Shevitat Yom Tov - Chapter One

I.e., Rosh HaShanah, the first ofTishrei, which is the seventh month when counting from Nisan. Significantly, the name Rosh HaShanah is not mentioned in the Torah at all.

Our interpretation of the words מלאכת עבודה as “servile labor” is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on Halachah 5. There he interprets it as referring to tasks that a person would hire a servant to do rather than perform himself.
In his commentary on the Torah (Leviticus 23:7), the Ramban explains that with the expression “servile labor,” the Torah intends to distinguish between work performed to prepare food (which he terms “gratifying labor”) and the other forms of labor. According to the Ramban, the Torah never forbade the performance of the activities included in the labors necessary for the preparation of food. Any restrictions placed on them are Rabbinic in nature.
The Ramban’s conception is also reflected in the statements of Rashi (Beitzah 12a), who interprets the Talmud’s ruling (see Halachah 4), “Since [these labors] were permitted for the sake [of preparing food], they are permitted even when [they are performed] without such an intent,” as meaning that, according to the Torah, there is no prohibition against performing these labors at all.
Tosafot (Beitzah, loc. cit.) differs and explains that for the performance of a labor to be allowed by the Torah, it must in some way contribute to the pleasure of the holiday. Otherwise, it is forbidden. According to this conception, all the thirty-nine labors forbidden on the Sabbath are prohibited on the holidays as well. There is, however, special dispensation to perform these labors when doing so will increase our holiday pleasure.
The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s citation of the expression “servile labor” as an indication that he follows the perspective shared by Rashi and the Ramban. Other authorities (e.g., the Lechem Mishneh and the Pri Chadash) do not agree with the Maggid Mishneh’s interpretation and explain that the Rambam favors the other position. [See also the Chemdat Yisrael, who explains that the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 328) do not concur with the Maggid Mishneh’s conception of the Rambam’s position.] Note the treatment of this subject in the Or Sameach and in Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XI. (See also the notes on Halachah 4.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandments 159-160, 162-163, 166-167) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvot 297, 300, 308, 310, 318, 321) include these six in the reckoning of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Note Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 159), which in addition to the term shabbaton, “day of rest,” also mentions the phrase mikra kodesh, “holy convocation,” as indicating that one is commanded to sanctify the day by ceasing to perform labor.

I.e., any of the 28 of the 39 labors forbidden on the Sabbath that do not involve the preparation of food. (See Hilchot Shabbat 7:1.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandments 323-326, 328-329) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvot 298,301,309,311,319 and 323) include these six in the reckoning of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

This is the minimum punishment given for the violation of a negative commandment that involves a deed.

Pesachim 48a, moreover, states that even if a person is given separate warnings for each forbidden labor, each activity is not considered to be a separate violation.

The Rambam is referring to the ruling (Hilchot Shabbat 7:7-8) that requires a person who performs activities that fall into two different categories of forbidden labor on the Sabbath to bring two different sin offerings. The performance of an activity from each category of forbidden labor is considered to be a separate violation. Such a distinction does not apply with regard to the performance of forbidden labors on the holidays.

The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position as follows: All the labors forbidden on the Sabbath that involve preparation of food are not prohibited on the holidays. In addition, there are two forbidden labors, kindling a flame and transferring articles, which do not necessarily involve the preparation of food. Nevertheless, since they are sometimes necessary for the preparation of food, they are permitted without any restriction.
Other authorities (e.g., Pri Chadash, Pri Megadim) interpret the Rambam’s statements as meaning that, with the exception of these two labors, even the forbidden labors involved with the preparation of food are permitted only for that purpose. If, however, one performs one of these labors for other reasons—e.g., one cooks food solely to give to animals—one is liable. Moreover, if one performs a forbidden labor that is not usually involved in the preparation of food for the purpose of preparing food, one is liable.
There is a third interpretation, that of the Mabit. (In his Responsum 124, however, he follows the second view.) According to the view he expresses in Kiryat Sefer, even if one performs a forbidden labor (that is not usually involved in the preparation of food) for the purpose of preparing food, one is not liable. As proof, he cites the example of making cheese, an act that the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 10:13) considers a derivative of the forbidden labor of building. Nevertheless, making cheese on a holiday is not considered a violation of a forbidden labor and is forbidden only as a sh’vut.

The reason for these two exceptions is as follows: Both are often involved in the preparation of food. Alternatively, the transfer of articles is considered “an inferior labor” (Tosafot, Beitzah 12a), and Exodus 35:3: “Do not kindle fire ... on the Sabbath day,” is interpreted also as an exclusion, indicating that kindling fire is forbidden on the Sabbath, but not on holidays.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 1, Tosafot requires that the activity bring a person some pleasure. This view is also reflected in the Ra’avad’s gloss.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ra’avad as stating that this prohibition has its source in the Torah itself. lndeed, the Jerusalem Talmud (Beitzah 1:10) and certain passages in the Babylonian Talmud (Shabbat 95a; Chaggigah 18a) support this view. Nevertheless, most later authorities accept the Rambam’s view that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.

The Ra’avad gives a different rationale: that the extra effort involved in the performance of these activities is out of place on a holiday.

The Ra’avad differs with the extent of the leniency granted by the Rambam, restricting it to sending containers and food. He also differs regarding the rationale, explaining that sending the articles on the holiday is a greater expression of honor and respect. The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the later authorities.

All these labors, although necessary for the preparation of food, are not intended for the preparation of a particular cooked dish or loaf of bread. Rather, one performs these activities for several days in advance. Therefore, our Sages desired that these activities should not be performed on the festival itself.
It must be noted that these forbidden labors are specifically mentioned in the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud cited above, which states that the prohibition against performing such activities stems from the Torah itself.

The Rambam’s rationale depends on the concept of freshness. Food that is not fresh loses a certain amount of its flavor. The Ra’avad questions this principle, noting that produce harvested today is also fresher and tastier than produce harvested on the day before. Several authorities offer different observations to counter the Ra’avad’s thesis.

See Tz’ror HaChayim, which mentions various opinions concerning whether this prohibition has its origin in the Torah itself or in Rabbinic decree. In conclusion, he favors the opinion that the prohibition is Scriptural in origin. (See also Halachah 15.) The doubt exists only with regard to the Rambam’s position. Tosafot and others maintain that the prohibition is Scriptural in origin (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:1).

If, however, one cooked food on a holiday with the intent of eating it on the following day, many authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:13) allow the food to be eaten after the holiday. (See also Halachah 11 and notes.)

The reason is that the meat is tastier when cooked with many pieces together (Maggid Mishneh ).

This gives us a second rationale for the leniency of preparing a larger quantity of food than one needs immediately: when, as in the instance mentioned, there is no extra work involved in preparing a large quantity as compared to a small quantity. If either of these two rationales applies, leniency may be taken and the extra amount prepared.
Once, however, the water is left to boil, an additional amount may not be added (Ramah, Orach Chayim 103:2).

Rabbenu Yonah explains that this applied in Talmudic times, when the ovens were small. In such an instance, a large number of loaves were placed in the oven at the same time, and it took longer for them to bake, producing a better flavor. If, as was the case with regard to the larger ovens used in the medieval period, adding to the number of loaves does not increase the flavor, it is forbidden to do so. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 507:6.)

The salting is intended to drain off the blood so that it is permitted to cook the meat, as stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 6.

Here, also, the leniency is granted because there is no additional difficulty in salting the other pieces. Alternatively, the leniency is allowed so that the remainder of the meat will not spoil. Compare to Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

As explained in Chapter 6, just as it is forbidden to prepare food on a holiday for a weekday that follows, our Sages forbade preparing food on a holiday for a Sabbath that follows directly after the holiday, or for the second day of the holiday itself. Nevertheless, as explained in that chapter, our Sages did provide the leniency of establishing an eruv tavshilin.

I.e., invite guests although he knows that they will .not come, or prepare a large quantity of food when one knows that one will be unable to eat it all, and then use the remainder for the following day.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:7 notes that it has become common practice to cook a meal for the night of the second day of a holiday on the afternoon of the first day, relying on the leniency that one will taste some of the food. He criticizes this practice and explains that women should be taught to discontinue it and prepare the food before the commencement of the holiday.

He and the members of his family may not partake of it; other Jews, however, are not restricted (Mishnah Berurah 527:79).

The rationale for this stringency is that the example shown by a person with guile might be copied by others, while few will emulate brazen transgression. Moreover, even with regard to the person himself, if he were not punished, a person who acts with guile would never really appreciate the seriousness of his transgression, and would repeat it. When, however, a person willfully violates the Sages’ decree, he will not be able to rationalize his conduct. Hence, there is the possibility he will recognize his error (Rashi, Beitzah 17b; Mishnah Berurah 527:78).

We are speaking about an instance where the person has already eaten, and hence would not ordinarily consider slaughtering the animal. Nevertheless, because it is dangerously ill, he fears that it will die before the conclusion of the holiday. Our Sages were fearful that he would slaughter the animal regardless, rather than suffer the loss of having it die without ritual slaughter. They therefore established directives that would allow slaughter in most instances (Maggid Mishneh; Rashi, Beitzah 25a). (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 10.)

Although the Rambam’s wording might be interpreted as indicating that it is necessary to eat at least this amount of meat, the Maggid Mishneh and the later halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch Harav 498: 11; Mishnah Berurah 498:34) explain that it is not necessary to partake of the meat on the holiday.

See the Mishnah Berurah 512:2, which states that a Jew who worships false gods or desecrates the Sabbath is considered like a gentile in this regard.

The Rambam’s citation of a verse from the Torah as a proof-text for this prohibition is interpreted as an indication that he follows the position (see the notes on Halachot 1 and 4) that the labors necessary to prepare food are forbidden by the Torah on the holiday unless one is preparing food for a Jew. As mentioned, others consider the prohibitions to be Rabbinic in origin.

This rationale is not applicable on the Sabbath, for then it is not permitted to cook at all.

I.e., as long as a portion of the loaf can be given to a baby, one is not cooking solely for the gentiles.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that many (e.g., Tur, Orach Chayim 512) have objected to the Rambam’s ruling, based on Beitzah 21a, which appears to establish a correlation between the permission to bake bread for these soldiers and the laws mentioned in the previous halachah regarding inviting gentiles as guests. It appears from that passage that the Sages who forbid inviting guests also forbid baking bread for the soldiers, for the same principle is involved: one is cooking additional food for a gentile.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that there is no contradiction and that the two views can be reconciled. The Jew can be considered to be baking for the sake of the child. For if he did not bake for the soldiers, they would not allow him to bake for the child.
The Rishon LeTzion amplifies the difference between the two situations, explaining that because the person is not baking solely for the gentiles, the prohibition against doing so is merely Rabbinic in origin and can be waived with regard to baking for a gentile army, since the person could suffer substantial financial loss if he refused. In contrast, when inviting guests, one does so on one’s own volition, with no loss involved.
As emphasized by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 512:6, this leniency was granted only in this situation, because of the risk of confrontation with the military authorities. One should not apply it to other circumstances. (See also Mishnah Berurah 512:15.)

Here also, since one is not baking solely for the dogs, one may bake the bread on a holiday. Although one is adding to the loaf one is baking for the dogs, since it would be possible to satisfy them by giving them meat, it appears that the shepherds are baking the loaf because they want to partake of it themselves (Maggid Mishneh).
As emphasized by the Mishnah Berurah 512:22, this leniency applies even when one has no other food immediately available for the dogs.

The Rambam’s wording appears to indicate that although the activity is forbidden by the Torah, punishment is not given, because it is possible that his activity might ultimately serve a permitted purpose.

The Maggid Mishneh states that anointing oneself is mentioned because it is often necessary to heat oil used to anoint oneself. Anointing oneself with cold oil for pleasure is permitted even on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 21:23).

The Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 2:5) explains that the Hebrew לכאי has the connotation of all physical pleasure, not necessarily merely eating or drinking. Note the explanation in Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 187.(See also the Yereim, section 113.)

The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 3:3) appears to indicate that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself. Although Tosafot (Shabbat 39b) accept this view, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rashba differ and maintain that this prohibition is a Rabbinical decree.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 22:2, our Sages instituted restrictions against bathing on the Sabbath because the attendants would heat up the water on the Sabbath and claim that they had done so on the preceding day. On holidays, although the rules are more lenient, certain restrictions remain. For a discussion concerning the laws of ritual immersion on a holiday, see the notes on Hilchot Shabbat 23:8.

Based on the position of Tosafot mentioned previously, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 511:2) forbids washing one’s entire body on a holiday as a safeguard, even when the water was heated before the commencement of the holiday. The subsequent Ashkenazic authorities accepted the Ramah’s ruling, but were slightly more lenient and allowed washing one’s entire body, portion by portion. Greater leniency is, however, shown with regard to washing a baby.

See Hilchot Shabbat, loc. cit.

See Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 21-23, which list activities forbidden by the Sages for every category of forbidden labor.

See Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 25 and 26.

The term muktzeh as popularly used with regard to the Sabbath prohibitions is not a precise application of the term. Muktzeh literally means “set aside.” As used in the context here, it applies to articles that a person did not intend to use on a holiday. Rather, he “set them aside” to be used in the future.
As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, on the Sabbath it is not necessary to have a specific intention to use an object on the Sabbath. As long as there is no reason that prevents one from using it on that day—e.g., the prohibitions mentioned in Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 25 and 26—one may carry it on the Sabbath.

The Ra’avad differs and states that there are authorities who maintain that articles that are muktzeh are permitted to be carried on holidays. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 495:4), while the Tur and the Ramah cite the more lenient view. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 495:13 states that although it is customary to follow the more lenient view, it would be preferable to follow the more stringent ruling.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 5.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.

The preparation we are speaking about here is preparation through natural means, and not preparation accomplished by man through performance of labor. As mentioned previously in the chapter, it is forbidden to perform any activities on a holiday that involve the preparation of food for the days that follow. (See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 1: 1.)

