Temurah - Chapter 1

We are using the term “transfer holiness” to refer to the convention of temurah. When this convention is employed even though the holiness of the animal is transferred the original animal remains consecrated.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 106) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 351) consider the prohibition against transferring the holiness of an animal as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Even if he transferred the holiness of several animals to others at one time, he is liable for lashes for each animal, as stated in Halachah 14.

Temurah 3a.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2.

For the transgression involves speech and ordinarily speech is not considered as a deed. There are times when it is considered as a deed (see Hilchot Sechirot 13:2) and there are Sages (Rabbi Yochanan, Bava Metzia 90b, Temurah 3b) who maintain that it should be considered as a deed. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion (Temurah 3a; Makkot 16a) is that in this context, it is not considered as a deed.

In his Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. 3, Chapter 41, the Rambam explains that these three prohibitions are singled out for the following reasons: When a person takes an oath, others are obligated to accept his statements. Transferring the holiness of consecrated animals is degrading for them. And cursing a colleague is viewed by people at large as more seriously than injuring a person physically.

I.e., aside from the issue of not involving deed, there is another reason why, seemingly, this prohibition should not be punishable by lashes as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

In which instance, the general rule is that if one fills the positive commandment, he does not receive lashes for the violation of the negative commandment (Makkot 15a; Hilchot Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 87) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 352) consider the charge to regard both animals as holy as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The prooftext cited above contains two prohibitions: “Do not exchange it and do not transfer its holiness.”

I.e., the scope of the negative commandment is more encompassing.

And thus the positive commandment does not apply in that instance. See Halachah 12 for the derivation of the exclusion of communal sacrifices and sacrificial animals brought by partners.

And the negative commandment does apply as the Rambam proceeds to illustrate.

As stated in Hilchot Shabbat 23:14, one should not consecrate an animal on the Sabbath. Even so, if one transgresses and transfers the holiness of a sacrificial animal to another animal, the transfer is effective and he is liable for lashes.

I.e., a full set of lashes. As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:1, in practice, a person is never given more than 39 lashes for one violation of a prohibition and that number could be reduced dependent on his strength.

The intent is not that one partner, or one member of the Jewish people, seeks to transfer the holiness of the animal, for it is obvious that such a transfer would not be effective. Since that person does not have ownership over the entire animal, there is no way that he can transfer its holiness. Instead, the intent is that even though both partners or the representatives of the entire people seek to transfer a sacrificial animal’s holiness, it may not be transferred.

I.e., since every Jew has a share in the communal sacrifices (see Hilchot Shekalim 4:1), they are considered comparable to sacrifices owned by partners.

Temurah 17b derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 17:10. Although generally, lashes are only given for the conscious violation of a prohibition, our Sages understood the verse as implying that this case is an exception to the rule.

I.e., how can one be liable for an inadvertent transgression?

For he is transgressing the prohibition consciously. He is merely erring in regard to the identity of the sacrifical animal whose holiness he wishes to transfer. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, because he follows a different understanding of the Talmudic passage cited. Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessel Mishneh provide support for the Rambam’s view, explaining that it is also followed by Rashi.

Because he transgressed unknowingly.

This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts with regard to sacrifices. See Hilchot Arachin 6:21, 24, Hilchot Temurah 1:3, Hilchot Nizirut 9:9.

A male lamb for a burnt offering, a ewe as a sin offering, and a ram as a peace offering, as stated in Hilchot Nizirut 8:1.

Since the sacrifice is set aside for his atonement, it is considered his (see Temurah 2b).

This refers to a burnt-offering or a peace-offering. A sin-offering or a guilt-offering is not offered for the sake of a deceased person, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1, 14.

In Halachah 1.

As stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2, a gentile may consecrate burnt-offerings to be offered in the Temple.

Temurah 2b states that since the punishment for transferring the holiness of an animal will not be meted out to a gentile, the gentile’s transfer of holiness is not effective. Moreover, the passage discussing this prohibition (Leviticus, ch. 27) begins: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Temurah 3a). See also Halachah 12.

I.e., this question is discussed in Temurah 2b-3a and left unresolved. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that a gentile cannot transfer the holiness of an animal at all, regardless of whether the animal belongs to him or a Jew. He interprets the unresolved question in the Talmud as applying to a situation where a Jew wants to transfer the holiness of an animal which a gentile consecrated for the Jew’s atonement. Rav Yosef Corcus agrees that the Rambam’s interpretation is problematic, for seemingly, since a Jew cannot consecrate an animal that he consecrated on behalf of another person (Halachah 4), why should a gentile have that prerogative?

