Avodat Kochavim - Chapter Five

Avodat HaMelech explains that this decision — in contrast to the law governing the punishment of those who proselytize an עיר הנדחת (see Chapter 4, Halachah 6, note 27) is based on Deuteronomy 13:11: “Because he tried to sway you away from God, your Lord.”

The first half of the passage quoted above deals with a prophet who proselytizes on behalf of false gods; the second half, with a common person who does so. Though the Torah mentions execution by stoning only in the second instance, through a process of Biblical exegesis, Sanhedrin 67a, 89b, derives that the same punishment is also given to a prophet.

If, however, the message is addressed to the majority of the inhabitants of a city, different rules apply, as the Rambam mentions in the previous chapter and in the following halachah.

He is governed by different laws, as explained in the previous chapter.

This is the punishment given to a person who leads the inhabitants of an עיר הנדחת astray, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 6. Since the prophet desires to lead the majority of the population astray, he is stoned only when he is successful in his intent. If he is not successful, he is executed by strangulation as a false prophet (Ben Yedid).

Thus, they are executed by stoning rather than decapitation, and their estates are given to their heirs rather than destroyed.

Note the contrast with regard to the laws applying to a madiach, as explained in Chapter 4, Halachah 5.

The phrase “Follow me” is added on the basis of the Commentary of the Kessef Mishneh, who notes that the mesit must direct his statements to the musat to be held liable.

A mesit is executed only for persuading a person to serve a false deity in a manner which would obligate the person who listens to be executed. A person is executed for serving a false deity through its accepted mode of service, as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, or serving it with one of the four services performed on God’s behalf.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

Generally, a person must be warned before he is punished for committing a transgression. In this instance, however, Sanhedrin 88b states that an exception is made and no warning is required. (See Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5.)

The testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to convict a transgressor. Hence, the musat must seek to have the mesit repeat his statements in the presence of others.

Here, we see an instance of retribution being meted out “measure for measure.” Since the mesit tried to lure his colleagues to sin, he is also lured into transgression (Kin’at Eliyahu).

One might ask: Why must two witnesses be hidden? On the surface, it would appear sufficient to hide a single witness and then he and the musat could testify against the mesit. This question can be resolved on the basis of the Rambam’s statements (Hilchot Edut 4:1) that, in capital cases, the two witnesses must see each other. Since the witness must be hidden so that the mesit will not see him, it is possible that the musat will also not be able to see him (Pri Chadash).

See Tosafot, Sanhedrin 8b, which explains that although a mesit is not given a complete warning as are other transgressors, the seriousness of the transgression he is committing must in some way be brought to his attention. The statement “How can we forsake...” serves this purpose. Accordingly, if the mesit does not repeat his statements after receiving this warning, he is not liable for execution.

Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1 relates that execution by stoning involves pushing the condemned from a two-storey height and then throwing heavy stones upon him. Thus, the musat should push the mesit and “throw the first stone.” If this is not sufficient to kill the mesit, others should join in throwing stones.

Avodat HaMelech questions why, both in this halachah and in Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam singles out the musat. Although these prohibitions apply to him, seemingly they also apply to all Jews.

See Hilchot Rotzeach 13:14, which explains that the “enemy” referred to in the above verse is “a sinner who violates a transgression after receiving a warning.” Thus, although we must show kindness to transgressors, the mesit is not granted such consideration.

See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5, which states that, in contrast to the general rule, once a mesit is convicted, the court should not listen to any arguments on his behalf.

Hilchot Sanhedrin (ibid.) states that even after a mesit has been vindicated, the case may be reopened if incriminating testimony is found against him.

The Kessef Mishneh and others explain the Rambam’s statements: There are two types of mesitim: a prophet and a commoner. The warning against a prophet proselytizing on behalf of false gods is the same as that for authoring any other false prophecy. (See Halachah 6.) Thus, only the source of the warning against a common person is a matter of question.

The musatim’s statements, and even those of the mesit, are considered to have been made facetiously. Since he is a human being, it is presumed that neither he nor they were serious about worshiping him (Sanhedrin 61b).

