Shegagot - Chapter 10

Although the mishnah (Keritot 2:3) mentions five categories when describing this sacrifice, that is because it includes the last two - an impure person who partakes of consecrated food and one who enters the Temple - in the same category.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 72) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 123) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

A skin affliction commonly - but incorrectly - identified as leprosy that results from speaking improperly about others. See Leviticus, chs. 12-14; Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at. When one afflicted by tzara’at regains ritual purity, he must bring sacrifices, as described in Halachah 3. See also Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:3.

As stated in Leviticus 12:6-8, after a woman gives birth, she is ritually impure for a given period and then she must bring sacrifices as described in Halachah 2. See also Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, foe. cit.

As the Rambam explains (Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:12, in explanation of Leviticus 5:1-7), one of the types of oaths mentioned by the Torah refers to a situation where a person could testify in support of a colleague’s financial claim, but refrains from doing so. His colleague requests that he testify and he refuses, taking a false oath that he does not know anything concerning which he could testify. He is required to bring a guilt-offering to secure atonement.

Keritot 9a explains that all the other passages requiting a guilt-offering use the term vene’alam, “it became hidden,” implying a lapse of awareness. Since that term is not used with regard to this oath, one can infer that he is liable even if he transgresses intentionally.

The term sh’vuat bitui refers to an oath regarding an activity that a person performed in the past or will perform in the future (“I ate this food,” “I did not eat it,” “I will eat it,” or “I will not eat it”), as stated in (Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:3, in explanation of Leviticus, op. cit.).

For the term vene’alam is used in this context.

The prohibition against partaking of consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity is mentioned in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:13.

The prohibition against entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity is mentioned in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:12. See Halachah 5 for an explanation of the derivation of the obligation to bring these sacrifices.

The wine, flour, and oil brought together with an animal sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 2:2,4.

The conclusion of Chapter I, Halachah 4.

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 12.

This refers to a person who takes a false oath regarding testimony.

As will be explained, this is interpreted as referring to partaking of consecrated food or entering the Temple in a state of impurity even though these transgressions are not explicitly mentioned in the verse.

This refers to a person who takes a false sh’vuat bitu’i.

See Sh’vuot 6b-7a.

This refers both to sacrifices she must bring to regain ritual purity and sacrifices she must bring to secure atonement. As the Rambam explains in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nega’im 14:12), this refers even to sacrifices for which a woman was obligated before she was married. The halachah is emphasizing that if a woman’s financial status changes due to marriage, she brings a sacrifice according to her present status, whether it rises or falls. In contrast to the others mentioned in the following clause, a man’s wife is considered as his own person and his and her status are considered as the same.
Rav Yosef Corcus mentions that even if a man divorces his wife, he must bring all the sacrifices for which she was obligated beforehand.

This applies even if he personally is wealthy. Since he is bringing sacrifices on behalf of another person, the Torah did not obligate him to bring them according to his financial standing, if they are poor.
A person may also bring sacrifices on behalf of other people even though they are not members of his household like the individuals mentioned here.

This refers both to his Hebrew and Canaanite servants and maidservants. For certain types of impurity [e.g., tzara’at (Hilchot Tzara’at 9:1) and zivah (Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 1:4)] apply also to Canaanite servants and they must bring the appropriate sacrifices to regain ritual purity. It is reasonable to think that a person would desire to have his family and servants regain ritual purity so that he would not have to worry about them causing consecrated food to contract ritual impurity.

The High Priest.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam, stating that a king is not liable for an oath regarding testimony and a High Priest is not liable for entering the Temple or partaking of consecrated foods in a state of impurity. The Rambam’s ruling depends on his interpretation of Horiot 2:8 which differs from that of most other commentaries.
This matter was obviously a matter of question for the Rambam himself. He originally subscribed to the understanding followed by most commentaries (and that understanding is reflected in the original text of his Commentary to the Mishnah). Afterwards, however, he changed his perspective (as indicated by Rav Kappach’s text of that work) and amended it according to the understanding reflected in this halachah. Even after that emendation, however, there is still a certain lack of clarity in our understanding of the Rambam’s position.