Temurah 2b derives the obligation of a woman from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:10. In that Talmudic passage, the question is raised: Why is there a need for a special verse to teach us that women are also liable? There is a general rule that women have the same liability as men with regard to all of the punishments of the Torah. In resolution, the Talmud explains that since this prohibition is unique in that there are instances where a person violates the prohibition and yet is not liable for punishment (e.g., partners as stated in Halachah I), it is necessary for there to be a source teaching that women are held liable.

For lashes are never given to a person below the age of majority. Until that age, he or she is not held responsible for their conduct.

As stated in Hilchot Nedarim 11:1-4, when a female reaches the age of eleven and a male, the age of twelve, and they are of sufficient intellectual prowess to understand to Whom vows are being made, their vows are binding according to Scriptural Law.

The Talmud’s question is whether we compare the transfer of holiness to the consecration of an animal, in which instance, one would say that just as such a minor could consecrate an animal, he could transfer its holiness. Or we say that since the punishment for this transgression is not given to a minor, the transfer of holiness is also not effective.

As stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:1, 9:1, 10:3, the meat of these animals must be eaten by the priests alone.

Thus until the animal is offered, it does not belong to them, as evident from ibid. 11:4 which states that a person who partakes of sacrificial meat before the blood is cast on the altar is liable for lashes. And as stated in Halachah 3, a person cannot transfer the holiness of an animal that does not belong to him.

As stated in Hilchot Bechorot 1:14, a person should keep his firstborn animal home until it grows some before giving it to the priest. When the priest receives it, he receives it, not as his private property, but with the intent of bringing it as a sacrifice.

And the animal to which the holiness was transferred must also be given to a priest, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

As stated in ibid.:7, although a priest is entitled to the firstborn born in his herds, he must offer it as a sacrifice.

Which is offered together with the bull brought as a sin-offering on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:3; Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 1:1).

Because this is his personal offering.

See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 5:13.

And the holiness of an animal belonging to partners cannot be transferred, as stated in Halachah 1.

Consecrated for sin-offerings and for burnt-offerings.

Leviticus 27:9-10.

The Rambam (quoting Temurah 13a) uses the term “sacrifices,” because Numbers 31:50 uses the term “sacrifice,” for offerings made to improve the Sanctuary.

Animals consecrated with the intent that they be sold and the proceeds used for the improvement of the Temple.

It was already stated that the holiness of sacrificial animals must not be transferred. Thus the fact that this concept was restated with regard to the tithe offering is obviously intended to teach certain points.

This is one of the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis listed by Rabbi Yishmael at the beginning of the Sifra and recited every day in our prayers.

Rav Yosef Corcus notes that in Hilchot Bechorot 6:10, the Rambam rules that in certain circumstances, partners may be liable to bring tithe-offerings from their combined holdings. He mentions that the Rambam addressed this issue in a revision of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 1:6). Originally (and this version is preserved in the standard published text), he wrote “We already explained at the conclusion of Bechorot that partners are not obligated in the tithe offering.” Afterwards (and this version is found in Rav Kapach’s edition of the Commentary of the Mishnah), he amended the text to read: “[The tithe offering] is not brought as a pledge or a vow by two people, as they would bring an animal as a burnt-offering or a peace-offering.”

I.e., none of the Torah’s agricultural obligations apply to land owned by Gentiles, even in Eretz Yisrael, as stated in Hilchot Terumot 4:15.

In Halachah 6.

And is thus unfit for sacrifice; see a description of these blemishes in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, ch. 2.

An animal that has a permanent blemish is not fit to be sacrificed. Instead, it should be redeemed and a sacrifice brought with the proceeds of its sale (ibid. 1:10). Hence, it resembles an animal consecrated for the improvement of the Temple and like it (Halachah 12), its holiness cannot be transferred.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:11 which lists several differences between the laws applying to sacrificial animals with temporary blemishes and those with permanent blemishes. The difference between the two situations is that when a blemish is only temporary, the animal is considered as a sacrificial animal and its consecration involves not only its worth, but its actual physical person.

Since it was unblemished at the time it was consecrated, the consecration affected its physical person, not only its worth. Although it became blemished afterwards, that fact does not detract from the original consecration.

See Chapter 2, Halachot I, 3, which explain that a blemished animal can be redeemed by exchanging it with an unblemished one in a way that does not violate this prohibition.

I.e., one that contracted the blemish after being consecrated, as explained in the previous halachah.