See Halachot 1 and 2.

Since the Rambam mentioned a prophet who proselytizes on behalf of a false god, he continues discussing a related issue, “a person who prophesies in the name of false gods.”

Note the contrast to a mesit, who does not require a proper warning, as mentioned in Halachah 3.

This is the same punishment given to a false prophet, as mentioned in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:1 and in the following halachah. In contrast, a “prophet” who proselytizes on behalf of false gods receives a more severe form of execution — stoning — as mentioned in Halachah 2.

The passage in Deuteronomy, Chapter 18, which mentions such false prophecy obviously deems it an undesirable activity. There is, however, no explicit verse in that passage forbidding it. The Mechilta D’Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai associates the prohibition with the verse in Exodus. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 26) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 517) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 28) mentions this as part of the Torah prohibition cited below.

In contrast, as the Rambam explains in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:7, 10:1, a person who prophesies in the name of God is asked to verify the authenticity of his prophecy by performing wonders — e.g., predicting future events.

Since this sign or wonder comes to contradict the prophecy of Moses, we can assume that it was performed through sorcery or black magic (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 8:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 456) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. (Note the Ramban’s Hasagot, where he contests this point.)

The Rambam also mentions the concept of a false prophet in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 7-10. The distinction between his statements there and those made in these halachot shed light on the careful structure which characterizes the Mishneh Torah.

Note Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:1, which explains that were a prophet to add to or diminish the mitzvot in any way, he would be automatically considered to be a false prophet.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 27) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 516) consider the prohibition against false prophecy to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:1,4, which describe “the paths of prophecy”: Prophecy is bestowed only upon a very wise sage of strong character... When he enters the Pardes and is drawn into these great and sublime concepts, if he possesses a correct perspective to comprehend and grasp [them], he will become holy. He will advance and separate himself from the masses, who proceed in the darkness of the time. He must continue and diligently train himself not to have any thoughts whatsoever about fruitless things or the vanities and intrigues of the times... [Those aspiring to prophecy] must concentrate their attention [upon spiritual concepts] and seclude themselves, [waiting] in a happy, joyous mood, because prophecy cannot rest upon a person when he is sad or languid, but only when he is happy.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 29) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 518) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This refers to the supreme Sanhedrin, which held court on the Temple Mount. In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 10, the Rambam elaborates on the process of testing the authenticity of a prophet and how a person’s prophecy can be established as false.

In particular, the Rambam discusses the difference between an oath (שבועה) and a vow (נדר) in the respective halachot in Sefer Hafla’ah. In general, the distinction is that the obligation brought about by an oath centers primarily on the person who accepts the obligation, while that incurred by a vow has a greater connection to the object of the vow.

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 7), which mentions the se verity of taking an oath by anything other than God, explaining that taking such an oath will cause a person’s existence to be obliterated.

The punishment for this transgression by lashes is questioned by the commentaries because it involves speech and not a deed and generally punishment for the violation of a prohibition is given only when a deed is involved. Nevertheless, in this instance, taking a vow or oath is considered as a deed.

The citation of this proof-text sheds light on the reason why this prohibition is mentioned here. As mentioned in Halachah 6, this verse also serves as the proof-text for the prohibition against prophesying in the name of a false deity. Hence, it is appropriate that this prohibition be mentioned after the discussion of false prophecy is concluded.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 14) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 87) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 147:3), which states that the mention of the names of these false deities is forbidden “whether it is necessary or unnecessary to mention them.” This implies that the prohibition applies even when a Jew would suffer a loss should he not mention them, and conversely, even when his mention of them is totally casual, without any apparent purpose.

In the previous halachah, the Rambam mentioned the prohibition against making a gentile take an oath on his false deity. In this halachah, he states that it is forbidden to enter into situations which might lead to this. Among the examples given for the latter prohibition is entering into a partnership with a gentile. Since, ultimately, a dispute between the partners that requires taking an oath might crop up, it is forbidden to enter into such an arrangement from the outset (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 156:1, Yoreh De’ah 147:2).