Based on Pesachim 47a, several Rabbis (Ramban; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 513:1; Mishnah Berurah 513:1) maintain that the prohibition against nolad is Scriptural in origin.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), by contrast, the Rambam explicitly states that it is a Rabbinic decree. Nevertheless, since the Commentary on the Mishnah was not widely studied, different perspectives about the Rambam’s view have been offered, including that of the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 295), who states that the Rambam would require a person to be punished by lashes for eating such an egg.

If the chicken is not set aside to be eaten on the holiday, the egg is forbidden regardless, because of the prohibition against muktzeh (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit. ).

There is no prohibition against eating an egg laid on a weekday that follows a holiday or on a Sunday. Since weekday meals are not significant, we are not concerned that a holiday or a Sabbath prepares for them.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 513:1) state: “lt is forbidden to touch it.” Although the prohibition is ordinarily against moving muktzeh, and touching it is permitted, the prohibition is made more severe in the present instance because an egg is round, and even the slightest’ touch is likely to cause it to roll.

Generally, when a forbidden substance becomes mixed with a permitted substance, the presence of the forbidden substance is considered inconsequential (and the mixture permitted) when the taste of the forbidden substance can no longer be recognized, or when it is mixed with more than sixty times its weight of permitted food.
More stringent rulings are made, however, with regard to a forbidden substance that will ultimately become permitted (davar sheyesh lo matirin). The rationale is that since the entire mixture will be permitted within a short time, there is no reason to seek leniencies and partake of it while a portion (although inconsequential) is forbidden (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, chapter 15).

The decrees our Sages instituted were meant to serve as safeguards, and a safeguard is necessary only when a situation occurs frequently.

See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:5, which explains that in the time when the calendar was established on the basis of the testimony of witnesses, the observance of the second day of a holiday in the distant diaspora was necessary because of a doubt regarding the days on which the holidays were to be celebrated. Nevertheless, in the present era, when we use a fixed calendar, the observance of the second day of a holiday in the diaspora is merely a custom. (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 14.)

As explained in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:7, even when the calendar was established on the basis of the testimony of witnesses, Rosh HaShanah was generally observed for two days throughout Eretz Yisrael. Since it is forbidden to travel beyond 2000 cubits on a holiday, only those living in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem had the possibility of knowing whether or not the new month had been sanctified.

The word “even” has attracted the attention ofthe commentaries for, as mentioned in Halachah 24, the observance of the second day of Rosh HaShanah is more severe than that of the second day of other holidays. The Lechem Mishneh explains that the intent is that even the observance of the second day of Rosh HaShanah does not warrant a more severe punishment.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah, Chapters 6 and 7.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 496:1) quotes the Tur, who states “If [the violator] is a Torah scholar, we do not punish him so severely as to place him under a ban of ostracism. He is to be beaten.” (See Sha’ar HaTziyun 496:5, which focuses on the difference between these two rulings.)

See Chapter 6, Halachah 17.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether only the actual burial and those activities that involve performance of a forbidden labor must be performed by gentiles, or whether this involves all activities associated with the burial, including the ritual purification of the body, dressing it in shrouds and the like.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that all activities associated with the burial must be performed by a gentile. The Hagahot Maimoniot, by contrast, maintain that any activity that does not actually involve a forbidden labor should be performed by a Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 526:1) follows this view.

Rashi (Shabbat 139b) and the Baal Halachot Gedolot explain that the leniency of allowing gentiles to bury a Jew on a holiday was instituted as a token of respect for the human body, the repository of the soul. If the body were left unburied, it would decompose and become an aspersion to the dignity of mankind. Therefore, they maintain that if the corpse is not likely to decompose, it should not be buried by gentiles.
Rabbenu Asher and others differ and maintain that the mitzvah of burying the corpse on the day the person dies is the source for this ruling (see Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:8). Therefore, even when the body is not likely to decompose, it should be buried on the first day. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 526:1) follows this view.

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit. :4) mention a custom practiced by Rabbenu Tam, which equates the first and second days of a holiday in this regard. The Ramah agrees to this custom when it is possible to find a gentile to perform these labors, but maintains that if it is impossible to perform these labors, they should be performed by Jews.
In practice at present, in some observant communities burials are conducted on the holidays. Nevertheless, the prevailing custom at large—particularly when burying the dead might lead to the unnecessary violation of the laws of the holidays by some—is to postpone the burial until the following day.

Originally, the observance of the holidays for two days came as a result of doubt: If the first day was actually the holiday, the second day was an ordinary day. Conversely, if the second day was actually the holiday, the first day was an ordinary day. Therefore, they were considered to be two different expressions of holiness. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 12.)

The Ramah ( Orach Chayim 496:2) interprets this as referring to an irritation that does not involve any danger. As such, tending to it by a Jew is forbidden on the first day of a holiday. On the second day, because it brings a person relief from pain, leniency is shown. The same law applies to all other remedies of this nature.

Since they were universally observed, even within Eretz Yisrael.

I.e., all instances of nolad.