Even though one cannot consecrate a blemished animal in a a way that its body becomes consecrated, if one is transferring the holiness of a consecrated animal, its body becomes consecrated. Temurah 9a derives this concept from Leviticus 27:10 which speaks about transferring the holiness of a “good” animal to a “bad” one. “Bad” is interpreted as being blemished and thus unfit for sacrifice [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 1:2), see also Chapter 3, Halachah 5].

More precisely, the term tzon is a collective term meaning sheep or goats.

Or more.

Thus if he transferred the holiness of one consecrated animal to 100 ordinary animals, he is liable for 100 sets of lashes and if he transfers the holiness of 100 animals to one ordinary animal, he is liable for one set of lashes (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The offspring of a consecrated animal is itself consecrated. Nevertheless, its holiness cannot be transferred to another animal. Based on a comparison to the following halachah, we must conclude that here, the Rambam is speaking about an instance in which an animal became pregnant after it was consecrated and then gave birth.

In the previous halachah.

Rav Yosef Corcus notes that the Rambam speaks of limbs that are not vital to the animal’s survival. If, however, one says: “The heart of this animal...” or “The head of this animal...”, the transfer of holiness would be effective. See also Halachah 19.

This is speaking about a situation where the person consecrated the animal while it was pregnant. Thus the holiness of it and its fetus are of the same nature (see Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 4:6). In this way, it is distinguished from the offspring of a consecrated animal mentioned in the previous halachah (Lechem Mishneh).

The Kiryat Sefer suggests that this is derived from the fact that the prooftext mentions transferring the holiness from “one animal to another animal.” Since these are not animals, holiness cannot be transferred to and from them.

Which is not fit to be offered on the altar.

An animal which will not live for more than 12 months (see Hilchot Shechitah 5:2 for a list of the different conditions which will cause an animal to be deemed tereifah).

An animal whose gender is masked by a wall of flesh.

An animal who has both male and female reproductive organs. All of these types of animals are not acceptable as offerings (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:1-3).

Which also cannot be consecrated for a sacrifice and yet, the holiness of an animal can be transferred to it, as stated in Halachah 14.

I.e., all of the types of animals mentioned above are considered as departures from the norm, so great that they are considered another type of animal. A blemished animal, by contrast, is considered as part of the same general category as an unblemished one, because it is very common for blemishes to occur (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Which is also unfit for sacrifice.

For that type of animal is offered as a sacrifice and they are permitted to be eaten (Rav Yosef Corcus).

This includes animals set aside, but not used as sacrifices to false deities, animals that were themselves worshipped as false deities, an animal given to a prostitute as her fee, an animal received in exchange for a dog, and an animal that was not of the age fit for sacrifice (see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:7-8, 10).

I.e., it was owned by two partners, one consecrated his portion and the other did not.

The Kiryat Sefer explains that this is derived from Leviticus 27:10 which speaks of exchanging the holiness of “an animal to an animal.” Implied is that the transfer must be from a complete animal to a complete animal. Just as the limbs of an animal cannot be involved in a transfer of holiness (Halachah 15), so too, half an animal cannot be involved in a transfer.

As stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1, this includes: a) the offspring of an animal designated as a sin-offering, b) an animal exchanged for an animal designated as a sin-offering, c) an animal designated as a sin-offering whose owner dies, and d) such animal that was lost and then found only after the owner secured atonement.

For example, an animal designated as a communal sin-offering, by contrast, which was lost and then discovered after atonement was secured, and others placed in the same category, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 4.

These types of sacrifices may only be brought from males (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:8, 10; Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:1).

In contrast to a blemished animal, which is mentioned in Halachah 13.

For the proceeds of its sale will be used to purchase a sacrificial animal that will be offered on the altar, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:16-17; Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:4.

All the sin-offerings brought by an ordinary person are female (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 1:15).

This is the interpretation of the term nasi used by the Rambam (see Hilchot Shegagot 15:6).

Instead of a he-goat as required of a king when he transgresses inadvertently (ibid.:1).

Instead of a bull as required of a High Priest when he transgresses inadvertently (ibid.).

I.e., in contrast to the situations mentioned above, there is no obligation to sell the animal that was designated and use the proceeds of the sale to purchase a sacrifice.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:18. The Rambam’s ruling appears to be based on the rationale that when an error was made in consecrating an animal as a sin-offering, it is not consecrated at all. In his gloss to those halachot, the Ra’avad objects to this ruling based on Temurah 19b-20a, but states that there is a way to resolve the Rambam’s perspective. In his gloss there, the Kessef Mishneh recognizes the difficulty in the Rambam’s ruling and also offers a possible resolution.