Shegagot - Chapter 2

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that this is included in the implications of Leviticus 4:27 which states: “When a person... will sin inadvertently by performing [a violation of] one of the commandments of God,” i.e., his violation of the commandment must be entirely inadvertent.

I.e., he was conscious of the transgression at the completion of the act and, nevertheless, continued to perform the deed.

I.e., he forgot or otherwise, became unaware of the fact that he was committing a transgression.

Even though he is not liable, his act involves a more serious transgression. Indeed, precisely for that reason, he is not given the opportunity to bring a sacrifice, so that he will not be granted atonement.

This is one of the forbidden Sabbath labors, as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 12:8-9. As explained in that source, the prohibition involves lifting an article up from a state of rest (akirah)in one domain and then placing it down in a different domain (hanachah).

Since he did not know the full seriousness of his act, he is considered to have transgressed unknowingly.

For this is a dimension that involves atonement and not the seriousness of the transgression.

As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 5, such a person also does not bring a tentative guilt-offering, because such an offering is only brought when one is unsure of whether he sinned and in this instance, the person knows that he sinned, he is just unaware of which sin he committed. In that halachah, the Rambam states that we are speaking about a situation where “The Sabbath and Yom Kippur followed directly after each other [and one] performed a forbidden labor in the twilight between them.” Some assert that this is also the intent here.

As long as he was once aware of the nature of the transgression that he violated, the fact that he is not aware at the time he is bringing the sacrifice is not significant. When slaughtering the sacrifice, he should say that it is being slaughtered for the sin-offered for which he is liable and request that it should serve as atonement even though he is unaware of the sin he committed (Kessef Mishneh).

Unlike sin-offerings of fowl of doubtful status that are burnt.
The Ra’avad raises a question, noting that the Tosefta states that when the person discovers which transgression he violated, he should bring a sin-offering as atonement. How can he bring two sacrifices as atonement for the same transgression? The Migdal Oz suggests that the Rambam possessed a different version of the Tosefta that did not contain this ruling. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since he knew he sinned at the outset, he should offer a sacrifice to achieve a certain measure of atonement. When he discovers the sin that he committed, he can achieve a full measure of atonement. Kin’at Eliyahu compares this to a conditional guilt offering in which originally, when the person suspects that he sinned, he brings one sacrifice and later, when he discovers that he definitely transgressed, he brings a second sacrifice.

In this instance, there is no question whether a sacrifice must be brought, because the person knows which transgression he committed.

I.e., he was under the impression that the woman was ritually pure.

I.e., at the time he was intimate with the woman, he was unaware of the family relationship and only afterwards did he discover it.

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that it is easier to comprehend this concept when inanimate objects are involved than when the situation concerns people.

I.e., even though he did not know a transgression was involved, he is not considered as an enus, someone who sins because of factors beyond his control.

The intent is not necessarily one who was physically captured by gentiles, but rather one who was under the influence of their mindset. Accordingly, even one who was brought up with the knowledge that he is Jewish, but unaware of the obligation to perform mitzvot should be included in this category (the Lubavitcher Rebbe).

I.e., he performed these transgressions without knowing that there was any sin involved.

However, he is required to bring only one sin-offering for all the Sabbaths he desecrated, one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat he ate, etc. The rationale is that all of the transgressions he performed are considered to have been performed in one state of lack of awareness, as explained in ch. 5.

This halachah refers to a different type of unintentional violation than those referred to previously. In the previous instances, the person intentionally performed an act, nevertheless, he is considered to have transgressed inadvertently, because he did not know that the act was forbidden. In this instance, the person was acting casually, without concentrating (mitaseik in Talmudic terminology). It is not that he purposely performed a deed that he later discovered to be a transgression. He was not acting purposefully at all.

Our Rabbis (see the commentaries to Keritot 19b) struggle to give examples of such a situation, for seemingly, sexual intimacy will always be a conscious act.

In these two instances, since he derived pleasure from his actions, he is held liable.

By choosing this example, the Rambam (and his source, Shabbat 72b), seek to clarify that the person is acting casually, without considering the deed he is performing. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 11, the same ruling applies even if one had the intent to cut an object that had already been severed from the ground, but actually, cut produce that was still attached.

I.e., an activity performed to bring about the desired intent.

Hilchot Shabbat 1:8-11.

I.e., he was performing an act that he was required to perform.

When a woman's husband dies childless, she is required to marry his brother. He is referred to as a yavam and she, a yevamah. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25, Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah, ch. l.

When relations are forbidden.

I.e., even if relations with his wife are a mitzvah, i.e., it is the night of her onah, he is liable, because he should have asked her regarding her state.

Since they have not lived together as man and wife, they do not share the type of familiarity that would allow such questions to be asked.

It is forbidden to cause bleeding on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, when the eighth day of the life of a native-born Jewish infant falls on the Sabbath, he may be circumcised on the Sabbath. If, however, the eighth day of the child's life already passed and for some reason, he was not circumcised, it is forbidden to circumcise him on the Sabbath. See Hilchot Milah, ch. 1.

For there was no mitzvah involved in his act.

And thus he cannot be considered to have sinned due to forces beyond his control. Nevertheless, since he did not intend to transgress, he is considered to have transgressed inadvertently (Kessef Mishneh).

For according to Scriptural Law, one is obligated to take the lulav on the first day of the holiday no matter where one is located (i.e., even outside the Temple). The restriction against doing so is Rabbinic in origin (Hilchot Lulav 7:15-17).
In explanation of this halachah, the Kessef Mishneh and others cite Sukkah 41b which explains that this is speaking about a situation where the person carries the lulav in a manner in which he does not fulfill his obligation. The rationale is that since he has not fulfilled his obligation as of yet, he is preoccupied with that thought and hence, he is exempted from the obligation of a sin-offering. If, however, he has already fulfilled his obligation to take the lulav, he is not considered as preoccupied with the performance of a mitzvah and is liable for a sin-offering.

