In the name of the Lord, the God of the world.
I inherited Your testimonies forever, for they are the joy of my heart.

The third book which is The Book of Times

It contains ten sets of Halachot and this is their order:

The Laws of the Shabbat
The Laws of Eruvin
The Laws of Shevitat Asor
The Laws of Shevitat Yom Tov
The Laws of Chametz U'Matzah
The Laws of Shofar, Sukkah, vLulav
The Laws of Shekalim
The Laws of Kiddush HaChodesh
The Laws of Ta'aniyot
The Laws of Megillah vChanukah

Introduction to Hilchos Shabbos

They contain five mitzvot: two positive commandments and three negative commandments:

1) To rest on the seventh day;
2) Not to perform work on this day;
3) [For the court] not to administer punishment on the Sabbath;
4) Not to proceed beyond the limits [established by the Torah] on the Sabbath;
5) To sanctify the day by taking note [of it].

These mitzvot are explained in the chapters [which follow].

בְּשֵׁם יי אֵל עוֹלָם (בראשית כא לג)
נָחַלְתִּי עֵדְו‍ֹתֶיךָ לְעוֹלָם, כִּי שְׂשׂוֹן לִבִּי הֵמָּה (תהלים קיט קיא)

ספר שלישי והוא ספר זמנים

הלכותיו עשר, וזה הוא סידורן:

הלכות שבת
הלכות עירובין
הלכות שביתת עשור
הלכות שביתת יום טוב
הלכות חמץ ומצה
הלכות שופר וסוכה ולולב
הלכות שקלים
הלכות קידוש החודש
הלכות תעניות
הלכות מגילה וחנוכה

הלכות שבת

יש בכללן חמש מצות: שתי מצות עשה, ושלש מצות לא תעשה. וזהו פרטן:
א) לשבות בשביעי.
ב) שלא לעשות בו מלאכה.
ג) שלא לענוש בשבת.
ד) שלא לצאת חוץ לגבול בשבת.
ה) לקדש את יום השבת בזכירה.
וביאור מצות אלו בפרקים אלו:


Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."

What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for karet; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.


שְׁבִיתָה בַּשְּׁבִיעִי מִמְּלָאכָה מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות לד כא) "וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי תִּשְׁבֹּת". וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה בּוֹ מְלָאכָה בִּטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְעָבַר עַל לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ה יד) "לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל מְלָאכָה". וּמַה הוּא חַיָּב עַל עֲשִׂיַּת מְלָאכָה. אִם עָשָׂה בִּרְצוֹנוֹ בְּזָדוֹן חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה נִסְקָל. וְאִם עָשָׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה חַיָּב קָרְבַּן חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה:

Resting from labor - Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)

The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.

From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)

on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment - Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." - In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah. Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular.

Anyone who performs labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, - Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective.

for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor on it." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly - i.e., without being forced by others

as a conscious act of defiance - and not inadvertently.

The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."

The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.

he is liable for karet - כרת means "cut off." Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.

if witnesses who administer a warning are present - As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed.

he should be stoned [to death]. - See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution.

If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression - accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved

he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature. - The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.


Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1


כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בְּהִלְכוֹת שַׁבָּת שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. וְאִם הָיָה שׁוֹגֵג חַיָּב חַטָּאת:


Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2

In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3 in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."4Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5 is given "stripes for defiance."


וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה פָּטוּר הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִן הַכָּרֵת וּמִן הַסְּקִילָה וּמִן הַקָּרְבָּן אֲבָל אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּשַׁבָּת וְאִסּוּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְהוּא הַרְחָקָה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה. וְהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵין עוֹשִׂין כָּךְ וְכָךְ אוֹ אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ בְּשַׁבָּת הָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת:


Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6 Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7


וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם אוֹ פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם אֵין מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ כְּלָל:

Mishneh Torah (Moznaim)

Featuring a modern English translation and a commentary that presents a digest of the centuries of Torah scholarship which have been devoted to the study of the Mishneh Torah by Maimonides.


It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8 - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9 will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10

What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11 and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12

Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13 Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.


דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים לַעֲשׂוֹתָן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּתָן אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה בִּגְלָלָן מְלָאכָה וְאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה. אִם לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. כֵּיצַד. גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה וְכִסֵּא וְסַפְסָל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַחְפֹּר חָרִיץ בַּקַּרְקַע בִּשְׁעַת גְּרִירָתָן. וּלְפִיכָךְ אִם חָפְרוּ הַקַּרְקַע אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּכָךְ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן. וְכֵן מְהַלֵּךְ אָדָם עַל גַּבֵּי עֲשָׂבִים בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲקֹר אוֹתָן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נֶעֶקְרוּ אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְרוֹחֵץ יָדָיו בַּעֲפַר הַפֵּרוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשִּׁיר הַשֵּׂעָר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נָשַׁר אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְכֵן פִּרְצָה דְּחוּקָה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס בָּהּ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיר צְרוֹרוֹת. וְכֵן כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּן כְּגוֹן זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:


[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14 even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].

What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15 he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.


אֲבָל עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּגְלָלוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁוַּדַּאי תֵּעָשֶׂה בִּשְׁבִיל אוֹתוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ חַיָּב. שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְרֹאשׁ עוֹף לְצַחֵק בּוֹ הַקָּטָן וְחָתַךְ רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹף מְגַמָּתוֹ לַהֲרִיגַת הָעוֹף בִּלְבַד חַיָּב שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּחְתֹּךְ רֹאשׁ הַחַי וְיִחְיֶה אֶלָּא הַמָּוֶת בָּא בִּשְׁבִילוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16

What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17 but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.

Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18 and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.


כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָהּ שֶׁל מְלָאכָה חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁכִּבָּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ לַפְּתִילָה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יֹאבַד אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׂרֵף אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִבָּקַע חֶרֶשׂ שֶׁל נֵר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַכִּבּוּי מְלָאכָה וַהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי וְלֹא כִּבָּה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי הַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַחֶרֶשׂ אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַפְּתִילָה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן הַמַּעֲבִיר אֶת הַקּוֹץ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אוֹ הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהֶן רַבִּים חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי אוֹ לְגוּף הַהַעֲבָרָה אֶלָּא לְהַרְחִיק הַהֶזֵּק הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19

What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.

How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20 and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21 He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.

Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22 For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23 he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.


כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשָׂה לוֹ מְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשֵׂית מַחֲשַׁבְתּוֹ. כֵּיצַד. זָרַק אֶבֶן אוֹ חֵץ בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה כְּדֵי לְהָרְגָן וְהָלַךְ וְעָקַר אִילָן בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ וְלֹא הָרַג הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. הֲרֵי זֶה קַל וָחֹמֶר אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאִסּוּר קַל וְנַעֲשָׂה אִסּוּר חָמוּר. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִזְרֹק בְּכַרְמְלִית וְעָבְרָה הָאֶבֶן לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. נִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר וְעָשָׂה דָּבָר אַחֵר כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַחְתֹּךְ אֶת הַתָּלוּשׁ וְחָתַךְ אֶת הַמְחֻבָּר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


Should a person intend24 to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25 - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26 He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.


נִתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת וְלִקֵּט לְבָנוֹת אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ עֲנָבִים וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְלִקֵּט הָעֲנָבִים בַּתְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ תְּאֵנִים פָּטוּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלִּקֵּט כָּל מַה שֶּׁחָשַׁב הוֹאִיל וְלֹא לִקֵּט כַּסֵּדֶר שֶׁחָשַׁב פָּטוּר שֶׁבְּלֹא כַּוָּנָה עָשָׂה שֶׁלֹּא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא מְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת:


When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27 for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28

To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29 and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.


הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי נֵרוֹת דּוֹלְקוֹת אוֹ כְּבוּיוֹת נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת זוֹ וְכִבָּה אֶת זוֹ לְהַדְלִיק זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק אֶת זוֹ חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי עָשָׂה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הָא לְמָה הוּא דּוֹמֶה לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנָה זוֹ וְלִקֵּט תְּאֵנָה אַחֶרֶת. אוֹ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי נַעֲשֵׂית מְלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ:


One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31

If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32 The same applies in other similar circumstances.

Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33


אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַדְלִיק רִאשׁוֹנָה וּלְכַבּוֹת שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְכִבָּה רִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִדְלִיק שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ פָּטוּר. כִּבָּה זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק זוֹ בִּנְשִׁימָה אַחַת חַיָּב. שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִקְדִּים הַהַדְלָקָה הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא אִחֵר אוֹתָהּ אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּיהֶן כְּאַחַת וּלְפִיכָךְ חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּמִתְעַסֵּק וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר:


Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34 If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35

What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.


כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בְּיוֹתֵר עַל כַּוָּנָתוֹ חַיָּב. בְּפָחוֹת מִכַּוָּנָתוֹ פָּטוּר. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא מַשָּׂא לְאַחֲרָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְפָנָיו חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לִשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית שְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה. אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא לְפָנָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְאַחֲרָיו פָּטוּר שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה וְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36 and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37


הָיָה חָגוּר בְּסִנָּר וְהִשְׁלִיךְ הַמַּשָּׂא בֵּין בְּשָׂרוֹ וַחֲלוּקוֹ בֵּין שֶׁבָּא זֶה הַמַּשָּׂא שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֹּאת לְפָנָיו בֵּין שֶׁבָּא לְאַחֲרָיו חַיָּב שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכּוֹ לִהְיוֹת חוֹזֵר:


Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38 he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39

For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40

Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41 Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.


כָּל הַמִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת וְהִתְחִיל בָּהּ וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר חַיָּב. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁלִים כָּל הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשְׁלִימָהּ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִכְתֹּב אִגֶּרֶת אוֹ שְׁטָר בְּשַׁבָּת אֵין אוֹמְרִים לֹא יִתְחַיֵּב זֶה עַד שֶׁיַּשְׁלִים חֶפְצוֹ וְיִכְתֹּב כָּל הַשְּׁטָר אוֹ כָּל הָאִגֶּרֶת אֶלָּא מִשֶּׁיִּכְתֹּב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת חַיָּב. וְכֵן אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱרֹג בֶּגֶד שָׁלֵם מִשֶּׁיֶאֱרֹג שְׁנֵי חוּטִין חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהַשְׁלִים הַבֶּגֶד הוֹאִיל וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר בְּכַוָּנָה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42 they are [both] free of liability.43

This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.


כָּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁהַיָּחִיד יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנַיִם בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת בֵּין שֶׁעָשָׂה זֶה מִקְצָתָהּ וְזֶה מִקְצָתָהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקַר זֶה הַחֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ וְהִנִּיחוֹ הַשֵּׁנִי בִּרְשׁוּת אַחֶרֶת בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָחֲזוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּקֻלְמוֹס וְכָתְבוּ אוֹ אָחֲזוּ כִּכָּר וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין:


When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44 For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45 and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.

[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46 The same applies in other similar situations.


וְאִם אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ כְּגוֹן שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ קוֹרָה וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים הוֹאִיל וְאֵין כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּבִין וְשִׁעוּר אֶחָד לִשְׁנֵיהֶן. הָיָה כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד לְהוֹצִיא קוֹרָה זוֹ לְבַדּוֹ וְהַשֵּׁנִי אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְנִשְׁתַּתְּפוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ. זֶה הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁיָּכוֹל חַיָּב וְהַשֵּׁנִי מְסַיֵּעַ הוּא וּמְסַיֵּעַ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:


Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47 What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48 one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.

A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49 Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.


כָּל הַמְקַלְקְלִין פְּטוּרִין. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁחָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה וְכֵן אִם קָרַע בְּגָדִים אוֹ שְׂרָפָן אוֹ שָׁבַר כֵּלִים דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. חָפַר גּוּמָא וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ אֶלָּא לַעֲפָרָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה מְקַלְקֵל וּפָטוּר. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה הוֹאִיל וְכַוָּנָתוֹ לְקַלְקֵל פָּטוּר:


Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50 For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51 one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.

The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52


כָּל הַמְקַלְקֵל עַל מְנָת לְתַקֵּן חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁסָּתַר כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בִּמְקוֹמוֹ אוֹ שֶׁמָּחַק כְּדֵי לִכְתֹּב בַּמָּקוֹם שֶׁמָּחַק אוֹ שֶׁחָפַר גּוּמָא כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בְּתוֹכָהּ יְסוֹדוֹת וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה חַיָּב. וְשִׁעוּרָן כְּשִׁעוּר הַמְתַקֵּן:


Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53 he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.

One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54 Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55 when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.


כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת מִקְצָתָהּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג וּמִקְצָתָהּ בְּזָדוֹן בֵּין שֶׁהֵזִיד וּלְבַסּוֹף שָׁגַג בֵּין שֶׁשָּׁגַג וּלְבַסּוֹף הֵזִיד פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר הַמְּלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף בְּזָדוֹן וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם יִהְיֶה בְּעֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. אוֹ שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר מְלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ בִּשְׁגָגָה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה: