Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh - Chapter 13

I.e., we do not say that since the owner overloaded his animal, he alone should bear the responsibility of raising it up. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:1) state that if an animal is wont to collapse under its load, it is the owner’s responsibility, and a passerby is not obligated to assist him.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 202) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 80) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The reason the Rambam includes these laws in Hilchot Rotzeach Ush’mirat HaNefesh, “the laws of murderers and the protection of life,” is apparent from the final halachah, which states that we should not leave the person “inclined toward death, lest he tarry because of his money and be brought to danger.”
(Significantly, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch mention these laws directly after the laws regarding the return of a lost article - the order in which these subjects are mentioned in Exodus - and not at the conclusion of the text of Choshen Mishpat, where the laws governing protecting one’s life are mentioned.)

For reloading an animal is a more difficult task than unloading it, and most likely the wayfarer will not be able to perform it alone.

See Halachah 8.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 203) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 541) consider reloading an animal to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Some amend the text to read “and has negated the observance of two positive commandments.” Alternatively, by each of his failures to act - both the failure to load and the failure to unload - he negates the observance of a positive commandment and transgresses a negative commandment.

Sefer HaMitzvot Negative Commandment 270) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 540) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam mentions that one transgresses this commandment both when one fails to load and when one fails to unload, for the proof-text from Exodus mentions “refraining from helping him.”

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:18, which explains that because there is both a positive and a negative commandment preventing a priest from contracting ritual impurity, they are not overridden by the commandment to return a lost article (even though it also involves both a positive and negative commandment). Similarly, in the present instance, the mitzvah to unload an animal does not override the observance of these positive and negative commandments.

I.e., a wise man whose dignity does not allow him to load and unload animals.

See the parallel in Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:13.
As will be explained in the notes on Halachot 8 and 9, there is a question whether we are obligated by Scriptural Law to show regard for the pain endured by animals (צער בעלי חיים). Even according to the authorities who maintain that there is such an obligation, it can be said that it is overridden by our obligation to honor the Torah and its students. Moreover, even showing respect to an honorable person who is not a Torah scholar (see the notes on the following halachah) overrides the need to care for animals, for human dignity takes precedence over caring for animals (Radbaz, Volume V, Responsum 1542).

But if unloading and reloading the animal were below his dignity, and he would not perform this activity even if his own animal were involved, he is not obligated to do so for a colleague.
The wording of this halachah appears to imply that if a person is dignified, but not a scholar, and would not unload his own animal himself, he need not unload one belonging to a colleague. (See Prishah, Choshen Mishpat 272.) There are, however, opinions that maintain that this leniency is granted only to a Torah scholar, for there is a mitzvah from the Torah to respect his honor. This does not apply with regard to the honor of other individuals.

The leader of the Sanhedrin, Israel’s highest court.

Thus, working with such a load is not a dignified activity.

Significantly, in Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:17 the Rambam also writes that a person who goes beyond the measure of the law should return a lost article even if doing so is beneath his dignity.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:3) state that a Torah scholar should not compromise his dignity. If he wants to go beyond the measure of the law and help the person in distress, he should hire another person to do so.

The number 100 is just a figure of speech, not a limit. One must unload and reload the animal as often as necessary.

From the Rambam’s wording here, it appears that it is the repetition of the verbs that indicates the need for a repeated activity. Nevertheless, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:14), he states that the use of the verb itself is sufficient to imply repeated activity, and that the repetition serves another exegetical purpose. (See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:7.)

I.e., lest the animal again collapse under its load.

A parsah is 4 mil, and a mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

The Nimukei Yosef explains that, as stated in Halachah 7, one may charge the owner for accompanying him. If the owner does not want to pay, then it is unnecessary to accompany him.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:6) states that a person may charge for this service as he does for returning a lost object. See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 12:3-4 for a discussion of this matter.

The commentaries raise the question: Often it is explained that the mitzvah of unloading and reloading an animal was instituted because of the regard we must show for the pain endured by animals (צער בעלי חיים). Unquestionably, the owner of the animal is acting improperly by refusing to help. Nevertheless, why should his misconduct cause us to reduce our regard for the animal’s suffering?
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 272) explains that indeed, the mitzvah of unloading the animal does not apply because of the owner’s conduct. Nevertheless, the passerby is still obligated to do so because of צער בעלי חיים. Rav Yosef Karo, in his commentary on the Tur entitled Beit Yosef, maintains that the Rambam also shares this perspective. Although the Rambam does not say so explicitly, that is because he is relying on his statements in Halachah 13. There are, however, opinions that maintain that the Rambam does not consider צער בעלי חיים a Scriptural obligation, and they maintain that even with regard to Rabbinic Law, there are instances when we ignore this concern.

And thus incapable of helping load or unload.

As if the owner were not there at all.

