Genevah - Chapter 9

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 243) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 36) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Since the other prohibitions surrounding it - murder and adultery - are subject to capital punishment, Sanhedrin 86a concludes that this commandment also refers to a theft punishable by execution - i.e., kidnapping.

Either male or female, minor or adult.
Although a Jew is not liable for kidnapping a gentile, a gentile is liable for kidnapping a fellow gentile. See Hilchot Melachim 9:9 regarding the Seven Universal Laws commanded to Noah and his descendants

The sequence is important, as reflected in the following halachah.

A p’rutah is a copper coin of minimal value. Generally, we follow the principle that “anything valued less than a p’rutah is not considered of monetary worth.” In this instance, however, we are not concerned with “monetary worth,” but rather with the fact that use was made of the abducted person.

Exodus 21:16, which speaks of kidnapping, speaks of the abducted person being “found in [the kidnapper’s] hand.” The Mechilta explains that in this context “hand” means “domain.”

For the kidnapper’s conduct must follow the sequence stated in the verse. Implied is that even if he made use of him afterwards, he is nonetheless not liable.

Although in translation, the intent of this phrase is that the kidnapped person must be one of our Jewish brethren, the principles of Biblical exegesis also allow for this interpretation. See Sanhedrin 86a.

Sanhedrin 85b leaves this question unresolved, and therefore the Rambam does not hold the person liable for capital punishment (Maggid Mishneh).

This question is also left unresolved by Sanhedrin, ibid.

Most commentaries explain that the same law would apply even if the brother or son were above majority. It is, however, more likely for this to be possible if the son or brother is below majority.

I.e., individuals like those cited above, who are always - or at least frequently - under the supervision of those responsible for them are not included in this charge.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is not an inference from the proof-text cited, but rather a reflection of a general principle: “All the punishments stated in the Torah apply equally to men and women.”

I.e., he had been owned by two masters. One freed him, but the other did not.
Deuteronomy 24:7 mentions “stealing... of his brethren, of the children of Israel.” Sanhedrin 86a interprets this to be an exclusion of these individuals, for they are not full-fledged members of the Jewish brotherhood.

Although Exodus 22:2 speaks of “the sun shining upon him,” this is interpreted, as explained in Halachah 10, as referring to a person who one knows will not kill him, and not to a theft that takes place during the day.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that a thief who steals during the day is not expecting to be apprehended and does not have in mind the possibility of killing the homeowner. Therefore, it is forbidden to kill him. The Maggid Mishneh, however, justifies the Rambam’s decision.

See Halachah 9, which explains why this license was granted.
See the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 425:1), from which it appears that if the house-owner can disable the thief by wounding him, he is not granted license to kill him. Compare to Hilchot Rotzeach 1:13.

The court does not deliver - or administer - the death sentence on the Sabbath, but here the person is killing in self-defense.

Rashi, Sanhedrin 72b, explains that a thief who does not break in must be given a warning before the house-owner is entitled to kill him. It does not, however, appear that the Rambam shares this opinion.

The explanation to follow is taken from Sanhedrin 72a.

See Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

A minor cannot be sentenced to death by the court, but here the person is killing in self-defense.

According to the Maggid Mishneh, these are not absolutes, but rather statements of probability. Generally, a father will never desire to kill a son, while a son may desire to kill his father. If, however, one knows for certain that a son will certainly not kill his father, the father may not kill him if he apprehends him breaking into his home. Conversely, if a son is certain that his father will kill him, he may kill him if he apprehends him breaking in.
The same concepts apply with regard to other people who are not related. If one is certain that the person breaking in will not kill, one may not kill him.

I.e., he had already begun to leave through the tunnel through which he had broken in (Migdal Oz, based on the Jerusalem Talmud). The Ra’avad interprets this to be referring to a person seen fleeing from the home.

Whether he stole or not, if he was caught as he left the tunnel, he may not be killed (Maggid Mishneh, based on Sanhedrin 72a).

For in such a situation, he will not attempt to slay the homeowner, since it is possible that he will be overpowered.

Since the witnesses will appear in court and have him convicted, he will not slay the house-owner (Ramban and Onkelos on Exodus 22:1).

In a home, there is some probability that the owner will apprehend the thief. Therefore, a thief breaking into a home is considered to have the intent to kill the homeowner if he discovers him. In the types of enclosures mentioned in this halachah, there is little chance that the owner will apprehend the thief. Therefore, the thief is not considered to have come with the intent to kill.

Although this involves the violation of the Sabbath laws, the threat to human life takes precedence.
The Rambam mentions only a person who is not deserving of death. This leads to the conclusion that a person who is deserving of death should be left to die. Others differ and maintain that since he is caught under the avalanche, there is no longer any chance that he will kill the house-owner. Therefore, if he is still alive, his life should be saved (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

There is no difference between him and any other person who causes damages.

As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, whenever a person is liable for capital punishment, he is not liable for any financial responsibilities. Since this person is liable to be killed at any moment, he is not liable for the damages he causes. (See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 8:12.)