Shegagot - Chapter 3

Before he transgressed. Thus it is possible that his transgression could have been inadvertent.

For a sin-offering is brought only when one transgresses inadvertently and not when one violates a transgression intentionally.

If, however, he contradicts the testimony of the witnesses and states that he did not perform the act neither intentionally or inadvertently, he is liable for a sin-offering, because the testimony of the witnesses is binding [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:1)]. See also Chapter II, Halachah 8.

And women’s testimony is not accepted in a court of law. Moreover, the Rambam uses the singular and for testimony to be accepted, there must be two witnesses.

If, however, he protested and denied the witness’ statement, he is not liable for a sin-offering (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:6).

Were there to have been a prevailing assumption already established that a food was permitted, it would take the testimony of two witnesses to cause it to be considered as forbidden. In this instance, however, the status of the fat is unknown. Hence, the statement of one witness is sufficient to cause it to be forbidden (Kiryat Sefer).

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:6.

Keritot 6:7.

This is the version found both in the standard published text and in many authentic manuscripts. Some commentaries suggest that the text should read: “He does not find atonement.”

For animals designated as sacrifices may not be redeemed until they become blemished.

The prooftext cited above also implies that each sin-offering should be brought for “the transgression that he committed” and not “the transgressions that he committed.”

The prooftext cited also implies that the sin-offering may be brought only for one transgression of one person as indicated by the phrase “he committed.”

See a comparable ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 4:5.

A burnt-offering brought when the altar is idle.

Rav Yosef Corcus questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that in matters of Scriptural Law, we follow the principal that the laws of bereirah do not apply, i.e., we do not say that retroactively, it can be considered that a person had a particular intent at the outset. In this instance, we do not say that the person’s intent at the outset is determined by his choice when he desired to slaughter the animal. Kin’at Eliyahu justifies the Rambam’s ruling explaining that as long as the person’s initial intent is not a contradiction to his ultimate intent, we are not concerned with his initial intent at all.

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:4.

The above source states: Even a burnt-offering that is accepted from a gentile is not accepted from this apostate. [This is derived from Leviticus 1:2 which] states: “A man from you who will sacrifice.” According to the Oral Tradition, we learned: “From you,” i.e., not all of you, excluding an apostate.

For both of these actions are considered as a denial of the entire Jewish tradition.

I.e., it is public knowledge that he violates a given transgression, e.g., partaking of blood or forbidden fat, repeatedly.

This latter phrase can be understood as giving an explanation for the ruling. Since the person frequently violates this transgression, we assume that he is not sincere in his desire for atonement for it and a sin-offering must be accompanied by sincere regret.

Gittin 47a differentiates between an apostate who acts out of desire and one who acts to anger God, explaining that the latter term refers to one who had two cuts of meat before him of equal quality, one kosher and one non-kosher, and he ate the non-kosher one solely for the intent of angering God. If, by contrast, a person partook of non-kosher meat because he was hungry and there was no other meat available, he is not considered as acting to anger God. He is, nevertheless, considered as an apostate and a sacrifice to atone for that transgression is not accepted from him.

Even though it is a similar transgression to partaking of forbidden fat (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, loc. cit. Since he observes this commandment continually, why should his other transgressions prevent him from gaining atonement for this violation. Moreover, it is hoped that offering this sacrifice will spur him to complete repentance.

With regard to that transgression, alternatively, with regard to the Sabbath or idolatry. In such a state, the sacrifice of the sin-offering on his behalf is not acceptable.

In which instance, sacrifices can be brought on his behalf.

In which instance, sacrifices cannot be brought on his behalf.

I.e., we do not say that since an animal was disqualified as a sacrifice once, it remains disqualified forever. Instead, whenever it becomes possible to offer the animal again, the sacrifice is acceptable. See Yoma 64a.

This is a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:34, 4:24, 6:1; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:4; et al.
As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 4:15, this represents a reversal of the Rambam’s initial position on the matter.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:6-7.

I.e., guilt-offerings brought because of specific sins, as explained in ch. 9

I.e., the atonement generated by Yom Kippur is not sufficient to atone for these transgressions, since a definite obligation was already established (Keritot 25b).

And the transgression concerning which he is in doubt would require him to bring a guilt-offering.

If, however, he discovers that in fact he committed a transgression that warrants a sin-offering, he is obligated to bring that sin-offering even after Y om Kippur (ibid. 26a).

In the following halachah.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 1:1. This issue is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and the Sages in Keritot 7a. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi maintains that Yom Kippur is powerful enough to generate atonement even if the person does not repent. The Sages, by contrast, maintain that Y om Kippur is effective, only when accompanied by repentance. [It must be emphasized that even the Sages acknowledge the unique purifying influence of Yom Kippur. They, however, maintain that a person cannot receive that influence unless he first opens himself up through sincere repentance (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. IV).]

For it is as if the sacrifice that he brought initially had not been offered.

I.e., complete atonement is not granted from Above until this sacrifice is offered.

For it is not brought to atone for a transgression.

As explained in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1, that term refers to zavim, zavot, women after childbirth, and one who was afflicted by tzara’at. In all these instances, there are situations where questions could arise whether the person actually deserved to be placed in this category and was in fact obligated to bring this sacrifice.

A woman suspected of adultery who is compelled to undergo a test of her fidelity is required to bring a meal-offering, as stated in Hilchot Sotah 3:12. The bracketed phrase is necessary because in contrast to the prior examples where the doubt is whether the persons are required to bring the offerings or not, with regard to a sotah, the doubt is whether she committed the transgression or not.

Since these sacrifices are not brought to bring the people atonement for sin, the fact that Yom Kippur passes has no bearing on the person's obligation.

For another transgression that he committed.

The rationale is that it is forbidden to delay an execution. Nevertheless, when the sacrificial animal has already been slaughtered and the delay is minimal, we make that delay so that he will receive atonement for that sin. Once the person has been executed, a sacrifice may not be offered on his behalf, because sacrifices are offered only for the sake of the living. These laws are restated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:5.