For the responsibility to unload and reload the animal is the gentile’s. In contrast to the last clause of this halachah, the Rambam does not mention the possibility of animosity arisi11g in the instance at hand, because since the burden being carried belongs to a Jew, the gentile owner will not suspect that it was a difference of religion that motivated the passerby’s indifference (Bayit Chadash, Choshen Mishpat 272).
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo maintains that צער בעלי חיים is a Scriptural obligation, and for this reason the Rambam would obligate the passer-by to unload the animal. This - he states - is obvious from Halachah 13. The expression “one is not obligated towards him” refers only to reloading. One may, however, take payment for this service.
In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 272:8), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s wording verbatim. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:12, however, quotes the interpretation given above. The Tur and the Ramah state explicitly that one is obligated to unload the animal because of צער בעלי חיים in all instances where the Rambam says that one is not liable.
The Merkevet HaMishneh, the Be’urei HaGra and others differ, explaining that the Rambam - like Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi under whose disciples he studied - maintains that צער בעלי חיים is a Rabbinic, and not a Scriptural, obligation, and that there are instances, like the ones mentioned in this halachah, when one is not obligated to go out of one’s way to unload a fallen animal.
It must be noted that in his Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapters 17 and 48, the Rambam states that the respect for an animal’s suffering is mandated by the Torah. He quotes this as the rationale for the laws of ritual slaughter, for the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its calf on the same day and for the mitzvah to send away the mother bird. Significantly, however, he does not mention this mitzvah in that context. See also Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 21 and 25, where the Rambam mentions how consideration for an animal’s suffering overrides certain Rabbinic prohibitions.

Whose property is being carried by the donkey and who therefore suffers great stress and anguish, as the Rambam states in Halachah 13.

Who is serving as the donkey-driver, and is concerned about the fate of his animal.

As mentioned above, there is a question if this statement is all inclusive or referring only to reloading.

I.e., the gentile may become upset when he sees the Jew ignore him, and express his anger on other Jews. To forestall such feelings from arising, one should help him raise his donkey.

And thus, it cannot proceed as fast as the other donkeys in the caravan.

Leaving him alone on the journey.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of the Tosefta (Bava Kama 2:8), which serves as the source for this halachah, stating that the intent is that the other donkey-drivers cannot drive their donkeys over the weak donkey until it falls.
In his Kessef Mishneh and apparently in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 272:12), Rav Yosef Karo favors the Rambam’s interpretation. The Or Sameach notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Kama 3:5) appears to support the Ra’avad’s interpretation.

And is no longer capable of proceeding at all.

The Ir Shushan 372 interprets this halachah as resembling the one that follows - i.e., two donkeys approach each other on a narrow road wide enough for only one to pass.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 372:22 differs and explains that the halachah refers to an instance where two donkeys are proceeding together and suddenly the road narrows, so they can pass only one at a time.

As the Rambam states in the following halachah, one should pay the other for the right of passage.
Kin’at Eliyahu maintains that in all instances, payment should be given for the right of passage. In this final instance, who receives that right should be determined by who desires to pay more, while in the previous instances, the criteria are laid down. Even so, in those instances, the one who is given the privilege should reimburse his colleague for his difficulty.

Our translation is based on Rashi (Sanhedrin 32b). Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:24 offers a different interpretation.

For waiting until the other proceeds presents a greater difficulty for the ship or the camel driver that is further removed from the port or city from which he set out.

Sanhedrin, ibid., interprets this verse as a charge to seek a compromise.

This law (quoted from Bava Metzia 32b) is the source for the concept that צער בעלי חיים is a factor with regard to this mitzvah. In Bava Metzia, ibid., there is a difference of opinion among the Sages whether the obligation is Scriptural or Rabbinic, as mentioned in the notes above.

A simple reading of the Mishneh Torah implies that this and the following halachah should be seen as the development of a single concept, and the “enemy” mentioned in this halachah is defined in that.
Based on Tosafot (Bava Metzia 32b), the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:10) states that the “enemy” mentioned in this halachah refers to a person whom one regards as an enemy for personal reasons. It is not referring to the definition of an enemy given by the Rambam in the following halachah. For with regard to such a person, even though it is a mitzvah to assist him, as stated in the following halachah, the concept of subjugating one’s natural inclination does not apply. For, since the person has transgressed and not repented, it is proper not to show him any extra regard. (Note, however, Tosafot, Pesachim 113b, which offers a different interpretation.)

I.e., a person’s evil inclination would urge him not to help his enemy, but instead, watch him suffer. Therefore, he is instructed to overcome that natural tendency and help him. This indicates that his observance of mitzvot is not a matter of personal preference, but rather a commitment to an ideal that transcends his individual identity.

I.e., this is considered a more significant factor than the discomfort suffered by the animal.

The mitzvah to unload an animal does not apply to an animal owned by a gentile, and thus, the enemy who owns the donkey that the verse mentions cannot be a non-Jew. (As mentioned above, according to the Merkevet HaMishneh, the mitzvah does not apply at all to an animal owned by a non-Jew. According to the Kessef Mishneh, one must unload the fallen animal, but since one may charge for one’s services under such circumstances, this is not the intent of the verse.)

The Rambam’s words (based on Bava Metzia 32b) do not reflect naivete. He (and our Sages) realized that there could be individuals who do not observe the Torah’s standard. His question is why does the Torah, which reflects an objective standard of truth, communicate this mitzvah using a situation that runs contrary to the Torah’s ideal. To refer to a principle frequently stated in the Talmud: “The verse does not concern itself with the wicked” (Rashbam, Pesachim 113b).

The Rambam mentions that the person saw the transgression alone. If he saw it together with another witness, and testimony regarding the matter could thus be brought to court, it would be a mitzvah for the entire Jewish people to show negative feelings to the person until he repents (Pesachim, ibid.).

I.e., the person will not desire to abandon his cargo because of its worth, and he will be at the mercy of thieves and the elements.

In this vein, see the Rambam’s concluding words in Iggeret HaSh’mad, where he urges tolerance and patience toward those Jews who under pressure converted to other faiths.

And similarly on the verse (Psalms 104:35): “May sinners perish from the earth,” our Sages commented (Berachot 10a): “Read ‘may sins perish’” - i.e., our hope should be that the sinners repent and abandon their wickedness.