The conclusion of Chapter 1, Halachah 4. See also Chapter 9, Halachah 10, and Chapter 15.

Chapters 4-6, 9-10.

Chapters 1,4.

These include oaths regarding testimony (Halachah I), relations with a consecrated maidservant (Chapter 9, Halachah I), and oaths regarding stolen property (Chapter 9, Halachah 7). Keritot 9a mentions that even in such a situation, a nazirite is liable for a sacrifice. The Rambam does not mention that concept here, because he has already stated it in Hilchot Nizirut 6:3 (Kessef Mishneh).

Since his transgression came as a result of coercion, there is no need for him to secure atonement.

On the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 6:8), it is apparent that here, the Rambam is speaking about a sin-offering which is a component of an adjustable guilt-offering and not a fixed sin-offering. This is also reflected by a comparison to Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 5:9.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the leniency of transferring money is granted only in a situation of need and not under ordinary circumstances.

Which usually costs less than a ewe.

When a person transfers holiness from a consecrated entity to a non-consecrated one, their status is reversed. The consecrated entity loses its holiness and the non-consecrated entity becomes consecrated whether they share the same worth or not.

This is speaking about a situation when the price of she-goats rose above the price of ewes and the person transferred the holiness of the money set aside for a she-goat to the ewe.

This is also speaking about an adjustable guilt-offering. Originally, the person was liable for the sacrifice of a wealthy person, but his financial status declined and at the time he brings his sacrifice, he is liable for a lesser offering.

He is no longer obligated to bring the sacrifice of a wealthy man and should bring the lesser offering.

I.e., through the transfer of holiness, the consecrated quality of the money is imparted to the fowl and the remainder of the money is considered as ordinary funds.

And may bring the sacrifice of a poor man even though in the very near future, he will become wealthy. Moreover, in his original version of Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 4:3; preserved in the standard published version of the text), the Rambam writes that even if the person did not bring the offering before his testator’s death, since he was poor at the time he was obligated to bring the sacrifice, he may bring a poor man’s offering even if he brings it after he takes possession of the estate. Nevertheless, in a later version (reflected in Rav Kapach’s translation of the text), he emended the text to reflect the concepts stated above, i.e., that if he became wealthy, he must bring a rich man’s offering.

He need not, however, take physical possession of the estate. Once the testator dies, it becomes the heir’s property automatically.

That disqualified it from being offered as a sacrifice.

The Rambam’s wording leads to the inference that, if he desired, he may bring the offering of a rich man. Even though his financial status has declined, he is not required to bring a poor man’s offering.

See Hilchot Issurei HaMizbeiach 3:1 which speaks about the situations in which a fowl can be disqualified. Most of the blemishes that disqualify an animal do not disqualify a fowl.

As explained in ibid. 6:4. Instead, the fowl must be left to die.

In which instance, a meal-offering is not sufficient.

Until a meal-offering is placed in a sacred container, its physical substance has not been consecrated, only its value. Hence there is no problem in redeeming it and using the money for another purpose (Hilchot lssurei Mizbeiach 6:5; see also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 13:2).

I.e. the consecrated dimension of the meal is transferred to the money. The meal then is considered as ordinary flour and may be eaten.

The literal meaning of the term used by the Rambam is “until its form decomposes.” Our translation is based on Rashi (Menachot 46b). See also Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:26.

Who is obligated to bring an adjustable guilt offering.

The adjustable guilt-offering which he is required to bring. The Rambam’s interpretation of Keritot 27b-28a, the source for this law, differs from that of Rashi.

And, according to his present level of wealth, he would be obligated to bring a pair of doves.

Since only their worth was consecrated (for originally, this person could not sacrifice them), there is more reason to think that they would not become acceptable afterwards.

I.e., the doves were not disqualified as a sacrifice because of a factor intrinsic to their being, but because of a peripheral issue, the person's financial status. Hence if that changes, they can become acceptable. Note a similar ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:4.

For he has exceeded the Torah’s requirements for him. Note, however, the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 123) which states that a person does not fulfill his obligation by bringing an inappropriate sacrifice even if it exceeds his obligations.