Shegagot - Chapter 9

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 71) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 129) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13 defines the term shifchah charufah used by Leviticus 19:20 and the Rambam here as “a woman who is half a Canaanite maid-servant and half a free woman who is consecrated by a Hebrew servant.”

As will be stated in Halachah 7, the intent here is not robbery alone, but any type of misappropriation of a colleague’s money.

The Rambam’s wording is somewhat general, because the purification of a person affiicted by tzara’at does not involve a transgression and a nazirite may have contracted ritual impurity against his will and thus, he is not considered to have transgressed.
In this chapter, the Rambam discusses the liability one incurs for the three transgressions mentioned. He discusses a nazirite’s liability for a guilt-offering in Hilchot Nizirut 6:11 and the liability of one who is purified from tzara’at in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2.

Above the age of twelve so that she will be liable for her actions.

In contrast to one who is compelled to transgress against her will or who sinned inadvertently.
This represents a change of mind for the Rambam. In one of the versions of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam writes that a consecrated maid-servant is liable even if she sinned inadvertently.

In contrast to anal intercourse.

I.e., the person liable for relations with her inserted his entire male organ. All of the latter points are derived from the term necherefet which has all of these implications (Keritot 11a).

This explains why the woman must be “past majority, aware of the transgression, [and] willfully participating.”

The literal meaning of the Rambam’s words is “nine years and one day old.” Nevertheless, the intent is that from nightfall on the day of his ninth birthday, he is considered as nine years and a day old, because any portion of a day is considered as a full day. From this age on, relations with such a youth are considered significant (Hilchot Ishut 11:3).

For she is past majority and is responsible for her conduct.

Even though generally, a minor is not held responsible for his conduct, in this instance, the youth is not being given punishment; he is being required to bring a sacrifice for atonement. And atonement is relevant even for one below majority.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, for he had an incorrect version of the Mishneh Torah in which it was stated that the youth receives lashes (Kessel Mishneh; see also the Ra’avad’s gloss to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, ch. 3).

See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:5 which states that sacrifices should be brought only when a person consciously brings them. A youth of nine is not considered as intellectually mature. Thus a sacrifice that he brings is not considered as having been brought willfully.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13, 15.

Both the maid-servant and the one who engages in relations with her.

This interpretation is not a contradiction to the testimony of the witnesses, for the witnesses would not necessarily observe this matter.

The maid-servant, however, receives lashes for every time they engage in relations (ibid. 3:14).

With regard to ordinary sin-offerings, becoming aware of a transgression would create a distinction between it and other transgressions and require the violator to bring a second sacrifice.

If his relations with the woman are considered as having been carried out under compulsion, he is exempt, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 8.

For the different bodies create a distinction.

Anything less than a p’rutah is not halachically significant (see Hilchot Sh’vuot 7:16, Hilchot Gezeilah 7:7, et al).

I.e., he stood in the open and took money from another person by force (Hilchot Gezeilah 1:3).

I.e., he stole money from another person without that person knowing (Hilchot Geneivah 1:3).

He found an object lost by a colleague; he withheld wages, or the like (see Hilchot Gezeilah 7:2).

This is an exception to the rule. Generally, one does not bring a sacrifice to atone for the intentional violation. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 2:2), the Rambam explains that the person’s liability in this instance is derived from a gezerah shevah (textual association) with the oath taken in connection with testimony. Significantly, in Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:9, he offers a different rationale.

Leviticus 5:21-25. There it is explicitly stated that he must return the stolen object and afterwards, it is stated he must bring a guilt-offering. Our Sages learn that the sequence is an absolute requirement. First, he must return the stolen object and then bring the sacrifice.

Leviticus 5:24 states that in addition to making restitution, the offender must add an additional fifth (more precisely, one fifth of the new total) to the principal.

Hilchot Sh’vuot, chs. 7-8.

If, however, he intentionally derived benefit from consecrated property, he receives lashes as punishment and must make restitution for the principal (Hilchot Me’ilah 1:3).

In this instance as well, anything worth less than a p’rutah is not considered as significant enough to warrant punishment (see ibid. 7:8).

Ibid. 1:4.

Thus it is considered as if he violated the prohibition against misappropriating consecrated property several times and must atone for each transgression individually. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, this is a stringency that applies with regard to the prohibition against misappropriating consecrated property that does not apply with regard to other prohibitions, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 1.

Here the intent is not karet per se, but rather the obligation to bring a sin-offering for transgressions for which one is liable for karet. In such a situation, a person is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

I.e., if one person gives another consecrated food to eat, the person who gave his colleague the food is liable for misappropriating consecrated property and not the person who actually partook of the food (Hilchot Me'ilah 5:3-4). With regard to other transgressions, the person who partook of the forbidden food would be liable, as Kiddushin 43a states: "With regard to the entire Torah, there is no situation where one benefits and another is liable."

I.e., if a person ate half of an olive-sized portion from consecrated food one day and the other half on a later date, he is liable (Hilchot Me’ilah 6:1). With regard to other transgressions, a person who partakes of forbidden food would not be liable unless be completes partaking of an olive-sized portion within the time it takes to eat three egg-sized portions of bread [several minutes; the exact measure of time is the subject of a debate between the authorities (see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:8)).

See Hilchot Me’ilah 7:1-2. With regard to other prohibitions, by contrast, we follow the principle (Kiddushin 42b): “The concept of agency does not apply with regard to a transgression,” and the person who actually performs the transgression is liable.

Although there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Shabbat 7lb-72a, the Rambam follows the perspective that equates the guilt-offering with a sin-offering.

The High Priest, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

In contrast, they must bring different offerings for the violation of sins that require a sin-offering, as explained in Chapter 15 and the conclusion of Chapter 1, Halachah 4. And, as stated in Halachah 6 of that chapter, a High Priest is not required to bring a provisional guilt-offering. See also Chapter 10, Halachah 7.

I.e., in contrast to sins for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Hilchot Me’ilah 1:5. Perhaps the Rambam singles out the misappropriation of sacred property, because there is a difference of opinion among the Sages concerning this issue in Keritot 22a and there, the discussion focuses on this transgression.

As stated in the previous halachah.

For he has certainly partaken of sacrificial meat.

Because the laws explained in the previous halachah apply to both of them. Note the contrast to the laws mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter 8.

He is not, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial meat, as stated above.

Because of the possibility that he partook of the forbidden fat. Even though both prohibitions have been violated, since it is not known who violated which prohibition, each one is liable only for one provisional guilt-offering.

Because he definitely ate a piece of forbidden fat. He is not, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial fat, as stated above..

Because his becoming aware of the prohibitions at different times creates a distinction between them and requires him to offer a second sin-offering

A sin-offering is required, because they both partook of forbidden fat. Neither is, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial meat even though it is certain that this prohibition was violated, as stated above.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:18-19; see also Chapter 6, Halachah 4, above.

It is considered an issur mosif, i.e., it expands the scope of the prohibition, because forbidden fat is prohibited only to be eaten, while it is forbidden to both eat and benefit from consecrated food.