Eruvin - Chapter Four

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s wording is not to be understood literally; if people eat in the same room, even if they eat at different tables—indeed, even if they eat their own food—they are not required to establish an eruv. These concepts are also reflected in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:7) and quoted as halachah by the Ramah ( Orach Chayim 370:4).
The most common application of this concept today would be a hotel or a bungalow colony, where many people eat in the same dining room, and yet have their own private rooms or dwellings.

This highlights the principle that it is the place where a person eats, and not where he sleeps, that is most significant in defining his place of residence.

In Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the Rambam states that every household participating in the eruv is required to contribute a loaf of bread. Nevertheless, in this instance, since all the inhabitants of the courtyard are considered to be members of a single household, only one loaf is required.

Although they eat in separate places, joining together in the eruv causes them to be considered as if they share the same table.

I.e., they collected loaves of bread from each household in the courtyard.

The Shem Yosef explains that this latter phrase represents the new concept contributed in this halachah, as opposed to the previous one. Although the eruv was originally collected for the purpose of establishing an eruv with the inhabitants of another courtyard, the collection itself causes the inhabitants to be considered members of a single household.

Although the Rambam uses a singular term, the same law applies to many sons or many students.

The Rambam’s comparison of these individuals to hired workers reflects his interpretation of the expression סרפ ילבקמב in Eruvin 73a. The Ra’avad offers a different interpretation, and his view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 370:5- 6).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent is not that the presence of a guest causes carrying to be forbidden when there are others living in the same courtyard. For as explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, and in Halachah 12 of this chapter, a guest’s presence makes no difference in this context. Rather, the point of the comparison above is to emphasize the intermediate status of these individuals. On one hand, like guests, they are at times considered to be members of the person’s household. On the other hand, since they have their own dwellings and often eat there, there is reason to consider them as having separate households.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who explains that it is sufficient for the partitions to reach within three handbreadths of the ceiling, since, based on the principle of l’vud, when they are that close it is considered as if they reached the ceiling itself. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:3) quotes this ruling.

I.e., they must make an eruv. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and (following the interpretation of Tosafot, Eruvin 72a and Rabbenu Asher) does not require an eruv at all unless they want to join with others living outside the hall in question.
The Shulchan Aruch, however, emphasizes that we are speaking about temporary partitions, either curtains or pieces of wood. If the partitions are permanent, they are considered as having separate dwellings, and an eruv is required.

All these structures have one thing in common—they are not ordinary dwellings where a person will eat his meals on a regular basis.

A Greek structure with two or three walls and a roof with a sky-light.

For these structures are not fit to serve as dwellings. In contrast, were a person to eat continually in a barn, a wood shed, or a shed for straw, these are considered to be dwellings, and an eruv is necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 370:1; see Chapter 1, Halachah 16).

I.e., to get to the inner dwellings, one must pass through the outer ones.

The Mishnah Berurah 370:52 extends this principle and applies it to people renting separate rooms in a single home. If the rooms lead through each other, the inhabitants of the outer rooms do not have to contribute to the eruv

But not the middle house. See the accompanying diagram.

And an eruv that was placed in a gatehouse is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 16.

This reflects a general principle in Torah law. Until a person actually stops breathing, he is considered to be alive. There is no difference in his status regarding any of the Torah’s laws.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

The rationale is that a dwelling without an owner is not considered to be a dwelling (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 371:1; Mishnah Berurah 371:1).

For it is unlikely that a Jew will return to his home on the Sabbath. Moreover, even if he did so, we apply the principle that since carrying was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a more lenient view, which states that if the gentile spends the Sabbath at a place that is more than a day’s journey from home, the inhabitants are allowed to carry, because it is impossible for him to arrive on the Sabbath. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:1).
The Ramah grants a further leniency and permits the inhabitants to carry when the gentile stays in another courtyard in the same city. If the gentile returns to his home on the Sabbath, the Turei Zahav 371:2 permits the inhabitants to continue to carry. The Mishnah Berurah 371:8, by contrast, rules that this is forbidden.

Note the ruling of the Ramah ( Orach Chayim 370:2), which states that this decision applies only when there are no other inhabitants in the courtyard besides the owner and the persons to whom he rented dwellings, or the eruv was brought into the house of the owner.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adds that this applies also when the articles are too heavy to be lifted on the Sabbath.

Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.

Since this metal has not been fashioned into a useful article, it is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath (loc. cit. :6).

See the Be’ur Halachah 312, which explains there are authorities who differ with regard to whether one is permitted to carry an article within a courtyard when an eruv has not been established—if that article had been placed in one of the homes at the commencement of the Sabbath, but was inadvertently taken from the home and placed in the courtyard. Although the Rambam would appear to forbid carrying the article entirely, Rashi (Shabbat 130b) and Tosafot (Eruvin 91b) maintain that it is permitted to carry it within the courtyard.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:3), the Rambam describes a porch as an intermediate level, at least ten handbreadths high, through which stairs lead to the courtyard.