The commentaries have suggested this translation based on Pesachim 71a.

And thus in all these instances, there is no owner on whose behalf the sacrifice should be offered. Nevertheless, at the time of the animal’s slaughter, the person offering the sacrifice did not know this. As stated in Hilchot Karban Pesach 1:20, he is considered as being held back by forces beyond his control.

Thus at the time the sacrificial animal was slaughtered, there was no way he could have known that the animal would be unacceptable as an offering.

He is not, however, considered to have sinned intentionally, since he was unaware of the disqualifying blemish and did not know that he was transgressing.

It is acceptable as a Paschal sacrifice and the one bringing it is not considered to have desecrated the Sabbath. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 15:1 which explains that this is referring to a situation in which the person did not intend to supplant the purpose of the sacrifice, but instead, did so in error, i.e., he thought he was offering a burnt-offering and for that reason, offered the Paschal sacrifice as one would offer a burnt-offering. If, however, he intentionally alters the intent with which he offers a Paschal sacrifice, i.e., he knowingly offers it as one would offer another sacrifice, the sacrifice is unacceptable and he is liable.

I.e., a person slaughtered an animal consecrated as a peace-offering as a Paschal sacrifice.

Even though it is forbidden to offer other individual sacrifices on the Sabbath, after the fact, the sacrifices are acceptable, as stated in Halachah 14.

Even though these offerings are not acceptable as Paschal sacrifices, since he is obligated to offer a Paschal sacrifice and his intent was to offer a Paschal sacrifice, he is considered as preoccupied with the performance of a mitzvah and exempt from a sin-offering.

And Paschal sacrifices may only be male (Hilchot Karban Pesach 1:1).

And a Paschal sacrifice may only be male and must be in the first year of its life (Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:1).

He is not considered to have erred concerning a matter associated with a mitzvah, because it is common knowledge that such animals are not acceptable. He is not, however, considered to have transgressed intentionally, because he did not have a willful intent to sin.

E. g., they were physically incapable of partaking of the Paschal sacrifice (see Hilchot Karban Pesach 2:3).

For only those enumerated on a Paschal sacrifice may partake of it (ibid.:1).

Who are forbidden to partake of a Paschal sacrifice (ibid. 5:5).

For they also may not partake of such a sacrifice (ibid.:1).

As stated in ibid. 2:5, when a sacrificial animal is slaughtered with such an intent, it is acceptable. Hence, he is not liable, because through his act, he performed a mitzvah

Since he did not offer it for the desired intent, the sacrifice is not acceptable for its purpose (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 15:1). Hence it is considered like an individual offering, which may not be offered on the Sabbath.

I.e., if he cast the blood on the altar, the sacrifice is not disqualified and after the Sabbath, these offerings should be made. See the following halachah.

E. g., one offered three continual offerings rather than two.

Since the communal offerings are matters of public knowledge, the person is not considered to have been involved in a mitzvah when slaughtering the animal as a communal offering. Moreover, slaughtering another animal as a sacrifice violates the prohibition against adding to the Torah’s commandments.

See Hilchot Chagigah 1:8. Since these sacrifices do not have a fixed time during which they are offered, their offering does not supersede the Sabbath prohibitions.

Since the sacrifices should not be offered, atonement must be secured for any violation of the Sabbath laws their offering involved.

Although the blood should not be cast on the altar and thus the meat is not permitted to be eaten, once the sacrificial animals are left overnight and disqualified, it is permitted to benefit from it. It need not be buried.
The Rambam’s ruling has a source in the Tosefta. Nevertheless, Rav Yosef Corcus questions what benefit may be derived from such sacrificial animals, for they are required to be burnt (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:10). He goes so far as to suggest that there is a textual error and that the text should read, “They are forbidden to be eaten.”

The rationale is that although casting the blood on the altar does not involve any forbidden labor, one should not do so, because doing so makes the meat fit to be eaten and the fats and organs fit to be offered on the altar. On the Sabbath, it is forbidden to cause an entity to be permitted.

Even though the sacrifice was acceptable, since initially, it was forbidden to offer the sacrifice, a sin-offering is required as atonement.

When an unnecessary slaughter of a sacrificial animal involves a transgression.

For only communal offerings are permitted to be offered on the Sabbath.

As required when Rosh Chodesh or a festival falls on the Sabbath.

Of which several are offered on the Sabbath.

A person- or the community- is obligated to bring the most superior animal available for its sacrifices (see the conclusion of Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach). Indeed, if one offers a lesser animal when a superior one is available, the sacrifice is unacceptable and he (or the community) is not considered to have fulfilled his obligation. Therefore, not only is he permitted to offer the stockier animal, he is obligated to do so (see Or Sameiach).

I.e., a disqualifying factor that could not be noticed at the time the animal was slaughtered.

I.e., he did not know that catching fish involved the commission of a forbidden labor or did not know that it was the Sabbath.

Thus saving him from drowning.

Since his action had a desirable outcome, retroactively, it is considered as if this was his initial intent. See Hilchot Shabbat 2:16 where the Rambam also uses this wording. There the Ra’avad objects and the Maggid Mishneh substantiates the Rambam’s ruling.

And thus his intent was to perform an act that was forbidden.

I.e., meat that was left over beyond the time when it was permitted to be eaten. Partaking of such meat violates a negative commandment, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin, ch. 19.

I.e., one might think that since the person intended to perform a mitzvah, he is not liable even though in practice, he performed a transgression. Hence the Rambam feels it necessary to emphasize that he is liable.