see Hilchot Ishut 1:8). Since that prohibition is not mentioned by the Torah, its violation is not punishable by lashes. See Chapter 19, Halachah 3.

This prohibition forbids several unconnected matters, including: a) not to partake of the meat of an animal until it is dead; b) not to partake of the meat of a sacrifice before its blood was offered on the altar; c) not to bring the meal of consolation to the relatives of a person who was executed; d) that a court who condemned a person to die should not eat on the day of his execution; e) that a “wayward and rebellious son” should not partake of the food purchased from the money he stole from his parents (see Sanhedrin 63a).
Since it includes so many different matters, it does not resemble the prohibition against muzzling an ox, which as stated above is the archetype for prohibitions punishable by lashes. That prohibition is explicit and focused on one deed. Any prohibition that is not does not receive the same punishment (Pesachim 41b).

The Paschal sacrifice.

Thus there is no difference whether the person ate partially roasted meat, cooked meat, or both together. He receives only one set of lashes. The Ramban in his Hasagot to the Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 9, differs and maintains that the person is given two sets of lashes if he eats partially roasted meat and cooked meat together. He considers the two as separate prohibitions.
In contrast to the prohibition: “Do not eat upon the blood,” a person is liable for lashes for transgressing the prohibition against partaking of the Paschal sacrifice in this manner. It is not entirely a prohibition of a general nature, for both dimensions are explicitly mentioned in the Torah.

Fresh grain that may not be eaten before the offering of the Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan. See Hilchot Ma'acholot Assurot, Ch. 10.

The various different prohibitions against black magic and occult arts mentioned in the verse.

And hence, one might think that one would receive only one set of lashes even though one violated all the transgressions. This, however, is not so, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

Although there are not separate prohibitions for all the different occult arts mentioned in the verse in Deuteronomy, since there are separate prohibitions for these two - and they are mentioned in the midst of the verse, we assume that similar concepts apply with regard to the other prohibitions [Sefer Mitzvot (General Principle 9), based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 7:5).]

E. g., the prohibition against a priest marrying woman unfit for him (Leviticus 21:7; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:2).

The word kipah literally means “dome,” i.e., a small room with a dome.

Our translation follows the version found in authentic manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a different and more difficult to understand version.

Which will swell in his digestive tract.

And he dies.
Since he brazenly violated a prohibition punishable by kerait time after time, the court causes him to die. This applies only when he violates the same prohibition repeatedly, but not when he violates different prohibitions punishable by kerait.

In apparent acquiescence to the warning.

I.e., stating that he is committing the transgression in full awareness of the punishment involved.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 2; see also Chapter 16, Halachah 4 with regard to lashes.

And thus he is not considered as having accepted the warning.

In the manner described in the previous halachah.
As an allusion to this practice, Sanhedrin 81b cites Psalms 34:22 which Rashi interprets as meaning “the evil of the wicked will cause him to die.” Since the person is a repeated sinner, he is considered as worthy of death. See also Hilchot Rotzeach 4:8 which speaks about a killer being placed in a kipah.

See the notes to Chapter 16, Halachah 3, for a definition of this term.

And since they were given a warning, the transgression was at least partially intentional.

In this instance, a warning is not necessary. If the court is convinced that the violation was intentional, it may administer this punishment without a warning having been given.

As reflected by the discussion of this practice by the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 73:17 and the Siftei Cohen 73:16, this punishment may also be given in the present age, and in fact, was used as a deterrent in previous generations. Today, however, it is no longer employed by most courts.

Sanhedrin 81 b cites a non-literal interpretation of Numbers 4:20 as an allusion to this concept.

The prohibition against blaspheming God's name is described in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 2. In this instance, since the transgressor involves the name of a false divinity, he is not liable for the violation of that prohibition. Instead, he is punished in this manner.

If, however, the woman observes the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants, this punishment does not apply [Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:5; the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 9:6).]

The Rambam deals with the question of relations with an idolatrous gentile woman at length in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 12. There he explains that if a Jew marries such a woman, their relations are punishable by lashes. If the relations are carried out in public (i.e., they seclude themselves in the presence of ten Jews), while the couple are in the midst of relations - but not afterwards - a zealous person may slay them. The classic example of such actions is the slaying of Zimri by Pinchas, as related in Numbers, Ch. 25.

Indeed, if the court is asked what to do, they should not respond. The action must be the result of the spontaneous feelings of the zealous person who cannot bear the knowledge that such an act is taking place (ibid.:5).

This transgression is punishable by death at the hand of heaven. Hence the violator would be given lashes by the court (see Chapter 19, Halachah 2).

So that there will be no impurity in that holy place.

This punishment is derived from an extension of the interpretation of Leviticus 22:9: “They will die... because they have defiled it.”

As indicated by Deuteronomy 19:15: “According to the testimony of two witnesses... will a matter be established.”

Instead, we follow the principle (Yevamot 25b) that a person is considered to be an involved party and his own testimony should not be used against him. Only with regard to financial matters, do we follow the principle (Bava Metzia 3b): “The admission of a witness is equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses.”
The Radbaz explains the difference between the two realms of judgment as follows: A person’s life - and even his physical body - are not his own possessions, but God’s. Hence he is not making an admission concerning what belongs to him. His financial resources, by contrast, are his own and he may do with them what he desires.

For benefiting from the spoil of Jericho (Joshua, Ch. 7).

For killing King Saul (II Samuel, Ch. 15).

I.e., he was instructed to do so by a Divine order which he received through the prophetic spirit (Bamidbar Rabbah 23:6). Thus this practice should not be emulated in the future.

Joshua is also considered as a king (see Hilchot Melachim 1:3).

As stated in Hilchot Melachim 3:8-10, a king has the right to execute people even when they are not liable for execution by the court. The commentaries have raised a question with this explanation, because as stated in that source, a king may only execute violators through decapitation, and Joshua had Achan stoned to death. The Minchat Chinuch states that when the king executes a person to strengthen Torah observance, his fiat is not limited and he may use any means of execution he desires.

I.e., although one might question the above explanation - for it does not necessarily apply with regard to lashes - one must realize that the ruling is not dependent on the explanation, but is instead a Divine decree, which we may or may not comprehend intellectually.