I.e., the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey descend through a stairwell into the courtyard, and from the courtyard they proceed to the public domain.

I.e., unless an eruv is established, the inhabitants of these domains are forbidden to carry within the others’ domains and within the property shared by both.

See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9.

I.e., since the cistern is filled with objects that are forbidden to be carried, it is not given any special importance, and instead is considered like any other large, distinct object in the courtyard.

It is, by nature, fit to be used by the inhabitants of both domains. Therefore, neither is entitled to do so, unless they establish an eruv.

The rationale for these rulings is obvious; the concept is mentioned primarily to show the contrast with the subsequent clauses of the halachah. Unlike the inhabitants of the inner courtyard, who can reach their own dwelling only by passing through the outer courtyard, there is no reason for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.

This ruling reflects the principle stated in Halachah 23, that when people are forbidden to carry within their own domain, they cause carrying to be forbidden in the domain through which they pass. Had the inhabitants of the inner courtyard established an eruv for themselves, they would not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as reflected in the following clause.

Similarly, if the single courtyard belongs to a single individual, or the owners are considered to be members of a single household—e.g., a father and his children, their presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).

For their eruv is still intact and there is no necessity for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.

The eruv is not acceptable for the inner courtyard, because it is not located within the courtyard itself, and it is not acceptable for the outer courtyard, because one of the inhabitants of the courtyard did not participate.

Chapter 2, Halachah 5.

For all the inhabitants of this courtyard have joined together in a single eruv. Although they had desired to join together with the inhabitants of the outer courtyard, the failure for this desire to be fulfilled does not cause them to forfeit their initial advantage as a domain joined by an eruv. (See Eruvin 75b.)

In this instance, the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are forbidden to carry because one of their number has failed to join in the eruv. This in turn causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as explained above.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:10), the Rambam explains that this can refer to members of an extended household—e.g., a father and his children.

Needless to say, to carry from one courtyard to the next, an eruv is necessary.

Our Sages explained that gentiles are less private about the details of their personal dwellings than the Jews. Thus many people will know of the gentile’s presence and the fact that his domain was not rented, but they may not know that only one Jew lives in the outer courtyard. Therefore, they might not realize that this is an exception, and generally, when one courtyard leads to another, an eruv is required (Eruvin 75b). Although when one Jew lives in a courtyard together with a gentile, he is generally not required to rent his domain (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), an exception is made in this instance.
The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 382: 17) mentions this as a singular opinion, and the Mishnah Berurah 382:59 states that it is not shared by most authorities. Some have noted that the Rambam himself uses a plural form of the word “rent,” and they interpret this as referring to an instance where two Jews live in the outer courtyard.

I.e., the inhabitants of the inner courtyard have established two eruvin, one with each of the outer courtyards.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that these two clauses refer to different situations. The first clause refers to a situation in which all three courtyards have entrances to the public domain, while this clause refers to a situation where only the outermost courtyard has an entrance to the public domain, and the inhabitants of this courtyard must pass through it.
Based on the Hagahot Maimoniot, Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the fundamental aspect of this ruling is the interpretation of Rabbi Shimeon’s statements that the inhabitants of the middle courtyard are permitted to carry in either of the outer courtyards (Eruvin 45b, 48b ). Although these statements were made regarding asituation in which only one courtyard opened up to the public domain, one can extrapolate that the same ruling would apply when all three open to the public domain.

See Hilchot Shabbat 15:15, which interprets this law as referring to a balcony with a hole in its floor, from which water is drawn and through which it is poured. The partition need not extend the full distance from the balcony to the water. As long as it extends either ten handbreadths below the balcony or ten handbreadths above the water, drawing water and pouring water through the hole in the balcony are permitted.

ln his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains this as referring to two balconies positioned one on top of the other. Each balcony has a hole in it, and these holes are also aligned one on top of the other.

The Ra’avad states that, based on Eruvin 88a, this ruling would appear to apply only when the two balconies are not directly above each other. The Ra’avad’s position is shared by Rashi and the Rashba, while the Rambam’s interpretation appears to be shared by Rabbenu Chanan’el. Although the Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam’s position, most authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 355:5) follow the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., the Rambam applies the principle stated in Halachah 23—about people passing from one domain to another—to the buckets used to draw water that pass from domain to domain. In this instance, as well, the Ra’avad, Rashi, and others interpret Eruvin (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah, differently, and their interpretation is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. ).

The fact that their buckets pass through the area of the lower domain is of no consequence.

For they have no partition.

Since they both have a share in the partition, they are considered as full partners in a single domain. Hence, it is necessary that they be joined together in an eruv.

I.e., through a hole in the building.

E.g, from a porch to a porch.

As evident from Hilchot Shabbat 15:16-17, this refers to a courtyard larger than four cubits by four cubits. It is forbidden to pour water into a smaller courtyard unless one digs a pit, as reflected in the second clause of this halachah.

The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:11).