Shegagot - Chapter 6

The different days do not cause the transgressions to be regarded as distinct.

With regard to inadvertent transgression, it is the person’s awareness of the transgression that causes a forbidden act to be considered as distinct.

Even if the forbidden fat was cooked with different foods, the transgressions are not considered as distinct. As stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 9, with regard to the misappropriation of consecrated objects, the different pots cause the transgressions to be considered as distinct. See Keritot 15b which quotes Rabbi Akiva’s logic in explain-ing the differences between the two prohibitions.

I.e., just as the fact that the food was cooked and served in different pots was not significant for a stringency, it is also not significant for a leniency.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:8. This is one of the fundamental concepts with regard to the mitzvot and prohibitions concerning eating. Just as there is a minimum amount, a k’zayit (an olive-sized portion), which one must eat for a mitzvah to be fulfilled or for a prohibition to be violated; so, too, there is a minimum measure of time, k’dei achilat p’ras, in which that amount of food must be eaten. If one takes a longer time to eat the prohibited food, his eating is not significant, like one who eats less than the minimum amount.
Rashi (Pesachim 44a) offers a different view and maintains that this measure is defined as the time it takes to eat four eggs. Shiurei Torah mentions several different opinions from between four minutes until nine minutes for this period of time.

Meat left over from a sacrifice beyond the prescribed time in which it must be eaten. Partaking of such meat inadvertently makes a person liable to bring a sacrifice (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:10).

The Or Sameiach questions why the ruling here is different than the ruling with regard to forbidden relations with an animal, in which instance, different bodies do create a distinction. He explains that since it is impossible to be intimate with more than one animal at a time, each act of intimacy is considered separately. With regard to meat forbidden as notar, by contrast, since it is possible to partake of the different types of sacrificial meat at the same time, the different bodies do not cause the prohibitions to be considered as distinct.

Here, also, despite the fact that different bodies are involved, the prohibitions are not considered as distinct. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that since the person does not derive physical satisfaction from the slaughter of the animals, they should not be considered as distinct prohibitions.

Or wild beast or fowl (see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 6:1).

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Keritot 22a. He understands the passage as emphasizing that the fact that the blood is in different cups does not cause the acts to be considered as distinct prohibitions. Rashi and others interpret that Talmudic passage differently.

If, however, he ate many olive-sized portions of the same type of prohibited food in one lapse of awareness, he is only liable for one sin-offering.

Sacrificial meat that was disqualified because the priest offering it had an improper intent with regard to the time when the sacrificial service associated with an offering would be performed or the time it would be eaten (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 13:1).

An issur mosif; see Chapter 4, Halachah 1, for a definition of this term.

An issur kollel. This term is also defined in that chapter.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:18-19, where the Rambam explains similar concepts with regard to liability for lashes for partaking of this forbidden substance.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:4), the Rambam explains that this is considered as an issur mosif, because before he became impure, this person was permitted to partake of the meat of the animal, although he was forbidden to partake of its fat. When he became impure, since its meat became forbidden, an additional prohibition was added to its fat.
The above represents the final version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, as recorded in Rav Kapach’s translation of that text. The initial version of that text, which is preserved in the standard published text, states that the person had to be impure as a minor. Thus when he came of age, the prohibition against partaking of forbidden fat and the prohibition against partaking of consecrated food would be considered as two prohibitions that took effect at the same time.

This is considered as an issur mosif, because before the sacrificial fat became no tar, it was permitted to be burned on the altar. After it became notar, that became forbidden. As a consequence, that prohibition also applies to partaking of the fat.

This is considered an issur kollel, because it encompasses not only this forbidden fat, but all other foods.

For one is not liable for eating on Yom Kippur unless one partakes of this amount (Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 2:1).

Provided the forbidden fat is worth a perutah.
This is also considered as an issur mosif, because before the animal was consecrated, it was forbidden to partake of its fat, but it was permitted to benefit from it. After it was consecrated, that became forbidden. Hence an additional prohibition also applies to partaking of it (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, foe. cit.).

One for the violation of the Yom Kippur prohibitions and one for the violation of the Sabbath prohibitions.

The observance of both holy days commences at the same time. Although the Rambam had already stated this law in Chapter 4, Halachah 1, he repeats it to distinguish between it and the law in the previous halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

For he has not eaten enough of either prohibited substance to be liable for lashes and substances forbidden because of two different prohibitions are not combined, as the Rambam proceeds to state.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:17; 14:5.

One is not liable for lashes or for a sin-offering unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion of a forbidden substance. The question the Rambam deals with in this halachah is whether two half-portions of a forbidden substance can be combined to make one liable.

I.e., with regard to a person who partook of the full measure for which he is liable, there is no question that becoming aware of the prohibition makes a distinction, as stated in Halachah 1. With regard to half the required measure, there is reason to say that, since the person is not liable, the fact that he becomes aware is not significant. Hence, the Rambam emphasizes that this is not so.

Writing is one of the labors forbidden on the Sabbath. To be liable, one must write two letters (Hilchot Shabbat 11:9).

The Rambam adds the phrase, “next to the first,” for to be liable, the two letters must be read as a single unit (ibid.:11).

Here, also, the person’s gaining awareness causes a distinction to be made between the prohibited actions.

Although in the first of these instances, the transgressor is liable and above, he is exempt, in this context as well, his gaining awareness is significant, as evident from the second instance. Therefore the Rambam introduces the clause with the phrase “in a like vein.”

One is liable for transferring an article four cubits in the public domain. In this instance, the person did transfer the article that distance. Nevertheless, since he gained awareness in the interim, the question is whether the two are combined (ibid. 12:8).

Thus all that is significant is his initial intent. The fact that in the interim, he changed his intent is not of consequence (see Shabbat 102a).

Carrying it, in which instance, he could bring it back.

It is considered as if he performed three separate actions, each distinct from the other.

Were he to have set aside an animal as a sacrifice, one could understand why it would not atone for a transgression that the person did not have in mind at the time he set it aside. The Rambam’s point is that even if he did not set the animal aside, the two transgressions cannot be atoned for together.

And the one offering atones for both transgressions.

Even though with regard to intimacy, the same person is involved in both transgressions, if one becomes aware of the transgressions at different times, he is liable for two sin-offerings. Alternatively, even though one cannot engage in two acts of intimacy at the same time, one is liable for one sin-offering if he found out about both at the same time (Kessef Mishneh).

Rav Yosef Corcus emphasizes that we are speaking about a situation where the person partook of the entire amount within the time it takes to eat three eggs (k’dei achilat p’ras). Otherwise, his partaking of the food at the different times would be considered as distinct actions.

That offering atones for the olive-sized portion that he became aware of. It does not affect the second smaller portion, because a sacrifice is not required for eating less than an olive-sized portion (Rav Yosef Corcus).

He receives atonement for the first half portion when offering the sacrifice for the portion of which he became aware. Hence, it is not combined with the second half-portion.

Even though he was not aware of the second transgression at the time he offered the sacrifice, it secures atonement for him. Even though, as stated in Halachah 9, the fact that he became aware of the transgressions at different times creates a distinction between them that principle applies only when he became aware of the transgressions before the sacrifice was offered. If he does not become aware until atonement is offered, by contrast, it secures atonement for him (Kessef Mishneh). See also Chapter 7, Halachah 10, where similar laws are discussed.

From Shabbat 71a-b, one could come to the conclusion that atonement is also secured for the third transgression. Nevertheless, that approach follows the opinion that becoming aware of the transgression does not create a distinction between the transgressions. The Rambam follows the opinion that a distinction is created and, hence, requires a sacrifice in this instance. See also the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 10.

This applies provided he becomes aware of the second transgression at the same time he becomes aware of the third or he becomes aware of it after the sacrifice was already offered (Kessef Mishneh).

Provided he did not become aware of the first or third transgressions before offering the sacrifice.

I.e., he did not know which pieces of fat he ate, the permitted one or the forbidden ones.

As explained in Chapter 8, when a person is uncertain whether or not he transgressed, he must bring a tentative guilt-offering. As explained in Halachah 8 of that chapter, in a situation where he becomes aware of the possibility that he transgressed twice at two different times, he must bring two guilt-offerings.

For one is not obligated to bring a sin-offering until he has definite knowledge of a transgression. Note, however, an exception to this principle in Chapter II, Halachah 7.